Parties: Kilbourn v. Thompson
Date: 1880-10-00
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - In the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts of 1780, adopted during the war of the Revolution, the twenty-first article of the Bill of Rights embodies the principle in the following language: 'The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either House of the legislature is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action, or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - 'The next great and vital privilege is the freedom of speech and debate, without which all other privileges would be comparatively unimportant or ineffectual.
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Parties: Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn
Date: 1885-05-04
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Parties: VIRGIL D. "GUS" REICHLE, JR., et al., Petitioners v. STEVEN HOWARDS
Date: 2012-06-04
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Parties: DIANNE KNOX, et al., Petitioners v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1000
Date: 2012-06-21
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Parties: FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Petitioners v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al.FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Petitioners v. ABC, INC., et al.
Date: 2012-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so [***25] that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.
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Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. XAVIER ALVAREZ
Date: 2012-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N252* The theory of our Constitution is "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market," Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like, and for good reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of the state but from the inalienable rights of the person. And suppression of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less so. Society has the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse. These ends are not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate public discussion through content-based mandates.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - This radical interpretation of the First Amendment is not supported by any precedent of this Court. The lies covered by the Stolen Valor Act have no intrinsic value and thus merit no First Amendment protection unless their prohibition would chill other expression that falls within the Amendment's scope.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace. Though few might find respondent's statements anything but contemptible, his right to make those statements is protected by the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - Time and again, this Court has recognized that as a general matter false factual statements possess no intrinsic First Amendment value. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 123 S. Ct. 1829, 155 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2003) N288* ("Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected speech")
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - While we have repeatedly endorsed the principle that false statements of fact do not merit First Amendment protection for their own sake, we have recognized that it is sometimes necessary to N289* "exten[d] a measure of strategic protection" to these statements in order to ensure sufficient " N290* 'breathing space' " for protected speech. Gertz, 418 U.S., at 342, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963)). Thus, in order to prevent [***71] the chilling of truthful speech on matters of public concern, we have [**608] held that liability for the defamation of a public official or figure requires proof that defamatory statements were made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.
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Parties: HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL, Petitioner v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al.
Date: 2012-01-11
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Parties: LAWRENCE GOLAN, et al. v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
Date: 2012-01-18
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Parties: AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, et al., Petitioners v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.
Date: 2013-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - At the same time, however, we have held that [**LEdHR9] [9] the Government N291* "'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally [**408] protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.'" Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 164 L. Ed. 2d 156 (quoting American Library Assn., supra, at 210, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 156 L. Ed. 2d 221). In some cases, a funding condition can result in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights.
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Parties: ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER, Petitioner v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN et al.
Date: 2013-06-24
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Parties: GIRIDHAR C. SEKHAR, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
Date: 2013-06-26
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Parties: Davis v. Beason
Date: 1890-02-03
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Parties: SHAUN McCUTCHEON, et al., Appellants v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Date: 2014-04-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - Buckley acknowledged that aggregate limits at least diminish an individual's right of political association. As the Court explained, the N228* "overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support."
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - The remaining justifications Buckley provided are also flawed. For example, Buckley claimed that contribution limits entail only a "marginal" speech restriction because N292* "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." 424 U.S., at 20, 21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. But this Court has never required a speaker to explain the reasons for his position in order to obtain full First Amendment protection. Instead, we have consistently held that speech is protected even N293* "when the underlying basis for a position is not given."
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Parties: OCTANE FITNESS, LLC, Petitioner v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
Date: 2014-04-29
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Parties: TOWN OF GREECE, NEW YORK, Petitioner v. SUSAN GALLOWAY et al.
Date: 2014-05-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - But their purpose is largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a tradition dating to the time of the Framers. For members of town boards and commissions, who often serve part-time and as volunteers, ceremonial prayer may also reflect the values they hold as private citizens. The prayer is an opportunity for them to show who and what they are without denying the right to dissent by those who disagree.
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Parties: TIM WOOD AND ROB SAVAGE, Petitioners v. MICHAEL MOSS et al.
Date: 2014-05-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - It is uncontested and uncontestable that [**LEdHR4] [4] government officials may not exclude from public places persons engaged in peaceful expressive activity solely because the government [***19] actor fears, dislikes, or disagrees with the views those persons express. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). It is equally plain that [**LEdHR5] [5] the fundamental right to speak secured by the First Amendment does not leave people at liberty to publicize their views N131* "'whenever and however and wherever they please.'"
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Parties: SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, et al., Petitioners v. STEVEN DRIEHAUS et al.
Date: 2014-06-16
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Parties: EDWARD R. LANE, Petitioner v. STEVE FRANKS, in his individual capacity, and SUSAN BURROW, in her official capacity as ACTING PRESIDENT OF CENTRAL ALABAMA COMMUNITY COLLEGE
Date: 2014-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - There is considerable value, moreover, in encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees. For N132* "[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work." Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661, 674, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion). The interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it." San Diego v. Roe,
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Parties: ELEANOR McCULLEN, et al., Petitioners v. MARTHA COAKLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, et al.
Date: 2014-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - As the Court of Appeals saw it, the Constitution does not accord "special protection" to close conversations or "handbilling." 571 F. 3d, at 180. But while the First Amendment does not guarantee a speaker the right to any particular form of expression, some forms--such as normal conversation and leafletting on a public sidewalk--have historically been more closely associated with the transmission of ideas than others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - But petitioners do not claim a right to trespass on the clinics' property. They instead claim a right to stand on the public sidewalks by the driveway as cars turn into the parking lot. Before the buffer zones, they could do so. Now they must stand a substantial distance away. The Act alone is responsible for that restriction on their ability to convey their message.
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Segment in Paragraph: 115 - The provision at issue here was indisputably meant to serve the same interest in protecting citizens' supposed right to avoid speech that they [**532] would [***69] rather not hear. For that reason, we granted a second question for review in this case
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - Even though the Act is content neutral, it still must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest." Ward, 491 U. S., at 796, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (internal quotation marks omitted). The tailoring requirement does not simply guard against an impermissible desire to censor. The government may attempt to suppress speech not only because it disagrees with the message being expressed, but also for mere convenience. Where certain speech is associated with particular problems, silencing the speech is sometimes the path of least resistance. But by demanding a close fit between ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents the government from too readily N62* "sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency."
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Segment in Paragraph: 124 - Going from bad to worse, the majority's opinion contends that "the record before us contains insufficient evidence to show" that abortion-facility escorts have actually spoken in favor of abortion (or, presumably, hindered antiabortion speech) while acting within the scope of their employment. Ante, at ___, 189 L. Ed. 2d, at 519. Here is a brave new First Amendment test: Speech restrictions favoring one viewpoint over another are not content based unless it can be shown that the favored viewpoint has actually been expressed. A city ordinance closing a park adjoining the Republican National Convention to all speakers except those whose remarks have been approved by the Republican National Committee is thus not subject to strict scrutiny unless it can be shown that someone has given committee-endorsed remarks. For this Court to suggest such a test is astonishing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - N294* "[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions N295* 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.'"
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Parties: PAMELA HARRIS, et al., Petitioners v. PAT QUINN, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, et al.
Date: 2014-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - In Knox, we considered specific features of an agency-shop agreement--allowing a union to impose upon nonmembers a special assessment or dues increase without providing notice and without obtaining the nonmembers' affirmative agreement--and we held that these features could not even satisfy the standard employed in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U. S. 405, 415, 121 S. Ct. 2334, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2001), where we struck down a provision that compelled the subsidization of commercial speech. We did not suggest, however, that the compelled [**654] speech in Knox was like the commercial speech in United Foods. On the contrary, we observed that N63* "[t]he subject of the speech at issue [in United Foods]--promoting the sale of mushrooms--was not one that is likely to stir the passions [***55] of many, but the mundane commercial nature of that speech only highlights the importance of our analysis and our holding."
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - Our precedents define commercial speech as N64* "speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 137 - The Court struck the appropriate balance by drawing a line, corresponding to Pickering's, between fees for collective bargaining and those for political activities. On the one side, Abood decided, speech within the employment relationship about pay and working conditions pertains mostly to private concerns and implicates the government's interests as employer; thus, the government could compel fair-share fees for collective bargaining. On the other side, speech in political campaigns relates to matters of public concern and has no bearing on the government's interest in structuring its workforce; thus, compelled fees for those activities are forbidden. In that way, the law surrounding fair-share provisions coheres with the law relating to public employees' speech [***100] generally. Or, said otherwise, an anomaly in the government's regulation of its workforce would arise in Abood's absence: Public employers could then pursue all policies, except this single one, reasonably designed to manage personnel and enhance the effectiveness of their programs.
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Segment in Paragraph: 140 - Our decisions (tracing from Pickering as well as Abood) teach that internal workplace speech about public employees' wages, benefits, and such--that is, the prosaic stuff of collective bargaining--does not become speech of "public concern" just because those employment terms may have broader consequence. To the contrary, we have made clear that except in narrow circumstances we will not allow an employee to make a N65* "federal constitutional issue" out of basic "employment matters, including working conditions, pay, discipline, promotions, leave, vacations, and terminations." Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U. S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2496, 180 L. Ed. 2d 408, 423 (2011) ); see Umbehr, 518 U. S., at 675, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 135 L. Ed. 2d 843 (public employees' "speech on merely private employment matters is unprotected"). Indeed, even [***102] Abood's original detractors conceded that an employee's interest in expressing views, within the workplace context, about N66* "narrowly defined economic issues [like] salaries and pension benefits" is "relatively insignificant" and "weak."
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Parties: SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Petitioners (No. 13-354) v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., et al. CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORPORATION et al., Petitioners (No. 13-356) v. SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.
Date: 2014-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 160 - It means, too, the right to express [***93] those beliefs and to establish one's religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.
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Parties: AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION, Petitioner v. WILLIAM L. HOEPER
Date: 2014-01-27
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Parties: LANELL WILLIAMS-YULEE, Petitioner v. THE FLORIDA BAR
Date: 2015-04-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The First Amendment provides that Congress "shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." The Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable to the States. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931). The parties agree that Canon 7C(1) restricts Yulee's speech on the basis of its content by prohibiting her from soliciting contributions to her election campaign.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The "closely drawn" standard is a poor fit for this case. The Court adopted [***18] that test in Buckley to address a claim that campaign contribution limits violated a contributor's "freedom of political association." Id., at 24-25, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. Here, Yulee does not claim that Canon 7C(1) violates her right to free association; she argues that it violates her right to free speech. And the Florida Bar can hardly dispute that the Canon infringes Yulee's freedom to discuss candidates and public issues--namely, herself and her qualifications to be a judge. The Bar's call to import the "closely drawn" test from the contribution limit context into a case about solicitation therefore has little avail.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - First Amendment protections are both personal and structural. Free speech begins with the right of each person to think and then to express his or her own ideas. Protecting this personal sphere of intellect and conscience, in turn, creates structural safeguards for many of the processes that define a free society. The individual speech here is political speech. The process is a fair election. These realms ought to be the last place, not the first, for the Court to allow unprecedented content-based restrictions on speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to speak in support of their campaigns. States have a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their judiciaries. When the State adopts a narrowly tailored restriction like the one at issue here, those principles do not conflict. A State's decision to elect judges does not compel it to compromise public confidence in their integrity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - The First Amendment consequences of the Court's ruling do not end with its denial of the individual's right to speak. For the very purpose of the candidate's fundraising was to facilitate a larger speech process: an election campaign. By cutting off one candidate's personal freedom to speak, the broader campaign debate that might have followed--a debate that might have been informed by new ideas and insights [***69] from both candidates--now is silenced.
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Segment in Paragraph: 108 - But once the people of a State choose to have elections, the First Amendment protects the candidate's right to speak and the public's ensuing right to open and robust debate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The Court adopted [***18] that test in Buckley to address a claim that campaign contribution limits violated a contributor's "freedom of political association." Id., at 24-25, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. Here, Yulee does not claim that Canon 7C(1) violates her right to free association; she argues that it violates her right to free speech. And the Florida Bar can hardly dispute that the Canon infringes Yulee's freedom to discuss candidates and public issues--namely, herself and her qualifications to be a judge. The Bar's call to import the "closely drawn" test from the contribution limit context into a case about solicitation therefore has little avail.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - A State may [***19] restrict the speech of a judicial candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - The first axiom of the First Amendment is this: As a general rule, the state has no power to ban speech on the basis of its content. One need not equate judges with politicians to see that this principle does not grow weaker merely because the censored speech is a judicial candidate's request [***47] for a campaign contribution. Our cases hold that speech enjoys the full protection of the First Amendment unless a widespread and longstanding tradition ratifies its regulation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 107 - Elections are a paradigmatic forum for speech. Though present day campaign rhetoric all too often might thwart or obscure deliberative discourse, the idea of elections is that voters can engage in, or at least consider, a principled debate. That debate can be a means to find consensus for a civic course that is prudent and wise. This pertains both to issues and to the choice of elected officials. The First Amendment seeks to make the idea of discussion, open debate, and consensus-building a reality.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - A reader of Justice Kennedy's dissent could be forgiven for concluding that the Court has just upheld a latter-day version of the Alien and Sedition Acts, approving "state censorship" that "locks the First Amendment out," imposes a "gag" on candidates, and inflicts "dead weight" on a "silenced" public debate. Post, at ___ - ___, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 603-604. But in reality, Canon 7C(1) leaves judicial candidates free to discuss any issue with any person at any time. Candidates can write letters, give speeches, and put up billboards. They can contact potential supporters in person, on the phone, or online. They can promote their campaigns on radio, television, or other media. They cannot say, "Please give me money." They can, however, direct their campaign [***32] committees to do so. Whatever else may be said of the Canon, it is surely not a "wildly disproportionate restriction upon speech."
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Parties: ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
Date: 2015-06-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 152 - Although the Federal Government apparently did not get into the business of regulating threats until 1917, the States have been doing so since the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See, e.g., 1795 N. J. Laws p. 108; Ill. Rev. Code of Laws, Crim. Code §108 (1827) (1827 Ill. Crim. Code); 1832 Fla. Laws pp. 68-69. And that practice continued even after the States amended their constitutions to include speech protections similar to [**30] those in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Fla. Const., Art. I, §5 (1838); Ill. Const., Art. VIII, §22 (1818), Mich. Const., Art. I, §7 (1835); N. J. Const., Art. I, §5 (1844); J. Hood, Index of Colonial and State Laws of New Jersey 1203, 1235, 1257, 1265 (1905); 1 Ill. Stat., ch. 30, div. 9, §31 (3d ed. 1873). State practice thus provides at least some evidence of the original meaning of the phrase "freedom of speech" in the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 155 - In short, there is good reason to believe that States bound by their own Constitutions to protect freedom of speech long ago enacted general-intent threat statutes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 122 - Threats of violence and intimidation are among the most favored weapons of domestic abusers, and the rise of social media has only made those tactics more commonplace. See Brief for The National Network to End [***38] Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 4-16. A fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such hurtful, valueless threats into protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 122 - A fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such hurtful, valueless threats into protected speech.
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Parties: JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, et al., Petitioners v. FAUZIA DIN
Date: 2015-06-15
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Parties: CLYDE REED, et al., Petitioners v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.
Date: 2015-06-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws "abridging the freedom of speech." U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal government vested with state authority, "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). Content-based laws--those that target speech based on its communicative content--are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - a speech regulation is content based if the law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. Supra, at ___, 192 L. Ed. 2d, at 245. A regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less content based than a regulation that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea. Here, the [***26] Code singles out signs bearing a particular message: the time and location of a specific event. This type of ordinance may seem like a perfectly rational way to regulate signs, but [**LEdHR9] [9] a clear and firm rule governing content neutrality is an essential means of protecting the freedom of speech, even if laws that might seem "entirely reasonable" will sometimes be "struck down because of their content-based nature."
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - Nonetheless, in these latter instances to use the presence [***35] of content discrimination automatically to trigger strict scrutiny and thereby call into play a strong presumption against constitutionality goes too far. That is because virtually all government activities involve speech, many of which involve the regulation of speech. Regulatory programs almost always require content discrimination. And to hold that such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory activity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The Court has said, for example, that we should apply less strict standards to "commercial speech." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-563, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980). But I have great concern that many justifiable instances of "content-based" regulation are noncommercial. And, worse than that, the Court has applied the heightened "strict scrutiny" standard even in cases where the less stringent "commercial speech" standard was [***37] appropriate. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., [**255] 564 U. S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667, 180 L. Ed. 2d 544, 559 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court has also said that "government speech" escapes First Amendment strictures. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 193-194, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1991). But regulated speech is typically private speech, not government speech. Further, the Court has said that, N67* "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists."
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Parties: JOHN WALKER, III, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES BOARD, et al., Petitioners v. TEXAS DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC., et al.
Date: 2015-06-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - We have therefore refused N143* "[t]o hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily [***12] discourages alternative goals." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1991). We have pointed out that a contrary holding "would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect." Ibid. Cf. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13, 110 S. Ct. 2228, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990) N144* ("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited [**282] to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed"). And we have made clear that N145* "the government can speak for itself."
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N68* When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-468, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 172 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2009). That freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2000). Thus, government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - The Court's decision passes off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. Under our First Amendment cases, the distinction between government speech and private speech is critical. The First Amendment N69* "does not regulate government speech," and therefore when government speaks, it is free "to select the views that it wants to express." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-468, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 172 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2009). By contrast, "[i]n the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995).
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - Texas has space available on millions of little mobile billboards. And Texas, in effect, sells that space to those who wish to use it to express a personal message--provided only that the message does not express a viewpoint that the State finds unacceptable. That is not government speech; it is the regulation of private speech. III
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - Messages that are proposed by private parties and placed on Texas specialty plates are private speech, not government speech. Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint. That is what it did here. Because the Court approves this violation of the First Amendment, I respectfully dissent.
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Parties: CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, Petitioner v. NARANJIBHAI PATEL, et al.
Date: 2015-06-22
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Parties: JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., Petitioners (No. 14-556) v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.VALERIA TANCO, et al., Petitioners (No. 14-562) v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, et al.APRIL DeBOER, et al., Petitioners (No. 14-571) v. RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et al.GREGORY BOURKE, et al., Petitioners (No. 14-574) v. STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY
Date: 2015-06-26
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Parties: In re Rapier
Date: 1892-02-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, it was held that the power vested in congress to establish post-offices and postroads embraced the regulation of the entire postal system of the country, and that under it congress may designate what may be carried in the mail and what excluded; that in excluding various articles from the mails the object of congress is not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other rights of the people, but to refuse the facitities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious by congress to the public morals; and that the transportation in any other way of matters excluded from the mails would not be forbidden.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The freedom of communication is not abridged, within the intent and meaning of the constitutional provision, unless congress is absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not be carried in the mails, and compelled arbitrarily to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment through the governmental agencies which it controls.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - We cannot regard the right to operate a lottery as a fundamental right infringed by the legislation in question; nor are we able to see that congress can be held, in its enactment, to have abridged the freedom of the press. The circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people. The freedom of communication is not abridged, within the intent and meaning of the constitutional provision, unless congress is absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not be carried in the mails,
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Parties: Robertson v. Baldwin
Date: 1897-01-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - the freedom of speech and of the press (article 1) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation;
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Parties: Kepner v. United States
Date: 1904-05-31
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Parties: Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.
Date: 1911-05-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act in concert when the signal is published gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We Don't Patronize,' or similar expressions, a force not inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such circumstances they become what have been called 'verbal acts,' and as much subject to injunction as the use of any other force whereby property is unlawfully damaged.
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Parties: Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan
Date: 1913-06-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Was the provision intended simply to supplement the existing legislation relative to second class mail matter or was it enacted as an exertion of legislative power to regulate the press, to curtail its freedom, and under the assumption that there was a right to compel obedience to the command of legislation having that object in view, to deprive one who refused to obey of all right to use the mail service? When the question is thus defined its solution is free from difficulty, since by its terms the provision only regulates second class mail, and the exclusion from the mails for which it provides is not an exclusion from the mails generally, but only from the right to [**873] participate in and enjoy the privileges accorded by the second class classification.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - We come then to determine whether the provision as thus construed is valid. That Congress in exerting its power concerning the mails has the comprehensive right to classify which it has exerted from the beginning and therefore may exercise its discretion for the purpose of furthering the public welfare as it understands it, we think it too clear for anything but statement; the exertion of the power of course, at all times and under all conditions being subject to the express or necessarily implied limitations of the Constitution. From this it results that it was and is in the power of Congress in "the interest of the dissemination of current intelligence" to so legislate as to the mails, by classification or otherwise, as to favor the widespread circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc., even although the legislation on the subject, when considered intrinsically, apparently seriously discriminates against the public and in favor of newspapers, periodicals, etc., and their publishers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - We repeat that in considering this subject we are concerned not with any general regulation of what should be published in newspapers, not with any condition excluding from the right to resort to the mails, but we are concerned solely and exclusively with the right on behalf of the publishers to continue to enjoy great privileges and advantages at the public expense, a right given to them by Congress upon condition of compliance with regulations deemed by that body incidental and necessary to the complete fruition of the [**876] public policy lying at the foundation of the privileges accorded.
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Parties: Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Com. of Ohio
Date: 1915-02-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - The next contention is that the statute violates the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution. In its discussion counsel have gone into a very elaborate description of moving picture exhibitions and their many useful purposes as graphic expressions of opinion and sentiments, as exponents of policies, as teachers of science and history, as useful, interesting, amusing, educational, and moral. And a list of the 'campaigns,' as counsel call them, which may be carried on, is given. We may concede the praise. It is not questioned by the Ohio statute, and under its comprehensive description, 'campaigns' of an infinite variety may be conducted. Films of a 'moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and approved,' are the words of the statute. No exhibition, therefore, or 'campaign' of complainant will be prevented if its pictures have those qualities. Therefore, however missionary of opinion films are or may become, however educational or entertaining, there is no impediment to their value or effect in the Ohio statute. But they may be used for evil, and against that possibility the statute was enacted. Their power of amusement, and, it may be, education, the audiences they assemble, not of women alone nor of men alone, but together, not of adults only, but of children, make them the more insidious in corruption by a pretense of worthy purpose or if they should degenerate from worthy purpose. Indeed, we may go beyond that possibility. They take their attraction from the general interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a prurient interest may be excited and appealed to. Besides, there are some things which should not have pictorial representation in public places and to all audiences. And not only the state of Ohio, but other states, have considered it to be in the interest of the public morals and welfare to supervise moving picture exhibitions. We would have to shut our eyes to the facts of the world to regard the precaution unreasonable or the legislation to effect it a mere wanton interference with personal liberty.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - In other words, as we have seen, the Constitution of Ohio is invoked, and an exhibition of films is assimilated to the freedom of speech, writing, and publication assured by that instrument, and for the abuse of which only is there responsibility, and, it is insisted, that as no law may be passed 'to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press,' no law may be passed to subject moving pictures to censorship before their exhibition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - We need not pause to dilate upon the freedom of opinion and its expression, and whether by speech, writing, or printing. They are too certain to need discussion—of such conceded value as to need no supporting praise. Nor can there be any doubt of their breadth, nor that their underlying safeguard is, to use the words of another, N58* 'that opinion is free, and that conduct alone is amenable to the law.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the power which was illustrated. The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - We do not understand that a possibility of an evil employment of films is denied, but a freedom from the censorship of the law and a precedent right of exhibition are asserted, subsequent responsibility only, it is contended, being incurred for abuse. In other words, as we have seen, the Constitution of Ohio is invoked, and an exhibition of films is assimilated to the freedom of speech, writing, and publication assured by that instrument, and for the abuse of which only is there responsibility, and, it is insisted, that as no law may be passed 'to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press,' no law may be passed to subject moving pictures to censorship before their exhibition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained which extends the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the billboards of our cities and towns, and which regards them as emblems of public safety, to use the words of Lord Camden, quoted by counsel, and which seeks to bring motion pictures and other spectacle into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N1* It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the power which was illustrated. The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. It was this capability and power, and it may be in experience of them, that induced the state of Ohio, in addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions, as it does in its Criminal Code, to require censorship before exhibition, as it does by the act under review. We cannot regard this as beyond the power of government.
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Parties: Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges
Date: 1915-02-23
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Parties: Fox v. Washington
Date: 1915-02-23
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Parties: Selective Draft Law Cases
Date: 1918-01-07
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Parties: Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States
Date: 1918-06-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - We might well pass the proposition by because to state it is to answer it, since it involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with impunity and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of those governmental duties upon the performance of which the freedom of all, including that of the press, depends. The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests and that freedom therefore does not and cannot be held to include the right virtually to destroy such institutions. It suffices to say that however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right as every other right enjoyed in human society is subject to the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - We might well pass the proposition by because to state it is to answer it, since it involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with impunity and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of those governmental duties upon the performance of which the freedom of all, including that of the press, depends. The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests and that freedom therefore does not and cannot be held to include the right virtually to destroy such institutions. It suffices to say that however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right as every other right enjoyed in human society is subject to the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - We might well pass the proposition by because to state it is to answer it, since it involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with impunity and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of those governmental duties upon the performance of which the freedom of all, including that of the press, depends. The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests and that freedom therefore does not and cannot be held to include the right virtually to destroy such institutions. It suffices to say that however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right as every other right enjoyed in human society is subject to the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing.
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Parties: Sugarman v. United States
Date: 1919-03-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N59* 'The Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances. This right has been deemed so essential and necessary to free institutions and a free people that it has been incorporated in substance in the Constitutions of all the states of the Union. These constitutional provisions referred to are not abrogated, they are not less in force now because of war, and they are as vital during war as during times of peace, and as binding upon you now as though we were at peace.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - 'Now, considerable has also been said in this case about freedom of speech. The Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. This provision of the Constitution is of course in force in times of war as well as in times of peace. But 'freedom of speech' does not mean that a man may say whatever he pleases without the possibility of being called to account for it. A man has a right to honestly discuss a measure or a law, and to honestly criticize it. But no man may advise another to disobey the law, or to obstruct its execution, without making himself liable to be called to account therefor.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N63* "But 'freedom of speech' does not mean that a man may say whatever he pleases without the possibility of being called to account for it. A man has a right to honestly discuss a measure or a law, and to honestly criticize it. But no man may advise another to disobey the law, or to obstruct its execution, without making himself liable to be called to account therefor."
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Phrase match: a right to honestly discuss a
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Parties: Frohwerk v. United States
Date: 1919-03-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N64* It may be that all this might be said or written even in time of war in circumstances that would not make it a crime. We do not lose our right to condemn either measures or men because the country is at war.
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Phrase match: our right to condemn either measures
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Parties: Debs v. United States
Date: 1919-03-10
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Parties: Schenck v. United States
Date: 1919-03-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 Sup. Ct. 556, 51 L. ed. 879, 10 Ann. Cas. 689. We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 205, 206, 25 Sup. Ct. 3, 49 L. Ed. 154. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced. The statute of 1917 in section 4 (Comp. St. 1918, § 10212d) punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech is not
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N62* The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
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Phrase match: a right to prevent. It is
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N32* It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 Sup. Ct. 556, 51 L. ed. 879, 10 Ann. Cas. 689. We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 205, 206, 25 Sup. Ct. 3, 49 L. Ed. 154. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech is not confined
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Parties: Abrams v. United States
Date: 1919-11-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 (Act July 14, 1798, c. 73, 1 Stat. 596), by repaying fines that it imposed. Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.' Of course I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United States.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech.' Of course
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N65* But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.
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Phrase match: the right to free speech is
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
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Phrase match: opposition by speech seems to indicate
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Parties: Schaefer v. United States
Date: 1920-03-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - as this court has declared, and as Professor Chafee has shown in his 'Freedom of Speech in War Time,' 32 Harvard Law Review, 932, 963, the test to be applied—as in the case of criminal attempts and incitements—is not the remote or possible effect. There must be the clear and present danger. Certainly men, judging in calmness and with this test presented to them, could not reasonably have said that this coarse and heavy humor immediately threatened the success of recruiting.
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Phrase match: his 'Freedom of Speech in War
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Segment in Paragraph: 116 - To prosecute men for such publications reminds of the days when men were hanged for constructive treason. And, indeed, the jury may well have believed from the charge that the Espionage Act had in effect restored the crime of constructive treason. To hold that such harmless additions to or omissions from news items, and such impotent expressions of editorial opinion, as were shown here, can afford the basis even of a prosecution, will doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of the government. To hold that such publications can be suppressed as false reports, subjects to new perils the constitutional liberty of the press, already seriously curtailed in practice under powers assumed to have been conferred upon the postal authorities. Nor will this grave danger end with the passing of the war. The constitutional right of free speech has been declared to be the same in peace and in war. In peace, too, men may differ widely as to what loyalty to our country demands; and an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future, as it has often been in the past to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it disagrees. Convictions such as these, besides abridging freedom of speech, threaten freedom of thought and of belief.
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Phrase match: abridging freedom of speech, threaten freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - This is a rule of reason. Correctly applied, it will preserve the right of free speech both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities, and from abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities. Like many other rules for human conduct, it can be applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment; and to the exercise of good judgment calmness is, in times of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and honesty. The question whether in a particular instance the words spoken or written fall within the permissible curtailment of free speech is, under the rule enunciated by this court, one of degree; and because it is a question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment is necessarily a wide one. But its field is not unlimited. The trial provided for is one by judge and jury, and the judge may not abdicate his function. If the words were of such a nature and were used under such circumstances that men, judging in calmness, could not reasonably say that they created a clear and present danger that they would bring about the evil which Congress sought and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of the trial judge to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury; and, if he fails to do so, it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error. In my opinion, no jury acting in calmness could reasonably say that any of the publications set forth in the indictment was of such a character or was made under such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger, either that they would obstruct recruiting or that they would promote the success of the enemies of the United States.
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Phrase match: the right of free speech both
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Segment in Paragraph: 116 - The constitutional right of free speech has been declared to be the same in peace and in war. In peace, too, men may differ widely as to what loyalty to our country demands; and an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future, as it has often been in the past to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it disagrees. Convictions such as these, besides abridging freedom of speech, threaten freedom of thought and of belief.
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Phrase match: constitutional right of free speech has
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - But simple as the law is, perilous to the country as disobedience to it was, offenders developed, and when it was exerted against them challenged it to decision as a violation of the right of free speech assured by the Constitution of the United States. A curious spectacle was presented. That great ordinance of government and orderly liberty was invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its precepts it was adduced against itself. In other words and explicitly, though it empowered Congress to declare war, and war is waged with armies, their formation (recruiting or enlisting) could be prevented or impeded, and the morale of the armies when formed could be weakened or debased by question or calumny of the motives of authority, and this could not be made a crime—that it was an impregnable attribute of free speech, upon which no curb could be put. Verdicts and judgments of conviction were the reply to the challenge, and when they were brought here our response to it was unhesitating and direct. We did more than reject the contention; we forestalled all shades or repetition of it, including that in the case at bar.
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Phrase match: the right of free speech assured
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - N66* 'The question in every case is whether the words * * * are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
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Phrase match: a right to prevent. It is
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - This is a rule of reason. Correctly applied, it will preserve the right of free speech both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities, and from abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities. Like many other rules for human conduct, it can be applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment; and to the exercise of good judgment calmness is, in times of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and honesty. The question whether in a particular instance the words spoken or written fall within the permissible curtailment of free speech is, under the rule enunciated by this court, one of degree; and because it is a question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment is necessarily a wide one. But its field is not unlimited. The trial provided for is one by judge and jury, and the judge may not abdicate his function. If the words were of such a nature and were used under such circumstances that men, judging in calmness, could not reasonably say that they created a clear and present danger that they would bring about the evil which Congress sought and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of the trial judge to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury; and, if he fails to do so, it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error. In my opinion, no jury acting in calmness could reasonably say that any of the publications set forth in the indictment was of such a character or was made under such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger, either that they would obstruct recruiting or that they would promote the success of the enemies of the United States.
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Phrase match: a right to prevent, then it
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Parties: Gilbert v. Minnesota
Date: 1920-12-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - It is asserted that the right of free speech is a natural and inherent right, and that it, and the freedom of the press, 'were regarded as among the most sacred and vital possessed by mankind when this nation was born, when its Constitution was framed and adopted.' And the contention seems necessary for the plaintiff in error to support. But without so deciding or considering the freedom asserted as guaranteed or secured either by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitution of the state, we pass immediately to the contention, and for the purposes of this case may concede it; that is, concede that the asserted freedom is natural and inherent, but it is not absolute; it is subject to restriction and limitation. And this we have decided. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. Ed. 470, we distinguished times and occasions, and said that N60* 'the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic;'
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press, 'were
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - The Minnesota statute was enacted during the World War; but it is not a war measure. The statute is said to have been enacted by the state under its police power to preserve the peace; but it is in fact an act to prevent teaching that the abolition of war is possible. Unlike the federal Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), it applies equally whether the United States is at peace or at war. It abridges freedom of speech and of the press, not in a particular emergency, in order to avert a clear and present danger, but under all circumstances. The restriction imposed relates to the teaching of the doctrine of pacifism, and the Legislature in effect proscribes it for all time. The statute does not in terms prohibit the teaching of the doctrine. Its prohibition is more specific and is directed against the teaching of certain applications of it. This specification operates, as will be seen, rather to extend, than to limit, the scope of the prohibition.
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Phrase match: abridges freedom of speech and of
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - it is said that the guaranty against abridging freedom of speech contained in the First Amendment of the federal Constitution applies only to federal action; that the legislation here complained of is that of a state; that the validity of the statute has been sustained by its highest court as a police measure; that the matter is one of state concern; and that consequently this court cannot interfere. But the matter is not one merely of state concern. The state law affects directly the functions of the federal government. It affects rights, privileges, and immunities of one who is a citizen of the United States; and it deprives him of an important part of his liberty. These are rights which are guaranteed protection by the federal Constitution; and they are invaded by the statute in question.
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Phrase match: abridging freedom of speech contained in
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The next contention is that the statute is violative of the right of free speech, and therefore void. It is asserted that the right of free speech is a natural and inherent right, and that it, and the freedom of the press, 'were regarded as among the most sacred and vital possessed by mankind when this nation was born, when its Constitution was framed and adopted.' And the contention seems necessary for the plaintiff in error to support. But without so deciding or considering the freedom asserted as guaranteed or secured either by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitution of the state, we pass immediately to the contention, and for the purposes of this case may concede it; that is, concede that the asserted freedom is natural and inherent, but it is not absolute; it is subject to restriction and limitation. And this we have decided. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. Ed. 470, we distinguished times and occasions, and said that N1* 'the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic;'
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Phrase match: the right of free speech, and
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Gilbert's speech had the purpose they denounce. The nation was at war with Germany, armies were recruiting, and the speech was the discouragement of that—its purpose was necessarily the discouragement of that. It was not an advocacy of policies or a censure of actions that a citizen had the right to make. The war was flagrant; it had been declared by the power constituted by the Constitution to declare it, and in the manner provided for by the Constitution. It was not declared in aggression, but in defense, in defense of our national honor, in vindication of the 'most sacred rights of our nation and our people.'
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Phrase match: the right to make. The war
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The right to speak freely concerning functions of the federal government is a privilege or immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state was powerless to curtail.
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Phrase match: The right to speak freely concerning
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - But it is said that the guaranty against abridging freedom of speech contained in the First Amendment of the federal Constitution applies only to federal action; that the legislation here complained of is that of a state; that the validity of the statute has been sustained by its highest court as a police measure; that the matter is one of state concern; and that consequently this court cannot interfere. But the matter is not one merely of state concern. The state law affects directly the functions of the federal government. It affects rights, privileges, and immunities of one who is a citizen of the United States; and it deprives him of an important part of his liberty. These are rights which are guaranteed protection by the federal Constitution; and they are invaded by the statute in question.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech contained in the
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Parties: United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson
Date: 1921-03-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - These publications were not designed to secure amendment or repeal of the laws denounced in them as arbitrary and oppressive, but to create hostility to, and to encourage violation of them. Freedom of the press may protect criticism and agitation for modification or repeal of laws, but it does not extend to protection of him who counsels and encourages the violation of the law as it exists. The Constitution was adopted to preserve our government, not to serve as a protecting screen for those who, while claiming its privileges, seek to destroy it.
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Phrase match: them. Freedom of the press may
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - the postal power, like all its other powers, is subject to the limitations of the Bill of Rights. Burton v.United States, 202 U.S. 344, 371, 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 6 Ann. Cas. 362. Compare Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764. Congress may not through its postal police power put limitations upon the freedom of the press which, if directly attempted, would be unconstitutional.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press which
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - The United States may give up the postoffice when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues and it would take very strong language to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically despotic power to any one man. There is no pretence that it has done so. Therefore I do not consider the limits of its constitutional power.
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Phrase match: the right to use our tongues
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of the cost of the service, and to deny that service to one paper of the same general character, because to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in the past seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship and abridge seriously freedom of expression.
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Phrase match: prove an effective censorship and abridge seriously
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Parties: Balzac v. Porto Rico
Date: 1922-04-10
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Parties: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek
Date: 1922-06-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - State court held that (state) freedom of speech included right to silece; SC says no federal guarantee of such rightHere the Supreme Court of Georgia held that 'An act to require certain corporations to give to their discharged employees or agents the causes of their removal or discharge, when discharged or removed,' was contrary to the fundamental law of the state, on the ground that the public, whether as a multitude or a sovereignty, had no interest to be protected or promoted by a correspondence between discharged agents or employees and their late employers, designed, not for public, but for private information as to the reasons for discharges and that the statute was violative of the general private right of silence enjoyed in that state by all persons, natural or artificial, from time immemorial; liberty of speech and of writing being secured by the state Constitution, 'and incident thereto is the correlative liberty of silence, not less important.'The case obviously is not in point, since the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states no obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the right of silence.
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Phrase match: private right of silence enjoyed in
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N2* The cases cited from Georgia, from Kansas, and from Texas place material dependence upon provisions of the several state Constitutions guaranteeing freedom of speech, from which is deduced as by contrast a right of privacy called the 'liberty of silence'; and it seems to be thought that the relations between a corporation and its employees and former employees are a matter of wholly private concern. But, as we have stated, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence'; nor, we may add, does it confer any right of privacy upon either persons or corporations.
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Phrase match: a right of privacy called the
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The case obviously is not in point, since the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states no obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the right of silence.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of free speech or the right
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - But, as we have stated, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence'; nor, we may add, does it confer any right of privacy upon either persons or corporations.
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Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: freedom of speech' or the 'liberty
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Parties: Gitlow v. New York
Date: 1925-06-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech and of
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - It is clear that the question in such cases is entirely different from that involved in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself, and it is sought to apply its provisions to language used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited results. There, if it be contended that the statute cannot be applied to the language used by the defendant because of its protection by the freedom of speech or press, it must necessarily be found, as an original question, without any previous determination by the legislative body, whether the specific language used involved such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil as to deprive it of the constitutional protection. In such case it has been held that the general provisions of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prevent. Schenck v. United States, supra, p. 51 (39 S. Ct. 247); Debs v. United States, supra, pp. 215, 216 (39 S. Ct. 252). And the general statement in the Schenck Case, p. 52 (39 S. Ct. 249) that the 'question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils,'—upon which great reliance is placed in the defendant's argument—was manifestly intended, as shown by the context, to apply only in cases of this class, and has no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech or press
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - In short this freedom N3* does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of self preservation; which, so long as human governments endure, they cannot be denied.
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Phrase match: essential right of self preservation; which
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - N1* 'Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - N2* 'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that [the State] has a right to prevent.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - And, for yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional State. Freedom of speech and press, said Story, supra, does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties. State v. Holm, supra, p. 275 (166 N. W. 181). It does not protect publications prompting the overthrow of government by force; the punishment of those who publish articles which tend to destroy organized society being essential to the security of freedom and the stability of the state. People v. Most, supra, pp. 431, 432 (64 N. E. 175). And a State may penalize utterances which openly advocate the overthrow of the representative and constitutional form of government of the United States and the several States, by violence or other unlawful means. People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 34, 136 N. E. 505. See, also, State v. Tachin, 92 N. J. Law, 269, 274, 106 A. 145, and People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 375, 203 P. 78. In short this freedom does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of self preservation; which, so long as human governments endure, they cannot be denied.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and I are of opinion that this judgment should be reversed. The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.
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Parties: Whitney v. Cal.
Date: 1927-05-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - Miss Whitney was convicted of the felony of assisting in organizing, in the year 1919, the Communist Labor Party of California, of being a member of it, and of assembling with it. These acts are held to constitute a crime, because the party was formed to teach criminal syndicalism. The statute which made these acts a crime restricted the right of free speech and of assembly theretofore existing. The claim is that the statute, as applied, denied to Miss Whitney the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - The right of free speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - That such united and joint action involves even greater danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals is clear. We cannot hold that, as here applied, the Act is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing any right of free speech, assembly or association, or that those persons are protected from punishment by the due process clause who abuse such rights by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the State.
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Phrase match: any right of free speech, assembly
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom;
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the federal Constitution from invasion by the states. The right of free speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138; Farrington v. Tokushige (No. 465, decided February 21, 1927) 273 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 406, 71 L. Ed. 646. These may not be denied or abridged. But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral. That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent has been settled.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society. A police measure may be unconstitutional merely because the remedy, although effective as means of protection, is unduly harsh or oppressive. Thus, a state might, in the exercise of its police power, make any trespass upon the land of another a crime, regardless of the results or of the intent or purpose of the trespasser. It might, also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an incitement to commit the trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this court would hold constitutional a statute which punished as a felony the mere voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that pedestrians had the moral right to cross uninclosed, unposted, waste lands and to advocate their doing so, even if there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead to a trespass. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech which is secured
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the federal Constitution from invasion by the states. The right of free speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138; Farrington v. Tokushige (No. 465, decided February 21, 1927) 273 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 406, 71 L. Ed. 646. These may not be denied or abridged. But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral. That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent has been settled.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - That such united and joint action N1* involves even greater danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals is clear. We cannot hold that, as here applied, the Act is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing any right of free speech, assembly or association, or that those persons are protected from punishment by the due process clause who abuse such rights by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the State.
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Parties: Stromberg v. California
Date: 1931-05-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - 'As we view the provisions of section 403a of the Penal Code, its prohibition of displaying a red flag 'as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character' is certain, and a proper and constitutional and legislative enactment. It is not contrary to the provisions of either the state or federal Constitutions guaranteeing freedom of speech to our people.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The Court decides that, in so far as section 403a declares it a crime to display a flag for the first purpose specified, 'as (an) emblem of opposition to organized government,' the section denies right of free speech, and the court holds that right to be included in the concept of 'liberty' safeguarded against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It sustains the parts forbidding the public display of a flag 'as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.' The count on which the convictionrest § charges that the appellant displayed a flag in ways and for all the purposes denounced by the section. Assuming all the clauses of the section to be valid, the display of a flag for the purpose specified in any one of them would be sufficient to warrant conviction. The Court holds the first clause invalid and, finding that the judgment may have rested upon that clause exclusively, sets aside the conviction.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The principles to be applied have been clearly set forth in our former decisions. It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 362, 371, 373, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 382, 47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108. The right is not an absolute one, and the State in the exercise of its police power may punish the abuse of this freedom. There is no question but that the State may thus provide for the punishment of those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. There is no constitutional immunity for such conduct abhorrent to our institutions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The Court decides that, in so far as section 403a declares it a crime to display a flag for the first purpose specified, 'as (an) emblem of opposition to organized government,' the section denies right of free speech, and the court holds that right to be included in the concept of 'liberty' safeguarded against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It sustains the parts forbidding the public display of a flag 'as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.' The count on which the convictionrest § charges that the appellant displayed a flag in ways and for all the purposes denounced by the section. Assuming all the clauses of the section to be valid, the display of a flag for the purpose specified in any one of them would be sufficient to warrant conviction. The Court holds the first clause invalid and, finding that the judgment may have rested upon that clause exclusively, sets aside the conviction.
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Parties: United States v. Macintosh
Date: 1931-05-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - To the end that war may not result in defeat, freedom of speech may, by act of Congress, be curtailed or denied so that the morale of the people and the spirit of the army may not be broken by seditious utterances; freedom of the press curtailed to preserve our military plans and movements from the knowledge of the enemy; deserters and spies put to death without indictment or trial by jury; ships and supplies requisitioned; property of alien enemies, theretofore under the protection of the Constitution, seized without process and converted to the public use without compensation and without due process of law in the ordinary sense of that term; prices of food and other necessities of life fixed or regulated; railways taken over and operated by the government; and other drastic powers, wholly inadmissible in time of peace, exercised to meet the emergencies of war.
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Parties: Near v. Minn.
Date: 1931-06-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - The liberty deemed to be established was thus described by Blackstone: 'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.'
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press; but
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also.' Report on the Virginia Resolutions, Madison's Works, vol. IV, p. 543. This Court said, in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 S. Ct. 556, 558, 51 L. Ed. 879, 10 Ann. Cas. 689: 'In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 313, 314 (15 Am. Dec. 214); Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325, 1 L. Ed. 155, 158. The preliminary fredom extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not in all.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N1* 'The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besiders the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.'
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press. The
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - charges of reprehensible conduct may create resentment and the disposition to resort to violent means of redress, but this well-understood tendency did not alter the determination to protect the press against censorship and restrain upon publication. As was said in New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan, 89 N. J. Eq. 387, 388, 105 A. 72: N2* 'If the township may prevent the circulation of a newspaper for no reason other than that some of its inhabitants may violently disagree with it, and resent it circulation by resorting to physical violence, there is no limit to what may be prohibited.' The danger of violent reactions becomes greater with effective organization of defiant groups resenting exposure, and, if this consideration warranted legislative interference with the initial freedom of publication, the constitutional protection would be reduced to a mere form of words.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - The decision of the Court in this case declares Minnesota and every other state powerless to restrain by injunction the business of publishing and circulating among the people malicious, scandalous, and defamatory periodicals that in due course of judicial procedure has been adjudged to the a public nuisance. It gives to freedom of the press a meaning and a scope not heretofore recognized, and construes 'liberty' in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to put upon the states a federal restriction that is without precedent.
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Phrase match: to freedom of the press a
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - The defendant here has no standing to assert that the statute is invalid because it might be construed so as to violate the Constitution. His right is limited solely to the inquiry whether, having regard to the points properly raised in his case, the effect of applying the statute is to deprive him of his liberty without die process of law. This court should not reverse the judgment below upon the ground that in some other case the statute may be applied in a way that is repugnant to the freedom of the press protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - It is plain that Blackstone taught that under the common law liberty of the press means simply the absence of restraint upon publication in advance as distinguished from liability, civil or criminal, for libelous or improper matter so published. And, as above shown, Story defined freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment to mean that 'every man shall be at liberty to publish what is true, with good motives and for justifiable ends.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - It is well known, as found by the state Supreme Court, that existing libel laws are inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from the kind of business and publications that are shown in this case. The doctrine that measures such as the one before us are invalid because they operate as revious restraints to infringe freedom of press exposes the peace and good order of every community and the business and private affairs of every individual to the constant and protracted false and malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have purpose and sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or program for oppression, blackmail or extortion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - This court was not called on until 1925 to decide whether the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of free speech and press. That question has been finally answered in the affirmative.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The Minnesota statute does not operate as a previous restraint on publication within the proper meaning of that phrase. It does not authorize administrative control in advance such as was formerly exercised by the licensers and censors, but prescribes a remedy to be enforced by a suit in equity. In this case there was previous publication made in the course of the business of regularly producing malicious, scandalous, and defamatory periodicals. The business and publications unquestionably constitute an abuse of the right of free press. The statute denounces the things done as a nuisance on the ground, as stated by the state Supreme Court, that they threaten morals, peace, and good order. There is no question of the power of the state to denounce such transgressions.
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Phrase match: the right of free press. The
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N3* 'There is no constitutional right to publish a fact merely because it is true. It is a matter of common knowledge that prosecutions under the criminal libel statutes do not result in efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal. Men who are the victims of such assaults seldom resort to the courts. This is especially true if their sins are exposed and the only question relates to whether it was done with good motive and for justifiable ends. This law is not for the protection of the person attacked nor to punish the wrongdoer. It is for the protection of the public welfare.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The struggle in England, directed against the legislative power of the licenser, resulted in renuciation of the censorship of the press. The liberty deemed to be established was thus described by Blackstone: N4* N5* 'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.' 4 Bl. Com. 151, 152. See Story on the Constitution, §§ 1884, 1889.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - In attempted justification of the statute, it is said that it deals not with publcati on per se, but with the 'business' of publishing defamation. If, however, the publisher has a constitutional right to publish, without previous restraint, an edition of his newspaper charging official derelictions, it cannot be denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same purpose. He does not lose his right by exercising it. If his right exists, it may be exercised in publishing nine editions, as in this case, as well as in one edition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Defendant concedes that the editions of the newspaper complained of are 'defamatory per se.' And he says: N6* 'It has been asserted that the constitution was never intended to be a shield for malice, scandal, and defamation when unrue, or published with bad motives, or for unjustificable ends. * * * The contrary is true; every person does have a constitutional right to publish malicious, scandalous, and defamatory matter though untrue, and with bad motives, and for unjustifiable ends, in the first instance, though he is subject to responsibility therefor afterwards.'
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Phrase match: constitutional right to publish malicious, scandalous
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - N7* 'That this amendment was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or print whatever he might please, without any responsibility, public or private, therefor, is a supposition too wild to be indulged by any rational man. This would be to allow to every citizen a right to destroy at his pleasure the reputation, the peace, the property, and even the personal safety of every other citizen. A man might, out of mere malice and revenge, accuse another of the most infamous crimes; might excite against him the indignation of all his fellow-citizens by the most atrocious calumnies; might disturb, nay, overturn, all his domestic peace, and embitter his parental affections; might inflict the most distressing punishments upon the weak, the timid, and the innocent; might prejudice all a man's civil, and political, and private rights; and might stir up sedition, rebellion, and treason even against the government itself, in the wantonness of his passions or the corruption of his heart. Civil society could not go on under such circumstances. Men would then be obliged to resort to private vengenance to make up for the deficiencies of the law; and assassination and savage cruelties would be perpetrated with all the frequency belonging to barbarous and brutal communities. It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment imports no more than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always that he does not injure any other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation; and so always that he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government. It is neither more nor less than an expansion of the great doctrine recently brought into operation in the law of libel, that every man shall be at liberty to publish what is true, with good motives and for justifiable ends. And with this reasonable limitation it is not only right in itself, but it is an inestimable privilege in a free government. Without such a limitation, it might become the scourge of the republic, first denouncing the principles of liberty, and then, by rendering the most virtuous patriots odious through the terrors of the press, introducing despotism in its worst form.' (Italicizing added.)
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Phrase match: absolute right to speak, or write
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the general conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship. The conception of the liberty of the press in this country had broadened with the exigencies of the colonial period and with the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration.
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Phrase match: previous restraints or censorship. The conception of
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - If this can be doneN2* , the Legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete system of censorship. The recognition of authority to impose previous restraint upon publication in order to protect the community against the circulation of charges of misconduct, and especially of official misconduct, necessarily would carry with it the admission of the authority of the censor against which the constitutional barrier was erected. The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does not depend, as this court has said, on proof of truth.
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Phrase match: complete system of censorship. The recognition of
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - There is nothing new in the fact that charges of reprehensible conduct may create resentment and the disposition to resort to violent means of redress, but this well-understood tendency did not alter the determination to protect the press against censorship and restrain upon publication.
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Phrase match: the press against censorship and restrain upon
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not N2* 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of frce.
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Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Parties: United States v. Chambers
Date: 1934-02-05
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Parties: United States v. Mack
Date: 1935-05-20
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Parties: Grosjean v. American Press Co.
Date: 1936-02-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N4* The struggle between the proponents of measures to that end and those who asserted the right of free expression was continuous and unceasing. As early as 1644, John Milton, in an 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,' assailed an act of Parliament which had just been passed providing for censorship of the press previous to publication. He vigorously defended the right of every man to make public his honest views N5* 'without previous censure'; and declared the impossibility of finding any man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time good enough to be allowed to perform its duties. Collett, History of the Taxes on Knowledge, vol. I, pp. 4—6. The act expired by its own terms in 1695. It was never renewed; and the liberty of the press thus became, as pointed out by Wickwar (The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, p. 15), merely N6* 'a right or liberty to publish without a license what formerly could be published only with one.'
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Phrase match: the right of free expression was
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N7* in the adoption of the English newspaper stamp tax and the tax on advertisements, revenue was of subordinate concern; and that the dominant and controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs. It is idle to suppose that so many of the best men of England would for a century of time have waged, as they did, stubborn and often precarious warfare against these taxes if a mere matter of taxation had been involved. The aim of the struggle was not to relieve taxpayers from a burden, but to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.
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Phrase match: the right of the English people
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N8* The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well.
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Phrase match: the right to be free in
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The conclusion there stated is that the object of the constitutional provisions was to prevent previous restraints on publication; and the court was careful not to limit the protection of the right to any particular way of abridging it. Liberty of the press within the meaning of the constitutional provision, it was broadly said (283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357), meant 'principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or (from) censorship.
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Phrase match: the right to any particular way
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - It is impossible to concede that by the words 'freedom of the press' the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow view then reflected by the law of England that such freedom consisted only in immunity from previous censorship; for this abuse had then permanently disappeared from English practice. It is equally impossible to believe that it was not intended to bring within the reach of these words such modes of restraint as were embodied in the two forms of taxation already described.
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Phrase match: immunity from previous censorship; for this abuse
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied: N3* 'The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.'
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Phrase match: were not the censorship of the press
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Parties: United States v. Rizzo
Date: 1936-03-09
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Parties: De Jonge v. Oregon
Date: 1937-01-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions go to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right of free speech and
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Notwithstanding those objectives, the defendant still enjoyed his personal right of free speech and assembly to take part in a peaceable assembly having a lawful purpose, although called by that party. N8* The defendant was none the less entitled to discuss the public issues of the day and thus in a lawful manner, without incitement to violence or crime, to seek redress of alleged grievances. That was of the essence of his guaranteed personal liberty.
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Phrase match: personal right of free speech and assembly
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Parties: State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.
Date: 1936-11-09
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Parties: AP v. NLRB
Date: 1937-04-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Freedom is not a mere intellectual abstraction; and it is not merely a word to adorn an oration upon occasions of patriotic rejoicing. It is an intensely practical reality, capable of concrete enjoyment in a multitude of ways day by day. When applied to the press, the term freedom is not to be narrowly confined; and it obviously means more than publication and circulation. If freedom of the press does not include the right to adopt and pursue a policy without governmental restriction, it is a misnomer to call it freedom. And we may as well deny at once the right of the press freely to adopt a policy and pursue it, as to concede that right and deny the liberty to exercise an uncensored judgment in respect of the employment and discharge of the agents through whom the policy is to be effectuated.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right of the press freely
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - N9* The conclusion that the First Amendment is here infringed does not challenge the right of employees to organize, to bargain collectively with their employers about wages and other matters respecting employment, or to refuse to work except upon conditions they are willing to accept. Nor, the First Amendment aside, does it challenge the act in so far as it is an allowable regulation of interstate commerce. All affirmations in respect of these matters may be fully conceded without prejudice to our very definite view that the application of the act here has resulted in an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right of employees to organize
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N9* When applied to the press, the term freedom is not to be narrowly confined; and it obviously means more than publication and circulation. If freedom of the press does not include the right to adopt and pursue a policy without governmental restriction, it is a misnomer to call it freedom. And we may as well deny at once the right of the press freely to adopt a policy and pursue it, as to concede that right and deny the liberty to exercise an uncensored judgment in respect of the employment and discharge of the agents through whom the policy is to be effectuated.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right to adopt and pursue
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - The findings of the board disclose that Watson continued in various ways to promote the interests of the guild; and there is no doubt that his sympathies were strongly enlisted in support of the guild's policies, whether they clashed with the policies of petitioner or not. We do not question his right to assume and maintain that attitude. But, if petitioner concluded, as it well could have done, that its policy to preserve its news service free from color, bias, or distortion was likely to be subverted by Watson's retention, what power has Congress to interfere in the face of the First Amendment?
Notes:
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Phrase match: his right to assume and maintain
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Parties: Herndon v. Lowry
Date: 1937-04-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The appellant had a constitutional right to address meetings and organize parties unless in so doing he violated some prohibition of a valid statute. The only prohibition he is said to have violated is that of section 56 forbidding incitement or attempted incitement to insurrection by violence. If the evidence fails to show that he did so incite, then, as applied to him, the statute unreasonably limits freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and violates the Fourteenth Amendment. We are of opinion that the requisite proof is lacking.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: limits freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - In these circumstances, to make membership in the party and solicitation of members for that party a criminal offense, punishable by death, in the discretion of a jury, is an unwarranted invasion of the right of freedom of speech.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right of freedom of speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N10* 'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: a right to prevent. It is
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The appellant had a constitutional right to address meetings and organize parties unless in so doing he violated some prohibition of a valid statute. The only prohibition he is said to have violated is that of section 56 forbidding incitement or attempted incitement to insurrection by violence. If the evidence fails to show that he did so incite, then, as applied to him, the statute unreasonably limits freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: constitutional right to address meetings and
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Parties: Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union
Date: 1937-05-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Notes:
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Phrase match: for freedom of speech is guaranteed
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Clearly the means which the statute authorizes picketing and publicity—are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The state may, in the exercise of its police power, regulate the methods and means of publicity as well as the use of public streets. If the end sought by the unions is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution, the state may authorize working men to seek to attain it by combining as pickets, just as it permits capitalists and employers to combine in other ways to attain their desired economic ends. The Legislature of Wisconsin has declared that 'peaceful picketing and patrolling' on the public streets and places shall be permissible 'whether engaged in singly or in numbers' provided this is done 'without intimidation or coercion' and free from 'fraud, violence, breach of the peace, or threat thereof.' The statute provides that the picketing must be peaceful; and that term as used implies not only absence of violence, but absence of any unlawful act. It precludes the intimidation of customers. It precludes any form of physical obstruction or interference with the plaintiff's business. It authorizes giving publicity to the existence of the dispute 'whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where any person or persons may lawfully be'; but precludes misrepresentation of the facts of the controversy. And it declares that 'nothing herein shall be construed to legalize a secondary boycott.' See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466, 41 S.Ct. 172, 176, 65 L.Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196. Inherently, the means authorized are clearly unobjectionable. In declaring such picketing permissible, Wisconsin has put this means of publicity on a par with advertisements in the press.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech is guaranteed by
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Parties: Lovell v. Griffin
Date: 1938-03-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press by
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially N11* a right to publish 'without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision
Notes:
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Phrase match: a right to publish 'without a
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish N4* 'without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 51 L.Ed. 879, 10 Ann.Cas. 689; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713—716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233, 245, 246, 56 S.Ct. 444, 447, 80 L.Ed. 660. Legislation of the type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and censorship in its baldest form.
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Phrase match: to license and censorship. The struggle for
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Parties: Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp.
Date: 1938-05-23
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Opinions:
Parties: Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.
Date: 1938-05-31
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Opinions:
Parties: Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Com.
Date: 1939-01-03
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Parties: Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick
Date: 1939-01-03
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Opinions:
Parties: William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau
Date: 1939-05-15
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Opinions:
Parties: HAGUE v. COMMITTEE FOR INDUS. ORG.
Date: 1939-06-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - It has been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by this Court, without a dissenting voice, that freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Notes:
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Phrase match: that freedom of speech and of
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - But it is said that the freedom of respondents with which the petitioners have interfered is the 'freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it', and that these are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States secured against state abridgment by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the freedom of respondents with which
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - True, the findings refer to the suppression by petitioners of exhibits, one of which turns out to be a handbill advising workers they have the legal right, under the Wagner Act, to choose their own labor union to represent them in collective bargaining. But the injunction, which the Court now rightly sustains, is not restricted to the protection of the right, said to pertain to United States citizenship, to disseminate information about the Wagner Act. On the contrary it extends and applies in the broadest terms to interferences with respondents in holding any lawful meeting and disseminating any lawful information by circular, leaflet, handbill and placard. If, as my brethren think, respondents are entitled to maintain in this suit only the rights secured to them by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—here the right to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act—it is plain that the decree is too broad. Instead of enjoining, as it does, interferences with all meetings ¢for all purposes and the lawful dissemination of all information, it should have confined its restraint to interferences with the dissemination of information about the National Labor Relations Act, through meetings or otherwise. The court below rightly omitted any such limitation from the decree, evidently because, as it declared, petitioners' acts infringed the due process clause, which guarantees to all persons freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose.
Notes:
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Phrase match: persons freedom of speech and of
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Since freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are rights secured to persons by the due process clause, all of the individual respondents are plainly authorized by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to maintain the present suit in equity to restrain infringement of their rights. As to the American Civil Liberties Union, which is a corporation, it cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights of freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons. Northwestern Nat. Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255, 27 S.Ct. 126, 129, 51 L.Ed. 168, 7 Ann.Cas. 1104; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363, 27 S.Ct. 384, 385, 51 L.Ed. 520.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: Since freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Section B deals with liberty of the mind. Paragraph 1 enjoins the petitioners from interfering with the right of the respondents, their agents and those acting with them, to communicate their views as individuals to others on the streets in an orderly and peaceable manner. It reserves to the petitioners full liberty to enforce law and order by lawful search and seizure or by arrest and production before a judicial officer. We think this paragraph unassailable.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right of the respondents, their
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right to discuss national legislation
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - But it is said that the freedom of respondents with which the petitioners have interfered is the 'freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it', and that these are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States secured against state abridgment by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been said that the right of citizens to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for the redress of grievances is a privilege of United States citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 553, 23 L.Ed. 588. We may assume for present purposes, although the step is a long and by no means certain one, see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448, 494, 44 L.Ed. 597; Twining v. New Jersey, supra, that the right to assemble to discuss the advantages of the National Labor Relations Act is likewise a privilege secured by the privileges and immunities clause to citizens of the United States, but not to others, while freedom to assemble for the purpose of discussing a similar state statute would not be within the privileges and immunities clause.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right to assemble to discuss
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Since freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are rights secured to persons by the due process clause, all of the individual respondents are plainly authorized by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to maintain the present suit in equity to restrain infringement of their rights. As to the American Civil Liberties Union, which is a corporation, it cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights of freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: freedom of speech and freedom of
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Parties: Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves
Date: 1939-11-13
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Parties: Schneider v. State
Date: 1939-11-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's conduct amounted to the solicitation and acceptance of money contributions without a permit, and held the ordinance prohibiting such action a valid regulation, aimed at protecting occupants and others from disturbance and annoyance and preventing unknown strangers from visiting houses by day and night. It overruled the petitioner's contention that the measure denies or unreasonably restricts freedom of speech or freedom of the press. The Court of Errors and Appeals thought Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra, not controlling, since the ordinance in that case prohibited all distribution of printed matter and was not limited to ways which might be regarded as consistent with the maintenance of public order or as involving disorderly conduct, molestation of inhabitants, or misuse or littering of the streets, whereas the ordinance here involved is aimed at canvassing or soliciting, subjects not embraced in that condemned in the Lovell case.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: restricts freedom of speech or freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: of freedom of speech or of
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - The court said that, whatever the motive, the ordinance was bad because it imposed penalties for the distribution of pamphlets, which had become historical weapons in the defense of liberty, by subjecting such distribution to license and censorship; and that the ordinance was void on its face, because it abridged the freedom of the press. Similarly in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423, an ordinance was held void on its face because it provided for previous administrative censorship of the exercise of the right of speech and assembly in appropriate public places.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated. So long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets. For example, a person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group of distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated. So long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets. For example, a person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group of distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - It is argued that the circumstance that in the actual enforcement of the Milwaukee ordinance the distributor is arrested only if those who receive the literature throw it in the streets, renders it valid. But, even as thus construed, the ordinance cannot be enforced without unconstitutionally abridging the liberty of free speech. As we have pointed out, the public convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - The court said that, whatever the motive, the ordinance was bad because it imposed penalties for the distribution of pamphlets, which had become historical weapons in the defense of liberty, by subjecting such distribution to license and censorship; and that the ordinance was void on its face, because it abridged the freedom of the press. Similarly in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423, an ordinance was held void on its face because it provided for previous administrative censorship of the exercise of the right of speech and assembly in appropriate public places.
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Parties: Carlson v. California
Date: 1940-04-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The sweeping and inexact terms of the ordinance disclose the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its existence. It cannot be thought to differ in any material respect from the statute held void in Thornhill's case. The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information on matters of public concern. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484. For the reasons set forth in our opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The sweeping and inexact terms of the ordinance disclose the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its existence. It cannot be thought to differ in any material respect from the statute held void in Thornhill's case. The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information on matters of public concern. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484. For the reasons set forth in our opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state.
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Parties: Cantwell v. Conn.
Date: 1940-05-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Having these considerations in mind, we note that Jesse Cantwell, on April 26, 1938, was upon a public street, where he had a right to be, and where he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others. There is no showing that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive. He requested of two pedestrians permission to play to them a phonograph record. The permission was granted. It is not claimed that he intended to insult or affront the hearers by playing the record. It is plain that he wished only to interest them in his propaganda. The sound of the phonograph is not shown to have disturbed residents of the street, to have drawn a crowd, or to have impeded traffic. Thus far he had invaded no right or interest of the public or of the men accosted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.
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Parties: Thornhill v. Ala.
Date: 1940-04-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government. Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion. Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - The power of the licensor against which John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing' is pernicious not merely by reason of the censure of particular comments but by reason of the threat to censure comments on matters of public concern. It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion. See Near
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - We think that Section 3448 is invalid on its face. The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 155, 162, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. See Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages and working conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these possible have an importance which is not less than the interests of those in the business or industry directly concerned. The health of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on these matters, and the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing. The merest glance at State and Federal legislation on the subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem. We concur in the observation of Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court in Senn's case (301 U.S. at page 478, '57 S.Ct. at page 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229): N3* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - We hold that the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion embodied in Section 3448.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion. Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem. We concur in the observation of Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court in Senn's case (301 U.S. at page 478, '57 S.Ct. at page 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229): N10* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - But no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter. We are not now concerned with picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated danger to these interests as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation giving rise to the danger.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - It does not follow that the State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern. A contrary conclusion could be used to support abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost every matter of importance to society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 155, 162, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. See Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages and working conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these possible have an importance which is not less than the interests of those in the business or industry directly concerned. The health of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on these matters, and the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing. The merest glance at State and Federal legislation on the subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem. We concur in the observation of Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court in Senn's case (301 U.S. at page 478, '57 S.Ct. at page 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229): 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
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Parties: Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.
Date: 1941-02-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N9* Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.
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Phrase match: Freedom to speak and write
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - A careful study of the entire record in this case convinces me that neither the findings nor the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to respondent, showed such imminent, clear and present danger as to justify an abridgment of the rights of freedom of speech and the press. The picketing, which did not begin until September, 1934, has at all times been peaceful.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - But it is going a long way to say that because of the acts of these few men, six thousand other members of their union can be denied the right to express their opinion to the extent accomplished by the sweeping injunction here sustained. Even those convicted of crime are not in this country punished by having their freedom of expression curtailed except under prison rules and regulations, and then only for the duration of their sentence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - A final word. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot be too often invoked as basic to our scheme of society. But these liberties will not be advanced or even maintained by denying to the states with all their resources, including the instrumentality of their courts, the power to deal with coercion due to extensive violence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The right of the Illinois courts to enjoin violence is not denied in this case. And I agree that nothing in the Federal Constitution deprives them of that right. But it is claimed that Illinois—through its courts—has here sanctioned an injunction so sweeping in its terms as to deny to petitioners and others their constitutional rights freely to express their views on matters of public concern. And this is the single federal question we must decide. In their brief, petitioners state that they 'have never and do not at the present time in any way condone or justify any violence by any member of the defendant union. Petitioners did not object to the issuance of an injunction restraining acts of violence. There is no contention made that the act of the Chancellor in granting such an injunction was erroneous.' 'Ethically, morally and legally', the petitioning union disclaims and condemns the acts of violence. And the master who conducted the hearings in the case specifically found that the union officials had instructed their pickets to refrain from violence. The record shows that the officials gave these instructions (which were obeyed), not only because they realized that resort to force and violence would be reprehensible and indefensible, but also because they recognized that such lawless conduct injures a labor union far more than it helps it. Aside from this, it cannot be doubted that attempts to persuade others by the application of physical force and violence as a substitute for persuasion by reason and peaceable argument is contrary to the first principles of our government. Nor can it be questioned that it is a prime function of courts to provide law enforcement means intended both to punish such illegal conduct and to protect against it. But this great responsibility is entrusted to courts not merely to determine the guilt or innocence of defendants, but to do so in such manner that those brought before them may enjoy a trial in which all their constitutional rights are safeguarded—including the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - My conclusion that the injunction as directed by the Supreme Court of Illinois invades the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press rests on my belief that these propositions are correct: (1) the subjects banned from public discussion by the injunction are matters of public concern, touching which the Constitution guarantees the right of freedom of expression; (2) the law of Illinois, as declared by its Supreme Court, makes illegal the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed privileges, and is an inadequate basis upon which to defend this abridgment of free speech; (3) the rule upon which the injunction is supported here and which this Court now declares to be the Illinois law is not the rule upon which the Illinois Supreme Court relied; (4) the rule announced here as supporting the right of a state to abridge freedom of expression is so general and sweeping in its implications that it opens up broad possibilities for invasion of these constitutional rights;
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Where nothing further appears, it is agreed that peaceful picketing, since it is an exercise of freedom of speech, may not be prohibited by injunction or by statute. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. —-, No. 56, decided today. It is equally clear that the right to picket is not absolute. It may, if actually necessary, be limited, let us say, to two or three individuals at a time and their manner of expressing their views may be reasonably restricted to an orderly presentation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - And so the right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of force.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - My conclusion that the injunction as directed by the Supreme Court of Illinois invades the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press rests on my belief that these propositions are correct: (1) the subjects banned from public discussion by the injunction are matters of public concern, touching which the Constitution guarantees the right of freedom of expression; (2) the law of Illinois, as declared by its Supreme Court, makes illegal the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed privileges, and is an inadequate basis upon which to defend this abridgment of free speech; (3) the rule upon which the injunction is supported here and which this Court now declares to be the Illinois law is not the rule upon which the Illinois Supreme Court relied; (4) the rule announced here as supporting the right of a state to abridge freedom of expression is so general and sweeping in its implications that it opens up broad possibilities for invasion of these constitutional rights; (5) in any event, the injunction here approved is too broad and sweeping in its terms to find justification under the rule announced by the Illinois court, and even though under other circumstances such an injunction would be permissible under the rule now announced by this Court, still in this case such an injunction is supported neither by the findings nor the evidence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - And even if violence were unintentionally included or incidentally referred to in the course of formulating a rule touching the right of free speech, such an unintentional inclusion or incidental reference is too uncertain a support upon which to rest a deprivation of this vital privilege.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - N11* In the present case, the prohibition against the dissemination of information through peaceful picketing was but one of the many restraints imposed by the sweeping injunction. As to this one single element of the prohibitions a number of statements appear in the rule now formulated. On the one hand it is said that 'dissociated acts of past violence' are not enough to forfeit the right of free speech. On the other hand a 'background of violence' appears to be sufficient. Nor are any more definite standards or guides to be found in such clauses as 'context of violence'; 'entanglement with violence'; 'coercive effect'; 'taint of force'; and 'coercive thrust'. It is my apprehension that a rule embodying such broad generalizations opens up new possibilities for invasion of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Illinois, like all the other states of the Union, is part of a national democratic system the continued existence of which depends upon the right of free discussion of public affairs—a right whose denial to some leads in the direction of it eventual denial to all. I am of opinion that the court's injunction strikes directly at the heart of our government, and that deprivation of these essential liberties cannot be reconciled with the rights guaranteed to the people of this Nation by their Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - The right to picket peacefully in industrial disputes is a recognized means for the marshaling of public opinion on the side of the worker. There is no finding that violence was planned or encouraged by the union. To deny this right of peaceful picketing to thousands because of the violence of a few means the cutting off of one of the constitutionally protected ways in which orderly adjustments of economic disputes are brought about. I cannot see that the constitutional problem is 'totally different' because raised by a court decree rather than a statute. Constitutional guarantees are just as effective for the individual as they are for the general public. The principle contended for by petitioners is the right to tell their side of the story by peaceful picketing despite a state court's view that such picketing may project fear from past violence into the future. In the last analysis we must ask ourselves whether this protection against assumed fear of future coercion flowing from past violence is sufficient to justify the suspension of the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - This nation relies upon public discussion as one of the indispensable means to attain correct solutions of problems of social welfare. Curtailment of free speech limits this open discussion. Our whole history teaches that adjustment of social relations through reason is possible while free speech is maintained. This Court has the solemn duty of determining when acts of legislation or decrees of courts infringe that right guaranteed to all citizens. Free speech may be absolutely prohibited only under the most pressing national emergencies. Those emergencies must be of the kind that justify the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the suppression of the right of trial by jury. Nothing approaching this situation exists in this record and, in my judgment, the action of the Supreme Court of Illinois in prohibiting peaceful picketing violates the constitutional rights of these petitioners.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - It is on the basis of my study of the entire record that I rest my conclusion that the forfeiture of the right to free speech effected by the injunction is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, I fully recognize that the union members guilty of violence were subject to punishment in accordance with the principles of due process of law. And some of them have in fact been prosecuted and convicted. Punishment of lawless conduct is in accord with the necessities of government and is essential to the peace and tranquillity of society. But it is going a long way to say that because of the acts of these few men, six thousand other members of their union can be denied the right to express their opinion to the extent accomplished by the sweeping injunction here sustained.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - The starting point is Thornhill's case. That case invoked the constitutional protection of free speech on behalf of a relatively modern means for 'publicizing, without annoyance or threat of any kind, the facts of a labor dispute'. 310 U.S. 100, 60 S.Ct. 743, 84 L.Ed. 1093. The whole series of cases defining the scope of free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment are facets of the same principle in that they all safeguard modes appropriate for assuring the right to utterance in different situations. Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - We have already adverted to the generous scope that must be given to the guarantee of free speech. Especially is this attitude to be observed where, as in labor controversies, the feelings of even the most detached minds may become engaged and a show of violence may make still further demands on calm judgment. It is therefore relevant to remind that the power to deny what otherwise would be lawful picketing derives from the power of the states to prevent future coercion. Right to free speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts of past violence. Nor may a state enjoin peaceful picketing merely because it may provoke violence in others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N12* In essence, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it was illegal for a labor union to publicize the fact of its belief that a cut-rate business system was injurious to the union and to the public, since such publicity necessarily discouraged that system's prospective purchasers. This conclusion of the court was based on the following reasoning: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Illinois Constitution, art. 2, § 2, considered (in some way not made clear) in connection with the unwritten 'common law', assure respondent the unqualified right to do business free from all unjustifiable interference; publication and peaceful argument intended to persuade respondent's customers that its methods of doing business were such that they should not buy the dairy's products were therefore illegal interference; the union's purpose to better working conditions of its members was no justification for its peaceful discussion of the controversy. Neither the presence nor the absence of violence was considered by the court to be a necessary element in its conclusion. All this was but to say that in this controversy peaceful criticism of the 'vendor system' was illegal because it might injure respondent's business by discouraging trade. But Illinois cannot, without nullifying constitutional guaranties, make it illegal to marshal public opinion against these general business practices.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - And the injunction of the trial judge, set aside by the Supreme Court of Illinois, specifically saved to petitioners—as in effect did Justice Cardozo in the New York case their right to publicize their cause by means of 'advertisement or communication.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Where nothing further appears, it is agreed that peaceful picketing, since it is an exercise of freedom of speech, may not be prohibited by injunction or by statute. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. —-, No. 56, decided today. It is equally clear that the right to picket is not absolute. It may, if actually necessary, be limited, let us say, to two or three individuals at a time and their manner of expressing their views may be reasonably restricted to an orderly presentation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - The right to picket peacefully in industrial disputes is a recognized means for the marshaling of public opinion on the side of the worker. There is no finding that violence was planned or encouraged by the union. To deny this right of peaceful picketing to thousands because of the violence of a few means the cutting off of one of the constitutionally protected ways in which orderly adjustments of economic disputes are brought about. I cannot see that the constitutional problem is 'totally different' because raised by a court decree rather than a statute. Constitutional guarantees are just as effective for the individual as they are for the general public. The principle contended for by petitioners is the right to tell their side of the story by peaceful picketing despite a state court's view that such picketing may project fear from past violence into the future. In the last analysis we must ask ourselves whether this protection against assumed fear of future coercion flowing from past violence is sufficient to justify the suspension of the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - This nation relies upon public discussion as one of the indispensable means to attain correct solutions of problems of social welfare. Curtailment of free speech limits this open discussion. Our whole history teaches that adjustment of social relations through reason is possible while free speech is maintained. This Court has the solemn duty of determining when acts of legislation or decrees of courts infringe that right guaranteed to all citizens. Free speech may be absolutely prohibited only under the most pressing national emergencies.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - The starting point is Thornhill's case. That case invoked the constitutional protection of free speech on behalf of a relatively modern means for N1* 'publicizing, without annoyance or threat of any kind, the facts of a labor dispute'. 310 U.S. 100, 60 S.Ct. 743, 84 L.Ed. 1093. The whole series of cases defining the scope of free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment are facets of the same principle in that they all safeguard modes appropriate for assuring the right to utterance in different situations. Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Where nothing further appears, it is agreed that peaceful picketing, since it is an exercise of freedom of speech, may not be prohibited by injunction or by statute. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. —-, No. 56, decided today. It is equally clear that the right to picket is not absolute. It may, if actually necessary, be limited, let us say, to two or three individuals at a time and their manner of expressing their views may be reasonably restricted to an orderly presentation. Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. page 105, 60 S.Ct. 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093. From the standpoint of the state, industrial controversy may not overstep the bounds of an appeal to reason and sympathy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - To sanction vague and undefined terminologies in dragnet clauses directly and exclusively aimed at restraining freedom of discussion upon the theory that we might later acquit those convicted for violation of such terminology amounts in my judgment to a prior censorship of views. No matter how the decree might eventually be construed, its language, viewed in the light of the whole proceedings, stands like an abstract statute with an overhanging and undefined threat to freedom of speech and the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N5* When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the Illinois courts to prevent or punish is obvious. Furthermore, this is true because a state has the power to adopt laws of general application to provide that the streets shall be used for the purpose for which they primarily exist, and because the preservation of peace and order is one of the first duties of government. But in a series of cases we have held that local laws ostensibly passed pursuant to this admittedly possessed general power could not be enforced in such a way as to amount to a prior censorship on freedom of expression, or to abridge that freedom as to those rightfully and lawfully on the streets.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - And whether the injunction will restrain the exercise of constitutional rights depends upon the effect it will have upon the minds of those whose freedom of expression might be abridged by its mandate. This effect in turn depends upon the language appearing upon the face of the injunction. By that language we must judge it. For this injunction does not run merely against lawyers who might give it a legalistic interpretation, but against laymen as well. Our question then becomes: To what extent will the layman who might wish to write about or discuss the prohibited subjects feel that he cannot do so without subjecting himself to the possibility of a jail sentence under a summary punishment for contempt? This injunction, like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct under fear of punishment. There is every reason why we should look at the injunction as we would a statute, and if upon its face it abridges the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, it should be stricken down.
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Phrase match: freedom of expression might be abridged by its mandate
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Parties: AMERICAN FEDN. OF LABOR v. SWING
Date: 1941-02-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech. That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown up by modern industry and to preserve the peace is axiomatic. But not even these essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state. A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him. The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, 42 S.Ct. 72, 78, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360. The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the utterance protected in Thornhill's case. N4* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech. That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown up by modern industry and to preserve the peace is axiomatic. But not even these essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state. A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him. The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, 42 S.Ct. 72, 78, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360. The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the utterance protected in Thornhill's case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the utterance protected in Thornhill's case. N2* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
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Parties: Cox v. New Hampshire
Date: 1941-03-31
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - In Lovell v. Griffin, supra, the ordinance prohibited the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit from the city manager, thus striking at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, supra (307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423), the ordinance dealt with the exercise of the right of assembly for the purpose of communicating views; it did not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets the standard of official action but enabled the local official absolutely to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal would prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage'. The ordinance thus created, as the record disclosed, an instrument of arbitrary suppression of opinions on public questions. The court said that 'uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right'. In Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U.S., page 163, 60 S.Ct. page 151, 84 L.Ed. 155, the ordinance was directed at canvassing and banned unlicensed communication of any views, or the advocacy of any cause, from door to door, subject only to the power of a police officer to determine as a censor what literature might be distributed and who might distribute it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - or is any question of peaceful picketing here involved, as in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, and Carlson v. People of California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104. The statute, as the state court said, is not aimed at any restraint of freedom of speech, and there is no basis for an assumption that it would be applied so as to prevent peaceful picketing as described in the cases cited.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional exercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The decisions upon which appellants rely are not applicable. In Lovell v. Griffin, supra, the ordinance prohibited the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit from the city manager, thus striking at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, supra (307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423), the ordinance dealt with the exercise of the right of assembly for the purpose of communicating views; it did not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets the standard of official action but enabled the local official absolutely to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal would prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage'. The ordinance thus created, as the record disclosed, an instrument of arbitrary suppression of opinions on public questions. The court said that 'uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right'. In Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U.S., page 163, 60 S.Ct. page 151, 84 L.Ed. 155, the ordinance was directed at canvassing and banned unlicensed communication of any views, or the advocacy of any cause, from door to door, subject only to the power of a police officer to determine as a censor what literature might be distributed and who might distribute it. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S., page 305, 60 S.Ct. page 904, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352, the statute dealt with the solicitation of funds for religious causes and authorized an official to determine whether the cause was a religious one and to refuse a permit if he determined it was not, thus establishing a censorship of religion.
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Parties: Bridges v. California
Date: 1941-12-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - How much 'likelihood' is another question, 'a question of proximity and degree' that cannot be completely captured in a formula. In Schenck v. United States, however, this Court said that there must be a determination of whether or not N5* 'the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils.' We recognize that this statement, however helpful, does not comprehend the whole problem. As Mr. Justice Brandeis said in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095: 'This court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present.' Nevertheless, the 'clear and present danger' language of the Schenck case has afforded practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of constitutional protections of freedom of expression was in issue.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits and law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech, or of
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - More specifically, it is to forget the environment in which the First Amendment was ratified. In presenting the proposals which were later embodied in the Bill of Rights, James Madison, the leader in the preparation of the First Amendment, said: N6* 'Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question in that body (Parliament), the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British Constitution.' 1 Annals of Congress 1789-1790, 434. And Madison elsewhere wrote that 'the state of the press * * * under the common law, cannot * * * be the standard of its freedom in the United States.' VI Writings of James Madison 1790-1802, 387.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - And very recently we have also suggested that 'clear and present danger' is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restrictions upon expression where the substantive evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is N12* 'destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy.' Thornhill v. Alabama,
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - Moreover, the likelihood, however great that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press. The evil itself must be 'substantial', Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. California, supra, 274 U.S. at page 374, 47 S.Ct. at page 647, 71 L.Ed. 1095; it must be 'serious', Id., 274 U.S. at page 376, 47 S.Ct. at page 648, 71 L.ed. 1095. And even the expression of N3* 'legislative preferences or beliefs' cannot transform minor matters of public inconvenience or annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient weight to warrant the curtailment of liberty of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression. Yet, it would follow as a practical result of the decisions below that anyone who might wish to give public expression to his views on a pending case involving no matter what problem of public interest, just at the time his audience would be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a deliberate statutory scheme of censorship had been adopted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Those cases N3* do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits and law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
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Parties: Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
Date: 1942-03-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - The term 'picketing' as used in (the act) does not include acts held in the Thornhill case (supra), to be within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of the right of free speech. The express language of the act forbids such a construction. It clearly refers to that kind of picketing which the Thornhill case, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093, says the state has power to deal with as a part of its power 'to preserve the peace and protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents.' * * * In this case it is undisputed that numerous assaults were committed by pickets, that the pickets acted in concert; that the fines of these pickets were paid by the unions; that ingress and egress to and from the premises of the employer were prevented by force and arms. It was at conduct of that kind that the statute was aimed. It is conduct of that kind that is dealt with in this case. It is conduct of that kind that is declared to be an unfair labor practice by the statute and from which the defendants are ordered to cease and desist. * * *' And on rehearing: 'Under the statute and the order of the board as interpreted and construed by the explicit language of the (previous) opinion, freedom of speech and the right peacefully to picket is in no way interfered with. The appellants could not be ordered to cease and desist from something they were not engaged in. * * * The picketing carried on in this case was not peaceful and the right of free speech is in no way infringed by the statute or the order of the board.' 236 Wis. 329, passim, 294 N.W. 632, 638, 295 N.W. 634, 635.
Notes:
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Phrase match: opinion, freedom of speech and the
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Parties: Chaplinsky v. N.H.
Date: 1942-03-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - It is now clear that 'Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action'.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. N4* 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.'
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Phrase match: of free speech is not absolute
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Parties: Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe
Date: 1942-03-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The constitutional right to communicate peaceably to the public the facts of a legitimate dispute is not lost merely because a labor dispute is involved, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, or because the communication takes the form of picketing, even when the communication does not concern a dispute between an employer and those directly employed by him. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855. But the circumstance that a labor dispute is the occasion of exercising freedom of expression does not give that freedom any greater constitutional sanction or render it completely inviolable. Where, as here, claims on behalf of free speech are met with claims on behalf of the authority of the state to impose reasonable regulations for the protection of the community as a whole, the duty of this Court is plain. Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of 'liberty', the question always is whether the state has violated 'the essential attributes of that liberty'. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 51 S.Ct. 625, 628, 75 L.Ed. 1357. While the right of free speech is embodied in the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, that Clause postulates the authority of the states to translate into law local policies N7* 'to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its people * * *. The limits of this sovereign power must always be determined with appropriate regard to the particular subject of its exercise.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - It does not follow that the State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern. A contrary conclusion could be used to support abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost every matter of importance to society,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - 'More thorough study of the record and full argument have reduced the issue to this: is the constitutional guarantee of freedom of discussion infringed by the common law policy of a state forbidding resort to peaceful persuasion through picketing merely because there is no immediate employer-employee dispute?' There was nothing in the opinion to intimate that the answer would have varied, if the union had been a local of the teamsters or painters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N16* 'In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. * * * Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem. * * *
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - But the circumstance that a labor dispute is the occasion of exercising freedom of expression does not give that freedom any greater constitutional sanction or render it completely inviolable. Where, as here, claims on behalf of free speech are met with claims on behalf of the authority of the state to impose reasonable regulations for the protection of the community as a whole, the duty of this Court is plain. Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of 'liberty', the question always is whether the state has violated N17* 'the essential attributes of that liberty'. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 51 S.Ct. 625, 628, 75 L.Ed. 1357. While the right of free speech is embodied in the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, that Clause postulates the authority of the states to translate into law local policies N18* 'to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its people * * *.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - It is true that by peaceful picketing workingmen communicate their grievances. As a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute peaceful picketing may be a phase of the constitutional right of free utterance. But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not imply that the states must be without power to confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N19* 'Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech. That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown up by modern industry and to preserve the peace is axiomatic. But not even these essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state. A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. American (Steel) Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, 42 S.Ct. 72, 78, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360. The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the utterance protected in Thornhill's case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - We are of the view that the right of free speech upheld in these decisions requires Texas to permit the publicizing of the dissatisfaction over Mr. Ritter's contract for his new building. Until today orderly, regulated, picketing has been within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such picketing was obviously disadvantageous to the business affected. In balancing social advantages it has been felt that the preservation of free speech in labor disputes was more important than the freedom of enterprise from the burdens of the picket line. It was a limitation on state power to deal as it pleased with labor disputes; a limitation consented to by the state when it became a part of the nation and one of precisely the same quality as those enforced in Carlson, Thornhill and Swing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - We are not here forced, as the Court assumes, to support a constitutional interpretation that peaceful picketing 'must be wholly immune from regulation by the community in order to protect the general interest.' We do not doubt the right of the state to impose not only some but many restrictions upon peaceful picketing. Reasonable numbers, quietness, truthful placards, open ingress and egress, suitable hours or other proper limitations, not destructive of the right to tell of labor difficulties, may be required.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The constitutional right to communicate peaceably to the public the facts of a legitimate dispute is not lost merely because a labor dispute is involved, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, or because the communication takes the form of picketing, even when the communication does not concern a dispute between an employer and those directly employed by him.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Recent cases in this Court have sought to make more definite the extent and limitations of the rights of free speech in labor disputes. For some time there has been general acceptance of the fundamental right to publicize N13* 'the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means.' One of the recognized means is by orderly picketing with banners or placards. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093. In Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113, 60 S.Ct. 746, 749, 84 L.Ed. 1104, we said: N14* 'For the reasons set forth in our opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - In the Carlson and Thornhill cases legislation forbidding picketing for the purpose of interfering with the business of another was invalidated because it was an unconstitutional prohibition of the worker's right to publicize his situation. It was not thought of sufficient importance in either case to mention in the opinion whether the picket was an interested disputant with those picketed or an utter stranger to the controversy and the industry.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - It does not follow that the State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern. A contrary conclusion could be used to support abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost every matter of importance to society,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - We are not here forced, as the Court assumes, to support a constitutional interpretation that peaceful picketing 'must be wholly immune from regulation by the community in order to protect the general interest.' We do not doubt the right of the state to impose not only some but many restrictions upon peaceful picketing. Reasonable numbers, quietness, truthful placards, open ingress and egress, suitable hours or other proper limitations, not destructive of the right to tell of labor difficulties, may be required.
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Phrase match: the right to tell of labor
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N5* 'Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech. That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown up by modern industry and to preserve the peace is axiomatic. But not even these essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state. A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.
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Parties: Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, etc. v. Wohl
Date: 1942-03-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - While we recognized that picketing could be regulated, we stated at pages 104, 105 of 310 U.S., at page 745 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 1093: N13* 'Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.' And we added at page 105 of 310 U.S., at page 745 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 1093: N14* 'But no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter.' For that reason we invoked the test, employed in comparable situations (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 904, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. —-) that the statute which is the source of the restriction on free speech must be N15* 'narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation giving rise to the danger.'
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Phrase match: the right of privacy, or breach
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - We ourselves can perceive no substantive evil of such magnitude as to mark a limit to the right of free speech which the petitioners sought to exercise. The record in this case does not contain the slightest suggestion of embarrassment in the task of governance; there are no findings and no circumstances from which we can draw the inference that the publication was attended or likely to be attended by violence, force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive; and it is not indicated that there was an actual or threatened abuse of the right to free speech through the use of excessive picketing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - We ourselves can perceive no substantive evil of such magnitude as to mark a limit to the right of free speech which the petitioners sought to exercise. The record in this case does not contain the slightest suggestion of embarrassment in the task of governance; there are no findings and no circumstances from which we can draw the inference that the publication was attended or likely to be attended by violence, force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive; and it is not indicated that there was an actual or threatened abuse of the right to free speech through the use of excessive picketing. A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual. But so far as we can tell, respondents' mobility and their insulation from the public as middlemen made it practically impossible for petitioners to make known their legitimate grievances to the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system except by the means here employed and contemplated; and those means are such as to have slight, if any, repercussions upon the interests of strangers to the issue.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - We ourselves can perceive no substantive evil of such magnitude as to mark a limit to the right of free speech which the petitioners sought to exercise. The record in this case does not contain the slightest suggestion of embarrassment in the task of governance; there are no findings and no circumstances from which we can draw the inference that the publication was attended or likely to be attended by violence, force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive; and it is not indicated that there was an actual or threatened abuse of the right to free speech through the use of excessive picketing.
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Phrase match: of free speech which the petitioners
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation.
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Parties: Valentine v. Chrestensen
Date: 1942-04-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - it is not clear whether this segment argues that advertising is outside speech covered by the First Amendment or that advertising is speech that can be regulatiedThis court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment. The question is not whether the legislative body may interfere with the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must permit such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of the highways by the people in fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated. If the respondent was attempting to use the streets of New York by distributing commercial advertising, the prohibition of the code provision was lawfully invoked against his conduct.
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Parties: Jones v. Opelika
Date: 1942-06-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Under the foregoing discussion of freedom of speech and freedom of the press any person would be exempt from taxation upon the act of distributing information or opinion of any kind, whether political, scientific, or religious in character, when done solely in an effort to spread knowledge and ideas, with no thought of commercial gain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - We turn to the constitutional problem squarely presented by these ordinances. There are ethical principles of greater value to mankind than the guarantees of the Constitution, personal liberties which are beyond the power of government to impair. These principles and liberties belong to the mental and spiritual realm where the judgments and decrees of mundane courts are ineffective to direct the course of man. The rights of which our Constitution speaks have a more earthy quality. They are not absolutes to be exercised independently of other cherished privileges, protected by the same organic instrument. Conflicts in the exercise of rights arise and the conflicting forces seek adjustments in the courts, as do these parties, claiming on the one side the freedom of religion, speech and the press, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and on the other the right to employ the sovereign power explicitly reserved to the State by the Tenth Amendment to ensure orderly living without which constitutional guarantees of civil liberties would be a mockery. Courts, no more than Constitutions, can intrude into the consciences of men or compel them to believe contrary to their faith or think contrary to their convictions, but courts are competent to adjudge the acts men do under color of a constitutional right, such as that of freedom of speech or of the press or the free exercise of religion and to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recognized powers, equally precious to mankind. So the mind and spirit of man remain forever free, while his actions rest subject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs of his fellows.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary commercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of the power of the state to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of canvassing. Careful as we may and should be to protect the freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to see in such enactments a shadow of prohibition of the exercise of religion or of abridgement of the freedom of speech or the press. It is prohibition and unjustifiable abridgement which is interdicted, not taxation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - . Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish N8* 'without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - It lends no support to the present tax to insist that its restraint on free speech and religion is non-discriminatory because the same levy is made upon business callings carried on for profit, many of which involve no question of freedom of speech and religion and all of which involve commercial elements—lacking here—which for present purposes may be assumed to afford a basis for taxation apart from the exercise of freedom of speech and religion. The constitutional protection of the Bill of Rights is not to be evaded by classifying with business callings an activity whose sole purpose is the dissemination of ideas, and taxing it as business callings are taxed. The immunity which press and religion enjoy may sometimes be lost when they are united with other activities not immune. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. —-. But here the only activities involved are the dissemination of ideas, educational and religious, and the collection of funds for the propagation of those ideas, which we have said is likewise the subject of constitutional protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position. Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being used to control or suppress it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Vivid recollections of the effect of those taxes N9* on the freedom of press survived to inspire the adoption of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Freedom of press and religion, explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, must at least be entitled to the same freedom from burdensome taxation which it has been thought that the more general phraseology of the commerce clause has extended to interstate commerce. Whatever doubts may be entertained as to this Court's function to relieve, unaided by Congressional legislation, from burdensome taxation under the commerce clause, see Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441, 446-455, 59 S.Ct. 325, 328, 331-335, 83 L.Ed. 272; McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 184, 185, 60 S.Ct. 504, 508, 84 L.Ed. 683, it cannot be thought that that function is wanting under the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech, press and religion. In any case the flat license tax can hardly become any the less burdensome or more permissible, when levied on activities within the protection extended by the First and Fourteenth Amendments both to the orderly communication of ideas, educational and religious, to persons willing to receive them, see Cant-well v. Connecticut, supra, and to the practice of religion and the solicitation of funds in its support.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - In view of the recent decisions of this Court striking down acts which impair freedom of speech and freedom of the press no elaboration on that subject is now necessary.We have N10* 'unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.' Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. —-, decided April 13, 1942. And as the distribution of pamphlets to spread information and opinion on the streets and from house to house for non-commercial purposes is protected from the prior restraint of censorship, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155, so should it be protected from the burden of taxation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - the taxes are in reality taxes upon the dissemination of religious ideas, a dissemination carried on by the distribution of religious literature for religious reasons alone and not for personal profit. As such they place a burden on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the exercise of religion even if the question of amount is laid aside. Liberty of circulation is the very life blood of a free press, cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, and taxes on the circulation of ideas have a long history of misuse against freedom of thought. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245—249, 56 S.Ct. 444, 447, 448, 80 L.Ed. 660.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - N11* Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion all have a double aspect—freedom of thought and freedom of action. Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind. But even an aggressive mind is of no missionary value unless there is freedom of action, freedom to communicate its message to others by speech and writing. Since in any form of action there is a possibility of collision with the rights of others, there can be no doubt that this freedom to act is not absolute but qualified, being subject to regulation in the public interest which does not unduly infringe the right. However, there is no assertion here that the ordinances were regulatory, but if there were such a claim, they still should not be sustained. No abuses justifying regulation are advanced and the ordinances are not narrowly and precisely drawn to deal with actual, or even hypothetical evils, while at the same time preserving the substance of the right. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. They impose a tax on the dissemination of information and opinion anywhere within the city limits, whether on the streets or from house to house. N12* 'As we have said, the streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised elsewhere.' Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. These taxes abridge that liberty.
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Phrase match: Freedom of speech, freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - It matters not that petitioners asked contributions for their literature. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot and must not mean freedom only for those who can distribute their broadsides without charge. There may be others with messages more vital but purses less full, who must seek some reimbursement for their outlay or else forego passing on their ideas. The pamphlet, an historic weapon against oppression, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, is today the convenient vehicle of those with limited resources because newspaper space and radio time are expensive and the cost of establishing such enterprises great. If freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to have any concrete meaning, people seeking to distribute information and opinion, to the end only that others shall have the benefit thereof, should not be taxed for circulating such matter.
Notes:
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Phrase match: literature. Freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - Respondents do not show that the instant activities of Jehovah's Witnesses create special problems causing a drain on the municipal coffers, or that these taxes are commensurate with any expenses entailed by the presence of the Witnesses. In the absence of such a showing I think no tax whatever can be levied on petitioners' activities in distributing their literature or disseminating their ideas. If the guaranties of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to be preserved, municipalities should not be free to raise general revenue by taxes on the circulation of information and opinion in non-commercial causes; other sources can be found, the taxation of which will not choke off ideas.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - No one could doubt that taxation which may be freely laid upon activities not within the protection of the Bill of Rights could—when applied to the dissemination of ideas—be made the ready instrument for destruction of that right. Few would deny that a license tax laid specifically on the privilege of disseminating ideas would infringe the right of free speech. For one reason among others, if the state may tax the privilege it may fix the rate of tax and, through the tax, control or suppress the activity which it taxes.
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Phrase match: the right of free speech. For
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Ordinances absolutely prohibiting the exercise of the right to disseminate information are, a fortiori, invalid.
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Phrase match: the right to disseminate information are
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.'And the liberty of the press became initially N15* a right to publish 'without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.'
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Phrase match: a right to publish 'without a
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - Respondents do not show that the instant activities of Jehovah's Witnesses create special problems causing a drain on the municipal coffers, or that these taxes are commensurate with any expenses entailed by the presence of the Witnesses. In the absence of such a showing I think no tax whatever can be levied on petitioners' activities in distributing their literature or disseminating their ideas. If the guaranties of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to be preserved, municipalities should not be free to raise general revenue by taxes on the circulation of information and opinion in non-commercial causes; other sources can be found, the taxation of which will not choke off ideas. Taxes such as the instant ones violate petitioners' right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, protected against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Phrase match: petitioners' right to freedom of speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - It lends no support to the present tax to insist that its restraint on free speech and religion is non-discriminatory because the same levy is made upon business callings carried on for profit, many of which involve no question of freedom of speech and religion and all of which involve commercial elements—lacking here—which for present purposes may be assumed to afford a basis for taxation apart from the exercise of freedom of speech and religion. The constitutional protection of the Bill of Rights is not to be evaded by classifying with business callings an activity whose sole purpose is the dissemination of ideas, and taxing it as business callings are taxed. The immunity which press and religion enjoy may sometimes be lost when they are united with other activities not immune. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. —-. But here the only activities involved are the dissemination of ideas, educational and religious, and the collection of funds for the propagation of those ideas, which we have said is likewise the subject of constitutional protection.
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Phrase match: on free speech and religion is
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position. Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being used to control or suppress it.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech and freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - And as the distribution of pamphlets to spread information and opinion on the streets and from house to house for non-commercial purposes is protected from the prior restraint of censorship, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155, so should it be protected from the burden of taxation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - It matters not that petitioners asked contributions for their literature. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot and must not mean freedom only for those who can distribute their broadsides without charge. There may be others with messages more vital but purses less full, who must seek some reimbursement for their outlay or else forego passing on their ideas. The pamphlet, an historic weapon against oppression, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, is today the convenient vehicle of those with limited resources because newspaper space and radio time are expensive and the cost of establishing such enterprises great. If freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to have any concrete meaning, people seeking to distribute information and opinion, to the end only that others shall have the benefit thereof, should not be taxed for circulating such matter.
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Phrase match: Freedom of speech and freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - N6* Taxes such as the instant ones violate petitioners' right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, protected against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech and freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - In view of the recent decisions of this Court striking down acts which impair freedom of speech and freedom of the press no elaboration on that subject is now necessary. We have N6* 'unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.' Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. —-, decided April 13, 1942. And as the distribution of pamphlets to spread information and opinion on the streets and from house to house for non-commercial purposes is protected from the prior restraint of censorship, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155, so should it be protected from the burden of taxation.
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Phrase match: prior restraint of censorship, Lovell v. Griffin
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - In dealing with these delicate adjustments this Court denies any place to administrative censorship of ideas or capricious approval of distributors.
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Phrase match: place to administrative censorship of ideas or
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The differences between censorship and complete prohibition, either of subject matter or the individuals participating, upon the one hand, and regulation of the conduct of individuals in the time, manner and place of their activities upon the other, are decisive.
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Phrase match: The differences between censorship and complete prohibition
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N7* In the ordinances of Casa Grande and Fort Smith, we have no discretionary power in the public authorities to refuse a license to any one desirous of selling religious literature. No censorship of the material which enters into the books or papers is authorized. No religious symbolism is involved such as was urged against the flag salute in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375, 127 A.L.R. 1493. For us there is no occasion to apply here the principles taught by that opinion. Nothing more is asked from one group than from another which uses similar methods of propagation. We see nothing in the collection of a nondiscriminatory license fee, uncontested in amount, from those selling books or papers, which abridges the freedoms of worship, speech or press.
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Phrase match: religious literature. No censorship of the material
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - To say that he who is free to withhold at will the privilege of publication exercises a power of censorship prohibited by the Constitution, but that he who has unrestricted power to withdraw the privilege does not, would be to ignore history and deny the teachings of experience, as well as to perpetuate the evils at which the First Amendment was aimed.
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Phrase match: a power of censorship prohibited by the
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - I think no tax whatever can be levied on petitioners' activities in distributing their literature or disseminating their ideas. If the guaranties of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to be preserved, municipalities should not be free to raise general revenue by taxes on the circulation of information and opinion in non-commercial causes; other sources can be found, the taxation of which will not choke off ideas. Taxes such as the instant ones violate petitioners' right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, protected against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position. Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being used to control or suppress it.
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Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Parties: Jamison v. Texas
Date: 1943-03-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - Of course, states may provide the control of travel on their streets in order to insure the safety and convenience of the traveling public. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1396. They may punish conduct on the streets which is in violation of a valid law. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031. But one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, supra; Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. Here, the ordinance as construed and applied prohibits the dissemination of information by handbills. As such, it cannot be sustained.
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Phrase match: constitutional right to express his views
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Parties: Murdock v. Pennsylvania
Date: 1943-05-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N13* ItN14* also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The taxes imposed by this ordinance can hardly help but be as severe and telling in their impact on the freedom of the press and religion as the 'taxes on knowledge' at which the First Amendment was partly aimed. Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, 297 U.S. at pages 244—249, 56 S.Ct. at pages 446—449, 80 L.Ed. 660. They may indeed operate even more subtly. Itinerant evangelists moving throughout a state or from state to state would feel immediately the cumulative effect of such ordinances as they become fashionable. The way of the religious dissenter has long been hard. But if the formula of this type of ordinance is approved, a new device for the suppression of religious minorities will have been found. This method of disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town, village by village. The spread of religious ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry of numerous religious groups would be stopped.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press and
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The ordinance is not narrowly drawn to prevent or control abuses or evils arising from that activity. Rather, it sets aside the residential areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied petitioners unless the tax is paid. That restraint and one which is city wide in scope (Jones v. Opelika) are different only in degree. Each is an abridgment of freedom of press and a restraint on the free exercise of religion. They stand or fall together.
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Phrase match: of freedom of press and a
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - While the interpreters of the Constitution find the purpose was to allow the widest practical scope for the exercise of religion and the dissemination of information, no jurist has ever conceived that the prohibition of interference is absolute. Is subjection to nondiscriminatory, nonexcessive taxation in the distribution of religious literature, a prohibition of the exercise of religion or an abridgment of the freedom of the press? Nothing has been brought to our attention which would lead to the conclusion that the contemporary advocates of the adoption of a Bill of Rights intended such an exemption. The words of the Amendment do not support such a construction. 'Free' cannot be held to be without cost but rather its meaning must accord with the freedom guaranteed. 'Free' means a privilege to print or pray without permission and without accounting to authority for one's actions.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press? Nothing
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660, it was said that the predominant purpose was to preserve N15* 'an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information.' In that case, a gross receipt tax on advertisements in papers with a circulation of more than twenty thousand copies per week was held invalid because 'a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation * * *.' There was this further comment: 'It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government. But this is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.' Id
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press.' Id
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Or is this Court saying that a religious practice of book distribution is free from taxation because a state cannot prohibit the 'free exercise thereof' and a newspaper is subject to the same tax even though the same Constitutional Amendment says the state cannot abridge the freedom of the press? It has never been thought before that freedom from taxation was a perquisite attaching to the privileges of the First Amendment. The national Government grants exemptions to ministers and churches because it wishes to do so, not because the Constitution compels.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press? It
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - It is urged that such a tax as this may be used readily to restrict the dissemination of ideas. This must be conceded by the possibility of misuse does not make a tax unconstitutional. No abuse is claimed here. The ordinances in some of these cases are the general occupation license type covering many businesses. In the Jeannette prosecutions, the ordinance involved lays the usual tax on canvassing or soliciting sales of goods, wares and merchandise. It was passed in 1898. Every power of taxation or regulation is capable of abuse. Each one to some extent prohibits the free exercise of religion and abridges the freedom of the press but that is hardly a reason for denying the power.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press but
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - It is certainly true that the protection afforded the freedom of the press by the First Amendment does not include exemption from all taxation. A tax upon newspaper publishing is not invalid simply because it falls upon the exercise of a constitutional right. Such a tax might be invalid if it invidiously singled out newspaper publishing for bearing the burdens of taxation or imposed upon them in such ways as to encroach on the essential scope of a free press. If the Court could justifiably hold that the tax measures in these cases were vulnerable on that ground, I would unreservedly agree. But the Court has not done so, and indeed could not.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press by
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - The First Amendment of course protects the right to publish a newspaper or a magazine or a book. But the crucial question is—how much protection does the Amendment give, and against what is the right protected? It is certainly true that the protection afforded the freedom of the press by the First Amendment does not include exemption from all taxation. A tax upon newspaper publishing is not invalid simply because it falls upon the exercise of a constitutional right.
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Phrase match: the right to publish a newspaper
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - As the opinion of my Brother REED demonstrates, we have not here the question whether the taxes imposed in these cases are in practical operation an unjustifiable curtailment upon the petitioners' undoubted right to communicate their views to others. No claim is made that the effect of these taxes, either separately or cumulatively, has been or is likely to be to restrict the petitioners' religious propaganda activities in any degree. Counsel expressly disclaim any such contention. They insist on absolute immunity from any kind of monetary exaction for their occupation. Their claim is that no tax, no matter how trifling, can constitutionally be laid upon the activity of distributing religious literature, regardless of the actual effect of the tax upon such activity.
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Phrase match: undoubted right to communicate their views
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge. It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.
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Phrase match: The right to use the press
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Can it be that the Constitution permits a tax on the printing presses and the gross income of a metropolitan newspaper but denies the right to lay an occupational tax on the distributors of the same papers? Does the exemption apply to booksellers or distributors of magazines or only to religious publications? And if the latter to what distributors? Or to what books? Or is this Court saying that a religious practice of book distribution is free from taxation because a state cannot prohibit the 'free exercise thereof' and a newspaper is subject to the same tax even though the same Constitutional Amendment says the state cannot abridge the freedom of the press? It has never been thought before that freedom from taxation was a perquisite attaching to the privileges of the First Amendment.
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Phrase match: the right to lay an occupational
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - It is strenuously urged that the Constitution denies a city the right to control the expression of men's minds and the right of men to win others to their views. But the Court is not divided on this proposition. No one disputes it. All members of the Court are equally familiar with the history that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights and are equally zealous to enforce the constitutional protection of the free play of the human spirit. Escape from the real issue before us cannot be found in such generalities. The real issue here is not whether a city may charge for the dissemination of ideas but whether the states have power to require those who need additional facilities to help bear the cost of furnishing such facilities. Street hawkers make demands upon municipalities that involve the expenditure of dollars and cents, whether they hawk printed matter or other things. As the facts in these cases show, the cost of maintaining the peace, the additional demands upon governmental facilities for assuring security, involve outlays which have to be met. To say that the Constitution forbids the states to obtain the necessary revenue from the whole of a class that enjoys these benefits and facilities, when in fact no discrimination is suggested as between purveyors of printed matter and purveyors of other things, and the exaction is not claimed to be actually burdensome, is to say that the Constitution requires, not that the dissemination of ideas in the interest of religion shall be free, but that it shall be subsidized by the state. Such a claim offends the most important of all aspects of religious freedom in this country, namely, that of the separation of church and state.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right to control the expression
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N7* But the mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge. It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.
Notes:
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Phrase match: Freedom of speech, freedom of the
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - In the opinion in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 86 L.Ed. 1691, 141 A.L.R. 514, on the former hearing, attention was called to the differentiation between these cases of taxation and those of forbidden censorship, prohibition or discrimination. There is no occasion to repeat what has been written so recently as to the constitutional right to tax the money raising activities of religious or didactic groups. There are, however, other reasons not fully developed in that opinion that add to our conviction that the Constitution does not prohibit these general occupational taxes.
Notes:
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Phrase match: those of forbidden censorship, prohibition or discrimination
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N8* A license tax applied to activities guaranteed by the First Amendment would have the same destructive effect. It is true that the First Amendment, like the commerce clause, draws no distinction between license taxes, fixed sum taxes, and other kinds of taxes. But that is no reason why we should shut our eyes to the nature of the tax and its destructive influence. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down.
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Phrase match: the power of censorship which this Court
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - This late withdrawal of the power of taxation over the distribution activities of those covered by the First Amendment fixes what seems to us an unfortunate principle of tax exemption, capable of indefinite extension. We had thought that such an exemption required a clear and certain grant. This we do not find in the language of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Parties: Martin v. Struthers
Date: 1943-05-03
Identifiers:
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Freedom to distribute publications is obviously a part of the general freedom guaranteed the expression of ideas by the First Amendment.
Notes:
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Phrase match: Freedom to distribute publications is
Search time: 2017-05-08 13:46:36 Searcher: ars9ef Editor: tcs9pk Segmenter: tcs9pk
Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a community of cleaning litter from its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. No one supposes, for example, that a city need permit a man with a communicable disease to distribute leaflets on the street or to homes, or that the First Amendment prohibits a state from preventing the distribution of leaflets in a church against the will of the church authorities.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech and press
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - I myself cannot say that those in whose keeping is the peace of the City of Struthers and the right of privacy of its home dwellers could not single out in circumstances of which they may have knowledge and I certainly have not, this class of canvassers as the particular source of mischief. The Court's opinion leaves one in doubt whether prohibition of all bell-ringing and door-knocking would be deemed an infringement of the constitutional protection of speech. It would be fantastic to suggest that a city has power, in the circumstances of modern urban life, to forbid house-to-house canvassing generally, but that the Constitution prohibits the inclusion in such prohibition of door-to-door vending of phylacteries or rosaries or of any printed matter. If the scope of the Court's opinion, apart from some of its general observations, is that this ordinance is an invidious discrimination against distributors of what is politely called literature, and therefore is deemed an unjustifiable prohibition of freedom of utterance, the decision leaves untouched what are in my view controlling constitutional principles, if I am correct in my understanding of what is held, and I would not be disposed to disagree with such a construction of the ordinance.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom of utterance, the decision
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Freedom to distribute publications is obviously a part of the general freedom guaranteed the expression of ideas by the First Amendment. It is trite to say that this freedom of expression is not unlimited. Obscenity, disloyalty and provocatives do not come within its protection. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 629, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1352; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51, 39 S.Ct. 247, 248, 63 L.Ed. 470; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 574, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 770, 86 L.Ed. 1031. All agree that there may be reasonable regulation of the freedom of expression. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. One cannot throw dodgers 'broadcast in the streets.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - I myself cannot say that those in whose keeping is the peace of the City of Struthers and the right of privacy of its home dwellers could not single out in circumstances of which they may have knowledge and I certainly have not, this class of canvassers as the particular source of mischief. The Court's opinion leaves one in doubt whether prohibition of all bell-ringing and door-knocking would be deemed an infringement of the constitutional protection of speech. It would be fantastic to suggest that a city has power, in the circumstances of modern urban life, to forbid house-to-house canvassing generally, but that the Constitution prohibits the inclusion in such prohibition of door-to-door vending of phylacteries or rosaries or of any printed matter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a community of cleaning litter from its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N16* This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a community of cleaning litter from its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - While I appreciate the necessity of watchfulness to avoid abridgments of our freedom of expression, it is impossible for me to discover in this trivial town police regulation a violation of the First Amendment. No ideas are being suppressed. No censorship is involved. The freedom to teach or preach by word or book is unabridged, save only the right to call a householder to the door of his house to receive the summoner's message.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a community of cleaning litter from its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155. Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - While I appreciate the necessity of watchfulness to avoid abridgments of our freedom of expression, it is impossible for me to discover in this trivial town police regulation a violation of the First Amendment. No ideas are being suppressed. No censorship is involved. The freedom to teach or preach by word or book is unabridged, save only the right to call a householder to the door of his house to receive the summoner's message. I cannot expand this regulation to a violation of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Douglas v. Jeannette
Date: 1943-05-03
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Parties: National Broadcasting Co. v. United States
Date: 1943-05-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - N16* speech. Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied. But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly different. The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices (a basis for choice which we hold is comprehended within the statutory criterion of 'public interest'), is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license. The licensing system established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The standard it provided for the licensing of stations was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.' Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.
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Phrase match: speech. Freedom of utterance is abridged
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - N20* We come, finally, to an appeal to the First Amendment. The Regulations, even if valid in all other respects, must fall because they abridge, say the appellants, their right of free speech. If that be so, it would follow that every person whose application for a license to operate a station is denied by the Commission is thereby denied his constitutional right of free speech. Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied. But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly different. The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices (a basis for choice which we hold is comprehended within the statutory criterion of 'public interest'), is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license. The licensing system established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The standard it provided for the licensing of stations was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.' Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices (a basis for choice which we hold is comprehended within the statutory criterion of N17* 'public interest'), is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices (a basis for choice which we hold is comprehended within the statutory criterion of 'public interest'), is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license. The licensing system established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - N1* Freedom of utterance is abridgedWe come, finally, to an appeal to the First Amendment. The Regulations, even if valid in all other respects, must fall because they abridge, say the appellants, their right of free speech. If that be so, it would follow that every person whose application for a license to operate a station is denied by the Commission is thereby denied his constitutional right of free speech. to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied. But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly different. The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices (a basis for choice which we hold is comprehended within the statutory criterion of 'public interest'), is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license. The licensing system established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The standard it provided for the licensing of stations was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.' Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.
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Parties: Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB
Date: 1943-06-07
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Parties: W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette
Date: 1943-06-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society,—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court. Without wishing to disparage the purposes and intentions of those who hope to inculcate sentiments of loyalty nd patriotism by requiring a declaration of allegiance as a feature of public education, or unduly belittle the benefits that may accrue therefrom, I am impelled to conclude that such a requirement is not essential to the maintenance of effective government and orderly society.
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Phrase match: The right of freedom of thought
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - The right of West Virginia to utilize the flag salute as part of its educational process is denied because, so it is argued, it cannot be justified as a means of meeting a N21* 'clear and present danger' to national unity. In passing it deserves to be noted that the four cases which unanimously sustained the power of states to utilize such an educational measure arose and were all decided before the present World War. But to measure the state's power to make such regulations as are here resisted by the imminence of national danger is wholly to misconceive the origin and purpose of the concept of N22* 'clear and present danger'. To apply such a test is for the Court to assume, however unwittingly, a legislative responsibility that does not belong to it. To talk about N23* 'clear and present danger' as the touchstone of allowable educational policy by the states whenever school curricula may impinge upon the boundaries of individual conscience, is to take a felicitous phrase out of the context of the particular situation where it arose and for which it was adapted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning. It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society,—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.
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Phrase match: the right to speak freely and
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The flag salute exercise has no kinship whatever to the oath tests so odious in history. For the oath test was one of the instruments for suppressing heretical beliefs. Saluting the flag suppresses no belief not curbs it. Children and their parents may believe what they please, avow their belief and practice it. It is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag involves the slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity on the part both of the children and of their parents to disavow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning that others attach to the gesture of salute. All channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents. Had we before us any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind any member of this Court in striking down such an invasion of the right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech protected by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect. It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case.
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Phrase match: freedoms of speech and of press
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning. It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - It is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag involves the slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity on the part both of the children and of their parents to disavow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning that others attach to the gesture of salute. All channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents. Had we before us any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind any member of this Court in striking down such an invasion of the right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech protected by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N4* Over a decade ago Chief Justice Hughes led this Court in holding that the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition by peaceful and legal means to organized government was protected by the free speech guaranties of the Constitution. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484. Here it is the State that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as presently organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks. Objection to this form of communication when coerced is an old one, well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights.
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Parties: Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos
Date: 1943-11-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - In Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229, this Court ruled that members of a union might, N17* 'without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.' 301 U.S. at page 478, 57 S.Ct. at page 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. Later cases applied the Senn doctrine by enforcing the right of workers to state their case and to appeal for public support in an orderly and peaceful manner regardless of the area of immunity as defined by state policy. A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855; Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178. To be sure the Senn case related to the employment of 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity'. 301 U.S. at page 482, 57 S.Ct. at page 863, 81 L.Ed. 1229. That the picketing under review was peaceful is not questioned. And to use loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies—like 'unfair' or 'fascist'—is not to falsify facts. In a setting like the present, continuing representations unquestionably false and acts of coercion going beyond the mere influence exerted by the fact of picketing, are of course not constitutional prerogatives.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - In Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229, this Court ruled that members of a union might, N24* 'without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.' 301 U.S. at page 478, 57 S.Ct. at page 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. Later cases applied the Senn doctrine by enforcing the right of workers to state their case and to appeal for public support in an orderly and peaceful manner regardless of the area of immunity as defined by state policy. A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855; Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178. To be sure the Senn case related to the employment of N25* 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity'. 301 U.S. at page 482, 57 S.Ct. at page 863, 81 L.Ed. 1229. That the picketing under review was peaceful is not questioned. And to use loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies—like 'unfair' or 'fascist'—is not to falsify facts. In a setting like the present, continuing representations unquestionably false and acts of coercion going beyond the mere influence exerted by the fact of picketing, are of course not constitutional prerogatives.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N18* 'that the power to deny what otherwise would be lawful picketing derives from the power of the states to prevent future coercion. Right to free speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts of past violence.' 312 U.S. at page 296, 61 S.Ct. at page 556, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200. Still less can the right to picket itself be taken away merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring in the course of that picketing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - But we also made clear N8* 'that the power to deny what otherwise would be lawful picketing derives from the power of the states to prevent future coercion. Right to free speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts of past violence.' 312 U.S. at page 296, 61 S.Ct. at page 556, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200. Still less can the right to picket itself be taken away merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring in the course of that picketing.
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Phrase match: to free speech in the future
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Parties: Carter v. Virginia
Date: 1944-01-31
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Parties: Prince v. Massachusetts
Date: 1944-01-31
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Street preaching, whether oral or by handing out literature, is not the primary use of the highway, even for adults. While for them it cannot be wholly prohibited, it can be regulated within reasonable limits in accommodation to the primary and other incidental uses. But, for obvious reasons, notwithstanding appellant's contrary view, the validity of such a prohibition applied to children not accompanied by an older person hardly would seem open to question. The case reduces itself therefore to the question whether the presence of the child's guardian puts a limit to the state's power. That fact may lessen the likelihood that some evils the legislation seeks to avert will occur. But it cannot forestall all of them. The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other matters, may and at times does create situations difficult enough for adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, of emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury. Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. Massachusetts has determined that an absolute prohibition, though one limited to streets and public places and to the incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives. Its power to attain them is broad enough to reach these peripheral instances in which the parent's supervision may reduce but cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the prohibited conduct. We think that with reference to the public proclaiming of religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places, the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power has not been crossed in this case.
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Phrase match: the right to engage in propagandizing
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N19* And N20* 'one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.' Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672. The sidewalk, no less than the cathedral or the evangelist's tent, is a proper place, under the Constitution, for the orderly worship of God. Such use of the streets is as necessary to the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Salvation Army and others who practice religion without benefit of conventional shelters as is the use of the streets for purposes of passage.
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Phrase match: constitutional right to express his views
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - And the fact that the zealous exercise of the right to propagandize the community may result in violent or disorderly situations difficult for children to face is no excuse for prohibiting the exercise of that right.
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Phrase match: the right to propagandize the community
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Parties: Follett v. McCormick
Date: 1944-03-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - In those cases members of Jehovah's Witnesses had also been found guilty of 'peddling' or 'selling' literature within the meaning of the local ordinances. But since they were engaged in a 'religious' rather than a 'commercial' venture, we held that the constitutionality of the ordinances might not be measured by the standards governing the sales of wares and merchandise by hucksters and other merchants. N18* 'Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.' Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra, 319 U.S. page 115, 63 S.Ct. page 876, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81. We emphasized that the 'inherent vice and evil' of the flat license tax is that 'it restrains in advance those constitutional liberties' and 'inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.'
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Phrase match: 'Freedom of press, freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N19* 'It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government. But this is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.'
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N9* The exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendments is as obnoxious (Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra) as the imposition of a censorship or a previous restraint.
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Parties: Hartzel v. United States
Date: 1944-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The First Amendment to the Constitution preserves freedom of speech and of the press in war as well as in peace. The right to criticize the Government and the handling of the war is not questioned. Congress has not sought, directly or indirectly, to abridge the right of anyone to present his views on the conduct of the war or the making of the peace. The legislation under which Hartzel was tried and convicted was aimed at those who, in time of war, 'shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States.' It is only when the requisite intent to produce those results is present that criticism may cross over the line of prohibited conduct. The constitutional power of Congress so to protect the national interest is beyond question.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The right of free speech is vital. But the necessity of finding beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to produce the prohibited result affords abundant protection to those whose criticism is directed to legitimate ends.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - 'willfully.' That word, when viewed in the context of a highly penal statute restricting freedom of expression, must be taken to mean deliberately and with a specific purpose to do the acts proscribed by Congress. Cf. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 at page 394, 54 S.Ct. 223, at page 225, 78 L.Ed. 381; United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, at page 242, 58 S.Ct. 533, at page 534, 82 L.Ed. 773; Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335 at page 341, 61 S.Ct. 599, at page 602, 85 L.Ed. 862; Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 at page 497, 63 S.Ct. 364, at page 367, 87 L.Ed. 418. The second element is an objective one, consisting of a clear and present danger that the activities in question will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470. Both elements must be proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - We are not unmindful of the fact that the United States is now engaged in a total war for national survival and that total war of the modern variety cannot be won by a doubtful, disunited nation in which any appreciable sector is disloyal. For that reason our enemies have developed psychological warfare to a high degree in an effort to cause unrest and disloyalty. Much of this type of warfare takes the form of insidious propaganda in the manner and tenor displayed by petitioner's three pamphlets. Crude appeals to overthrow the government or to discard our arms in open mutiny are seldom made. Emphasis is laid, rather, on such matters as the futility of our war aims, the vices of our allies and the inadequacy of our leadership. But the mere fact that such ideas are enunciated by a citizen is not enough by itself to warrant a finding of a criminal intent to violate Section 3 of the Espionage Act. Unless there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to bring about the specific consequences prohibited by the Act, an American citizen has the right to discuss these matters either by temperate reasoning or by immoderate and vicious invective without running afoul of the Espionage Act of 1917. Such evidence was not present in this case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The First Amendment to the Constitution preserves freedom of speech and of the press in war as well as in peace. The right to criticize the Government and the handling of the war is not questioned. Congress has not sought, directly or indirectly, to abridge the right of anyone to present his views on the conduct of the war or the making of the peace.
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Parties: United States v. Ballard
Date: 1944-04-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - But that is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - N9* But that N10* is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish.
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Parties: Thomas v. Collins
Date: 1945-01-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438. Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - When legislation or its application can confine labor leaders on such occasions to innocuous and abstract discussion of the virtues of trade unions and so becloud even this with doubt, uncertainty and the risk of penalty, freedom of speech for them will be at an end. A restriction so destructive of the right of public discussion, without greater or more imminent danger to the public interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with the freedoms secured by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - utterances this Court held that N20* 'consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.' And 'those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - There is some modicum of freedom of thought, speech and assembly which all citizens of the Republic may exercise throughout its length and breadth, which no State, nor all together, nor the Nation itself, can prohibit, restrain or impede. If the restraint were smaller than it is, it is from petty tyrannies that large ones take root and grow. This fact can be no more plain than when they are imposed on the most basic rights of all. Seedlings planted in that soil grow great and, growing, break down the foundations of liberty.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - It included their right fully and freely to discuss and be informed concerning this choice, privately or in public assembly. Necessarily correlative was the right of the union, its members and officials, whether residents or nonresidents of Texas and, if the latter, whether there for a single occasion or sojourning longer, to discuss with and inform the employees concerning matters involved in their choice. These rights of assembly and discussion are protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - A restriction so destructive of the right of public discussion, without greater or more imminent danger to the public interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with the freedoms secured by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - However, the remedy is not to allow Texas improperly to deny the right of free speech but to apply the same rule and spirit to free speech cases whoever the speaker.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Lawful public assemblies, involving no element of grave and immediate danger to an interest the state is entitled to protect, are not instruments of harm which require previous identification of the speakers. And the right either of workmen or of unions under these conditions to assemble and discuss their own affairs is as fully protected by the Constitution as the right of businessmen, farmers, educators, political party members or others to assemble and discuss their affairs and to enlist the support of others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which amounts to more than the right of free discussion comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration or identification requirement may be imposed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - The right to express thoughts freely and to disseminate ideas fully is secured by the Constitution as basic to the conception of our government. A long series of cases has applied these fundamental rights in a great variety of circumstances. Not until today, however, has it been questioned that there was any clash between this right to think one's thoughts and to express them and the right of people to the protected in their dealings with those who hold themselves out in some professional capacity by requiring registration of those who profess to pursue such callings.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - It affects only the right of one to engage in the business as a paid organizer, and not the mere right of an individual to express his views on the merits of the union.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - That there was restriction upon Thomas' right to speak and the rights of the workers to hear what he had to say, there can be no doubt. The threat of the restraining order, backed by the power of contempt, and of arrest for crime, hung over every word. A speaker in such circumstances could avoid the words 'solicit,' 'invite,' 'join.' It would be impossible to avoid the idea. The statute requires no specific formula. It is not contended that only the use of the word 'solicit' would violate the prohibition. Without such a limitation, the statute forbids any language which conveys, or reasonably could be found to convey, the meaning of invitation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - We do not mean to say there is not, in many circumstances, a difference between urging a course of action and merely giving and acquiring information. On the other hand, history has not been without periods when the search for knowledge alone was banned. Of this we may assume the men who wrote the Bill of Rights were aware. But the protection they sought was not solely for persons in intellectual pursuits. It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to action. The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.
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Phrase match: his right to make a public
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - The right to express thoughts freely and to disseminate ideas fully is secured by the Constitution as basic to the conception of our government. A long series of cases has applied these fundamental rights in a great variety of circumstances. Not until today, however, has it been questioned that there was any clash between this right to think one's thoughts and to express them and the right of people to the protected in their dealings with those who hold themselves out in some professional capacity by requiring registration of those who profess to pursue such callings. Doctors and nurses, lawyers and notaries, bankers and accountants, insurance agents and solicitors of every kind in every State of this Union have traditionally been under duty to make some identification of themselves as practitioners of their calling. The question before us is as to the power of Texas to call for such registration within limits precisely defined by the Supreme Court of that State in sustaining the statute now challenged.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly. It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259, 81 L.Ed. 278, and therefore are united in the First Article's assurance.
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Phrase match: freedom in speech and press were
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amendment's safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity. And it does not resolve where the line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge, as Texas does, that an organization for which the rights of free speech and free assembly are claimed is one 'engaged in business activities' or that the individual who leads it in exercising these rights receives compensation for doing so.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Moreover, the State has shown no justification for placing restrictions on the use of the word 'solicit.' We have here nothing comparable to the case where use of the word 'fire' in a crowded theater creates a clear and present danger which the State may undertake to avoid or against which it may protect. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470. We cannot say that 'solicit' in this setting is such a dangerous word. So far as free speech alone is concerned, there can be no ban or restriction or burden placed on the use of such a word except on showing of exceptional circumstances where the public safety, morality or health is involved or some other substantial interest of the community is at stake.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee. But as long as he does no more than speak he has the same unfettered right, no matter what side of an issue he espouses.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - A state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed person from making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other kind of right, including recommending that his hearers organize to support his views. Likewise, the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.So the state to an extent not necessary now to determine may regulate one who makes a business or a livelihood of soliciting funds or memberships for unions. But I do not think it can prohibit one, even if he is a salaried labor leader, from making an address to a public meeting of workmen, telling them their rights as he sees them and urging them to unite in general or to join a specific union.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - control. Here, speech admittedly otherwise beyond the reach of the states is attempted to be brought within its licensing system by associating it with 'solicitation.' Speech of employers otherwise beyond reach of the Federal Government is brought within the Labor Board's power to suppress by associating it with 'coercion' or 'domination.' Speech of political malcontents is sought to be reached by associating it with some variety of 'sedition.' Whether in a particular case the association or characterization is a proven and valid one often is difficult to resolve. If this Court may not or does not in proper cases inquire whether speech or publication is properly condemned by association, its claim to guardianship of free speech and press is but a hollow one.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak. But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee. But as long as he does no more than speak he has the same unfettered right, no matter what side of an issue he espouses.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of free speech, but as part of free assembly.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - These rights of assembly and discussion are protected by the First Amendment. Whatever would restrict them, without sufficient occasion, would infringe its safeguards. The occasion was clearly protected. The speech was an essential part of the occasion, unless all meaning and purpose were to be taken from it. And the invitations, both general and particular, were parts of the speech, inseparable incidents of the occasion and of all that was said or done.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - Stripped to its bare bones, this argument is that labor organizations are beneficial and lawful; that solicitation of members by and for them is a necessary incident of their progress; that freedom to solicit for them is a liberty of speech protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment and the National Labor Relations Act, and hence Texas cannot require a paid solicitor to identify himself. I think this is the issue and the only issue presented to the courts below and decided by them, and the only one raised here.
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Parties: United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.
Date: 1945-03-05
Identifiers:
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Parties: Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory
Date: 1945-06-11
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Parties: Associated Press v. United States
Date: 1945-06-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.
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Phrase match: freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - It would be strange indeed however if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an argument agains application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.
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Phrase match: for freedom of the press which
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Segment in Paragraph: 97 - The decree may well result not in freer competition but in a monopoly in AP or UP, or in some resulting agency, and thus force full and complete regimentation of all news service to the people of the nation. The decree here approved may well be, and I think threatens to be, but a first step in the shackling of the press, which will subvert the constitutional freedom to print or to withhold, to print as and how one's reason or one's interest dictates. When that time comes, the state will be supreme and freedom of the state will have superseded freedom of the individual to print, being responsible before the law for abuse of the high privilege.
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - N21* The existing situation with respect to radio points the moral of what I have said. In that field Congress has imposed regulation because, in contrast to the press, the physical channels of communication are limited, and chaos would result from unrestrained and unregulated use of such channels. But in imposing regulation, Congress has refrained from any restraint on ownership of news or information or the right to use it. And any regulation of this major source of information, in the light of the constitutional guarantee of free speech, should be closely and jealously examined by the courts.
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Phrase match: the right to use it. And
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Parties: Bridges v. Wixon
Date: 1945-06-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - N21* 'The First Amendment prohibits all laws abridging freedom of press and religion, not merely some laws or all except tax laws.' By the same token, the First Amendment and other portions of the Bill of Rights make no exception in favor of deportation laws or laws enacted pursuant to a 'plenary' power of the Government. Hence the very provisions of the Constitution negative the proposition that Congress, in the exercise of a 'plenary' power, may override the rights of those who are numbered among the beneficiaries of the Bill of Rights.
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Phrase match: abridging freedom of press and religion
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - Any other conclusion would make our constitutional safeguards transitory and discriminatory in nature. Thus the Government would be precluded from enjoining or imprisoning an alien for exercising his freedom of speech. But the Government at the same time would be free, from a constitutional standpoint, to deport him for exercising that very same freedom. The alien would be fully clothed with his constitutional rights when defending himself in a court of law, but he would be stripped of those rights when deportation officials encircle him. I cannot agree that the framers of the Constitution meant to make such an empty mockery of human freedom.
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Phrase match: his freedom of speech. But the
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - We as a nation lose part of our greatness whenever we deport or punish those who merely exercise their freedoms in an unpopular though innocuous manner. The strength of this nation is weakened more by those who suppress the freedom of others than by those who are allowed freely to think and act as their consciences dictate.
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Phrase match: the freedom of others than by
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all 'persons' and guard against any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority. Indeed, this Court has previously and expressly recognized that Harry Bridges, the alien, possesses the right to free speech and free press and that the Constitution will defend him in the exercise of that right.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.
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Parties: May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB
Date: 1945-12-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - We find no basis for eliminating the announcements or the publication from consideration on the ground that they were an exercise of the right of free expression, secured by the First Amendment. They are a part of the totality of Company activities and were properly received by the Board as evidence of the unilateral action of the employer.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - I find nothing in the announcements to justify a finding they were made with this purpose or effect, and there is no finding to the contrary. They were, in my judgment, no more than an exercise of the employer's rights of free speech and a free press, secured by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Marsh v. Alabama
Date: 1946-01-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Former decisions of this Court have interpreted generously the Constitutional rights of people in this Land to exercise freedom of religion, of speech and of the press. It has never been held and is not now by this opinion of the Court that these rights are absolute and unlimited either in respect to the manner or the place of their exercise. What the present decision establishes as a principle is that one may remain on private property against the will of the owner and contrary to the law of the state so long as the only objection to his presence is that he is exercising an asserted right to spread there his religious views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - " This is because the prohibition is an impediment to the right of organization which is protected by a statute which governs a relation between employers and employees if and when the latter are admitted to the employers' premises as licensees. It was recognized in the opinion that the freedom of solicitation was the result of a regulatory statute and was not a Constitutional right. Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 988, 157 A.L.R. 1081. In the area which is covered by the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court has been careful to point out that the owner of property may protect himself against the intrusion of strangers. Although in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313, an ordinance forbidding the summonsing of the occupants of a dwelling to receive handbills was held invalid because in conflict with the freedom of speech and press, this Court pointed out at page 147 of 319 U.S., at page 865 of 63 S.Ct., that after warning the property owner would be protected from annoyance. The very Alabama statute which is now held powerless to protect the property of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, after notice, from this trespass was there cited, note 10, to show that it would protect the householder, after notice. The right to communicate ideas was expressed by us in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L.Ed. 869, as follows: N26* 'But one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Our Constitution guarantees to every man the right to express his views in an orderly fashion. An essential element of 'orderly' is that the man shall also have a right to use the place he chooses for his exposition. The rights of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of the trespasser, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - Under our decision in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, and others which have followed that case, neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will. We have also held that an ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets can not be justified on the ground that the municipality holds legal title to them. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869. And we have recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a municipality could not without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit door to door distribution of literature.
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal corporation and had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling by those appointed by the corporation to manage a company-town it would have been clear that appellant's conviction must be reversed. Under our decision in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, and others which have followed that case, neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will. We have also held that an ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets can not be justified on the ground that the municipality holds legal title to them.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment N22* 'lies at the foundation of free government by free men' and we must in all cases 'weigh the circumstances and appraise * * * the reasons * * * in support of the regulation of (those) rights.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The right to communicate ideas was expressed by us in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L.Ed. 869, as follows: N23* 'But one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Our Constitution guarantees to every man the right to express his views in an orderly fashion. An essential element of 'orderly' is that the man shall also have a right to use the place he chooses for his exposition. The rights of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of the trespass r, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N11* I am unable to find legal significance in the fact that a town in which the Constitutional freedoms of religion and speech are invoked happens to be company-owned. These decisions accorded the purveyors of ideas, religious or otherwise, N12* 'a preferred position', Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra, 319 U.S. at page 115, 63 S.Ct. at page 876, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81, even to the extent of relieving them from an unhampering and non-discriminatory duty of bearing their share of the cost of maintaining the peace and the other amenities of a civilized society. Constitutional privileges having such a reach ought not to depend upon a State court's notion of the extent of 'dedication' or private property to public purposes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - A state does have the moral duty of furnishing the opportunity for information, education and religious enlightenment to its inhabitants, including those who live in company towns, but it has not heretofore been adjudged that it must commandeer, without compensation, the private property of other citizens to carry out that obligation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Our Constitution guarantees to every man the right to express his views in an orderly fashion. An essential element of 'orderly' is that the man shall also have a right to use the place he chooses for his exposition. The rights of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of the trespasser, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech. We cannot say that Jehovah's Witnesses can claim the privilege of a license, which has never been granted, to hold their meetings in other private places, merely because the owner has admitted the public to them for other limited purposes. Even though we have reached the point where this Court is required to force private owners to open their property for the practice there of religious activities or propaganda distasteful to the owner, because of the public interest in freedom of speech and religion, there is no need for the application of such a doctrine here. Appellant, as we have said, was free to engage in such practices on the public highways, without becoming a trespasser on the company's property.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - A state does have the moral duty of furnishing the opportunity for information, education and religious enlightenment to its inhabitants, including those who live in company towns, but it has not heretofore been adjudged that it must commandeer, without compensation, the private property of other citizens to carry out that obligation. Heretofore this Court has sustained the right of employees, under an appropriate statute, protecting full freedom of employee organization, to solicit union membership in nonworking time on the property of an employer and against his express prohibition. This is because the prohibition is an impediment to the right of organization which is protected by a statute which governs a relation between employers and employees if and when the latter are admitted to the employers' premises as licensees. It was recognized in the opinion that the freedom of solicitation was the result of a regulatory statute and was not a Constitutional right. Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 988, 157 A.L.R. 1081. In the area which is covered by the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court has been careful to point out that the owner of property may protect himself against the intrusion of strangers.
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Parties: Tucker v. Texas
Date: 1946-01-07
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Parties: Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co.
Date: 1946-02-11
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Parties: Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling
Date: 1946-02-11
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Parties: Pennekamp v. Florida
Date: 1946-06-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Courts must have power to protect the interests of prisoners and litigants before them from unseemly efforts to pervert judicial action. In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - He N22* left no doubt that judicial protection of freedom of utterance is necessarily qualified by the requirements of the Constitution as an entirety for the maintenance of a free society. It does an illservice to the author of the most quoted judicial phrases regarding freedom of speech, to make him the victim of a tendency which he fought all his life, whereby phrases are made to do service for critical anaylsis by being turned into dogma. N23* 'It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.' Holmes, J., dissenting, in Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384, at page 391, 32 S.Ct. 793, 808, at page 811, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614. Words which 'are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent,' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470, speak their own condemnation. But it does violence to the juristic philosophy and the judicial practice of Mr. Justice Holmes to assume that an using the phrase 'a clear and present danger' he was expressing even remotely an absolutist test or had in mind a danger in the abs ract. He followed the observation just quoted by the emphatic statement that the question is one 'of proximity and degree,' as he conceived to be most questions in connection with the large, undefined rights guaranteed by the Constitution. And Mr. Justice Brandeis, co-architect of the great constitutional structure of civil liberties, also recognized that 'the permissible curtailment of free speech is * * * one of degree; and because it is a question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment is necessarily a wide one.' Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482, at page 483, 40 S.Ct. 259, 264, at page 265, 64 L.Ed. 360 (dissenting). If Mr. Justice Brandeis' constitutional philosophy means anything, it is clear beyond peradventure that he would not deny to a State, exercising its judgment as to the mode by which speech may be curtailed by punishment subsequent to its utterance, a field less wide than that which he permitted a jury in a federal court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - N24* 'Clear and present danger' was never used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken from its context. In its setting it served to indicate the importance of freedom of speech to a free society but also to emphasize that its exercise must be compatible with the preservation of other freedoms essential to a democracy and guaranteed by our Constitution. When those other attributes of a democracy are threatened by speech the Constitution does not deny power to the States to curb it. 'The clear and present danger' to be arrested may be danger short of a threat as comprehensive and vague as a threat to the safety of the Republic or 'the American way of life.' Neither Mr. Justice Holmes nor Mr. Justice Brandeis nor this Court ever suggested in all the cases that arose in connection with the First World War, that only imminent threats to the immediate security of the country would authorize courts to sustain legislation curtailing utterance. Such forces of destruction are of an order of magnitude which courts are hardly designed to counter. 'The clear and present danger' with which its two great judicial exponents were concerned, was a clear and present danger that utterance would 'bring about the * * * evils' which Congress sought and 'has a right to prevent.' Schenck v. United States, supra. Among 'the substantive evils' with which legislation may deal is the hampering of a court in a pending controversy, because the fair administration of justice is one of the chief tests of a true democracy. And since men equally devoted to the vital importance of freedom of speech may fairly differ in an estimate of this danger in a particular case, the field in which a State 'may exercise its judgment is necessarily a wide one.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - Without a free press there can be no free society. Freedom of the press, however, is not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free society. The scope and nature of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech must be viewed in that light and in that light applied.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - freedom carries with it responsibility even for the press; freedom of the press is not a freedom from responsibility for its exercise. Most State constitutions expressly provide for liability for abuse of the press's freedom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or juries. That is no more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exercise of the right to vote.
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Phrase match: securing freedom of speech, the Constitution
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - at the core of our problem is a proper balance between two basic conditions of our constitutional democracy—freedom of utterance and impartial justice—we cannot escape the exercise of judgment on the particular circumstances of the particular case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - This essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercison was held to be consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - N27* 'It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.' A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The decision in the Bridges case did not explicitly deny to the States the right to protect the judicial process from interference by means of a publication bearing on a pending litigation. The atmosphere and emanations of the Court's opinion, however, were calculated to sanction anything to be said or written outside the courtroom even though it may hurt or embarrass the just outcome of a proceeding. But in a series of decisions which presented most sharply the constitutional extent of freedom of speech, this Court had held that the Constitution did not allow absolute freedom of expression—a freedom unrestricted by the duty to respect other needs fulfillment of which make for the dignity and security of man.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - No Justice thought more deeply about the nature of a free society or was more zealous to safeguard its conditions by the most abundant regard for civil liberty than Mr. Justice Holmes. He left no doubt that judicial protection of freedom of utterance is necessarily qualified by the requirements of the Constitution as an entirety for the maintenance of a free society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Words which N24* 'are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent,' Schenck v.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - N25* 'I venture to think that no judge with long criminal experience will fail to be able to recall instances in which the publication of matters such as that to which I have referred N26* has had the effect of making the task of a judge extremely difficult and no one has the right to publish matter which will have that effect.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - They serve also to emphasize that the purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it. '* * * the liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen,' Regina v. Gray, (1900) 2 Q.B. 36, 40, and, in the United States, it is no greater than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic. The right to undermine proceedings in court is not a special prerogative of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or juries. That is no more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exercise of the right to vote.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - Were we to sanction the judgment rendered by the court below we would be approving, in effect, an unwarranted restriction upon the freedom of the press. That freedom covers something more than the right to approve and condone insofar as the judiciary and the judicial process are concerned. It also includes the right to criticize and disparage, even though the terms be vitriolic, scurrilous or erroneous. To talk of a clear and present danger arising out of such criticism is idle unless the criticism makes it impossible in a very real sense for a court to carry on the administration of justice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or juries. That is no more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exercise of the right to vote.
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Parties: Everson v. Bd. of Educ.
Date: 1947-02-10
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Parties: Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Com.
Date: 1947-02-10
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Parties: United Public Workers v. Mitchell
Date: 1947-02-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The right to vote and privately to express an opinion on political matters, important though they be, are but parts of the broad freedoms which our Constitution has provided as the bulwark of our free political institutions. Popular government, to be effective, must permit and encourage much wider political activity by all the people. Real popular government means N26* 'that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion * * *. Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.' Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 740, 741, 84 L.Ed. 1093. Legislation which muzzles several million citizens threatens popular government, not only because it injures the individuals muzzled, but also, because of its harmful effect on the body politic in depriving it of the political participation and interest of such a large segment of our citizens. Forcing public employees to contribute money and influence can well be proscribed in the interest of 'clean politics' and public administration. But I think the Constitution prohibits legislation which prevents millions of citizens from contributing their arguments, complaints, and suggestions to the political debates which are the essence of our democracy; prevents them from engaging in organizational activity to urge others to vote and take an interest in political affairs; bars them from performing the interested citizen's duty of insuring that his and his fellow citizens' votes are counted. Such drastic limitations on the right of all the people to express political opinions and take political action would be inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - But I think the Constitution prohibits legislation which prevents millions of citizens from contributing their arguments, complaints, and suggestions to the political debates which are the essence of our democracy; prevents them from engaging in organizational activity to urge others to vote and take an interest in political affairs; bars them from performing the interested citizen's duty of insuring that his and his fellow citizens' votes are counted. Such drastic limitations on the right of all the people to express political opinions and take political action would be inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - But this Court has not approved the statutory power of the Commission to promulgate such a rule,N28* nor has it ever expressly or by implication approved the constitutional validity of any such sweeping abridgement of the right of freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - As pointed out hereinbefore in this opinion, the practice of excluding classified employees from party offices and personal political activity at the polls has been in effect for several decades. Some incidents similar to those that are under examination here have been before this Court and the prohibition against certain types of political activity by office holders has been upheld. The leading case was decided in 1882. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 1 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed. 232. There a subordinate United States employee was indicted for violation of an act that forbade employees who were not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate from giving or receiving money for political purposes from or to other employees of the government on penalty of discharge and criminal punishment. Curtis urged that the statute was unconstitutional. This Court upheld the right of Congress to punish the infraction of this law. The decisive principle was the power of Congress, within reasonable limits, to regulate, so far as it might deem necessary, the political conduct of its employees.
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Phrase match: the right of Congress to punish
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The right to vote and privately to express an opinion on political matters, important though they be, are but parts of the broad freedoms which our Constitution has provided as the bulwark of our free political institutions. Popular government, to be effective, must permit and encourage much wider political activity by all the people. Real popular government means 'that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion * * *. Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.' Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 740, 741, 84 L.Ed. 1093. Legislation which muzzles several million citizens threatens popular government, not only because it injures the individuals muzzled, but also, because of its harmful effect on the body politic in depriving it of the political participation and interest of such a large segment of our citizens. Forcing public employees to contribute money and influence can well be proscribed in the interest of 'clean politics' and public administration. But I think the Constitution prohibits legislation which prevents millions of citizens from contributing their arguments, complaints, and suggestions to the political debates which are the essence of our democracy; prevents them from engaging in organizational activity to urge others to vote and take an interest in political affairs; bars them from performing the interested citizen's duty of insuring that his and his fellow citizens' votes are counted. Such drastic limitations on the right of all the people to express political opinions and take political action would be inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - But I think the Constitution prohibits legislation which prevents millions of citizens from contributing their arguments, complaints, and suggestions to the political debates which are the essence of our democracy; prevents them from engaging in organizational activity to urge others to vote and take an interest in political affairs; bars them from performing the interested citizen's duty of insuring that his and his fellow citizens' votes are counted. Such drastic limitations on the right of all the people to express political opinions and take political action would be inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - All of the petitioners here challenge the constitutional validity of that sentence of § 9 of the statute which prohibits all federal employees from taking 'any active part in political management or in political campaigns' and which by reference only sweeps under this prohibition all thenexisting civil service regulations. The charge is that this provision, thus supplemented by the regulations, violates the First Amendment by prohibiting freedom of press, speech, and assembly; that it violates the Fifth Amendment because it effects an arbitrary and gross discrimination between government employees covered and those exempted; that it also violates the Fifth Amendment because it is so vague and indefinite as to prohibit lawful activities as well as activities which are properly made unlawful by other provisions of law. Thus, these attacks of Poole and all the other petitioners are identical, namely, that the provision is unconstitutional on its face. The Court decides this question against Poole after holding that his case presents a justiciable controversy. I think Poole's challenge to the constitutionality of the provision should be sustained. And since I agree with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS that all the petitioners' complaints state a case or controversy, and show threats of imminent irreparable damages, I think that the contention that the challenged provision is unconstitutional on its face should be sustained as to all of them.
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Parties: Craig v. Harney
Date: 1947-05-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The history of the power to punish for contempt (see Nye v. United States, supra; Bridges v. State of California, supra) and the unequivocal command of the First Amendment serve as constant reminders that freedom of speech and of the press should not be impaired through the exercise of that power, unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - A free press lies at the heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty. Any inroad made upon the constitutional protection of a free press tends to undermine the freedom of all men to print and to read the truth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N27* 'Courts must have power to protect the interests of prisoners and litigants before them from unseemly efforts to pervert judicial action. In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - It cannot be repeated too often that the freedom of the press so indispensable to our democratic society presupposes an independent judiciary which will, when occasion demands, protect that freedom. To help achieve such an independent judiciary and to protect its members in their independence, the States of the Union, from the very beginning and throughout our history, have provided for prompt suppression and punishment of interference with the impartial exercise of the judicial process in an active litigation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one, but so is the right to have a calm and fair trial free from outside pressures and influences. Every other right, including the right of a free press itself, may depend on the ability to get a judicial hearing as dispassionate and impartial as the weakness inherent in men will permit. I think this publisher passed beyond the legitimate use of press freedom and infringed the citizen's right to a calm and impartial trial. I do not think we can say that it is beyond the power of the state to exert safeguards against such interference with the course of trial as we have here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one, but so is the right to have a calm and fair trial free from outside pressures and influences.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The history of the power to punish for contempt (see Nye v. United States, supra; Bridges v. State of California, supra) and the unequivocal command of the First Amendment serve as constant reminders that freedom of speech and of the press should not be impaired through the exercise of that power, unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.
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Parties: United States v. Petrillo
Date: 1947-06-23
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Parties: Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.
Date: 1948-03-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - None of the recent cases to which respondents refer, however, provide the slightest support for a contention that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the mails for perpetration of swinding schemes.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - A contention cannot be seriously considered which assumes that freedom of the press includes a right to raise money to promote circulation by deception of the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - A contention cannot be seriously considered which assumes that freedom of the press includes a right to raise money to promote circulation by deception of the public.
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Parties: Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.
Date: 1948-03-08
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Parties: Winters v. New York
Date: 1948-03-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - A failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions, protected by the principles of the First Amendment violates an accused's rights under procedural due process and freedom of speech or press. Where the alleged vagueness of a state statute had been cured by an opinion of the state court, confining a statute, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2564, punishing the circulation of publications N28* 'having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission of any crime' to 'encouraging an actual breach of law,' this Court affirmed a conviction under the stated limitation of meaning. The accused publication was read as advocating the commission of the crime of indecent exposure.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - When a legislative body concludes that the mores of the community call for an extension of the impermissible limits, an enactment aimed at the evil is plainly within its power, if it does not transgress the boundaries fixed by the Constitution for freedom of expression. The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement. The crime 'must be defined with appropriate definiteness.' Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311, 62 S.Ct. 237, 239, 86 L.Ed. 226; Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act, Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888, or in regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.
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Phrase match: for freedom of expression. The standards
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - Every legislative limitation upon utterance, however valid, may in a particular case serve as an inroad upon the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature. Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 153, 158, 66 S.Ct. 456, 460, 462, 90 L.Ed. 586. They are equally subject to control if they are lewd, indecent, obscene or profane.
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Phrase match: of free speech as the best
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Parties: Musser v. Utah
Date: 1948-02-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - It is axiomatic that a democratic state may not deny its citizens the right to criticize existing laws and to urge that they be changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an effort to legalize polygamy it is obviously necessary to convince a substantial number of people that such conduct is desirable. But conviction that the practice is desirable has a natural tendency to induce the practice itself. Thus, depending on where the circular reasoning is started, the advocacy of polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of law, or be constitutionally protected as essential to the proper functioning of the democratic process.
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Phrase match: the right to criticize existing laws
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - At the very least the line must be drawn between advocacy and incitement, and even the state's power to punish incitement may vary with the nature of the speech, whether persuasive or coercive, the nature of the wrong induced, whether violent or merely offensive to the mores, and the degree of probability that the substantive evil actually will result.
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Parties: United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.
Date: 1948-05-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment. That issue would be focused here if we had any question concerning monopoly in the production of moving pictures. But monopoly in production was eliminated as an issue in these cases, as we have noted. The chief argument at the bar is phrased in terms of monopoly of exhibition, restraints on exhibition, and the like. Actually, the issue is even narrower than that. The main contest is over the cream of the exhibition business—that of the first-run theatres. By defining the issue so narrowly we do not intend to belittle its importance. It shows, however, tha the question here is not what the public will see or if the public will be permitted to see certain features. It is clear that under the existing system the public will be denied access to none. If the public cannot see the features on the first-run, it may do so on the second, third, fourth, or later run. The central problem presented by these cases is which exhibitors get the highly profitable first-run business. That problem has important aspects under the Sherman Act. But it bears only remotely, if at all, on any question of freedom of the press, save only as timeliness of release may be a factor of importance in specific situations.
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Phrase match: of freedom of the press, save
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Parties: Saia v. New York
Date: 1948-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The right to be heard is placed in the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police. He stands athwart the channels of communication as an obstruction which can be removed only after criminal trial and conviction and lengthy appeal. A more effective previous restraint is difficult to imagine. Unless we are to retreat from the firm positions we have taken in the past, we must give freedom of speech in this case the same preferred treatment that we gave freedom of religion in the Cantwell case, freedom of the press in the Griffin case, and freedom of speech and assembly in the Hague case.
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Phrase match: give freedom of speech in this
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N29* Surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen. Cf. Otto, Speech and Freedom of Speech, in Freedom and Experience (Edited by Hook and Konvitz, 1947) 78, 83 et seq. And so I cannot agree that we must deny the right of a State to control these broadcasting devices so as to safeguard the rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive noise but to be free to put their freedom of mind and attention to uses of their own choice.
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Phrase match: and Freedom of Speech, in Freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N30* "We are dealing with new technological devices and with attempts to control them in order to gain their benefits while maintaining the precious freedom of privacy. These attempts, being experimental, are bound to be tentative, and the views I have expressed are directed towards the circumstances of the immediate case. Suffice it to say that the limitations by New York upon the exercise of appellant's rights of utterance did not in my view exceed the accommodation between the conflicting interests which the State was here entitled to make in view of time and place and circumstances.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - And so I cannot agree that we must deny the right of a State to control these broadcasting devices so as to safeguard the rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive noise but to be free to put their freedom of mind and attention to uses of their own choice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - We hold that § 3 of this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action. To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The present ordinance has the same defects. N27* The right to be heard is placed in the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police. He stands athwart the channels of communication as an obstruction which can be removed only after criminal trial and conviction and lengthy appeal. A more effective previous restraint is difficult to imagine. Unless we are to retreat from the firm positions we have taken in the past, we must give freedom of speech in this case the same preferred treatment that we gave freedom of religion in the Cantwell case, freedom of the press in the Griffin case, and freedom of speech and assembly in the Hague case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen. Cf. Otto, Speech and Freedom of Speech, in Freedom and Experience (Edited by Hook and Konvitz, 1947) 78, 83 et seq. And so I cannot agree that we must deny the right of a State to control these broadcasting devices so as to safeguard the rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive noise but to be free to put their freedom of mind and attention to uses of their own choice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - I cannot say that it was beyond constitutional limits to refuse a license to the appellant for the time and place requested. The State was entitled to authorize the local authorities of Lockport to determine that the well-being of those of its inhabitants who sought quiet and other pleasures that a park affords, outweighed the appellant's right to force his message upon them. Nor did it exceed the bounds of reason for the chief of police to base his decision refusing a license upon the fact that the manner in which the license had been used in the past was distructive of the enjoyment of the park by those for whom it was maintained. That people complained about an annoyance would seem to be a pretty solid basis in experience for not sanctioning its continuance.
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Phrase match: s right to force his message
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The appellant, one of Jehovah's Witnesses, contends, and the Court holds, that without the permission required by city ordinance he may set up a sound truck so as to flood this area with amplified lectures on religious subjects. It must be remembered that he demands even more than the right to speak and hold a meeting in this area which is reserved for other and quite inconsistent purposes. He located his car, on which loud-speakers were mounted, either in the park itself, not open to vehicles, or in the street close by. The microphone for the speaker was located some little distance from the car and in the park, and electric wires were strung, in one or more instances apparently across the sidewalk, from the one to the other. So that what the Court is holding, is that the Constitution of the United States forbids a city to require a permit for a private person to erect, in its streets, parks and public places, a temporary public address system, which certainly has potentialities of annoyance and even injury to park patrons if carelessly handled. It was for setting up this system of microphone, wires and sound truck without a permit, that this appellant was convicted—it was not for speaking.
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Phrase match: the right to speak and hold
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - To my mind this is not a free speech issue. Lockport has in no way denied or restricted the free use, even in its park, of all of the facilities for speech with which nature has endowed the appeliant. It has not even interfered with his inviting an assemblage in a park space not set aside for that purpose. But can it be that society has no control of apparatus which, when put to unregulated proselyting, propaganda and commercial uses, can render life unbearable? It is intimated that the City can control the decibels; if so, why may it not prescribe zero decibels as appropriate to some places? It seems to me that society has the right to control, as to place, time and volume, the use of loud-speaking devices for any purpose, provided its regulations are not unduly arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N13* Loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public speech. The sound truck has become an accepted method of political campaigning. It is the way people are reached.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - And so utterances by speech or pen can neither be forbidden nor licensed, save in the familiar classes of exceptional situations. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031. But modern devices for amplifying the range and volume of the voice, or its recording, afford easy, too easy, opportunities for aural aggression. If uncontrolled, the result is intrusion into cherished privacy. The refreshment of mere silence, or meditaiton, or quiet conversation, may be disturbed or precluded by noise beyond one's personal control.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N14* Surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen. Cf. Otto, Speech and Freedom of Speech, in Freedom and Experience (Edited by Hook and Konvitz, 1947) 78, 83 et seq. And so I cannot agree that we must deny the right of a State to control these broadcasting devices so as to safeguard the rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive noise but to be free to put their freedom of mind and attention to uses of their own choice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - It treats the issue only as one of free speech. To my mind this is not a free speech issue. Lockport has in no way denied or restricted the free use, even in its park, of all of the facilities for speech with which nature has endowed the appeliant. It has not even interfered with his inviting an assemblage in a park space not set aside for that purpose. But can it be that society has no control of apparatus which, when put to unregulated proselyting, propaganda and commercial uses, can render life unbearable? It is intimated that the City can control the decibels; if so, why may it not prescribe zero decibels as appropriate to some places? It seems to me that society has the right to control, as to place, time and volume, the use of loud-speaking devices for any purpose, provided its regulations are not unduly arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
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Phrase match: of free speech. To my mind
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N11* Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes. When a city allows an official to ban them in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression of free communication of ideas. In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said to have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit may be denied because some people find the ideas annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance reveals its vice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - That ordinance, like the present one, was dressed in the garb of the control of a 'nuisance.' But the Court made short shrift of the argument, saying that approval of the licensing system would institute censorship 'in its baldest form.' In Hague v. C.I.O., supra, we struck down a city ordinance which required a license from a local official for a public assembly on the streets or highways or in the public parks or public buildings. The official was empowered to refuse the permit if in his opinion the refusal would prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' We held that the ordinance was void on its face because it could be made N10* 'the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - N5* We hold that § 3 of this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action. To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion. The statute is not narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers, or the volume of sound (the decibels) to which they must be adjusted. The ordinance therefore has all the vices of the ones which we struck down in Cantwell v. Connecticut
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Parties: United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs.
Date: 1948-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - We are concerned in this case with the constitutionality of § 313 as amended only insofar as it may be applied in restriction or abridgment of the rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly secured by the First Amendment. Other applications are not in question. There can be little doubt of Congress' power to regulate the making of political contributions and expenditures by labor unions, as well as by other organizations and individuals, in the interest of free and pure elections and the prevention of official corruption, by appropriate measures not trenching on those basic rights. But when regulation or prohibition touches them, this Court is duty bound to examine the restrictions and to decide in its own independent judgment whether they are abridged within the Amendment's meaning.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech, press and
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been an integral part of our democratic electoral and legislative processes. They could hardly go on without it. Moreover, to an extent not necessary now to attempt delimiting, that right is secured by the guaranty of freedom of assembly, a liberty essentially coordinate with the freedoms of speech, the press, and conscience. Cf. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 251, 252, 69 N.E.2d 115, 167 A.L.R. 1447. It is not by accident, it is by explicit design, as was said in Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U.S. at page 530, 65 S.Ct. at page 322, 89 L.Ed. 430, that these freedoms are coupled together in the First Amendment's assurance. They involve the right to hear as well as to speak, and any restriction upon either attenuates both.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom of assembly, a liberty
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - it does not follow that the broadside and blanketing prohibitions here attempted in restriction of freedom of expression and assembly would be valid in their corporate applications. Corporations have been held within the First Amendment's protection against restrictions upon the circulation of their madia of expression. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660. It cannot therefore be taken, merely upon legislative assumption, practice or judgment, that restrictions upon freedoms of expression by corporations are valid. Again, those matters cannot be settled finally until this Court has spoken.
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Phrase match: of freedom of expression and assembly
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - Indeed pamphleteering was a common mode of exercising freedom of the press before and at the time of the Amendment's adoption. It cannot have been intended to tolerate exclusion of this form of exercising that freedom. Nor does making the difference between distribution to dues-paying members only and distribution to outsiders or the public, whether with or without price, make a constitutional difference. The Amendment did not make its protections turn on whether the hearer or reader pays, or can pay, for the publication or the privilege of hearing the oral or written pronouncement. Neither freedom of speech and the press nor the right of peaceable assembly is restricted to persons who can and do pay.
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Phrase match: exercising freedom of the press before
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - There is therefore an effect in restricting expenditures for the publicizing of political views not inherently present in restricting other types of expenditure, namely, that it necessarily deprives the electorate, the persons entitled to hear, as well as the author of the utterance, whether an individual or a group, of the advantage of free and full discussion and of the right of free assembly for that purpose.
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Phrase match: the right of free assembly for
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - It would be a vr y great infringement of individual as well as group freedoms, affecting vast numbers of our citizens, if labor unions could be deprived of all right of expression upon pending political matters affecting their interests.
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Phrase match: all right of expression upon pending
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - Neither freedom of speech and the press nor the right of peaceable assembly is restricted to persons who can and do pay.
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Phrase match: the right of peaceable assembly is
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - It is not by accident, it is by explicit design, as was said in Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U.S. at page 530, 65 S.Ct. at page 322, 89 L.Ed. 430, that these freedoms N28* are coupled together in the First Amendment's assurance. They involve the right to hear as well as to speak, and any restriction upon either attenuates both.
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Phrase match: the right to hear as well
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - But even if the right to sway others by persuasion is assumed to be subject to some curtailment, in the interest of preventing grossly unbalanced presentations, that right cannot be wholly denied, Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, supra, 320 Mass. at page 252, 69 N.E.2d at page 130, 167 A.L.R. 1447; nor can it be restricted beyond what is reasonably and clearly necessary to correct an evil so gross and immediate that the correction indubitably outweights the loss to the public interest resulting from the restriction.
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Phrase match: the right to sway others by
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been an integral part of our democratic electoral and legislative processes. They could hardly go on without it. Moreover, to an extent not necessary now to attempt delimiting, that right is secured by the guaranty of freedom of assembly, a liberty essentially coordinate with the freedoms of speech, the press, and conscience. Cf. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 251, 252, 69 N.E.2d 115, 167 A.L.R. 1447. It is not by accident, it is by explicit design, as was said in Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U.S. at page 530, 65 S.Ct. at page 322, 89 L.Ed. 430, that these freedoms are coupled together in the First Amendment's assurance. They involve the right to hear as well as to speak, and any restriction upon either attenuates both.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: freedoms of speech, the press, and
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - The Amendment did not make its protections turn on whether the hearer or reader pays, or can pay, for the publication or the privilege of hearing the oral or written pronouncement. Neither freedom of speech and the press nor the right of peaceable assembly is restricted to persons who can and do pay.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: freedom of speech and the press
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Parties: Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.
Date: 1949-01-03
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Segment Sets:
Segment in Paragraph: 3 - It is contended that these state laws abridge the freedom of speech and the opportunities of unions and their members 'peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a refress of grievances.' Under the state policy adopted by these laws, employers must, other considerations being equal, give equal opportunities for remunerative work to union and non-union members without discrimination against either. In order to achieve this objective of equal opportunity for the two groups, employers are forbidden to make contracts which would obligate them to hire to keep none but union members. Nothing in the language of the laws indicates a purpose to prohibit speech, assembly, or petition. Precisely what these state laws do is to forbid employers acting alone or in concert with labor organizations deliberately to restrict employment to none but union members.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech and the
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - The right of unions and union members to demand that no non-union members work along with union members is 'indispensable to the right of self organization and the association of workers into unions'; without a right of union members to refuse to work with non-union members, there are 'no means of eliminating the competition of the non-union worker'; since, the reasoning continues, a 'closed shop' is indispensable to achievement of sufficient union membership to put unions and employers on a full equality for collective bargaining, a closed shop is consequently 'an indispensable concomitant' of 'the right of employees to assemble into and associate together through labor organizations. * * *' Justification for such an expansive construction of the right to speak, assemble and petition is then rested in part on appellants' assertion 'that the right to work as a non-unionist is in no way equivalent to or the parallel of the right to work as a union member; that there exists no constitutional right to work as a non-unionist on the one hand while the right to maintain employment free from discrimination because of union membership is constitutionally protected.'
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Phrase match: The right of unions and union
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - There cannot be wrung from a constitutional right of workers to assemble to discuss improvement of their own working standards, a further constitutional right to drive from remunerative employment all other persons who will not or can not, participate in union assemblies.
Notes:
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Phrase match: constitutional right of workers to assemble
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - There cannot be wrung from a constitutional right of workers to assemble to discuss improvement of their own working standards, a further constitutional right to drive from remunerative employment all other persons who will not or can not, participate in union assemblies.
Notes:
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Phrase match: constitutional right to drive from remunerative
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Parties: Am. Fedn. of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co.
Date: 1949-01-03
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Parties: Fisher v. Pace
Date: 1949-02-07
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Segment Sets:
Segment in Paragraph: 42 - we narrowly restricted the power to punish summarily for constructive contempts in order to maintain freedom of press and of speech in their preferred position. Freedom of speech in the courtroom deserves the same protection.
Notes:
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Phrase match: maintain freedom of press and of
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - It is said, however, that such elements of misbehavior as expression, manner of speaking, bearing, and attitude of Fisher may have given the words a contemptuous flavor that the cold record does not reveal. I do not think freedom of speech should be so readily sacrificed, even in a courtroom.
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Phrase match: think freedom of speech should be
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - I do not think freedom of speech should be so readily sacrificed, even in a courtroom.
Notes:
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Phrase match: freedom of speech should be so
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - It is said, however, that such elements of misbehavior as expression, manner of speaking, bearing, and attitude of Fisher may have given the words a contemptuous flavor that the cold record does not reveal. I do not think freedom of speech should be so readily sacrificed, even in a courtroom. If that were the offense, it is not too much to ask that the judge make it the ground of his ruling. Certainly the judge did not purport to fine and imprison Fisher for the manner of making the objection, for the tone of his voice, or for this facial expression. The dispute was merely over the bounds of permissible comment before a jury. Fisher having been stopped at one point tried another strategy. He was acting the role of a resourceful lawyer. The decision which penalizes him for that zeal sanctions censorship inside a courthouse where the ideals of freedom of speech should flourish.
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Phrase match: that zeal sanctions censorship inside a courthouse
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Parties: International Union, U. A. W. A. v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd.
Date: 1949-02-28
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Parties: Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
Date: 1949-04-04
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Parties: Kovacs v. Cooper
Date: 1949-01-31
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Segment Sets:
Segment in Paragraph: 50 - Freedom of speech for Kovacs does not, in my view, include freedom to use sound amplifiers to drown out the natural speech of others.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: include freedom to use sound amplifiers
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - We took jurisdiction to consider the challenge made to the constitutionality of the section on its face and as applied on the ground that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated because the section and the conviction are in contravention of rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assemblage and freedom to communicate information and opinions to others. The ordinance is also challenged as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that it is so obscure, vague, and indefinite as to be impossible of reasonably accurate interpretation. No question was raised as to the sufficiency of the complaint.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech, freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - The scope of the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, for the right of a citizen to play music and express his views on matters which he considers to be of interest to himself and others on a public street through sound amplification devices mounted on vehicles, must be considered. Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom to communicate information and opinion to others are all comprehended on this appeal in the claimed right of free speech.
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Phrase match: considered. Freedom of speech, freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N34* The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention. This is the phase of freedom of speech that is involved here. We do not think the Trenton ordinance abridges that freedom. It is an extravagant extension of due process to say that because of it a city cannot forbid talking on the streets through a loud speaker in a loud and raucous tone. Surely such an ordinance does not violate our people's 'concept of ordered liberty' so as to require federal intervention to protect a citizen from the action of his own local government. Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288. Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionably amplified sound on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the streets. The preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself. That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without cost from some zealous supporter, is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open. Section 4 of the ordinance bars sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the streets. There is no restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers. We think that the need for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped with such sound amplifying devices justifies the ordinance.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech that is
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N35* My brother REED speaks of N36* 'The preferred position of freedom of speech,' though, to be sure, he finds that the Trenton ordinance does not disregard it. This is a phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity. It is not the first time in the history of constitutional adjudication that such a doctrinaire attitude has disregarded the admonition most to be observed in exercising the Court's reviewing power over legislation, 'that it is a constitution we are expounding,' McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L.Ed. 579. I say the phrase is mischievous because it radiates a constitutional doctrine without avowing it.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech,' though, to
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - N37* 'The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather than the rule and the penalizing even of utterances of a defined character must find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government. The judgment of the Legislature is not unfettered. The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to the safety of the state.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: abridge freedom of speech and of
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N39* 'Moreover, the likelihood, however great that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press. The evil itself must be substantial', Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. California, supra, 274 U.S. (357) at page 374, 47 S.Ct. (641) at page 647, 71 L.Ed. 1095; it must be 'serious,' Id., 274 U.S. at page 376, 47 S.Ct. at page 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095. And even the expression of 'legislative preferences or beliefs' cannot transform minor matters of public inconvenience or annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient weight to warrant the curtailment of liberty of expression.
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Phrase match: upon freedom of speech or the
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - for him N40* the right to search for truth was of a different order than some transient economic dogma. And without freedom of expression, thought becomes checked and atrophied.
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Phrase match: without freedom of expression, thought becomes
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The objection to summarizing this line of thought by the phrase N41* 'the preferred position of freedom of speech' is that it expresses a complicated process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula. And it was Mr. Justice Holmes who admonished us that 'To rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech' is that
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - It is argued that the Constitution protects freedom of speech: Freedom of speech means the right to communicate, whatever the physical means for so doing; sound trucks are one form of communication; ergo that form is entitled to the same protection as any other means of communication, whether by tongue or pen. Such sterile argumentation treats society as though it consisted of bloodless categories. The various forms of modern so-called 'mass communications' raise issues that were not implied in the means of communication known or contemplated by Franklin and Jefferson and Madison. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013. Movies have created problems not presented by the circulation of books, pamphlets, or newspapers, and so the movies have been constitutionally regulated. Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387, 59 L.Ed. 552, Ann.Cas. 1916C, 296. Broadcasting in turn has produced its brood of complicated problems hardly to be solved by an easy formula about the preferred position of free speech.
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Phrase match: protects freedom of speech: Freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - Only a disregard of vital differences between natural speech, even of the loudest spellbinders, and the noise of sound trucks would give sound trucks the constitutional rights accorded to the unaided human voice. Nor is it for this Court to devise the terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to operate, if at all. These are matters for the legislative judgment controlled by public opinion. So long as a legislature does not prescribe what ideas may be noisily expre sed and what may not be, nor discriminate among those who would make inroads upon the public peace, it is not for us to supervise the limits the legislature may impose in safeguarding the steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection.Without such opportunities freedom of thought becomes a mocking phrase, and without freedom of thought there can be no free society.
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Phrase match: opportunities freedom of thought becomes a
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - No violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason of infringement of free speech arises unless such regulation or prohibition undertakes to censor the contents of the broadcasting. Freedom of speech for Kovacs does not, in my view, include freedom to use sound amplifiers to drown out the natural speech of others.
Notes:
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Phrase match: broadcasting. Freedom of speech for Kovacs
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - this repudiation of the prior Saia opinion makes a dangerous and unjustifiable breach in the constitutional barriers designed to insure freedom of expression. Ideas and beliefs are today chiefly disseminated to the masses of people through the press, radio, moving pictures, and public address systems. To some extent at least there is competition of ideas between and within these groups. The basic premise of the First Amendment is that all present instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition. Laws which hamper the free use of some instruments of communication thereby favor competing channels. Thus unless constitutionally prohibited, laws like this Trenton ordinance can give an overpowering influence to views of owners of legally favored instruments of communication. This favoritism, it seems to me, is the inevitable result of today's decision. For the result of today's opinion in upholding this statutory prohibition of amplifiers would surely not be reached by this Court if such channels of communication as the press, radio, or moving pictures were similarly attacked.
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Phrase match: insure freedom of expression. Ideas and
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - There is no more reason that I can see for wholly prohibiting one useful instrument of communication that another. If Trenton can completely bar the streets to the advantageous use of loud speakers, all cities can do the same. In that event preference in the dissemination of ideas is given those who can obtain the support of newspapers, etc., or those who have money enough to buy advertising from newspapers, radios, or moving pictures. This Court should no more permit this invidious prohibition against the dissemination of ideas by speaking than it would permit a complete blackout of the press, the radio, or moving pictures. It is wise for all who cherish freedom of expression to reflect upon the plain fact that a holding that the audiences of public speakers can be constitutionally prohibited is not unrelated to a like prohibition in other fields. And the right to freedom of expression should be protected from absolute censorship for persons without, as for persons with, wealth and power.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: cherish freedom of expression to reflect
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom to communicate information and opinion to others are all comprehended on this appeal in the claimed right of free speech. They
Notes:
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Phrase match: claimed right of free speech. They
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention. This is the phase of freedom of speech that is involved here. We do not think the Trenton ordinance abridges that freedom. It is an extravagant extension of due process to say that because of it a city cannot forbid talking on the streets through a loud speaker in a loud and raucous tone. Surely such an ordinance does not violate our people's 'concept of ordered liberty' so as to require federal intervention to protect a citizen from the action of his own local government. Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288. Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionab y amplified sound on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the streets. The preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself. That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without cost from some zealous supporter, is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open. Section 4 of the ordinance bars sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the streets. There is no restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers. We think that the need for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped with such sound amplifying devices justifies the ordinance.
Notes:
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Phrase match: The right of free speech is
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N29* 'The right to be heard is placed in the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police. He stands athwart the channels of communication as an obstruction which can be removed only after criminal trial and conviction and lengthy appeal. A more effective previous restraint is difficult to imagine.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: The right to be heard is
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The right to speak one's mind would often be an empty privilege in a place and at a time beyond the protecting hand of the guardians of public order.
Notes:
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Phrase match: The right to speak one's
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - the N30* 'right to free discussion' 'is to be guarded with a jealous eye.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: the 'right to free discussion' 'is
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - But since he also realized that the progress of civilization is to a considerable extent the displacement of error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other beliefs, for him the right to search for truth was of a different order than some transient economic dogma. And without freedom of expression, thought becomes checked and atrophied.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right to search for truth
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - N31* There is no more reason that I can see for wholly prohibiting one useful instrument of communication that another. If Trenton can completely bar the streets to the advantageous use of loud speakers, all cities can do the same. In that event preference in the dissemination of ideas is given those who can obtain the support of newspapers, etc., or those who have money enough to buy advertising from newspapers, radios, or moving pictures. This Court should no more permit this invidious prohibition against the dissemination of ideas by speaking than it would permit a complete blackout of the press, the radio, or moving pictures. It is wise for all who cherish freedom of expression to reflect upon the plain fact that a holding that the audiences of public speakers can be constitutionally prohibited is not unrelated to a like prohibition in other fields. And the right to freedom of expression should be protected from absolute censorship for persons without, as for persons with, wealth and power.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right to freedom of expression
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - We think it is a permissible exercise of legislative discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public interest, amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of municipalities. On the business streets of cities like Trenton, with its more than 125,000 people, such distractions would be dangerous to traffic at all hours useful for the dissemination of information, and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers would likewise be at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions. We cannot believe that rights of free speech compel a municipality to allow such mechanical voice amplification on any of its streets.
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Phrase match: of free speech compel a municipality
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionab y amplified sound on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the streets. The preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself. That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without cost from some zealous supporter, is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - The various forms of modern so-called 'mass communications' raise issues that were not implied in the means of communication known or contemplated by Franklin and Jefferson and Madison. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013. Movies have created problems not presented by the circulation of books, pamphlets, or newspapers, and so the movies have been constitutionally regulated. Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387, 59 L.Ed. 552, Ann.Cas. 1916C, 296. Broadcasting in turn has produced its brood of complicated problems hardly to be solved by an easy formula about the preferred position of free speech. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - Only a disregard of vital differences between natural speech, even of the loudest spellbinders, and the noise of sound trucks would give sound trucks the constitutional rights accorded to the unaided human voice. Nor is it for this Court to devise the terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to operate, if at all. These are matters for the legislative judgment controlled by public opinion. So long as a legislature does not prescribe what ideas may be noisily expressed and what may not be, nor discriminate among those who would make inroads upon the public peace, it is not for us to supervise the limits the legislature may impose in safeguarding the steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection. Without such opportunities freedom of thought becomes a mocking phrase, and without freedom of thought there can be no free society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - N15* And of course cities may restrict or absolutely ban the use of amplifiers on busy streets in the business area. A city ordinance that reasonably restricts the volume of sound, or the hours during which an amplifier may be used, does not, in my mind, infringe the constitutionally protected area of free speech. It is because this ordinance does none of these things, but is instead an absolute prohibition of all uses of an amplifier on any of the streets of Trenton at any time that I must dissent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - N12* N13* The ordinance was applied to keep a minister from using an amplifier while preaching in a public park. We held that the ordinance, aimed at the use of an amplifying device, invaded the area of free speech guaranteed the people by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The ordinance, so we decided, amounted to censorship in its baldest form. And our conclusion rested on the fact that the chief of police was given arbitrary power to prevent the use of speech amplifying devices at all times and places in the city, without regard to the volume of the sound. We pointed out the indispensable function performed by loud speakers in modern public speaking. We then placed use of loud speakers in public streets and parks on the same constitutional level as freedom to speak on streets without such devices, freedom to speak over radio, and freedom to distribute literature.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - The opinion argues that the Trenton ordinance allows for content-based censorship In this case the Court denies speech amplifiers the constitutional shelter recognized by our decisions and holding in the Saia case. This is true because the Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance here sustained goes beyond a mere prior censorship of all loud speakers with authority in the censor to prohibit some of them. This Trenton ordinance wholly bars the use of all loud speakers mounted upon any vehicle in any of the city's public streets.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - N14* Ideas and beliefs are today chiefly disseminated to the masses of people through the press, radio, moving pictures, and public address systems. To some extent at least there is competition of ideas between and within these groups. The basic premise of the First Amendment is that all present instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition. Laws which hamper the free use of some instruments of communication thereby favor competing channels. Thus unless constitutionally prohibited, laws like this Trenton ordinance can give an overpowering influence to views of owners of legally favored instruments of communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - N15* It is wise for all who cherish freedom of expression to reflect upon the plain fact that a holding that the audiences of public speakers can be constitutionally prohibited is not unrelated to a like prohibition in other fields. And the right to freedom of expression should be protected from absolute censorship for persons without, as for persons with, wealth and power. At least, such is the theory of our society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - This Court held the ordinance 'unconstitutional on its face,' Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1149 because the quoted section established a 'previous restraint' on free speech with 'no standards prescribed for the exercise' of discretion by the Chief of Police. When ordinances undertake censorship of speech or religious practices before permitting their exercise, the Constitution forbids their enforcement.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - N1* This Court should no more permit this invidious prohibition against the dissemination of ideas by speaking N2* than it would permit a complete blackout of the press, the radio, or moving pictures. It is wise for all who cherish freedom of expression to reflect upon the plain fact that a holding that the audiences of public speakers can be constitutionally prohibited is not unrelated to a like prohibition in other fields. And the right to freedom of expression should be protected from absolute censorship for persons without, as for persons with, wealth and power.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - N6* N7* N8* But ordinances can be drawn which adequately protect a community from unreasonable use of public speaking devices without absolutely denying to the community's citizens all information that may be disseminated or received through this new avenue for trade in ideas. I would agree without reservation to the sentiment that 'unrestrained use throughout a municipality of all sound amplifying devices would be intolerable.' And of course cities may restrict or absolutely ban the use of amplifiers on busy streets in the business area. A city ordinance that reasonably restricts the volume of sound, or the hours during which an amplifier may be used, does not, in my mind, infringe the constitutionally protected area of free speech.
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Parties: Terminiello v. Chicago
Date: 1949-05-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - This absence from the Constitution of any expressed power to deal with abuse of freedom of speech has enabled the Court to soar aloof from any consideration of the abuses which create problems for the states and to indulge in denials of local authority, some of which seem to me improvident in the light of functions which local governments must be relied on to perform for our free society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. at pages 571—572, 62 S.Ct. at page 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to roduce a N44* clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Freedom of speech undoubtedly means freedom to express views that challenge deep-seated, sacred beliefs and to utter sentiments that may provoke resentment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - Were the Court to sustain the claim urged throughout these proceedings, in Illinois and here, namely, that a law is unconstitutional when it forbids Terminiello's harangue in the circumstances of its utterance, it would be immaterial that only $100 is involved.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The Court reverses this conviction by reiterating generalized approbations of freedom of speech with which, in the abstract, no one will disagree. Doubts as to their applicability are lulled by avoidance of more than passing reference to the circumstances of Terminiello's speech and judging it as if he had spoken to persons as dispassionate as empty benches, or like a modern Demosthenes practicing his Philippics on a lonely seashore.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - "It N45* was dealing with a riot and with a speech that provoked a hostile mob and incited a friendly one, and threatened violence between the two. When the trial judge instructed the jury that it might find Terminiello guilty of inducing a breach of the peace if his behavior stirred the public to anger, invited dispute, brought about unrest, created a disturbance or molested peace and quiet by arousing alarm, he was not speaking of these as harmless or abstract conditions. He was addressing his words to the concrete behavior and specific consequences disclosed by the evidence. He was saying to the jury, in effect, that if this particular speech added fuel to the situation already so inflamed as to threaten to get beyond police control, it could be punished as inducing a breach of peace. When the light of the evidence not recited by the Court is thrown upon the Court's opinion, it discloses that underneath a little issue of Terminiello and his hundred-dollar fine lurk some of the most far-reaching constitutional questions that can confront a people who value both liberty and order. This Court seems to regard these as enemies of each other and to be of the view that we must forego order to achieve liberty. So it fixes its eyes on a conception of freedom of speech so rigid as to tolerate no concession to society's need for public order.
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - Mr. Justice Roberts for a unanimous Court also said: N46* 'The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or other, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.' 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech.' This restrains no authority except Congress. Read as literally as some would do, it restrains Congress i terms so absolute that no legislation would be valid if it touched free speech, no matter how obscene, treasonable, defamatory, inciting or provoking. If it seems strange that no express qualifications were inserted in the Amendment, the answer may be that limitations were thought to be implicit in the definition of 'freedom of speech' as then understood. Or it may have been thought unnecessary to delegate to Congress any power over abuses of free speech. The Federal Government was then a new and experimental authority, remote from the people, and it was supposed to deal with a limited class of national problems. Inasmuch as any breaches of peace from abuse of free speech traditionally were punishable by state governments, it was needless to reserve that power in a provision drafted to exclude only Congress from such a field of law-making.
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - 'Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' (Emphasis added.) That is what I think is meant by the cryptic phrase 'freedom of speech,' as used in the Federal Compact, and that is the rule I think we should apply to the states.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - I begin with the oft-forgotten principle which this case demonstrates, that freedom of speech exists only under law and not independently of it. What would Terminiello's theoretical freedom of speech have amounted to had he not been given active aid by the officers of the law? He could reach the hall only with this help, could talk only because they restrained the mob, and could make his getaway only under their protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - No one will disagree that the fundamental, permanent and overriding policy of police and courts should be to permit and encourage utmost freedom of utterance. It is the legal right of any American citizen to advocate peaceful adoption of fascism or communism, socialism or capitalism. He may go far in expressing sentiments whether pro- emitic or anti-semitic, pro-negro or anti-negro, pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic. He is legally free to argue for some anti-American system of government to supersede by constitutional methods the one we have. It is our philosophy that the course of government should be controlled by a consensus of the governed. This process of reaching intelligent popular decisions requires free discussion. Hence we should tolerate no law or custom of censorship or suppression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 105 - 'I have always been among those who b lieved that the greatest freedom of speech was the greatest safety, because if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking. It cannot be so easily discovered if you allow him to remain silent and look wise, but if you let him speak, the secret is out and the world knows that he is a fool. So it is by the exposure of folly that it is defeated; not by the seclusion of folly, and in this free air of free speech men get into that sort of communication with one another which constitutes the basis of all common achievement.' Address at the Institute of France, Paris, May 10, 1919. 2 Selected Literary and Political Papers and Addresses of Woodrow Wilson (1926) 333.
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - No one will disagree that the fundamental, permanent and overriding policy of police and courts should be to permit and encourage utmost freedom of utterance. It is the legal right of any American citizen to advocate peaceful adoption of fascism or communism, socialism or capitalism.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - When the right of society to freedom from probable violence should prevail over the right of an individual to defy opposing opinion, presents a problem that always tests wisdom and often calls for immediate and vigorous action to preserve public order and safety.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - N33* 'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress (or the State or City) has a right to prevent.' (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470. No one ventures to contend that the State on the basis of this test, for whatever it may be worth, was not justified in punishing Terminiello. In this case the evidence pro es beyond dispute that danger of rioting and violence in response to the speech was clear, present and immediate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - N34* This case demonstrates also that this Court's service to free speech is essentially negative and can consist only of reviewing actions by local magistrates. But if free speech is to be a practical reality, affirmative and immediate protection is required; and it can come only from nonjudicial sources. It depends on local police, maintained by law-abiding taxpayers, and who, regardless of their own feelings, risk themselves to maintain supremacy of law. Terminiello's theoretical right to speak free from interference would have no reality if Chicago should withdraw its officers to some other section of the city, or if the men assigned to the task should look the other way when the crowd threatens Terminiello. Can society by expected to keep these men at Terminiello's service if it has nothing to say of his behavior which may force them into dangerous action?
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - The Constitution of Illinois is representative of the provisions put in nearly all state constitutions and reads (Art. II, § 4): 'Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' (Emphasis added.) That is what I think is meant by the cryptic phrase 'freedom of speech,' as used in the Federal Compact, and that is the rule I think we should apply to the states.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - N16* This case demonstrates also that this Court's service to free speech is essentially negative and can consist only of reviewing actions by local magistrates. But if free speech is to be a practical reality, affirmative and immediate protection is required; and it can come only from nonjudicial sources. It depends on local police, maintained by law-abiding taxpayers, and who, regardless of their own feelings, risk themselves to maintain supremacy of law. Terminiello's theoretical right to speak free from interference would have no reality if Chicago should withdraw its officers to some other section of the city, or if the men assigned to the task should look the other way when the crowd threatens Terminiello. Can society by expected to keep these men at Terminiello's service if it has nothing to say of his behavior which may force them into dangerous action?
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - But if we maintain a general policy of free speaking, we must recognize that its inevitable consequence will be sporadic local outbreaks of violence, for it is the nature of men to be intolerant of attacks upon institutions, personalities and ideas for which they really care. In the long run, maintenance of free speech will be more endangered if the population can have no protection from the abuses which lead to violence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - I am unable to see the the local authorities have transgressed the Federal Constitution. Illinois imposed no prior censorship or suppression upon Terminiello. On the contrary, its sufferance and protection was all that enabled him to speak. It does not appear that the motive in punishing him is to silence the ideology he expressed as offensive to the State's policy or as untrue, or has any purpose of controlling his thought or its peaceful communication to others. There is no claim that the proceedings against Terminiello are designed to discriminate against him or the faction he represents or the ideas that he bespeaks. There is no indication that the charge against him is a mere pretext to give the semblance of legality to a covert effort to silence him or to prevent his followers or the public from hearing any truth that is in him.
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - No one will disagree that the fundamental, permanent and overriding policy of police and courts should be to permit and encourage utmost freedom of utterance. It is the legal right of any American citizen to advocate peaceful adoption of fascism or communism, socialism or capitalism. He may go far in expressing sentiments whether pro- emitic or anti-semitic, pro-negro or anti-negro, pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic. He is legally free to argue for some anti-American system of government to supersede by constitutional methods the one we have. It is our philosophy that the course of government should be controlled by a consensus of the governed. This process of reaching intelligent popular decisions requires free discussion. Hence we should tolerate no law or custom of censorship or suppression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N16* Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. at pages 571—572, 62 S.Ct. at page 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to roduce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L.Ed. 1546. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. at pages 571—572, 62 S.Ct. at page 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to roduce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L.Ed. 1546. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.
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Parties: Cole v. Arkansas
Date: 1949-12-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Certainly the Act before us does not penalize the promotion, encouragement, or furtherance or peaceful assembly at or near any place where a labor dispute exists, nor does it infringe the right of expression of views in any labor dispute.
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Parties: American Communications Ass'n v. Douds
Date: 1950-05-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 111 - On the contrary, the First Amendment was added after adoption of the Constitution for the express purpose of barring Congress from using previously granted powers to abridge belief or its expression. Freedom to think is inevitably abridged when beliefs are penalized by imposition of civil disabilities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Although the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, press or assembly, it has long been established that those freedoms themselves are dependent upon the power of constitutional government to survive. If it is to survive it must have power to protect itself against unlawful conduct and, under some circumstances, against incitements to commit unlawful acts. Freedom of speech thus does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time. The important question that came to this Court immediately after the First World War was not whether, but how far, the First Amendment permits the suppression of speech which advocates conduct inimical to the public welfare.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - To hold that such an oath is permissible, on the other hand, is to admit that the circumstances under which one is asked to state his belief and the consequences which flow from his refusal to do so or his disclosure of a particular belief make a difference. The reason for the difference has been pointed out at some length above. First, the loss of a particular position is not the loss of life or liberty. We have noted that the distinction is one of degree, and it is for this reason that the effect of the statute in proscribing beliefs—like its effect in restraining speech or freedom of association—must be carefully weighed by the courts in determining whether the balance struck by Congress comports with the dictates of the Constitution. But it is inaccurate to speak of § 9(h) as 'punishing' or 'forbidding' the holding of beliefs, any more than it punishes or forbids membership in the Communist Party.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - the right of the public to be protected from evils of conduct, even though First Amendment rights of persons or groups are thereby in some manner infringed, has received frequent and consistent recognition by this Court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the congressional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to interstate commerce and that Communists and others identified by § 9(h) pose continuing threats to that public interest when in positions of union leadership.
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Segment in Paragraph: 104 - our Constitution excludes both general and local governments from the realm of opinions and ideas, beliefs and doubts, heresy and orthodoxy, political, religious or scientific. The right to speak out, or to publish, also is protected when it does not clearly and presently threaten some injury to society which the Government has a right to protect. Separate opinion,
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Segment in Paragraph: 111 - No case cited by the Court provides the least vestige of support for thus holding that the Commerce Clause restricts the right to think. On the contrary, the First Amendment was added after adoption of the Constitution for the express purpose of barring Congress from using previously granted powers to abridge belief or its expression. Freedom to think is inevitably abridged when beliefs are penalized by imposition of civil disabilities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - /prefTerm>Although the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, press or assembly, it has long been established that those freedoms themselves are dependent upon the power of constitutional government to survive. If it is to survive it must have power to protect itself against unlawful conduct and, under some circumstances, against incitements to commit unlawful acts. Freedom of speech thus does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time. The important question that came to this Court immediately after the First World War was not whether, but how far, the First Amendment permits the suppression of speech which advocates conduct inimical to the public welfare.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - under the First Amendment, the public has a right to every man's views and every man the right to speak them. Government may cut him off only when his views are no longer merely views but threaten, clearly and imminently, to ripen into conduct against which the public has a right to protect itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N35* 'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' Schenck v. United States,
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - Therefore, it becomes most relevant whether an oath which Congress asks men to take may or may not be thought to touch matters that may not be subjected to compulsory avowal of belief or disbelief. In the uncertainty of the reach of § 9(h), one may withhold an oath because of conscientious scruples that it covers beliefs whose disclosure Congress could not in terms exact. If a man has scruples about taking an oath because of uncertainty as to whether it encompasses some beliefs that are inviolate, the surrender of abstention is invited by the ambiguity of the congressional exaction. As Mr. Justice JACKSON'S opinion indicates, probing into men's thoughts trenches on those aspects of individual freedom which we rightly regard as the most cherished aspects of Western civilization. The cardinal article of faith of our civilization is the inviolate character of the individual. A man can be regarded as an individual and not as a function of the state only if he is protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person. Entry into that citadel can be justified, if at all, only if strictly confined so that the belief that a man is asked to reveal is so defined as to leave no fair room for doubt that he is not asked to disclose what he has a right to withhold.
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - Progress generally begins in skepticism about accepted truths. Intellectual freedom means the right to re-examine much that has been long taken for granted. A free man must be a reasoning man, and he must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral majority may most passionately assert. The danger that citizens will think wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not thinking at all. Our Constitution relies on our electorate's complete ideological freedom to nourish independent and responsible intelligence and preserve our democracy from that submissiveness, timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would foster a tyranny of mediocrity. The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional right of each member to think as he will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it. It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the censors are better shielded against error than the censored.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Thus, N17* 'the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the state (or Congress) constitutionally may seek to prevent * * *.' Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 47 S.Ct. 641, 647, 71 L.Ed. 1095. By this means they sought to convey the philosophy that, under the First Amendment, the public has a right to every man's views and every man the right to speak them. Government may cut him off only when his views are no longer merely views but threaten, clearly and imminently, to ripen into conduct against which the public has a right to protect itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Considering the circumstances surrounding the problem—the deference due the congressional judgment concerning the need for regulation of conduct affecting interstate commerce and the effect of the statute upon rights of speech, assembly and belief—we conclude that § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, does not unduly infringe freedoms protected by the First Amendment. Those who, so Congress has found, would subvert the public interest cannot escape all regulation because, at the same time, they carry on legitimate political activities. Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 1942, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262. To encourage unions to displace them from positions of great power over the national economy, while at the same time leaving free the outlets by which they may pursue legitimate political activities of persuasion and advocacy, does not seem to us to contravene the purposes of the First Amendment. That Amendment requires that one be permitted to believe what he will. It requires that one be permitted to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and present danger that a substantial public evil will result therefrom. It does not require that he be permitted to be the keeper of the arsenal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - While the Governments, State and Federal, have expansive powers to curtail action, and some small powers to curtail speech or writing, I think neither has any power, on any pretext, directly or indirectly to attempt foreclosure of any line of thought. Our forefathers found the evils of free thinking more to be endured than the evils of inquest or suppression. They gave the status of almost absolute individual rights to the outward means of expressing belief. I cannot believe that they left open a way for legislation to embarrass or impede the mere intellectual processes by which those expressions of belief are examined and formulated. This is not only because individual thinking presents no danger to society, but because thoughtful, bold and independent minds are essential to wise and considered self-government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 119 - Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, a unanimous Court calmly announced time-honored principles that should govern this Court today: N18* 'The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutinal government.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - N17* Progress generally begins in skepticism about accepted truths. Intellectual freedom means the right to re-examine much that has been long taken for granted. A free man must be a reasoning man, and he must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral majority may most passionately assert. The danger that citizens will think wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not thinking at all. Our Constitution relies on our electorate's complete ideological freedom to nourish independent and responsible intelligence and preserve our democracy from that submissiveness, timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would foster a tyranny of mediocrity. The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional right of each member to think as he will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it. It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the censors are better shielded against error than the censored.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The high place in which the right to speak, think, and assemble as you will was held by the Framers of the Bill of Rights and is held today by those who value liberty both as a means and an end indicates the solicitude with which we must view any assertion of personal freedoms. We must recognize, moreover, that regulation of 'conduct' has all too frequently been employed by public authority as a cloak to hide censorship of unpopular ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - But we have here no statute which is either frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas nor one which, although ostensibly aimed at the regulation of conduct, may actually N18* 'be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views.' Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 1939, 307 U.S. 496, 516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423. There are here involved none of the elements of censorship or prohibition of the dissemination of information that were present in the cases mainly relied upon by those attacking the statute. The 'discouragements' of § 9(h) proceed not against the groups or beliefs identified therein, but only against the combination of those affiliations or beliefs with occupancy of a position of great power over the economy of the country. Congress has concluded that substantial harm, in the form of direct, positive action, may be expected from that combination. In this legislation, Congress did not restrain the activities of the Communist Party as a political organization; nor did it attempt to stifle beliefs.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. The high place in which the right to speak, think, and assemble as you will was held by the Framers of the Bill of Rights and is held today by those who value liberty both as a means and an end indicates the solicitude with which we must view any assertion of personal freedoms. We must recognize, moreover, that regulation of 'conduct' has all too frequently been employed by public authority as a cloak to hide censorship of unpopular ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - But we have here no statute which is either frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas nor one which, although ostensibly aimed at the regulation of conduct, may actually 'be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views.' Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 1939, 307 U.S. 496, 516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423. There are here involved none of the elements of censorship or prohibition of the dissemination of information that were present in the cases mainly relied upon by those attacking the statute. The 'discouragements' of § 9(h) proceed not against the groups or beliefs identified therein, but only against the combination of those affiliations or beliefs with occupancy of a position of great power over the economy of the country.
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Segment in Paragraph: 111 - On the contrary, the First Amendment was added after adoption of the Constitution for the express purpose of barring Congress from using previously granted powers to abridge belief or its expression. Freedom to think is inevitably abridged when beliefs are penalized by imposition of civil disabilities.
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Parties: Hughes v. Superior Court of California
Date: 1950-05-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N36* These considerations are most pertinent in regard to a population made up of so many diverse groups as ours. To deny to California the right to ban picketing in the circumstances of this case would mean that there could be no prohibition of the pressure of picketing to secure proportional employment on ancestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York, and so on through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations in various cities. States may well believe that such constitutional sheltering would inevitably encourage use of picketing to compel employment on the basis of racial discrimination. In disallowing such picketing States may act under the belief that otherwise community tensions and conflicts would be exacerbated. The differences in cultural traditions instead of adding flavor and variety to our common citizenry might well be hardened into hostilities by leave of law. The Constitution does not demand that the element of communication in picketing prevail over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - But while picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something more and different. Industrial picketing N19* 'is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.' Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Black and Murphy, JJ., concurring in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775, 776, 62 S.Ct. 816, 819, 86 L.Ed. 1178. Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent.
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Parties: International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke
Date: 1950-06-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - we must start with the fact that while picketing has an ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech. Our decisions reflect recognition that picketing is N47* 'indeed a hybrid.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I understand the above cases to have found violations of the federal constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, and the picketing could not be restrained because to do so would violate the right of free speech and publicity. This view is plainly stated by this Court in Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302, v. Angelos, 320 U.S. at page 295, 64 S.Ct. at page 127: 'In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229, this Court ruled that members of a union might, 'without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - All the recent cases of this Court upholding picketing, from Thornhill to Angelos, have done so on the view that 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity' (see 320 U.S. at page 295, 64 S.Ct. at page 127, 88 L.Ed. 58) is protected by the guaranty of free speech. This view stems from Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement in Senn that N48* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.' 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. In that case Justice Brandeis was dealing with action of Wisconsin that permitted picketing by a labor union of a one-man shop. Of course, as long as Wisconsin allowed picketing, there was no interference with freedom of expression. By permitting picketing the State was allowing the expression found in 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity.' There was in that posture of the case no question of conflict with the right of free speech. But because Wisconsin could permit picketing, and not thereby encroach upon freedom of speech, it does not follow that it could forbid like picketing; for that might involve conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems to me that Justice Brandeis, foreseeing the problem of the converse, made the statement above quoted in order to indicate that picketing could be protected by the free speech guaranty of the Federal Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I understand the above cases to have found violations of the federal constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, and the picketing could not be restrained because to do so would violate the right of free speech and publicity. This view is plainly stated by this Court in Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302, v. Angelos,
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - All the recent cases of this Court upholding picketing, from Thornhill to Angelos, have done so on the view that N32* 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity' (see 320 U.S. at page 295, 64 S.Ct. at page 127, 88 L.Ed. 58) is protected by the guaranty of free speech. This view stems from Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement in Senn that N33* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.' 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. In that case Justice Brandeis was dealing with action of Wisconsin that permitted picketing by a labor union of a one-man shop. Of course, as long as Wisconsin allowed picketing, there was no interference with freedom of expression. By permitting picketing the State was allowing the expression found in 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity.' There was in that posture of the case no question of conflict with the right of free speech. But because Wisconsin could permit picketing, and not thereby encroach upon freedom of speech, it does not follow that it could forbid like picketing; for that might involve conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Because the decrees here are not directed at any abuse of picketing but at all picketing, I think to sustain them is contrary to our prior holdings, founded as they are in the doctrine that N34* 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity' is protected by the constitutional guaranty of the right of free speech. I recognize that picketing is more than speech. That is why I think an abuse of picketing may lead to a forfeiture of the protection of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Here, as in Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, we must start with the fact that while picketing has an ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech. Our decisions reflect recognition that picketing is N20* 'indeed a hybrid.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Because the decrees here are not directed at any abuse of picketing but at all picketing, I think to sustain them is contrary to our prior holdings, founded as they are in the doctrine that 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity' is protected by the constitutional guaranty of the right of free speech. I recognize that picketing is more than speech. That is why I think an abuse of picketing may lead to a forfeiture of the protection of free speech. Tested by the philosophy of prior decisions, no such forfeiture is justified here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - All the recent cases of this Court upholding picketing, from Thornhill to Angelos, have done so on the view that N9* 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity' (see 320 U.S. at page 295, 64 S.Ct. at page 127, 88 L.Ed. 58) is protected by the guaranty of free speech. This view stems from Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement in Senn that N10* 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.' 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229. In that case Justice Brandeis was dealing with action of Wisconsin that permitted picketing by a labor union of a one-man shop. Of course, as long as Wisconsin allowed picketing, there was no interference with freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Because the decrees here are not directed at any abuse of picketing but at all picketing, I think to sustain them is contrary to our prior holdings, founded as they are in the doctrine that N11* 'peaceful picketing and truthful publicity' is protected by the constitutional guaranty of the right of free speech. I recognize that picketing is more than speech. That is why I think an abuse of picketing may lead to a forfeiture of the protection of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Here, as in Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, we must start with the fact that while picketing has an ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech.
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Parties: Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam
Date: 1950-05-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - This Court has said that picketing is in part an exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855; Carlson v. People of State of California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229. But since picketing is more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey, this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful publicity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Peaceful picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by the decree under review. The State has not here, as in Swing, relied on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. Thus the State has not, as was the case there, excludedN29* 'workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N30* 'But placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an important public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state control. * * * N31* And it is clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. * * * They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - But since picketing is more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey, this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful publicity.
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Parties: Niemotko v. Maryland
Date: 1951-01-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - this Court condemned statutes and ordinances which required that permits be obtained from local officials as a prerequisite to the use of public places, on the grounds that a license requirement constituted a prior restraint on freedom of speech, press and religion, and, in the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow, must be invalid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - An attempt to derive from dicta in the Davis case the right of a city to exercise any power over its parks, however, arbitrary or discriminatory, was rejected in Hague v. C.I.O., supra. The ordinance presented in the Hague case required a permit for meetings on public ground, the permit to be refused by the licensing official only 'for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' 307 U.S. 302, 59 S.Ct. 958 note 1. The facts of the case, however, left no doubt that the licensing power had been made an 'instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs'. 307 U.S. at page 516, 59 S.Ct. at page 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423. And the construction given the ordinance in the State courts gave the licensing officials wide discretion. See Thomas v. Casey, 121 N.J.L. 185, 1 A.2d 866. The holding of the Hague case was not that a city could not subject the use of its streets and parks to reasonable regulation. The holding was that the licensing officials could not be given power arbitrarily to suppress free expression, no matter under what cover of law they purported to act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N37* Indeed, rarely has any case been before this Court which shows so clearly an unwarranted discrimination in a refusal to issue such a license. It is true that the City Council held a hearing at which it considered the application. But we have searched the record in vain to discover any valid basis for the refusal. In fact, the Mayor testified that the permit would probably have been granted if, at the hearing, the applicants had not started to 'berate' the Park Commissioner for his refusal to issue the permit. The only questions asked of the Witnesses at the hearing pertained to their alleged refusal to salute the flag, their views on the Bible, and other issues irrelevant to unemcumbered use of the public parks. The conclusion is inescapable that the use of the park was denied because of the City Council's dislike for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their views. The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing body.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Legislatures, local authorities, and the courts have for years grappled with claims of the right to disseminate ideas in public places as against claims of an effective power in government to keep the peace and to protect other interests of a civilized community.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - Administrative control over the right to speak must be based on appropriate standards, whether the speaking be done indoors or out-of-doors. The vice to be guarded against is arbitrary action by officials.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - It is true that breach-of-peace statutes, like most tools of government, may be misused. Enforcement of these statutes calls for public tolerance and intelligent police administration. These, in the long run, must give substance to whatever this Court may say about free speech. But the possibility of misuse is not alone a sufficient reason to deny New York the power here asserted or so limit it by constitutional construction as to deny its practical exercise.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The conclusion is inescapable that the use of the park was denied because of the City Council's dislike for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their views. The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing body.
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Parties: Kunz v. New York
Date: 1951-01-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - It may become difficult to preserve here what a large part of the world has lost—the right to speak, even temperately, on matters vital to spirit and body. In such a setting, to blanket hateful and hate-stirring attacks on races and faiths under the protections for freedom of speech may be a noble innovation. On the other hand, it may be a quixotic tilt at windmills which belittles great principles of liberty.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - This Court's prior decisions, as well as its decisions today, will be searched in vain for clear standards by which it does, or lower courts should, distinguish legitimate speaking from that acknowledged to be outside of constitutional protection. One reason for this absence is that this Court has had little experience in deciding controversies over city control of street meetings. As late as 1922, this Court declared, '* * * neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' * * *.' Prudential Insurance
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - If anything less than a reasonable certainty of disorder was shown, denial of a permit would be improper. The procedure by which that decision is reached commends itself to the orderly mind—complaints are filed, witnesses are heard, opportunity to cross-examine is given, and decision is reached by what we must assume to be an impartial and reasonable administrative officer, and, if he denies the permit, the applicant may carry his cause to the courts. He may thus have a civil test of his rights without the personal humiliation of being arrested as presenting a menace to public order. It seems to me that this procedure better protects freedom of speech than to let everyone speak without leave, but subject to surveillance and to being ordered to stop in the discretion of the police.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The speeches which Kunz has made and which he asserts he has a right to make in the future were properly held by the courts below to be out of bounds for a street meeting and not constitutionally protected. This Court, without discussion, makes a contrary assumption which is basic to its whole opinion. It says New York has given 'an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets'. Again, it says that 'prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights' invalidates the ordinance. (Emphasis supplied.) This seems to take the last step first, assuming as a premise what is in question. Of course, if Kunz is only exercising his constitutional rights, then New York can neither restrain nor punish him. But I doubt that the Court's assumption will survive analysis.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - It is well to be vigilant to protect the right of Kunz to speak, but is he to be sole judge as to how far he will carry verbal attacks in the public streets?
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - We have here, then, an ordinance which gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - In Saia v. People of State of New York, 1948, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574, we reaffirmed the invalidity of such prior restraints upon the right to speak: N35* 'We hold that § 3 of this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action. To use a loudspeaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - we reaffirmed the invalidity of such prior restraints upon the right to speak: N38* 'We hold that § 3 of this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action. To use a loudspeaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - It is sufficient to say that New York cannot vest restraining control over the right to speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards to guide his action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Essential freedoms are today threatened from without and within. It may become difficult to preserve here what a large part of the world has lost—the right to speak, even temperately, on matters vital to spirit and body. In such a setting, to blanket hateful and hate-stirring attacks on races and faiths under the protections for freedom of speech may be a noble innovation. On the other hand, it may be a quixotic tilt at windmills which belittles great principles of liberty. Only time can tell. But I incline to the latter view and cannot assent to the decision.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The speeches which Kunz has made and which he asserts he has a right to make in the future were properly held by the courts below to be out of bounds for a street meeting and not constitutionally protected. This Court, without discussion, makes a contrary assumption which is basic to its whole opinion. It says New York has given N39* N40* 'an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets'.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - If New York has benefit of the rule as Mr. Justice Holmes announced it, Schenck v. United States, supra, 249 U.S. at page 52, 39 S.Ct. at page 249, 63 L.Ed. 470, it would mean that it could punish or prevent speech if N41* 'the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils' that the City has a right to prevent, among which I should suppose we would list street fighting or riots. As I have pointed out, the proof in this case leaves no doubt that Kunz's words, in the environment of the streets, have and will result in that, unless a police escort attends to awe the hearers into submission.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - A hostile reception of his subject certainly does not alone destroy one's right to speak. A temperate and reasoned criticism of Roman Catholicism or Judaism might, and probably would, cause some resentment and protest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - But this kind of disorder does not abridge the right to speak except for the emergency and, since the speaker was within his constitutional right to speak, it could not be grounds for revoking or refusing him a permit or convicting him of any offense because of his utterance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The purpose of the Court is to enable those who feel a call to proselytize to do so by street meetings. The means is to set up a private right to speak in the city streets without asking permission. Of course, if Kunz may speak without a permit, so may anyone else. If he may speak whenever and wherever he may elect, I know of no way in which the City can silence the heckler, the interrupter, the dissenter, the rivals with missionary fervor, who have an equal right at the same time and place to lift their voices. And, of course, if the City may not stop Kunz from uttering insulting and 'fighting' words, neither can it stop his adversaries, and the discussion degenerates to a name-calling contest without social value and, human nature being what it is, to a fight or perhaps a riot. The end of the Court's method is chaos.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The court below has mistakenly derived support for its conclusion from the evidence produced at the trial that appellant's religious meetings had, in the past, caused some disorder. There are appropriate public remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if appellant's speeches should result in disorder or violence. 'In the present case, we have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of subsequent punishment.' Near v. State of Minnesota, 1931, 283 U.S. 697, 715, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357. We do not express any opinion on the propriety of punitive remedies which the New York authorities may utilize. We are here concerned with suppression—not punishment. It is sufficient to say that New York cannot vest restraining control over the right to speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards to guide his action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - N21* Of course, as to the press, there are the best of reasons against any licensing or prior restraint. Decisions such as Near v. State of Minnesota, supra, hold any licensing or prior restraint of the press unconstitutional, and I heartily agree. But precedents from that field cannot reasonably be transposed to the street-meeting field. The impact of publishing on public order has no similarity with that of a street meeting. Publishing does not make private use of public property. It reaches only those who choose to read, and, in that way, is analogous to a meeting held in a hall where those who come do so by choice. Written words are less apt to incite or provoke to mass action than spoken words, speech being the primitive and direct communication with the emotions. Few are the riots caused by publication alone, few are the mobs that have not had their immediate origin in harangue. The vulnerability of various forms of communication to community control must be proportioned to their impact upon other community interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - But if the Court conceives, as Feiner indicates, that upon uttering insulting, provocative or inciting words the policeman on the best may stop the meeting, then its assurance of free speech in this decision is 'a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope,' if the patrolman on the beat happens to have prejudices of his own.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The question remains whether the Constitution prohibits a city from control of its streets by a permit system which takes into account dangers to public peace and order. I am persuaded that it does not do so, provided, of course, that the city does not so discriminate as to deny equal protection of the law or undertake a censorship of utterances that are not so defamatory, insulting, inciting, or provocative as to be reasonably likely to cause disorder and violence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - In this case there is no evidence of a purpose to suppress speech, except to keep it in bounds that will not upset good order. If there are abuses of censorship or discrimination in administering the ordinance, as well there may be, they are not proved in this case. This Court should be particularly sure of its ground before it strikes down, in a time like this, the going, practical system by which New York has sought to control its street-meeting problem.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The speeches which Kunz has made and which he asserts he has a right to make in the future were properly held by the courts below to be out of bounds for a street meeting and not constitutionally protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N12* 'We hold that § 3 of this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action. To use a loudspeaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion.'
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Parties: Feiner v. New York
Date: 1951-01-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N49* 'The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. On one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.' 310 U.S. at page 308, 60 S.Ct. at page 905. The findings of the New York courts as to the condition of the crowd and the refusal of petitioner to obey the police requests, supported as they are by the record of this case, are persuasive that the conviction of petitioner for violation of public peace, order and authority does not exceed the bounds of proper state police action. This Court respects, as it must, the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Criticism of public officials will be too dangerous for all but the most courageous. This is true regardless of the fact that in two other cases decided this day, Kunz v. People of State of New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312; Niemotko v. State of Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, a majority, in obedience to past decisions of this Court, provides a theoretical safeguard for freedom of speech. For whatever is thought to be guaranteed in Kunz and Niemotko is taken away by what is done here. The three cases read together mean that while previous restraints probably cannot be imposed on an unpopular speaker, the police have discretion to silence him as soon as the customary hostility to his views develops.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - On the contrary, I think that the policeman's action was a 'deliberate defiance' of ordinary official duty as well as of the constitutional right of free speech. For at least where time allows, courtesy and explanation of commands are basic elements of good official conduct in a democratic society. Here petitioner was 'asked' then 'told' then 'commanded' to stop speaking, but a man making a lawful address is certainly not required to be silent merely because an officer directs it. Petitioner was entitled to know why he should cease doing a lawful act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - N42* Their duty was to protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to interfere. Instead, they shirked that duty and acted only to suppress the right to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Finally, I cannot agree with the Court's statement that petitioner's disregard of the policeman's unexplained request amounted to such 'deliberate defiance' as would justify an arrest or conviction for disorderly conduct. On the contrary, I think that the policeman's action was a 'deliberate defiance' of ordinary official duty as well as of the constitutional right of free speech. For at least where time allows, courtesy and explanation of commands are basic elements of good official conduct in a democratic society. Here petitioner was 'asked' then 'told' then 'commanded' to stop speaking, but a man making a lawful address is certainly not required to be silent merely because an officer directs it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Public assemblies and public speech occupy an important role in American life. One high function of the police is to protect these lawful gatherings so that the speakers may exercise their constitutional rights. When unpopular causes are sponsored from the public platform, there will commonly be mutterings and unrest and heckling from the crowd. When a speaker mounts a platform it is not unusual to find him resorting to exaggeration, to vilification of ideas and men, to the making of false charges. But those extravagances, as we emphasized in Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, do not justify penalizing the speaker by depriving him of the platform or by punishing him for his conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - It shows an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one man to haul the speaker from the stage. It is against that kind of threat that speakers need police protection. If they do not receive it and instead the police throw their weight on the side of those who would break up the meetings, the police become the new censors of speech. Police censorship has all the vices of the censorship from city halls which we have repeatedy struck down.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - A speaker may not, of course, incite a riot any more than he may incite a breach of the peace by the use of 'fighting words'. See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031. But this record shows no such extremes. It shows an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one man to haul the speaker from the stage. It is against that kind of threat that speakers need police protection. If they do not receive it and instead the police throw their weight on the side of those who would break up the meetings, the police become the new censors of speech. Police censorship has all the vices of the censorship from city halls which we have repeatedy struck down.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - But still more has been lost today. Even accepting every 'finding of fact' below, I think this conviction makes a mockery of the free speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The end result of the affirmance here is to approve a simple and readily available technique by which cities and states can with impunity subject all speeches, political or otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to the supervision and censorship of the local police. I will have no part or parcel in this holding which I view as a long step toward totalitarian authority.
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Parties: Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath
Date: 1951-04-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 131 - First Amendment.—Petitioners assert that their inclusion on the disloyal list has abridged their freedom of speech, since listeners or readers are more difficult to obtain for their speeches and publications, and parties interested in their work are more hesitant to become associates. The Refugee Committee brief adds that 'thought' is also abridged. A concurring opinion accepts these arguments to the point of concluding that the publication of the lists 'with or without a hearing' violates the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Finally, the standing of the petitioners to bring these suits is clear. The touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right and the right of a bona fide charitable organization to carry on its work, free from defamatory statements of the kind discussed, is such a right.
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Segment in Paragraph: 133 - Recognizing that the designation, rightly or wrongly, of petitioner organizations as communist impairs their ability to carry forward successfully whatever legitimate objects they seek to accomplish, we do not accept their argument that such interference is an abridgment of First Amendment guarantees. They are in the position of every proponent of unpopular views. Heresy induces strong expressions of opposition. So long as petitioners are permitted to voice their political ideas, free from suggestions for the opportune use of force to accomplish their social and economic aims, it is hard to understand how any advocate of freedom of expression can assert that their right has been unconstitutionally abridged. As nothing in the orders or regulations concerning this list limits the teachings or support of these organizations, we do not believe that any right of theirs under the First Amendment is abridged by publication of the list.
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Segment in Paragraph: 132 - But neither are we compelled to endure espionage and sedition. Wide as are the freedoms of the First Amendment, this Court has never hesitated to deny the individual's right to use the privileges for the overturn of law and order. Reasonable restraints for the fair protection of the Government against incitement to sedition cannot properly be said to be N43* 'undemocratic' or contrary to the guarantees of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 133 - So long as petitioners are permitted to voice their political ideas, free from suggestions for the opportune use of force to accomplish their social and economic aims, it is hard to understand how any advocate of freedom of expression can assert that their right has been unconstitutionally abridged. As nothing in the orders or regulations concerning this list limits the teachings or support of these organizations, we do not believe that any right of theirs under the First Amendment is abridged by publication of the list.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - More fundamentally, however, in my judgment the executive has no constitutional authority, with or without a hearing, officially to prepare and publish the lists challenged by petitioners. In the first place, the system adopted effectively punishes many organizations and their members merely because of their political beliefs and utterances, and to this extent smacks of a most evil type of censorship. This cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment as I interpret it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 133 - Recognizing that the designation, rightly or wrongly, of petitioner organizations as communist impairs their ability to carry forward successfully whatever legitimate objects they seek to accomplish, we do not accept their argument that such interference is an abridgment of First Amendment guarantees. They are in the position of every proponent of unpopular views. Heresy induces strong expressions of opposition. So long as petitioners are permitted to voice their political ideas, free from suggestions for the opportune use of force to accomplish their social and economic aims, it is hard to understand how any advocate of freedom of expression can assert that their right has been unconstitutionally abridged. As nothing in the orders or regulations concerning this list limits the teachings or support of these organizations, we do not believe that any right of theirs under the First Amendment is abridged by publication of the list.
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Segment in Paragraph: 133 - N2* They are in the position of every proponent of unpopular views. Heresy induces strong expressions of opposition. So long as petitioners are permitted to voice their political ideas, free from suggestions for the opportune use of force to accomplish their social and economic aims, it is hard to understand how any advocate of freedom of expression can assert that their right has been unconstitutionally abridged.
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Parties: Tenney v. Brandhove
Date: 1951-05-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - In 1689, the Bill of Rights declared in unequivocal language: 'That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Article V of the Articles of Confederation is quite close to the English Bill of Rights: 'Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress * * *.' Article I, § 6, of the Constitution provides: '* * * for any Speech or Debate in either House, (the Senators and Representatives) shall not be questioned in any other Place.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The Maryland Declaration of Rights, Nov. 3, 1776, provided: 'That freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any other court or judicature.' Art. VIII. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided 'The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action, or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.' Part I, Art. XXI. Chief Justice Parsons gave the following gloss to this provision in Coffin v. Coffin, 1808, 4 Mass. 1, 27:
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided: 'The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place whatsoever.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - the right of every person in this country to have his say, however unorthodox or unpopular he or his opinions may be, is guaranteed by the same constitutional amendment that protects the free press. Those who cherish freedom of the press here would do well to remember that this freedom cannot long survive the legislative snuffing out of freedom to believe and freedom to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - We are dealing here with a right protected by the Constitution—the right of free speech. The charge seems strained and difficult to sustain; but it is that a legislative committee brought the weight of its authority down on respondent for exercising his right of free speech. Reprisal for speaking is as much an abridgment as a prior restraint.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - it does not seem inappropriate to point out that the right of every person in this country to have his say, however unorthodox or unpopular he or his opinions may be, is guaranteed by the same constitutional amendment that protects the free press. Those who cherish freedom of the press here would do well to remember that this freedom cannot long survive the legislative snuffing out of freedom to believe and freedom to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N22* N23* 'I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution, for every thing said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - It is one thing to give great leeway to the legislative right of speech, debate, and investigation. But when a committee perverts its power, brings down on an individual the whole weight of government for an illegal or corrupt purpose, the reason for the immunity ends. It was indeed the purpose of this civil rights legislation to secure federal rights against invasion by officers and agents of the states. I see no reason why any officer of government should be higher than the Constitution from which all rights and privileges of an office obtain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - We are dealing here with a right protected by the Constitution—the right of free speech. The charge seems strained and difficult to sustain; but it is that a legislative committee brought the weight of its authority down on respondent for exercising his right of free speech. Reprisal for speaking is as much an abridgment as a prior restraint. If a committee departs so far from its domain to deprive a citizen of a right protected by the Constitution, I can think of no reason why it should be immune.
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Parties: Dennis v. United States
Date: 1951-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 186 - The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and immorality.
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Segment in Paragraph: 111 - Congress has determined that the danger created by advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction on freedom of speech. The determination was made after due deliberation, and the seriousness of the congressional purpose is attested by the volume of legislation passed to effectuate the same ends.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - The First Amendment is such a restriction. It exacts obedience even during periods of war; it is applicable when war clouds are not figments of the imagination no less than when they are. The First Amendment categorically demands that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' The right of a man to think what he pleases, to write what he thinks, and to have his thoughts made available for others to hear or read has an engaging ring of universality. The Smith Act and this conviction under it no doubt restrict the exercise of free speech and assembly.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - our function in reviewing statutes restricting freedom of expression differs sharply from our normal duty in sitting in judgment on legislation. It has been said that such statutes N50* 'must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtedly or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - History regards 'freedom of the press' as indispensable for a free society and for its government. We have, therefore, invalidated discriminatory taxation against the press and prior restraints on publication of defamatory matter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - We have also given clear indication of the importance we attach to dissemination of ideas in reviewing the attempts of States to reconcile freedom of the press with protection of the integrity of the judicial process. In Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295, the Court agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment barred a State from adjudging in contempt of court the publisher of critical and inaccurate comment about portions of a litigation that for all practical purposes were no longer pending. We likewise agreed, in a minor phase of our decision in Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, that even when statements in the press relate to matters still pending before a court, convictions for their publication cannot be sustained if their utterance is too trivial to be deemed a substantial threat to the impartial administration of justice
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - But in no case has a majority of this Court held that a legislative judgment, even as to freedom of utterance, may be overturned merely because the Court would have made a different choice between the competing interests had the initial legislative judgment been for it to make.
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - We must not overlook the value of that interchange. Freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civilization—the civilization we seek to maintain and further by recognizing the right of Congress to put some limitation upon expression. Such are the paradoxes of life. For social development of trial and error, the fullest possible opportunity for the free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite. The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought not to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge. Liberty of thought soon shrivels without freedom of expression. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile to the endeavor or under dangers which are hazarded only by heroes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 123 - When legislation touches freedom of thought and freedom of speech, such a tendency is a formidable enemy of the free spirit. Much that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive and envenoming, may well be not unconstitutional. The ultimate reliance for the deepest needs of civilization must be found outside their vindication in courts of law; apart from all else, judges, howsoever they may conscientiously seek to discipline themselves against it, unconsciously are too apt to be moved by the deep under-currents of public feeling. A persistent, positive translation of the liberating faith into the feelings and thoughts and actions of men and women is the real protection against attempts to strait-jacket the human mind. Such temptations will have their way, if fear and hatred are not exorcized.
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Segment in Paragraph: 169 - The defense of freedom of speech or press has often been raised in conspiracy cases, because, whether committed by Communists, by businessmen, or by common criminals, it usually consists of words written or spoken, evidenced by letters, conversations, speeches or documents. Communication is the essence of every conspiracy, for only by it can common purpose and concert of action be brought about or be proved.
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Segment in Paragraph: 171 - N51* '* * * It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. * * * Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 182 - The opinions for affirmance indicate that the chief reason for jettisoning the rule is the expressed fear that advocacy of Communist doctrine endangers the safety of the Republic. Undoubtedly, a governmental policy of unfettered communication of ideas does entail dangers. To the Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived from free expression were worth the risk. They embodied this philosophy in the First Amendment's command that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.' I have always believed that the First Amendment is the keystone of our Government, that the freedoms it guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction of all freedom. At least as to speech in the realm of public matters, I believe that the N52* 'clear and present danger' test does not 'mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression' but does 'no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 183 - I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 'reasonableness.' Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress. The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those 'safe' or orthodox views which rarely need its protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 189 - The opinion of the Court does not outlaw these texts nor condemn them to the fire, as the Communists do literature offensive to their creed. But if the books themselves are not outlawed, if they can lawfully remain on library shelves, by what reasoning does their use in a classroom become a crime? It would not be a crime under the Act to introduce these books to a class, though that would be teaching what the creed of violent overthrow of the Government is. The Act, as construed, requires the element of intent—that those who teach the creed believe in it. The crime then depends not on what is taught but on who the teacher is. That is to make freedom of speech turn not on what is said, but on the intent with which it is said. Once we start down that road we enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every citizen
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Segment in Paragraph: 205 - The First Amendment provides that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech'. The Constitution provides no exception. This does not mean, however, that the Nation need hold its hand until it is in such weakened condition that there is no time to protect itself from incitement to revolution. Seditious conduct can always be punished. But the command of the First Amendment is so clear that we should not allow Congress to call a halt to free speech except in the extreme case of peril from the speech itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - The right of a man to think what he pleases, to write what he thinks, and to have his thoughts made available for others to hear or read has an engaging ring of universality. The Smith Act and this conviction under it no doubt restrict the exercise of free speech and assembly. Does that, without more, dispose of the matter?
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - Just as there are those who regard as invulnerable every measure for which the claim of national survival is invoked, there are those who find in the Constitution a wholly unfettered right of expression. Such literalness treats the words of the Constitution as though they were found on a piece of outworn parchment instead of being words that have called into being a nation with a past to be preserved for the future. The soil in which the Bill of Rights grew was not a soil of arid pedantry. The historic antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the range of political interest. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 guaranteed free speech; yet there are records of at least three convictions for political libels obtained between 1799 and 1803. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 and the Delaware Constitution of 1792 expressly imposed liability for abuse of the right of free speech. Madison's own State put on its books in 1792 a statute confining the abusive exercise of the right of utterance. And it deserves to be noted that in writing to John Adam's wife, Jefferson did not rest his condemnation of the Sedition Act of 1798 on his belief in unrestrained utterance as to political matter. The First Amendment, he argued, reflected a limitation upon Federal power, leaving the right to enforce restrictions on speech to the States.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - But we held that the statute was not for this reason presumptively invalid. The problem, we said, was N36* 'one of weighing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the congressional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to interstate commerce and that Communists and others identified by § 9(h) pose continuing threats to that public interest when in positions of union leadership.' 339 U.S. at page 400, 70 S.Ct. at page 684, 94 L.Ed. 925. On balance, we decided that the legislative judgment was a permissible one.
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - It were far better that the phrase N37* be abandoned than that it be sounded once more to hide from the believers in an absolute right of free speech the plain fact that the interest in speech, profoundly important as it is, is no more conclusive in judicial review than other attributes of democracy or than a determination of the people's representatives that a measure is necessary to assure the safety of government itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - Freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civilization—the civilization we seek to maintain and further by recognizing the right of Congress to put some limitation upon expression. Such are the paradoxes of life. For social development of trial and error, the fullest possible opportunity for the free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite. The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought not to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge. Liberty of thought soon shrivels without freedom of expression. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile to the endeavor or under dangers which are hazarded only by heroes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes stated that the N44* 'question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' 249 U.S. at page 52, 39 S.Ct. at page 249, 63 L.Ed. 470. But the force of even this expression is considerably weakened by the reference at the end of the opinion to Goldman v. United States, 1918, 245 U.S. 474, 38 S.Ct. 166, 62 L.Ed. 410, a prosecution under the same statute. Said Justice Holmes, N45* 'Indeed (Goldman) might be said to dispose of the present contention if the precedent covers all media concludendi. But as the right to free speech was not referred to specially, we have thought fit to add a few words.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The doctrine that there must be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent is a judicial rule to be applied as a matter of law by the courts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - The historic antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the range of political interest. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 guaranteed free speech; yet there are records of at least three convictions for political libels obtained between 1799 and 1803. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 and the Delaware Constitution of 1792 expressly imposed liability for abuse of the right of free speech. Madison's own State put on its books in 1792 a statute confining the abusive exercise of the right of utterance. And it deserves to be noted that in writing to John Adam's wife, Jefferson did not rest his condemnation of the Sedition Act of 1798 on his belief in unrestrained utterance as to political matter. The First Amendment, he argued, reflected a limitation upon Federal power, leaving the right to enforce restrictions on speech to the States.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - The First Amendment N46* 'cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715.' Frohwerk v. United States, supra, 249 U.S. at page 206, 39 S.Ct. at page 250, 63 L.Ed. 561. N47* 'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 107 - The right to exert all governmental powers in aid of maintaining our institutions and resisting their physical overthrow does not include intolerance of opinions and speech that cannot do harm although opposed and perhaps alien to dominant, traditional opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 154 - But even an individual cannot claim that the Constitution protects him in advocating or teaching overthrow of government by force or violence. I should suppose no one would doubt that Congress has power to make such attempted overthrow a crime. But the contention is that one has the constitutional right to work up a public desire and will to do what it is a crime to attempt. I think direct incitement by speech or writing can be made a crime,
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Segment in Paragraph: 177 - The law of conspiracy has been the chief means at the Government's disposal to deal with the growing problems created by such organizations. I happen to think it is an awkward and inept remedy, but I find no constitutional authority for taking this weapon from the Government. There is no constitutional right to 'gang up' on the Government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - We pointed out in Douds, supra, that the basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate od ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies. It is for this reason that this Court has recognized the inherent value of free discourse. An analysis of the leading cases in this Court which have involved direct limitations on speech, however, will demonstrate that both the majority of the Court and the dissenters in particular cases have recognized that this is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be protected. If, then, this interest may be protected, the literal problem which is presented is what has been meant by the use of the phrase 'clear and present danger' of the utterances bringing about the evil within the power of Congress to punish.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase as follows: N24* 'In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' 183 F.2d at 212. We adopt this statement of the rule.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - The complex issues presented by regulation of speech in public places, by picketing, and by legislation prohibiting advocacy of crime have been resolved by scrutiny of many factors besides the imminence and gravity of the evil threatened. The matter has been well summarized by a reflective student of the Court's work. N25* 'The truth is that the clear-and-present-danger test is an oversimplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number of other factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; the availability of more moderate controls than those which the state has imposed; and perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is launched. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger,' or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must disentangle.' Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 27—28.
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Segment in Paragraph: 97 - Not every type of speech occupies the same position on the scale of values. There is no substantial public interest in permitting certain kinds of utterances: N26* 'the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 167 - Also, it is urged that since the conviction is for conspiracy to teach and advocate, and to organize the Communist Party to teach and advocate, the First Amendment is violated, because freedoms of speech and press protect teaching and advocacy regardless of what is taught or advocated. I have never thought that to be the law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 183 - So long as this Court exercises the power of judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 'reasonableness.' Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress. The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those 'safe' or orthodox views which rarely need its protection. I must also express my objection to the holding because, as Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent shows, it sanctions the determination of a crucial issue of fact by the judge rather than by the jury.
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Segment in Paragraph: 189 - The Act, as construed, requires the element of intent—that those who teach the creed believe in it. The crime then depends not on what is taught but on who the teacher is. That is to make freedom of speech turn not on what is said, but on the intent with which it is said. Once we start down that road we enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every citizen.
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Segment in Paragraph: 192 - The doctrine of conspiracy has served divers and oppressive purposes and in its broad reach can be made to do great evil. But never until today has anyone seriously thought that the ancient law of conspiracy could constitutionally be used to turn speech into seditious conduct. Yet that is precisely what is suggested. I repeat that we deal here with speech alone, not with speech plus acts of sabotage or unlawful conduct. Not a single seditious act is charged in the indictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because two men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling proportions. That course is to make a radical break with the past and to violate one of the cardinal principles of our constitutional scheme.
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Segment in Paragraph: 197 - Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 205 - Unless and until extreme and necessitous circumstances are shown our aim should be to keep speech unfettered and to allow the processes of law to be invoked only when the provocateurs among us move from speech to action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 181 - press These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date: The indictment is that they conspired to organize the Communist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publications in the future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government. No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids. I would hold § 3 of the Smith Act authorizing this prior restraint unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - Throughout our decisions there has recurred a distinction between the statement of an idea which may prompt its hearers to take unlawful action, and advocacy that such action be taken. The distinction has its root in the conception of the common law, supported by principles of morality, that a person who procures another to do an act is responsible for that act as though he had done it himself. This principle was extended in Fox v. State of Washington, supra, to words directed to the public generally which would constitute an incitement were they directed to an individual. It was adapted in Schenck v. United States, supra, into a rule of evidence designed to restrict application of the Espionage Act. It was relied on by the Court in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, supra. The distinction has been repeated in many of the decisions in which we have upheld the claims of speech. We frequently have distinguished protected forms of expression from statements whichN3* 'incite to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - The distinction has been repeated in many of the decisions in which we have upheld the claims of speech. We frequently have distinguished protected forms of expression from statements which N13* 'incite to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 182 - To the Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived from free expression were worth the risk. They embodied this philosophy in the First Amendment's command that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.' I have always believed that the First Amendment is the keystone of our Government, that the freedoms it guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction of all freedom. At least as to speech in the realm of public matters, I believe that the N14* 'clear and present danger' test does not 'mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression' but does 'no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights.'
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Parties: Shepherd v. Florida
Date: 1951-04-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - But if freedoms of press are so abused as to make fair trial in the locality impossible, the judicial process must be protected by removing the trial to a forum beyond its probable influence. Newspapers, in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, may not deprive accused persons of their right to fair trial. These convictions, accompanied by such events, do not meet any civilized conception of due process of law.
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Parties: Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections
Date: 1951-04-12
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Parties: Breard v. Alexandria
Date: 1951-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - This is that such an ordinance is an abridgment of freedom of speech and the press. Only the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this point. It was not open to the solicitors for gadgets or brushes. The point is not that the press is free of the ordinary restraints and regulations of the modern state, such as taxation or labor regulation, referred to above at note 24, but, as stated in appellant's brief, 'because the ordinance places an arbitrary, unreasonable and undue burden upon a well established and essential method of distribution and circulation of lawful magazines and periodicals and, in effect, is tantamount to a prohibition of the utilization of such method.' Regulation necessarily has elements of prohibition. Thus the argument is not that the money-making activities of the solicitor entitle him to go 'in or upon private residences' at will, but that the distribution of periodicals through door-to-door canvassing is entitled to First Amendment protection. This kind of distribution is said to be protected because the mere fact that money is made out of the distribution does not bar the publications from First Amendment protection. We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment. The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the advocates are involved.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - It is my belief that the freedom of the people of this Nation cannot survive even a little governmental hobbling of religious or political ideas, whether they be communicated orally or through the press.
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Parties: NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
Date: 1951-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - safeguarding freedom of speech has no significant application to the picket's placard in this case. Section 8(c) does not apply to a mere signal by a labor organization to its members, or to the members of its affiliates, to engage in an unfair labor practice such as a strike proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(A).
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Parties: IBEW v. NLRB
Date: 1951-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure by § 8(b)(4)(A) carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free speech. The inducement or encouragement in the instant case took the form of picketing followed by a telephone call emphasizing its purpose. The constitutionality of § 8(b)(4)(A) is here questioned only as to its possible relation to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. This provision has been sustained by several Courts of Appeals. The substantive evil condemned by Congress in § 8(b)(4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The substantive evil condemned by Congress in § 8(b)(4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise.
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Parties: Garner v. Board of Public Works
Date: 1951-06-04
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Parties: Lorain Journal Co. v. United States
Date: 1951-12-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The injunction does not violate any guaranteed freedom of the press. The publisher suggests that the injunction amounts to a prior restraint upon what it may publish. We find in it no restriction upon any guaranteed freedom of the press. The injunction applies to a publisher what the law applies to others. The publisher may not accept or deny advertisements in an 'attempt to monopolize * * * any part of the trade or commerce among the several States
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Parties: Adler v. Board of Education
Date: 1952-03-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - I have not been able to accept the recent doctrine that a citizen who enters the public service can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights. I cannot for example find in our constitutional scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of second-class citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression. The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - If, under the procedure set up in the New York law, a person is found to be unfit and is disqualified from employment in the public school system because of membership in a listed organization, he is not thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice. Certainly such limitation is not one the state may not make in the exercise of its police power to protect the schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The broad, generalized claims urged at the bar touch the deepest interests of a democratic society: its right to self-preservation and ample scope for the individual's freedom, especially the teacher's freedom of thought, inquiry and expression. No problem of a free society is probably more difficult than the reconciliation or accommodation of these too often conflicting interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - we are without enlightenment, for example, on the nature of the reporting system described by the Rules. This may be a vital matter, affecting not the special circumstances of a particular case but coloring the whole scheme. For it may well be of constitutional significance whether the reporting system contemplates merely the notation as to each teacher that no evidence of disqualification has turned up, if such be the case, or whether it demands systematic and continuous surveillance and investigation of evidence. The difference cannot be meaningless, it may even be decisive, if our function is to balance the restrictions on freedom of utterance and of association against the evil to be suppressed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - These are the organizations into which Communists often infiltrate. Their presence infects the whole, even though the project was not conceived in sin. A teacher caught in that mesh is almost certain to stand condemned. Fearing condemnation, she will tend to shrink from any association that stirs controversy. In that manner freedom of expression will be stifled.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - If, under the procedure set up in the New York law, a person is found to be unfit and is disqualified from employment in the public school system because of membership in a listed organization, he is not thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at libertyto retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech or assembly? We think not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Indeed the impact of this kind of censorship on the public school system illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from censorship.
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Parties: Harisiades v. Shaughnessy
Date: 1952-03-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The assumption is that the First Amendment allows Congress to make no distinction between advocating change in the existing order by lawful elective processes and advocating change by force and violence, that freedom for the one includes freedom for the other, and that when teaching of violence is denied so is freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - He N38* is entitled to habeas corpus to test the legality of his restraint, to the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in criminal trials, and to the right of free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - To arm all men for orderly change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the electorate by press, speech and assembly. This means freedom to advocate or promote Communism by means of the ballot box, but it does not include the practice or incitement of violence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - We have long held that a resident alien is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. He therefore may not be deprived either by the National Government or by any state of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Nor may he be denied the equal protection of the laws. A state was not allowed to exclude an alien from the laundry business because he was a Chinese, nor discharge him from employment because he was not a citizen, nor deprive him of the right to fish because he was a Japanese ineligible to citizenship. An alien's property (provided he is not an enemy alien), may not be taken without just compensation. He is entitled to habeas corpus to test the legality of his restraint, to the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in criminal trials, and to the right of free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Beauharnais v. Illinois
Date: 1952-04-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Every power may be abused, but the possibility of abuse is a poor reason for denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal libels sanctioned by centuries of Anglo-American law. 'While this Court sits' it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel. Of course discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Americans stated as the first unequivocal command of their Bill of Rights: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' Without distortion, this First Amendment could not possibly be read so as to hold that Congress has power to punish Beauharnais and others for petitioning Congress as they have here sought to petition the Chicago authorities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - New Hampshire had a state law making it an offense to direct insulting words at an individual on a public street. Chaplinsky had violated that law by calling a man vile names 'face-to-face'. We pointed out in that context that the use of such 'fighting' words was not an essential part of exposition of ideas. Whether the words used in their context here are 'fighting' words in the same sense is doubtful, but whether so or not they are not addressed to or about individuals. Moreover, the leaflet used here was also the means adopted by an assembled group to enlist interest in their efforts to have legislation enacted. And the fighting words were but a part of arguments on questions of wide public interest and importance. Freedom of petition, assembly, speech and press could be greatly abridged by a practice of meticulously scrutinizing every editorial, speech, sermon or other printed matter to extract two or three naughty words on which to hang charges of 'group libel.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - No rationalization on a purely legal level can conceal the fact that state laws like this one present a constant overhanging threat to freedom of speech, press and religion. Today Beauharnais is punished for publicly expressing strong views in favor of segregation. Ironically enough, Beauharnais, convicted of crime in Chicago, would probably be given a hero's reception in many other localities, if not in some parts of Chicago itself. Moreover, the same kind of state law that makes Beauharnais a criminal for advocating segregation in Illinois can be utilized to send people to jail in other states for advocating equality and nonsegregation. What Beauharnais said in his leaflet is mild compared with usual arguments on both sides of racial controversies.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - We are told that freedom of petition and discussion are in no danger 'while this Court sits.' This case raises considerable doubt. Since those who peacefully petition for changes in the law are not to be protected 'while this Court sits,' who is? I do not agree that the Constitution leaves freedom of petition, assembly, speech, press or worship at the mercy of a case-by-case, day-by-day majority of this Court. I had supposed that our people could rely for their freedom on the Constitution's commands, rather than on the grace of this Court on an individual case basis. To say that a legislative body can, with this Court's approval, make it a crime to petition for and publicly discuss proposed legislation seems as farfetched to me as it would be to say that a valid law could be enacted to punish a candidate for President for telling the people his views. I think the First Amendment, with the Fourteenth, 'absolutely' forbids such laws without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases.' Whatever the danger, if any, in such public discussions, it is a danger the Founders deemed outweighed by the danger incident to the stifling of thought and speech. The Court does not act on this view of the Founders. It calculates what it deems to be the danger of public discussion, holds the scales are tipped on the side of state suppression, and upholds state censorship. This method of decision offers little protection to First Amendment liberties 'while this Court sits.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The First Amendment is conched in absolute terms—freedom of speech shall not be abridged. Speech has therefore a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil rights. For example, privacy, equally sacred to some, is protected by the Fourth Amendment only against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is room for regulation of the ways and means of invading privacy. No such leeway is granted the invasion of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Until recent years that had been the course and direction of constitutional law. Yet recently the Court in this and in other cases has engrafted the right of regulation onto the First Amendment by placing in the hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate 'within reasonable limits' the right of free speech. This to me is an ominous and alarming trend. The free trade in ideas which the Framers of the Constitution visualized disappears. In its place there is substituted a new orthodoxy—an orthodoxy that changes with the whims of the age or the day, an orthodoxy which the majority by solemn judgment proclaims to be essential to the safety, welfare, security, morality, or health of society. Free speech in the constitutional sense disappears. Limits are drawn—limits dictated by expediency, political opinion, prejudices or some other desideratum of legislative action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - The First Amendment says that freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the free exercise of religion shall not be abridged. That is a negation of power on the part of each and every department of government. Free speech, free press, free exercise of religion are placed separate and apart; they are above and beyond the police power; they are not subject to regulation in the manner of factories, slums, apartment houses, production of oil, and the like.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - The assumption of other dissents is that the 'liberty' which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against denial by the States is the literal and identical 'freedom of speech, or of the press' which the First Amendment forbids only Congress to abridge. The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 'incorporate' the First, that the powers of Congress and of the States over this subject are not of the same dimensions, and that because Congress probably could not enact this law it does not follow that the States may not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - \ Yet recently the Court in this and in other cases has engrafted the right of regulation onto the First Amendment by placing in the hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate 'within reasonable limits' the right of free speech. This to me is an ominous and alarming trend. The free trade in ideas which the Framers of the Constitution visualized disappears. In its place there is substituted a new orthodoxy—an orthodoxy that changes with the whims of the age or the day, an orthodoxy which the majority by solemn judgment proclaims to be essential to the safety, welfare, security, morality, or health of society. Free speech in the constitutional sense disappears. Limits are drawn—limits dictated by expediency, political opinion, prejudices or some other desideratum of legislative action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - While I support the right of a State to place decent bounds upon it, I am not ready to hold that group purposes, characteristics and histories are to be immunized from comment or may be discussed only at the risk of prosecution free of all usual safeguards.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - So important to a constitutional democracy is the right of discussion that any challenge to legislative abridgment of those privileges of a free people calls for careful judicial appraisal. It is when speech becomes an incitement to crime that the right freely to exhort may be abridged.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - N39* The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - Yet recently the Court in this and in other cases has engrafted the right of regulation onto the First Amendment by placing in the hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate 'within reasonable limits' the right of free speech. This to me is an ominous and alarming trend. The free trade in ideas which the Framers of the Constitution visualized disappears. In its place there is substituted a new orthodoxy—an orthodoxy that changes with the whims of the age or the day, an orthodoxy which the majority by solemn judgment proclaims to be essential to the safety, welfare, security, morality, or health of society. Free speech in the constitutional sense disappears. Limits are drawn—limits dictated by expediency, political opinion, prejudices or some other desideratum of legislative action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was presented.N48* 'There are limits to the exercise of these liberties (of speech and of the press). The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those limits the states appropriately may punish.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - N49* 'Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty to speech, or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - clear and present danger of those substantive evils which the legislature has a right to prevent. The evils at which Congress may aim, and in so doing come into conflict with free speech, will be relatively few since it is a government of limited powers. Because the States may reach more evils, they will have wider range to punish speech which presents clear and present danger of bringing about those evils.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - N50* The same may be said of the right to comment upon matters of public interest insofar as the statement includes matters of opinion, a point, however, which the defense may have inadequately raised. When any naturally cohesive or artificially organized group possesses a racial or sectarian solidarity which is or may be exploited to influence public affairs, that group becomes a legitimate subject for public comment. Of course, one can only deplore the habitual intemperance and bitter disparagement which characterizes most such comment. While I support the right of a State to place decent bounds upon it, I am not ready to hold that group purposes, characteristics and histories are to be immunized from comment or may be discussed only at the risk of prosecution free of all usual safeguards.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - In matters relating to business, finance, industrial and labor conditions, health and the public welfare, great leeway is now granted the legislature, for there is no guarantee in the Constitution that the status quo will be preserved against regulation by government. Freedom of speech, however, rests on a different constitutional basis. The First Amendment says that freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the free exercise of religion shall not be abridged. That is a negation of power on the part of each and every department of government. Free speech, free press, free exercise of religion are placed separate and apart; they are above and beyond the police power; they are not subject to regulation in the manner of factories, slums, apartment houses, production of oil, and the like.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - individual liberty Today a white man stands convicted for protesting in unseemly language against our decisions invalidating restrictive covenants. Tomorrow a negro will be haliled before a court for denouncing lynch law in heated terms. Farm laborers in the west who compete with field hands drifting up from Mexico; whites who feel the pressure of orientals; a minority which finds employment going to members of the dominant religious group—all of these are caught in the mesh of today's decision. Debate and argument even in the courtroom are not always calm and dispassionate. Emotions sway speakers and audiences alike. Intemperate speech is a distinctive characteristic of man. Hot-heads blow off and release destructive energy in the process. They shout and rave, exaggerating weaknesses, magnifying error, viewing with alarm. So it has been from the beginning; and so it will be throughout time. The Framers of the Constitution knew human nature as well as we do. They too had lived in dangerous days; they too knew the suffocating influence of orthodoxy and standardized thought. They weighed the compulsions for retrained speech and thought against the abuses of liberty. They chose liberty. That should be our choice today no matter how distasteful to us the pamphlet of Beauharnais may be.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Whether the words used in their context here are 'fighting' words in the same sense is doubtful, but whether so or not they are not addressed to or about individuals. Moreover, the leaflet used here was also the means adopted by an assembled group to enlist interest in their efforts to have legislation enacted. And the fighting words were but a part of arguments on questions of wide public interest and importance. Freedom of petition, assembly, speech and press could be greatly abridged by a practice of meticulously scrutinizing every editorial, speech, sermon or other printed matter to extract two or three naughty words on which to hang charges of 'group libel.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - N19* The Court condones this expansive state censorship by painstakingly analogizing it to the law of criminal libel. As a result of this refined analysis, the Illinois statute emerges labeled a 'group libel law.' This label may make the Court's holding more palatable for those who sustain it, but the sugar-coating does not make the censorship less deadly. However tagged, the Illinois law is not that criminal libel which has been 'defined, limited and constitutionally recognized time out of mind'. For as 'CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED' THAT CRIME has provided for punishment of false, malicious, scurrilous charges against individuals, not against huge groups. This limited scope of the law of criminal libel is of no small importance. It has confined state punishment of speech and expression to the narrowest of areas involving nothing more than purely private feuds. Every expansion of the law of criminal libel so as to punish discussions of matters of public concern means a corresponding invasion of the area dedicated to free expression by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - It N20* calculates what it deems to be the danger of public discussion, holds the scales are tipped on the side of state suppression, and upholds state censorship. This method of decision offers little protection to First Amendment liberties 'while this Court sits.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - N1* New Hampshire had a state law making it an offense to direct insulting words at an individual on a public street. Chaplinsky had violated that law by calling a man vile names 'face-to-face'. We pointed out in that context that the use of such 'fighting' words was not an essential part of exposition of ideas. Whether the words used in their context here are 'fighting' words in the same sense is doubtful, but whether so or not they are not addressed to or about individuals. Moreover, the leaflet used here was also the means adopted by an assembled group to enlist interest in their efforts to have legislation enacted. And the fighting words were but a part of arguments on questions of wide public interest and importance. Freedom of petition, assembly, speech and press could be greatly abridged by a practice of meticulously scrutinizing every editorial, speech, sermon or other printed matter to extract two or three naughty words on which to hang charges of 'group libel.' The Chaplinsky case makes no such broad inroads on First Amendment freedoms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The First Amendment is conched in absolute terms—freedom of speech shall not be abridged. Speech has therefore a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - We are told that freedom of petition and discussion are in no danger 'while this Court sits.' This case raises considerable doubt. Since those who peacefully petition for changes in the law are not to be protected 'while this Court sits,' who is? I do not agree that the Constitution leaves freedom of petition, assembly, speech, press or worship at the mercy of a case-by-case, day-by-day majority of this Court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The scope of the statute before us, as construed by the Illinois court, disposes of the contention that the conduct prohibited by the law is so ill-defined that judges and juries in applying the statute and men in acting cannot draw from it adequate standards to guide them. The clarifying construction and fixed usage which govern the meaning of the enactment before us were not present, so the Court found, in the New York law held invalid in Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840. Nor, thus construed and limited, is the act so broad that the general verdict of guilty on an indictment drawn in the statutory language might have been predicated on constitutionally protected conduct. On this score, the conviction here reviewed differs from those upset in Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; and Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131. Even the latter case did not hold that the unconstitutionality of a statute is established because the speech prohibited by it raises a ruckus.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - In carrying out its obligation to conform state legal administration to the 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice' imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court has steadily affirmed that the general principle against abridgment of free speech, protected by the First Amendment, is included in the command of the Fourteenth. So important to a constitutional democracy is the right of discussion that any challenge to legislative abridgment of those privileges of a free people calls for careful judicial appraisal. It is when speech becomes an incitement to crime that the right freely to exhort may be abridged.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - Speech has therefore a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil rights. For example, privacy, equally sacred to some, is protected by the Fourth Amendment only against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is room for regulation of the ways and means of invading privacy. No such leeway is granted the invasion of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Until recent years that had been the course and direction of constitutional law. Yet recently the Court in this and in other cases has engrafted the right of regulation onto the First Amendment by placing in the hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate 'within reasonable limits' the right of free speech. This to me is an ominous and alarming trend. The free trade in ideas which the Framers of the Constitution visualized disappears.
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Parties: Zorach v. Clauson
Date: 1952-04-28
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Parties: Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak
Date: 1952-05-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Pollak and Martin contend that the radio programs interfere with their freedom of conversation and that of other passengers by making it necessary for them to compete against the programs in order to be heard. The Commission, however, did not find, and the testimony does not compel a finding, that the programs interfered substantially with the conversation of passengers or with rights of communication constitutionally protected in public places. It is suggested also that the First Amendment guarantees a freedom to listen only to such points of view as the listener wishes to hear. There is no substantial claim that the programs have been used for objectionable propaganda. There is no issue of that kind before us. The inclusion in the programs of a few announcements explanatory and commendatory of Capital Transit's own services does not sustain such an objection
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - He may not be compelled against his will to attend a religious serivce; he may not be forced to make an affirmation or observe a ritual that violates his scruples; he may not be made to accept one religious, political, or philosophical creed as against another. Freedom of religion and freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than the privilege to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - If liberty is to flourish, government should never be allowed to force people to listen to any radio program. The right of privacy should include the right to pick and choose from competing entertainments, competing propaganda, competing political philosophies.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - This claim is that no matter how much Capital Transit may wish to use radio in its vehicles as part of its service to its passengers and as a source of income, no matter how much the great majority of its passengers may desire radio in those vehicles, and however positively the Commission, on substantial evidence, may conclude that such use of radio does not interfere with the convenience, comfort and safety of the service but tends to improve it, yet if one passenger objects to the programs as an invasion of his constitutional right of privacy, the use of radio on the vehicles must be discontinued. This position wrongly assumes that the Fifth Amendment secures to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the Federal Government a right of privacy substantially equal to the privacy to which he is entitled in his own home. However complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - He may not be compelled against his will to attend a religious serivce; he may not be forced to make an affirmation or observe a ritual that violates his scruples; he may not be made to accept one religious, political, or philosophical creed as against another. Freedom of religion and freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than the privilege to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.
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Parties: Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson
Date: 1952-05-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect to other media of communication of ideas. Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 1931, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357. The Court there recounted the history which indicates that a major purpose of the First Amendment guaranty of a free press was to prevent prior restraints upon publication, although it was carefully pointed out that the liberty of the press is not limited to that protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N53* N54* N55* New York's highest court says there is 'nothing mysterious' about the statutory provision applied in this case: 'It is simply this: that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule * * *.' This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of 'sacrilegious' given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myraid of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies, New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Cf. Kunz v. People of State of New York, 1951, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312, 328, 95 L.Ed. 267, 280. Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the 'sacrilegious' test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - After concluding that the Board of Regents acted within its authority and that its determination was not 'one that no reasonable mind could reach', id., 303 N.Y. at pages 250—255, 256—257, 101 N.E.2d at pages 665, 667, 670—671, the majority held, first, that 'sacrilegious' was an adequately definite standard,
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - The two dissenting judges, after dealing with a matter of local law not reviewable here, found that the standard 'sacrilegious' is unconstitutionally vague, and, finally, that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech applied equally to motion pictures and prevented this censorship.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - We are asked to decide this case by choosing between two mutually exclusive alternatives: that motion pictures may be subjected to unrestricted censorship, or that they must be allowed to be shown under any circumstances. But only the tyranny of absolutes would rely on such alternatives to meet the problems generated by the need to accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion pictures in compact modern communities. It would startle Madison and Jefferson and George Mason, could they adjust themselves to our day, to be told that the freedom of speech which they espoused in the Bill of Rights authorizes a showing of 'The Miracle' from windows facing St. Patrick's Cathedral in the forenoon of Easter Sunday, just as it would startle them to be told that any picture, whatever its theme and its expression, could be barred from being commercially exhibited. The general principle of free speech, expressed in the First Amendment as to encroachments by Congress, and included as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment, binding on the States, must be placed in its historical and legal contexts. The Constitution, we cannot recall too often, is an organism, not merely a literary composition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N27* we conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect to other media of communication of ideas. Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - It is hardly necessary to comment that the limits of this definition N21* remain too uncertain to justify constraining the creative efforts of the imagination by fear of pains and penalties imposed by a necessarily subjective censorship. It is true
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - We are asked to decide this case by choosing between two mutually exclusive alternatives: that motion pictures may be subjected to unrestricted censorship, or that they must be allowed to be shown under any circumstances. But only the tyranny of absolutes would rely on such alternatives to meet the problems generated by the need to accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion pictures in compact modern communities. It would startle Madison and Jefferson and George Mason, could they adjust themselves to our day, to be told that the freedom of speech which they espoused in the Bill of Rights authorizes a showing of 'The Miracle' from windows facing St. Patrick's Cathedral in the forenoon of Easter Sunday, just as it would startle them to be told that any picture, whatever its theme and its expression, could be barred from being commercially exhibited. The general principle of free speech, expressed in the First Amendment as to encroachments by Congress, and included as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment, binding on the States, must be placed in its historical and legal contexts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - To allow such vague, undefinable powers of censorship to be exercised is bound to have stultifying consequences on the creative process of literature and art—for the films are derived largely from literature. History does not encourage reliance on the wisdom and moderation of the censor as a safeguard in the exercise of such drastic power over the minds of men. We not only do not know but cannot know what is condemnable by 'sacrilegious.' And if we cannot tell, how are those to be governed by the statute to tell?
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - It is further urged that motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression. Even if one were to accept this hypothesis, it does not follow that motion pictures should be disqualified from First Amendment protection. If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have here.
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Parties: Wieman v. Updegraff
Date: 1952-12-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States against infraction by national or State government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first intended. We must have freedom of speech for all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
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Phrase match: have freedom of speech for all
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - to require such an oath, on pain of a teacher's loss of his position in case of refusal to take the oath, penalizes a teacher for exercising a right ofassociation peculiarly characteristic of our people. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 Am.Hist.Rev. 1 (1944), reprinted in Schlesinger, Paths To The Present 23. Such joining is an exercise of the rights of free speech and free inquiry. By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling.
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Phrase match: with freedom of speech and freedom
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - N40* Since the affiliation which must thus be forsworn may well have been for reasons or for purposes as innocent as membership in a club of one of the established political parties, to require such an oath, on pain of a teacher's loss of his position in case of refusal to take the oath, penalizes a teacher for exercising a right ofassociation peculiarly characteristic of our people. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 Am.Hist.Rev. 1 (1944), reprinted in Schlesinger, Paths To The Present 23. Such joining is an exercise of the rights of free speech and free inquiry.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Our constitutional liberties survived the ordeal of this regrettable period because there were influential men and powerful organized groups bold enough to champion the undiluted right of individuals to publish and argue for their beliefs however unorthodox or loathsome. Today however, few individuals and organizations of power and influence argue that unpopular advocacy has this same wholly unqualified immunity from governmental interference. For this and other reasons the present period of fear seems more ominously dangerous to speech and press than was that of the Alien and Sedition Laws.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - We must have freedom of speech for all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
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Phrase match: the right to speak on matters
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - It seems self-evident that all speech criticizing government rulers and challenging current beliefs may be dangerous to the status quo. With full knowledge of this danger the Framers rested our First Amendment on the premise that the slightest suppression of thought, speech, press, or public assembly is still more dangerous. This means that individuals are guaranteed an undiluted and unequivocal right to express themselves on questions of current public interest.
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Parties: Edelman v. California
Date: 1953-01-12
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Parties: Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church
Date: 1952-11-24
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Parties: United Asso. of J. P. & Steamfitters v. Graham
Date: 1953-03-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - The basic question here is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, may enjoin peaceful picketing when it is carried on for purposes in conflict with the Virginia Right to Work Statute. A question also before us is whether the record in this case justifies the finding, made below, that the picketing was for such purposes. We answer each in the affirmative.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Picketing is a form of free speech—the workingman's method of giving publicity to the facts of industrial life. As such it is entitled to constitutional protection. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093. No court would be entitled to prevent the dissemination of the news 'This is not a Union Job,' whether it be by radio, by newspaper, by pamphlets, or by picketing. A picket carrying that sign would be proclaiming to all union men to stay away. Yet as Mr. Justice Minton, dissenting in International Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481, 482, 70 S.Ct. 773, 779, 94 L.Ed. 995, stated, peaceful picketing when used N28* 'as an instrument of publicity' is a form of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is entitled to that protection though it incites to action. For it is the aim of most ideas to shape conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Picketing is a form of free speech—the workingman's method of giving publicity to the facts of industrial life. As such it is entitled to constitutional protection. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093. No court would be entitled to prevent the dissemination of the news 'This is not a Union Job,' whether it be by radio, by newspaper, by pamphlets, or by picketing. A picket carrying that sign would be proclaiming to all union men to stay away. Yet as Mr. Justice Minton, dissenting in International Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481, 482, 70 S.Ct. 773, 779, 94 L.Ed. 995, stated, peaceful picketing when used 'as an instrument of publicity' is a form of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is entitled to that protection though it incites to action. For it is the aim of most ideas to shape conduct.
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Parties: Poulos v. New Hampshire
Date: 1953-04-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - When there is no duty to speak on such issues there is a duty not to speak. This is not so merely because constitutional pronouncements, when a case before the Court does not call for them, violate a constitutional practice sanctioned by history and reinforced by the costly experience of occasional departures from it. The practice is especially compelling in cases involving the scope and limits of judicial protection of religious freedom and freedom of speech. These present perhaps the most difficult issues for courts.
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Phrase match: and freedom of speech. These present
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - If lucid English means what it unambiguously says, the 'first' contention in the above quotation—'no license for conducting religious ceremonies in Goodwin Park may be required because such a requirement would abridge the freedom of speech and religion guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment'—means that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars New Hampshire from requiring a license for 'an open air public meeting,' as is required by the ordinance of Portsmouth. And this in legal terms is a claim by the appellant that the ordinance (for jurisdictional purposes, a statute) is void on its face.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech and religion
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Here the record shows beyond doubt that objection to Poulos' talking was not rooted in a permissible regulation as to the time and place street or park speeches could be made. For the New Hampshire Supreme Court tells us that its officials 'arbitrarily and unreasonably' refused to grant Poulos a 'license' to talk. This shows that the State's speech licensing officials actually denied Poulos his constitutional right of free speech. The Court now holds Poulos can be branded a criminal for making a talk at the very time and place which the State Supreme Court has held its licensing officials could not legally forbid. I do not challenge the Court's argument that New Hampshire could prosecute a man who refused to follow the letter of the law to procure a license to 'run businesses,' 'erect structures,' 'purchase firearms,' 'store explosives,' or, I may add, to run a pawnshop. But the First Amendment affords freedom of speech a special protection; I believe it prohibits a state from convicting a man of crime whose only offense is that he makes an orderly religious appeal after he has been illegally 'arbitrarily and unreasonably' denied a 'license' to talk. This to me is a subtle use of a creeping censorship loose in the land.
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Phrase match: affords freedom of speech a special
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - If the citizen can flout the legislature when it undertakes to tamper with his First Amendment rights, I fail to see why he may not flout the official or agency who administers a licensing law designed to regulate the exercise of the right of free speech. defiance of a statute is hardly less harmful to an orderly society than defiance of an administrative order.
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Phrase match: the right of free speech. defiance
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - New Hampshire may in these circumstances, I agree, refuse him permission to set up the Council's arbitrary denial of his application as a defense to prosecution under the ordinance, which fixes the penalty at $20. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the remedy to which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire confined Poulos effectively frustrated his right of utterance, let alone that it circumvented his constitutional right by a procedural pretense.
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Phrase match: his right of utterance, let alone
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - The Court's holding in this case is one more in a series of recent decisions which fail to protect the right of Americans to speak freely.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right of Americans to speak
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - This shows that the State's speech licensing officials actually denied Poulos his constitutional right of free speech. The Court now holds Poulos can be branded a criminal for making a talk at the very time and place which the State Supreme Court has held its licensing officials could not legally forbid. I do not challenge the Court's argument that New Hampshire could prosecute a man who refused to follow the letter of the law to procure a license to 'run businesses,' 'erect structures,' 'purchase firearms,' 'store explosives,' or, I may add, to run a pawnshop. But the First Amendment affords freedom of speech a special protection; I believe it prohibits a state from convicting a man of crime whose only offense is that he makes an orderly religious appeal after he has been illegally 'arbitrarily and unreasonably' denied a 'license' to talk. This to me is a subtle use of a creeping censorship loose in the land.
Notes:
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Phrase match: constitutional right of free speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - A legislature that undertakes to license or censor the right of free speech is imposing a prior restraint, see Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357, odious in our history. The Constitution commands that government keep its hands off the exercise of First Amendment rights. No matter what the legislature may say, a man has the right to make his speech, print his handbill, compose his newspaper, and deliver his sermon without asking anyone's permission.
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Phrase match: the right of free speech is
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The principles of First Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather around him at any public place and at any time a group for discussion or instruction. It is a nonsequitur to say that First Amendment rights may not be regulated because they hold a preferred position in the hierarchy of the constitutional guarantees of the incidents of freedom. This Court has never so held and indeed has definitely indicated the contrary. It has indicated approval of reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation by governmental authority that preserves peace, order and tranquillity without deprivation of the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, press and the exercise of religion. When considering specifically the regulation of the use of public parks, this Court has taken the same position. See the quotation from the Hague case below and Kunz v. People of State of New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293—294, 71 S.Ct. 312, 314—315, 95 L.Ed. 280; Saia v. People of State of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1150, 92 L.Ed. 1574. In these cases, the ordinances were held invalid, not because they regulated the use of the parks for meeting and instruction but because they left complete discretion to refuse the use in the hands of officials.N51* 'The right to be heard is placed in the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police.' 334 U.S. at page 560, 68 S.Ct. at page 1150, 92 L.Ed. 1574. N52* '(W)e have consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Nothing said there indicated that a state's power to regulate traffic carried with it a right to censor public speeches or speakers merely because the state did not wish certain speakers to be heard.
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Phrase match: a right to censor public speeches
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - The Court concedes, as indeed it must under our decisions, see Royall v. State of Virginia, 116 U.S. 572, 6 S.Ct. 510, 29 L.Ed. 735; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430, that if denial of the right to speak had been contained in a statute, appellant would have been entitled to flout the law, to exercise his constitutional right to free speech, to make the address on July 2, 1950, and when arrested and tried for violating the statute, to defend on the ground that the law was unconstitutional. An unconstitutional statute is not necessarily a nullity; it may have intermediate consequences binding upon people. See Chicot County Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329. But when a legislature undertakes to proscribe the exercise of a citizen's constitutional right to free speech, it acts lawlessly; and the citizen can take matters in his own hands and proceed on the basis that such a law is no law at all.
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Phrase match: the right to speak had been
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - The Constitution commands that government keep its hands off the exercise of First Amendment rights. No matter what the legislature may say, a man has the right to make his speech, print his handbill, compose his newspaper, and deliver his sermon without asking anyone's permission.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right to make his speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The vice of a statute, which exacts a license for the right to make a speech, is that it adds a burden to the right. The burden is the same when the officials administering the licensing system withhold the license and require the applicant to spend months or years in the courts in order to win a right which he Constitution says no government shall deny.
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Phrase match: the right to make a speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The requirement that the licensing authority stay within 'the bounds of reason' and that it be 'free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination' is a command that it act reasonably, not capriciously or arbitrarily. But even a reasonable regulation of the right to free speech is not compatible with the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - There is no free speech in the sense of the Constitution when permission must be obtained from an official before a speech can be made. That is a previous restraint condemned by history and at war with the First Amendment. The nature of the particular official who has the power to grant or deny the authority does not matter. Those who wrote the First Amendment conceived of the right to free speech as wholly independent of the prior restraint of anyone.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The principles of First Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather around him at any public place and at any time a group for discussion or instruction. It is a nonsequitur to say that First Amendment rights may not be regulated because they hold a preferred position in the hierarchy of the constitutional guarantees of the incidents of freedom. This Court has never so held and indeed has definitely indicated the contrary. It has indicated approval of reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation by governmental authority that preserves peace, order and tranquillity without deprivation of the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, press and the exercise of religion.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of free speech, press and the
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - But the First Amendment affords freedom of speech a special protection; I believe it prohibits a state from convicting a man of crime whose only offense is that he makes an orderly religious appeal after he has been illegally 'arbitrarily and unreasonably' denied a 'license' to talk. This to me is a subtle use of a creeping censorship loose in the land.
Notes:
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Phrase match: freedom of speech a special protection
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - What Mr. Justice Roberts said needs to be repeated over and again. There is no free speech in the sense of the Constitution when permission must be obtained from an official before a speech can be made. That is a previous restraint condemned by history and at war with the First Amendment. The nature of the particular official who has the power to grant or deny the authority does not matter. Those who wrote the First Amendment conceived of the right to free speech as wholly independent of the prior restraint of anyone.
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Phrase match: no free speech in the sense
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - But the First Amendment affords freedom of speech a special protection; I believe it prohibits a state from convicting a man of crime whose only offense is that he makes an orderly religious appeal after he has been illegally 'arbitrarily and unreasonably' denied a 'license' to talk. This to me is a subtle use of a creeping censorship loose in the land.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of a creeping censorship loose in the
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Parties: United States v. Rumely
Date: 1953-03-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The command that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' has behind it a long history. It expresses the confidence that the safety of society depends on the tolerance of government for hostile as well as friendly criticism, that in a community where men's minds are free, there must be room for the unorthodox as well as the orthodox views.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech, or of
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N41* We have here a publisher who through books and pamphlets seeks to reach the minds and hearts of the American people. He is different in some respects from other publishers. But the differences are minor. Like the publishers of newspapers, magazines, or books, this publisher bids for the minds of men in the market place of ideas. The aim of the historic struggle for a free press was N42* 'to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The aim of the historic struggle for a free press was N22* 'to establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.' Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247, 56 S.Ct. 444, 448, 80 L.Ed. 660. That is the tradition behind the First Amendment. Censorship or previous restraint is banned. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357. Discriminatory taxation is outlawed. Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra. The privilege of pamphleteering, as well as the more orthodox types of publications, may neither be licensed, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, nor taxed. Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292. Door to door distribution is privileged. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313. These are illustrative of the preferred position granted speech and the press by the First Amendment. The command that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' has behind it a long history. It expresses the confidence that the safety of society depends on the tolerance of government for hostile as well as friendly criticism, that in a community where men's minds are free, there must be room for the unorthodox as well as the orthodox views.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the First Amendment. Censorship or previous restraint
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - If the present inquiry were sanctioned the press would be subjected to harassment that in practical effect might be as serious as censorship. A publisher, compelled to register with the federal government, would be subjected to vexatious inquiries. A requirement that a publisher disclose the identity of those who buy his books, pamphlets, or papers is indeed the beginning of surveillance of the press. True, no legal sanction is involved here. Congress has imposed no tax, established no board of censors, instituted no licensing system. But the potential restraint is equally severe. The finger of government leveled against the press is omnious. Once the government can demand of a publisher the names of the purchasers of his publications, the free press as we know it disappears.
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Phrase match: as serious as censorship. A publisher, compelled
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Parties: Fowler v. Rhode Island
Date: 1953-03-09
Identifiers:
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Parties: Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education
Date: 1954-01-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - Certainly the spoken word is as freely protected against prior restraints as that which is written. Such indeed is the force of our decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540, 65 S.Ct. 315, 327, 89 L.Ed. 430. The freedom of the platform which it espouses carries with it freedom of the stage.
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Phrase match: The freedom of the platform which
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas. On occasion one may be more powerful or effective than another. The movie, like the public speech, radio, or television is transitory here now and gone in an instant. The novel, the short story, the poem in printed form are permanently at hand to reenact the drama or to retell the story over and again. Which medium will give the most excitement and have the most enduring effect will vary with the theme and the actors. It is not for the censor to determine in any case. The First and the Fourteenth Amendments say that Congress and the States shall make 'no law' which abridges freedom of speech or of the press. In order to sanction a system of censorship I would have to say that 'no law' does not mean what it says, that 'no law' is qualified to mean 'some' laws. I cannot take that step.
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Phrase match: abridges freedom of speech or of
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - The argument of Ohio and New York that the government may establish censorship over moving pictures is one I cannot accept. In 1925 Minnesota passed a law aimed at suppressing before publication any 'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper'. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, struck down that law as violating the Fourteenth Amendment, which has made the First Amendment applicable to the States. Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 626, 75 L.Ed. 1357. The N23* 'chief purpose' of the constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press, said the Court, was 'to prevent previous restraints upon publication.'
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Phrase match: government may establish censorship over moving pictures
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - Certainly a system, still in force in some nations, which required a newspaper to submit to a board its news items, editorials, and cartoons before it published them could not be sustained. Nor could book publishers be required to submit their novels, poems, and tracts to censors for clearance before publication. Any such scheme of censorship would be in irreconciable conflict with the language and purpose of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas. On occasion one may be more powerful or effective than another. The movie, like the public speech, radio, or television is transitory here now and gone in an instant. The novel, the short story, the poem in printed form are permanently at hand to reenact the drama or to retell the story over and again. Which medium will give the most excitement and have the most enduring effect will vary with the theme and the actors. It is not for the censor to determine in any case. The First and the Fourteenth Amendments say that Congress and the States shall make 'no law' which abridges freedom of speech or of the press. In order to sanction a system of censorship I would have to say that 'no law' does not mean what it says, that 'no law' is qualified to mean 'some' laws. I cannot take that step.
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Parties: Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB
Date: 1954-02-01
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Parties: United States v. Harriss
Date: 1954-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - It is suggested, however, that the Lobbying Act, with respect to persons other than those defined in § 307, may as a practical matter act as a deterrent to their exercise of First Amendment rights. Hypothetical borderline situations are conjured up in which such persons choose to remain silent because of fear of possible prosecution for failure to comply with the Act. Our narrow construction of the Act, precluding as it does reasonable fears, is calculated to avoid such restraint. But, even assuming some such deterrent effect, the restraint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship, comparable in many ways to the restraint resulting from criminal libel laws. The hazard of such restraint is too remote to require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - If that rule were relaxed, if Congress could impose registration requirements on the exercise of First Amendment rights, saving to the courts the salvage of the good from the bad, and meanwhile causing all who might possibly be covered to act at their peril, the law would in practical effect be a deterrent to the exercise of First Amendment rights. The Court seeks to avoid that consequence by construing the law narrowly as applying only to those who are paid to 'button hole' Congressman or who collect and expend moneys to get others to do so. It may be appropriate in some cases to read a statute with the gloss a court has placed on it in order to save it from the charge of vagueness. See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277, 35 S.Ct. 383, 384, 59 L.Ed. 573. But I do not think that course is appropriate here.
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Parties: Quinn v. United States
Date: 1955-05-23
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Parties: Emspak v. United States
Date: 1955-05-23
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Parties: Ellis v. Dixon
Date: 1955-06-06
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Parties: Ullmann v. United States
Date: 1956-03-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - The guarantee against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment is not only a protection against conviction and prosecution but a safeguard of conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well. My view is that the Framers put it beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes. The evil to be guarded against was partly self-accusation under legal compulsion. But that was only a part of the evial. The conscience and dignity of man were also involved. So too was his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Framers, therefore, created the federally protected right of silence and decreed that the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness against himself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - N44* The guarantee against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment is not only a protection against conviction and prosecution but a safeguard of conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well. My view is that the Framers put it beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes. The evil to be guarded against was partly self-accusation under legal compulsion. But that was only a part of the evial. The conscience and dignity of man were also involved. So too was his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Framers, therefore, created the federally protected right of silence and decreed that the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness against himself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - N53* My view is that the Framers put it beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes. The evil to be guarded against was partly self-accusation under legal compulsion. But that was only a part of the evial. The conscience and dignity of man were also involved. So too was his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Framers, therefore, created the federally protected right of silence and decreed that the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness against himself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - So too was his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Framers, therefore, created the federally protected right of silence and decreed that the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness against himself.
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Parties: Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson
Date: 1956-06-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by this record. Congress endeavored to safeguard against that possibility by making explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects 'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.' If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case.
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Parties: Black v. Cutter Labs.
Date: 1956-06-04
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Parties: BUTLER v. MICHIGAN
Date: 1957-02-25
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Parties: UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTO., AIRCRAFT & AGRIC. IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA
Date: 1957-03-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - To draw a constitutional line between informing the people and inciting or persuading them and to suggest that one is protected and the other not by the First Amendment is to give constitutional dignity to an irrelevance. Any political speaker worth his salt intends to sway voters. His purpose to do so cannot possibly rob him of his First Amendment rights, unless we are to reduce that great guarantee of freedom to the protection of meaningless mouthings of ineffective speakers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - Mr. Justice Rutledge spoke of the importance of the First Amendment rights—freedom of expression and freedom of assembly—to the integrity of our elections. 'The most complete exercise of those rights,' he said, 'is essential to the full, fair and untrammeled operation of the electoral process. To the extent they are curtailed the electorate is deprived of information knowledge and opinion vital to its function.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - The making of a political speech up to now has always been one of the preferred rights protected by the First Amendment. It usually costs money to communicate an idea to a large audience. But no one would seriously contend that the expenditure of money to print a newspaper deprives the publisher of freedom of the press. Nor can the fact that it costs money to make a speech—whether it be hiring a hall or purchasing time on the air—make the speech any the less an exercise of First Amendment rights. Yet this statute, as construed and applied in this indictment, makes criminal any 'expenditure' by a union for the purpose of expressing its views on the issues of an election and the candidates. It would make no difference under this construction of the Act whether the union spokesman made his address from the platform of a hall, used a sound truck in the streets, or bought time on radio or television. In each case the mere 'expenditure' of money to make the speech is an indictable offense. The principle applied today would make equally criminal the use by a union of its funds to print pamphlets for general distribution or to distribute political literature at large.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - It asks, 'Did the broadcast reach the public at large or only those affiliated with appellee?' But the size of the audience has heretofore been deemed wholly irrelevant to First Amendment issues. One has a right to freedom of speech whether he talks to one person or to one thousand. One has a right to freedom of speech not only when he talks to his friends but also when he talks to the public. It is startling to learn that a union spokesman or the spokesman for a corporate interest has fewer constitutional rights when he talks to the public than when he talks to members of his group.
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - The Act, as construed and applied, is a broadside assault on the freedom of political expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. It cannot possibly be saved by any of the facts conjured up by the Court. The answers to the questions reserved are quite irrelevant to the constitutional questions tendered under the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - But the size of the audience has heretofore been deemed wholly irrelevant to First Amendment issues. One has a right to freedom of speech whether he talks to one person or to one thousand. One has a right to freedom of speech not only when he talks to his friends but also when he talks to the public. It is startling to learn that a union spokesman or the spokesman for a corporate interest has fewer constitutional rights when he talks to the public than when he talks to members of his group.
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - Making a speech endorsing a candidate for office does not, however, deserve to be identified with antisocial conduct. Until today political speech has never been considered a crime. The making of a political speech up to now has always been one of the preferred rights protected by the First Amendment. It usually costs money to communicate an idea to a large audience. But no one would seriously contend that the expenditure of money to print a newspaper deprives the publisher of freedom of the press. Nor can the fact that it costs money to make a speech—whether it be hiring a hall or purchasing time on the air—make the speech any the less an exercise of First Amendment rights. Yet this statute, as construed and applied in this indictment, makes criminal any 'expenditure' by a union for the purpose of expressing its views on the issues of an election and the candidates. It would make no difference under this construction of the Act whether the union spokesman made his address from the platform of a hall, used a sound truck in the streets, or bought time on radio or television. In each case the mere 'expenditure' of money to make the speech is an indictable offense. The principle applied today would make equally criminal the use by a union of its funds to print pamphlets for general distribution or to distribute political literature at large.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - But the size of the audience has heretofore been deemed wholly irrelevant to First Amendment issues. One has a right to freedom of speech whether he talks to one person or to one thousand. One has a right to freedom of speech not only when he talks to his friends but also when he talks to the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The purpose of speech is not only to inform but to incite to action. As Mr. Justice Holmes said in his dissent in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 632, 69 L.Ed. 1138, N29* 'Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth.' To draw a constitutional line between informing the people and inciting or persuading them and to suggest that one is protected and the other not by the First Amendment is to give constitutional dignity to an irrelevance. Any political speaker worth his salt intends to sway voters. His purpose to do so cannot possibly rob him of his First Amendment rights, unless we are to reduce that great guarantee of freedom to the protection of meaningless mouthings of ineffective speakers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - N1* note> The Court asks whether the broadcast constituted 'active electioneering' or simply stated 'the record of particular candidates on economic issues.' What possible difference can it make under the First Amendment whether it was one or the other? The First Amendment covers the entire spectrum. It protects the impassioned plea of the orator as much as the quiet publication of the tabulations of the statistician or economist. If there is an innuendo that 'active electioneering' by union spokesmen is not covered by the First Amendment, the opinion makes a sharp break with our political and constitutional heritage.
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Parties: Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.
Date: 1957-05-06
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions about matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to freedom of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the Board itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion of Konigsberg on his failure to answer.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - When read in the light of the ordinary give-and-take of political controversy the editorials Konigsberg wrote are not unusually extreme and fairly interpreted only say that certain officials were performing their duties in a manner that, in the opinion of the writer, was injurious to the public. We do not believe that an inference of bad moral character can rationally be drawn from these editorials. Because of the very nature of our democracy such expressions of political views must be permitted. Citizens have a right under our constitutional system to criticize government officials and agencies. Courts are not, and should not be, immune to such criticism. Government censorship can no more be reconciled with our national constitutional standard of freedom of speech and press when done in the guise of determinign 'moral character,' than if it should be attempted directly.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or association. A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated—free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Because of the very nature of our democracy such expressions of political views must be permitted. Citizens have a right under our constitutional system to criticize government officials and agencies. Courts are not, and should not be, immune to such criticism. Government censorship can no more be reconciled with our national constitutional standard of freedom of speech and press when done in the guise of determinign 'moral character,' than if it should be attempted directly.
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Parties: WATKINS v. UNITED STATES
Date: 1957-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - In effect the Court honors Watkins' claim of a 'right to silence' which brings all inquiries, as we know, to a 'dead end.' I do not see how any First Amendment rights were endangered here. There is nothing in the First Amendment that provides the guarantees Watkins claims. That Amendment was designed to prevent attempts by law to curtail freedom of speech. Whitney v. People of State of California, 1927, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095. It forbids Congress from making any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It guarantees Watkins' right to join any organization and make any speech that does not have an intent to incite to crime.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - As already indicated, even if Watkins' associates were on the stand they could not decline to disclose their Communist connections on First Amendment grounds. While there may be no restraint by the Government of one's beliefs, the right of free belief has never been extended to include the withholding of knowledge of past events or transactions. There is no general privilege of silence. The First Amendment does not make speech or silence permissible to a person in such measure as he chooses.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - It concludes that compelling a witness to reveal his 'beliefs, expressions or associations' impinges upon First Amendment rights. The system of inquiry, it says, must 'insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.' In effect the Court honors Watkins' claim of a 'right to silence' which brings all inquiries, as we know, to a 'dead end.' I do not see how any First Amendment rights were endangered here. There is nothing in the First Amendment that provides the guarantees Watkins claims. That Amendment was designed to prevent attempts by law to curtail freedom of speech. Whitney v. People of State of California, 1927, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095. It forbids Congress from making any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It guarantees Watkins' right to join any organization and make any speech that does not have an intent to incite to crime. Dennis v. United States, 1951, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137. But Watkins was asked whether he knew named individuals and whether they were Communists. He refused to answer on the ground that his rights were being abridged. What he was actually seeking to do was to protect his former associates, not himself, from embarrassment. He had already admitted his own involvement. He sought to vindicate the rights, if any, of his associates. It is settled that one cannot invoke the constitutional rights of another.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - While there may be no restraint by the Government of one's beliefs, the right of free belief has never been extended to include the withholding of knowledge of past events or transactions. There is no general privilege of silence. The First Amendment does not make speech or silence permissible to a person in such measure as he chooses. Watkins has here exercised his own choice as to when he talks, what questions he answers, and when he remains silent. A witness is not given such a choice by the Amendment. Remote and indirect disadvantages such as 'public stigma, scorn and obloquy' may be related to the First Amendment, but they are not enough to block investigation.
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Parties: SWEEZY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE
Date: 1957-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - There is no doubt that legislative investigations, whether on a federal or state level, are capable of encroaching upon the constitutional liberties of individuals. It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of communication of ideas, particularly in the academic community.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - N54* The State Supreme Court thus conceded without extended discussion that petitioner's right to lecture and his right to associate with others were constitutionally protected freedoms which had been abridged through this investigation. These conclusions could not be seriously debated. Merely to summon a witness and compel him, against his will, to disclose the nature of his past expressions and associations in a measure of governmental interference in these matters. These are rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression—areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - The New Hampshire Supreme Court, although recognizing that such inquiries (100 N.H. 113, 114, 121 A.2d 792) 'undoubtedly interfered with the defendant's free exercise' of his constitutionally guaranteed right to lecture, justified the interference on the ground that it would occur 'in a limited area in which the legislative committee may reasonably believe that the overthrow of existing government by force and violence is being or has been taught, advocated or planned, an area in which the interest of the State justifies this intrusion upon civil liberties.' According to the court, the facts that made reasonable the committee's belief that petitioner had taught violent overthrow in his lecture were that he was a Socialist with a record of affiliation with groups cited by the Attorney General of the United States or the House Un-American Activities Committee and that he was co-editor of an article stating that, although the authors hated violence, it was less to be deplored when used by the Soviet Union than by capitalist countries.
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Parties: INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 695 v. VOGT
Date: 1957-07-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - the Court broadly assimilated peaceful picketing in general to freedom of speech, and as such protected against abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N45* The Court therefore concluded that it was 'clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. * * * They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - the Court made sweeping pronouncements about the right to picket in holding unconstitutional a statute that had been applied to ban all picketing, with N56* 'no exceptions based upon either the number of persons engaged in the proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character and the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the dispute.' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99, 60 S.Ct. 736, 743, 84 L.Ed. 1093. As the statute dealt at large with all picketing, so the Court broadly assimilated peaceful picketing in general to freedom of speech, and as such protected against abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N18* In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093, we struck down a state ban on picketing on the ground that 'the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.' Less than one year later, we held that the First Amendment protected organizational picketing on a factual record which cannot be distinguished from the one now before us. A.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855. Of course, we have always recognized that picketing has aspects which make it more than speech. Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 777, 62 S.Ct. 816, 819, 820, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (concurring opinion). That difference underlines our decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834. There, picketing was an essential part of 'a single and integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri's valid law.' Id., 336 U.S. at page 498, 69 S.Ct. at page 688. And see National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477—478, 62 S.Ct. 344, 348, 86 L.Ed. 348. We emphasized that N19* 'there was clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restrained, appellants would succeed in making (the state) policy a dead letter * * *.' 336 U.S. at page 503, 69 S.Ct. at page 691. Speech there was enjoined because it was an inseparable part of conduct which the State constitutionally could and did regulate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - As the statute dealt at large with all picketing, so the Court broadly assimilated peaceful picketing in general to freedom of speech, and as such protected against abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Parties: Yates v. United States
Date: 1957-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something. At best the expressions used by the trial court were equivocal, since in the absence of any instructions differentiating advocacy of abstract doctrine from advocacy of action, they were as consistent with the former as they were with the latter. Nor do we regard their ambiguity as lessened by what the trial court had to say as to the right of the defendants to announce their beliefs as to the inevitability of violent revolution, or to advocate other unpopular opinions. Especially when it is unmistakable that the court did not consider the urging of action for forcible overthrow as being a necessary element of the proscribed advocacy, but rather considered the crucial question to be whether the advocacy was uttered with a specific intent to accomplish such overthrow, we would not be warranted in assuming that the jury drew from these instructions more than the court itself intended them to convey.
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Parties: KINGSLEY v. BROWN
Date: 1957-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - If New York chooses to subject persons who disseminate obscene 'literature' to criminal prosecution and also to deal with such books as deodands of old, or both, with due regard, of course, to appropriate opportunities for the trial of the underlying issue, it is not for us to gainsay its selection of remedies. Just as Near v. State of Minnesota, supra, one of the landmark opinions in shaping the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and of the press, left no doubts that 'Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an absolute right,' 283 U.S. at page 708, 51 S.Ct. at page 628, it likewise made clear that 'the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.' Id., 283 U.S. at page 716, 51 S.Ct. at page 631. To be sure, the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Nor are the consequences of a judicial condemnation for obscenity under § 22—a more restrictive of freedom of expression than the result of conviction for a misdemeanor.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - My views on the right of a State to protect its people against the purveyance of obscenity were expressed in Roth v. United States
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The publisher is entitled to that leeway under our constitutional system. One is entitled to defend every utterance on its merits and not to suffer today for what he uttered yesterday. Free speech is not to be regulated like diseased cattle and impure butter. The audience (in this case the judge or the jury) that hissed yesterday may applaud today, even for the same performance.
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Parties: MOREY v. DOUD
Date: 1957-06-24
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Parties: Roth v. United States
Date: 1957-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - I agree with the result reached by the Court in these cases, but, because we are operating in a field of expression and because broad language used here may eventually be applied to the arts and sciences and freedom of communication generally, I would limit our decision to the facts before us and to the validity of the statutes in question as applied.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. As early as 1712, Massachusetts made it criminal to publish 'any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon' in imitation or mimicking of religious services.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - 'The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - 'The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times. * * * Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The fundamental freedom of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Roth's argument that the federal obscenity statute unconstitutionally encroaches upon the powers reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the States and to the people to punish speech and press where offensive to decency and morality is hinged upon his contention that obscenity is expression not excepted from the sweep of the provision of the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.' (Emphasis added.) That argument falls in light of our holding that obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment. We therefore hold that the federal obscenity statute punishing the use of the mails for obscene material is a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - The standard of what offends 'the common conscience of the community' conflicts, in my judgment, with the command of the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' Certainly that standard would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics, polities or philosophy were involved. How does it become a constitutional standard when literature treating with sex is concerned?
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment. Under that test, juries can censor, suppress, and punish what they don't like, provided the matter relates to 'sexual impurity' or has a tendency 'to excite lustful thoughts.' This is community censorship in one of its worst forms. It creates a regime where in the battle between the literati and the Philistines, the Philistines and certain to win. If experience in this field teaches anything, it is that 'censorship of obscenity has almost always been both irrational and indiscriminate.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - Government should be concerned with antisocial conduct, not with utterances. Thus, if the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press is to mean anything in this field, it must allow protests even against the moral code that the standard of the day sets for the community. In other words, literature should not be suppressed merely because it offends the moral code of the censor.
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - I do not think that the problem can be resolved by the Court's statement that 'obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment.' With the exception of Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919, none of our cases has resolved problems of free speech and free press by placing any form of expression beyond the pale of the absolute prohibition of the First Amendment. Unlike the law of libel, wrongfully relief on in Beauharnais, there is no special historical evidence that literature dealing with sex was intended to be treated in a special manner by those who drafted the First Amendment. In fact, the first reported court decision in this country involving obscene literature was in 1821. Lockhart & McClure, op. cit. supra, at 324, n. 200. I reject too the implication that problems of freedom of speech and of the press are to be resolved by weighing against the values of free expression, the judgment of the Court that a particular form of that expression has 'no redeeming social importance.' The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence. The First Amendment puts free speech in the preferred position.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 688, 93 L.Ed. 834; National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477—478, 62 S.Ct. 344, 348, 86 L.Ed. 348. As a people, we cannot afford to relax that standard. For the test that suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem tomorrow. All it need do is to incite a lascivious thought or arouse a lustful desire. The list of books that judges or juries can place in that category is endless.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - I can understand (and at times even sympathize) with programs of civic groups and church groups to protect and depend the existing moral standards of the community. I can understand the motives of the Anthony Comstocks who would impose Victorian standards on the community. When speech alone is involved, I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment, can become the sponsor of any of these movements. I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment, can throw its weight behind one school or another. Government should be concerned with antisocial conduct, not with utterances. Thus, if the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press is to mean anything in this field, it must allow protests even against the moral code that the standard of the day sets for the community. In other words, literature should not be suppressed merely because it offends the moral code of the censor.
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - I reject too the implication that problems of freedom of speech and of the press are to be resolved by weighing against the values of free expression, the judgment of the Court that a particular form of that expression has 'no redeeming social importance.' The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence. The First Amendment puts free speech in the preferred position.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment. Under that test, juries can censor, suppress, and punish what they don't like, provided the matter relates to 'sexual impurity' or has a tendency 'to excite lustful thoughts.' This is community censorship in one of its worst forms. It creates a regime where in the battle between the literati and the Philistines, the Philistines and certain to win. If experience in this field teaches anything, it is that N24* 'censorship of obscenity has almost always been both irrational and indiscriminate.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment. We therefore hold that the federal obscenity statute punishing the use of the mails for obscene material is a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - I do not think that the problem can be resolved by the Court's statement that 'obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment.' With the exception of Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919, none of our cases has resolved problems of free speech and free press by placing any form of expression beyond the pale of the absolute prohibition of the First Amendment. Unlike the law of libel, wrongfully relief on in Beauharnais, there is no special historical evidence that literature dealing with sex was intended to be treated in a special manner by those who drafted the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and press. Although this is the first time the question has been squarely presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech. Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725, 735, 96 L.Ed. 919. At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N16* '* * * There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene * * *. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality * * *.' (Emphasis added.)We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N17* 'Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - speech, or of the press * * *.' (Emphasis added.) That argument falls in light of our holding that obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment. We therefore hold that the federal obscenity statute punishing the use of the mails for obscene material is a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - By these standards punishment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial conduct. This test cannot be squared with our decisions under the First Amendment. Even the ill-starred Dennis case conceded that speech to be punishable must have some relation to action which could be penalized by government. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502—511, 71 S.Ct. 857, 863—868, 95 L.Ed. 1137. Cf. Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty (1956), p. 69. This issue cannot be avoided by saying that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - I do not think that the problem can be resolved by the Court's statement that 'obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment.' With the exception of Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919, none of our cases has resolved problems of free speech and free press by placing any form of expression beyond the pale of the absolute prohibition of the First Amendment. Unlike the law of libel, wrongfully relief on in Beauharnais, there is no special historical evidence that literature dealing with sex was intended to be treated in a special manner by those who drafted the First Amendment. In fact, the first reported court decision in this country involving obscene literature was in 1821. Lockhart & McClure, op. cit. supra, at 324, n. 200. I reject too the implication that problems of freedom of speech and of the press are to be resolved by weighing against the values of free expression, the judgment of the Court that a particular form of that expression has 'no redeeming social importance.' The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence. The First Amendment puts free speech in the preferred position.
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Parties: Staub v. City of Baxley
Date: 1958-01-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - The First Amendment of the Constitution provides: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * * *.' This freedom is among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action; and municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - It is undeniable that the ordinance authorized the Mayor and Council of the City of Baxley to grant 'or refuse to grant' the required permit in their uncontrolled discretion. It thus makes enjoyment of speech contingent upon the will of the Mayor and Council of the City, although that fundamental right is made free from congressional abridgment by the First Amendment and is protected by the Fourteenth from invasion by state action. For these reasons, the ordinance, on its face, imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint upon the enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms
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Parties: Perez v. Brownell
Date: 1958-03-31
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Parties: NLRB v. Usw
Date: 1958-06-30
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Parties: NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson
Date: 1958-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259, 81 L.Ed. 278; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 322, 89 L.Ed. 430. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. See Gitlow v. New York
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Statutes imposing taxes upon rather than prohibiting particular activity have been struck down when perceived to have the consequence of unduly curtailing the liberty of freedom of press assured under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.
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Parties: Speiser v. Randall
Date: 1958-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. The Supreme Court of California recognized that these provisions were limitations on speech but concluded that 'by no standard can the infringement upon freedom of speech imposed by section 19 of article XX be deemed a substantial one.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - this whole business of penalizing people because of their views and expressions concerning government is hopelessly repugnant to the principles of freedom upon which this Nation was founded and which have helped to make it the greatest in the world. As stated in prior cases, I believe 'that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, (to) discuss all governmental affairs and (to) argue for desired changes in the existing order. This freedom is too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit. But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship and deliberately chose the First Amendment's unequivocal command that freedom of assembly, petition, speech and press shall not be abridged.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Advocacy and belief go hand in hand. For there can be no true freedom of mind if thoughts are secure only when they are pent up.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - No conspiracy to overthrow the Government was involved. Speech and speech alone was the offense. I repeat that thought and speech go hand in hand. There is no real freedom of thought if ideas must be suppressed. There can be no freedom of the mind unless ideas can be uttered.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Included were those contained in the First Amendment—the right to speak freely, the right to believe what one chooses, the right of conscience. Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302. Today what one thinks or believes, what one utters and says have the full protection of the First Amendment. It is only his actions that government may examine and penalize. When we allow government to probe his beliefs and withhold from him some of the privileges of citizenship because of what he thinks, we do indeed 'invert the order of things,' to use Hamilton's phrase.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - As stated in prior cases, I believe N57* 'that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, (to) discuss all governmental affairs and (to) argue for desired changes in the existing order.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Included were those contained in the First Amendment—the right to speak freely, the right to believe what one chooses, the right of conscience. Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302. Today what one thinks or believes, what one utters and says have the full protection of the First Amendment. It is only his actions that government may examine and penalize.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - we hold that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition. The State clearly has no such compelling interest at stake as to justify a short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected speech. Accordingly, though the validity of § 19 of Art. XX of the State Constitution be conceded arguendo, its enforcement through procedures which place the burdens of proof and persuasion on the taxpayer is a violation of due process.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - We should never forget that the freedoms secured by that Amendment Speech, Press, Religion, Petition and Assembly—are absolutely indispensable for the preservation of a free society in which government is based upon the consent of an informed citizenry and is dedicated to the protection of the rights of all, even the most despised minorities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Speech which is in no way brigaded with action should always be protected by the First Amendment. That protection should extend even to the ideas we despise. As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote in dissent in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 632, 69 L.Ed. 1138, N30* 'If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.' It is time for government—state or federal—to become concerned with the citizen's advocacy when his ideas and beliefs move into the realm of action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - No conspiracy to overthrow the Government was involved. Speech and speech alone was the offense.I repeat that thought and speech go hand in hand. There is no real freedom of thought if ideas must be suppressed. There can be no freedom of the mind unless ideas can be uttered.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - I am convinced that this whole business of penalizing people because of their views and expressions concerning government is hopelessly repugnant to the principles of freedom upon which this Nation was founded and which have helped to make it the greatest in the world. As stated in prior cases, I believe N25* 'that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, (to) discuss all governmental affairs and (to) argue for desired changes in the existing order. This freedom is too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit. But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship and deliberately chose the First Amendment's unequivocal command that freedom of assembly, petition, speech and press shall not be abridged. I happen to believe this was a wise choice and that our free way of life enlists such respect and love that our Nation cannot be imperiled by mere talk.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N3* 'that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, (to) discuss all governmental affairs and (to) argue for desired changes in the existing order. This freedom is too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit. But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship and deliberately chose the First Amendment's unequivocal command that freedom of assembly, petition, speech and press shall not be abridged.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Advocacy which is in no way brigaded with action should always be protected by the First Amendment. That protection should extend even to the ideas we despise. As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote in dissent in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 632, 69 L.Ed. 1138, N20* 'If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.' It is time for government—state or federal—to become concerned with the citizen's advocacy when his ideas and beliefs move into the realm of action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The purpose of the legislation sustained in the Douds case, the Court found, was to minimize the danger of political strikes disruptive of interstate commerce by discouraging labor unions from electing Communist Party members to union office. While the Court recognized that the necessary effect of the legislation was to discourage the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment, this consequence was said to be only indirect. The congressional purpose was to achieve an objective other than restraint on speech. Only the method of achieving this end touched on protected rights and that only tangentially. The evil at which Congress has attempted to strike in that case was thought sufficiently grave to justify limited infringement of political rights. Similar considerations governed the other cases. Each case concerned a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be misused to the detriment of the public. The present legislation, however, can have no such justification. It purports to deal directly with speech and the expression of political ideas. 'Encouragement to loyalty to our institutions * * * (is a doctrine) which the state has plainly promulgated and intends to foster.' 48 Cal.2d at page 439, 311 P.2d at page 520. The State argues that veterans as a class occupy a position of special trust and influence in the community, and therefore any veteran who engages in the proscribed advocacy constitutes a special danger to the State. But while a union official or public employee may be deprived of his position and thereby removed from the place of special danger, the State is powerless to erase the service which the veteran has rendered his country; though he be denied a tax exemption, he remains a veteran. The State, consequently, can act against the veteran only as it can act against any other citizen, by imposing penalties to deter the unlawful conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Believing that the principles of those cases have no application here, we hold that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech he unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition. The State clearly has no such compelling interest at stake as to justify a short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected speech.
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Parties: FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Date: 1958-06-30
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Parties: Cammarano v. United States
Date: 1959-02-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - That 'freedom of speech or of the press,' directly guaranteed against encroachment by the Federal Government and safeguarded against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is not in terms or by implication confined to discourse of a particular kind and nature. It has often been stressed as essential to the exposition and exchange of political ideas, to the expression of philosophical attitudes, to the flowering of the letters. Important as the First Amendment is to all those cultural ends, it has not been restricted to them. Individual or group protests against action which results in monetary injuries are certainly not beyond the reach of the First Amendment
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - That 'freedom of speech or of the press,' directly guaranteed against encroachment by the Federal Government and safeguarded against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is not in terms or by implication confined to discourse of a particular kind and nature. It has often been stressed as essential to the exposition and exchange of political ideas, to the expression of philosophical attitudes, to the flowering of the letters. Important as the First Amendment is to all those cultural ends, it has not been restricted to them. Individual or group protests against action which results in monetary injuries are certainly not beyond the reach of the First Amendment, as Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, which placed picketing within the ambit of the First Amendment, teaches. And see Newell v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union 795, 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817, 182 Kan. 205, 319 P.2d 171, reversed, 356 U.S. 341, 78 S.Ct. 779, 2 L.Ed.2d 809. A protest against government action that affects a business occupies as high a place. The profit motive should make no difference, for that is an element inherent in the very conception of a press under our system of free enterprise. Those who make their living through exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a profit motive.
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Parties: SCULL v. VIRGINIA ex rel. COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM & RACIAL ACTIVITIES
Date: 1959-05-04
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Parties: BARENBLATT v. UNITED STATES
Date: 1959-06-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - I believe that the resolution establishing the House Un-American Activities Committee and the questions that Committee asked Barenblatt violate the Constitution in several respects. (1) Rule XI creating the Committee authorizes such a sweeping, unlimited, all-inclusive and undiscriminating compulsory examination of witnesses in the field of speech, press, petition and assembly that it violates the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (2) Compelling an answer to the questions asked Barenblatt abridges freedom of speech and association in contravention of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - The First Amendment says in no equivocal language that Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition. The activities of this Committee, authorized by Congress, do precisely that, through exposure, obloquy and public scorn. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197—198, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1184—1185. The Court does not really deny this fact but relies on a combination of three reasons for permitting the infringement: (A) The notion that despite the First Amendment's command Congress can abridge speech and association if this Court decides that the governmental interest in abridging speech is greater than an individual's interest in exercising that freedom, (B) the Government's right to 'preserve itself,' (C) the fact that the Committee is only after Communists or suspected Communists in this investigation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - (A) I do not agree that laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process. There are, of course, cases suggesting that a law which primarily regulates conduct but which might also indirectly affect speech can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct. With these cases I agree. Typical of them are Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, and Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155. Both of these involved the right of a city to control its streets. In Cantwell, a man had been convicted of breach of the peace for playing a phonograph on the street. He defended on the ground that he was disseminating religious views and could not, therefore, be stopped. We upheld his defense, but in so doing we pointed out that the city did have substantial power over conduct on the streets even where this power might to some extent affect speech. A State, we said, might 'by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and holding meetings thereon.' 310 U.S. at page 304, 60 S.Ct. at page 903. But even such laws governing conduct, we emphasized, must be tested, though only by a balancing process, if they indirectly affect ideas. On one side of the balance, we pointed out, is the interest of the United States in seeing that its fundamental law protecting freedom of communication is not abridged; on the other the obvious interest of the State to regulate conduct within its boundaries. In Cantwell we held that the need to control the streets could not justify the restriction made on speech. We stressed the fact that where a man had a right to be on a street, 'he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.' 310 U.S. at page 308, 60 S.Ct. at page 905. Similar views were expressed in Schneider, which concerned ordinances prohibiting the distribution of handbills to prevent littering. We forbade application of such ordinances when they affected literature designed to spread ideas. There were other ways, we said, to protect the city from littering which would not sacrifice the right of the people to be informed. In so holding, we, of course, found it necessary to 'weigh the circumstances.' 308 U.S. at page 161, 60 S.Ct. at page 151. But we did not in Schneider, any more than in Cantwell, even remotely suggest that a law directly aimed at curtailing speech and political persuasion could be saved through a balancing process. Neither these cases, nor any others, can be read as allowing legislative bodies to pass laws abridging freedom of speech, press and association merely because of hostility to views peacefully expressed in a place where the speaker had a right to be.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - To apply the Court's balancing test under such circumstances is to read the First Amendment to say 'Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of the people in having them exercised.' This is closely akin to the notion that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Bill of Rights should be enforced unless the Court believes it is reasonable to do so.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - The fact is that once we allow any group which has some political aims or ideas to be driven from the ballot and from the battle for men's minds because some of its members are bad and some of its tenets are illegal, no group is safe. Today we deal with Communists or suspected Communists. In 1920, instead, the New York Assembly sspe nded duly elected legislators on the ground that, being Socialists, they were disloyal to the country's principles. In the 1830's the Masons were hunted as outlaws and subversives, and abolitionists were considered revolutionaries of the most dangerous kind in both North and South. Earlier still, at the time of the universally unlamented alien and sedition laws, Thomas Jefferson's party was attacked and its members were derisively called 'Jacobins.' Fisher Ames described the party as a 'French faction' guilty of 'subversion' and 'officered, regimented and formed to subordination.' Its members, he claimed, intended to 'take arms against the laws as soon as they dare.' History should teach us then, that in times of high emotional excitement minority parties and groups which advocate extremely unpopular social or governmental innovations will always be typed as criminal gangs and attempts will always be made to drive them out. It was knowledge of this fact, and of its great dangers, that caused the Founders of our land to enact the First Amendment as a guarantee that neither Congress nor the people would do anything to hinder or destroy the capacity of individuals and groups to seek converts and votes for any cause, however radical or unpalatable their principles might seem under the accepted notions of the time. Whatever the States were left free to do, the First Amendment sought to leave Congress devoid of any kind or quality of power to direct any type of national laws against the freedom of individuals to think what they please, advocate whatever policy they choose, and join with others to bring about the social, religious, political and governmental changes which seem best to them.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Undeniably, the First Amendment in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational relationships. However, the protections of the First Amendment, unlike a proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - This Court has recognized that the stricter standard is as much required in criminal contempt cases as in all other criminal cases, and has emphasized that the 'vice of vagueness' is especially pernicious where legislative power over an area involving speech, press, petition and assembly is involved. In this area the statement that a statute is void if it 'attempts to cover so much that it effectively covers nothing,' see Musser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97, 68 S.Ct. 397, 398, 92 L.Ed. 562, takes on double significance. For a statute broad enough to support infringement of speech, writtings, thoughts and public assemblies, against the unequivocal command of the First Amendment necessarily leaves all persons to guess just what he law really means to cover, and fear of a wrong guess inevitably leads people to forego the very rights the Constitution sought to protect above all others. Vagueness becomes even more intolerable in this area if one accepts, as the Court today does, a balancing test to decide if First Amendment rights shall be protected. It is difficult at best to make a man guess—at the penalty or imprisonment—whether a court will consider the State's need for certain information superior to society's interest in unfettered freedom. It is unconscionable to make him choose between the right to keep silent and the need to speak when the statute supposedly establishing the 'state's interest' is too vague to give him guidance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - The First Amendment says in no equivocal language that Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition. The activities of this Committee, authorized by Congress, do precisely that, through exposure, obloquy and public scorn. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197—198, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1184—1185. The Court does not really deny this fact but relies on a combination of three reasons for permitting the infringement: (A) The notion that despite the First Amendment's command Congress can abridge speech and association if this Court decides that the governmental interest in abridging speech is greater than an individual's interest in exercising that freedom, (B) the Government's right to 'preserve itself,' (C) the fact that the Committee is only after Communists or suspected Communists in this investigation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - I do not agree that laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process. There are, of course, cases suggesting that a law which primarily regulates conduct but which might also indirectly affect speech can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct. With these cases I agree. Typical of them are Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, and Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155. Both of these involved the right of a city to control its streets. In Cantwell, a man had been convicted of breach of the peace for playing a phonograph on the street. He defended on the ground that he was disseminating religious views and could not, therefore, be stopped. We upheld his defense, but in so doing we pointed out that the city did have substantial power over conduct on the streets even where this power might to some extent affect speech. A State, we said, might 'by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and holding meetings thereon.' 310 U.S. at page 304, 60 S.Ct. at page 903. But even such laws governing conduct, we emphasized, must be tested, though only by a balancing process, if they indirectly affect ideas. On one side of the balance, we pointed out, is the interest of the United States in seeing that its fundamental law protecting freedom of communication is not abridged; on the other the obvious interest of the State to regulate conduct within its boundaries. In Cantwell we held that the need to control the streets could not justify the restriction made on speech. We stressed the fact that where a man had a right to be on a street, 'he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.' 310 U.S. at page 308, 60 S.Ct. at page 905. Similar views were expressed in Schneider, which concerned ordinances prohibiting the distribution of handbills to prevent littering. We forbade application of such ordinances when they affected literature designed to spread ideas. There were other ways, we said, to protect the city from littering which would not sacrifice the right of the people to be informed. In so holding, we, of course, found it necessary to 'weigh the circumstances.' 308 U.S. at page 161, 60 S.Ct. at page 151. But we did not in Schneider, any more than in Cantwell, even remotely suggest that a law directly aimed at curtailing speech and political persuasion could be saved through a balancing process.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - On one side of the balance, we pointed out, is the interest of the United States in seeing that its fundamental law protecting freedom of communication is not abridged; on the other the obvious interest of the State to regulate conduct within its boundaries. In Cantwell we held that the need to control the streets could not justify the restriction made on speech. We stressed the fact that where a man had a right to be on a street, 'he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.'
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Parties: NLRB v. CABOT CARBON CO.
Date: 1959-06-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Respondents argue that to hold these employee committees to be labor organizations would prevent employers and employees from discussing matters of mutual interest concerning the employment relationship, and would thus abridge freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. But the Board's order does not impose any such bar; it merely precludes the employers from dominating, interfering with or supporting such employee committees which Congress has defined to be labor organizations.
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Parties: BARR v. MATTEO
Date: 1959-06-29
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Parties: In re SAWYER
Date: 1959-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - If, as suggested by my Brother FRANKFURTER, there runs through the principal opinion an intimation that a lawyer can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical conduct, it is an intimation in which I do not join. A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor, which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of justice. He who would follow that calling must conform to those standards.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. For example, I doubt that a physician who broadcast the confidential disclosures of his patients could rely on the constitutional right of free speech to protect him from professional discipline.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - protected speech. Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. For example, I doubt that a physician who broadcast the confidential disclosures of his patients could rely on the constitutional right of free speech to protect him from professional discipline.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - The problem raised by this case—is the particular conduct in which this petitioner engaged constitutionally protected from the disciplinary proceedings of courts of law?—cannot be disposed of by general observations about freedom of speech. Of course, the free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite of a free society. And freedom of thought is meaningless without freedom of expression. But the two great Justices to whom we mostly owe the shaping of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech, Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, did not erect freedom of speech into a dogma of absolute validity nor enforce it to doctrinaire limits. Time, place and circumstances determine the constitutional protection of utterance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Judge Wiig remained equally protected from statements impugning him, and petitioner remained equally free to make critical statements that did not cross that line. We find that hers cannot be said to have done so. Accordingly, the suspension order, based on the charge relating to the speech, cannot stand.
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Parties: KINGSLEY v. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF NEW YORK
Date: 1959-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - It is not our province to meet these recalcitrant problems of legislative drafting. Ours is the vital but very limited task of scrutinizing the work of the draftsmen in order to determine whether they have kept within the narrow limits of the kind of censorship which even D. H. Lawrence deemed necessary. The legislation must not be so vague, the language so loose, as to leave to those who have to apply it too wide a discretion for sweeping within its condemnation what is permissible expression as well as what society may permissibly prohibit. Always remembering that the widest scope of freedom is to be given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the human spirit, we have struck down legislation phrased in language intrinsically vague, unless it be responsive to the common understanding of men even though not susceptible of explicit definition. The ultimate reason for invalidating such laws is that they lead to timidity and inertia and thereby discourage the boldness of expression indispensable for a progressive society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - My view is that stated by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, that prior censorship of moving pictures like prior censorship of newspapers and books violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If despite the Constitution, however, this Nation is to embark on the dangerous road of censorship, my belief is that this Court is about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of Censors that could be found.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - While I join in the opinion of the Court, I adhere to the views I expressed in Superior Films Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 588—589, 74 S.Ct. 286, 98 L.Ed. 329, that censorship of movies is unconstitutional, since it is a form of 'previous restraint' that is as much at war with the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth, as the censorship struck down in Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357. If a particular movie violates a valid law, the exhibitor can be prosecuted in the usual way. I can find in the First Amendment no room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial, reading a news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a movie.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - But its N26* language, in terms that are absolute, is utterly at war with censorship. Different questions may arise as to censorship of some news when the Nation is actually at war. But any possible exceptions are extremely limited.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Even in these areas, censorship of movies shown on television gives way by reason of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. See Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 3 Cir., 184 F.2d 153. And from what information is available, movie censors do not seem to be very active. Deletion of the residual part of censorship that remains would constitute the elimination of an institution that intrudes on First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - Since the denial of a license by the Board of Regents was confirmed by the highest court of the State, I have no choice but to agree with this Court's judgment in holding that the State exceeded the bounds of free expression protected by the 'liberty' of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - It is not surprising, therefore, that the pertinacious, eloquent and free-spirited promoters of the liberalizing legislation in Great Britain did not conceive the needs of a civilized society, in assuring the utmost freedom to those who make literature and art possible—authors, artists, publishers, producers, book sellers—easily attainable by sounding abstract and unqualified dogmas about freedom. They had a keen awareness that freedom, of expression is no more an absolute than any other freedom, an awareness that is reflected in the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, to whom we predominantly owe the present constitutional safeguards on behalf of freedom of expression. And see Near v. State of Minnesota, ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715—716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357, for limitations on constitutionally protected freedom of speech.
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Parties: UPHAUS v. WYMAN
Date: 1959-06-08
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Parties: Smith v. Cal.
Date: 1959-12-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The bookseller's limitation in the amount of reading material with which he could familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress directly. The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered. Through it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The grounds on which the Court draws a constitutional distinction between a law that punishes possession of a book with knowledge of its "obscenity" and a law that punishes without such knowledge are not persuasive to me. Those grounds are that conviction of a bookseller for possession of an "obscene" book when he is unaware of its obscenity "will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected," and therefore "may tend to work a substantial restriction on freedom of speech." The fact is, of course, that prison sentences for possession of "obscene" books will seriously burden freedom of the press whether punishment is imposed with or without knowledge of the obscenity. The Court's opinion correctly points out how little extra burden will be imposed on prosecutors by requiring proof that a bookseller was aware of a book's contents when he possessed it. And if the Constitution's requirement of knowledge is so easily met, the result of this case is that one particular bookseller gains his freedom, but the way is left open for state censorship and punishment of all other booksellers by merely adding a few new words to old censorship laws. Our constitutional safeguards for speech and press therefore gain little.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - there are grave doubts in my mind as to the desirability or constitutionality of this Court's becoming a Supreme Board of Censors -- reading books and viewing television performances to determine whether, if permitted, [***215] they might adversely affect the morals of the people throughout the many diversified local communities in this vast country. It is true that the ordinance here is on its face only applicable to "obscene or indecent writing." It is also true that this particular kind of censorship is considered by many to be "the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form . . . ." But N27* "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way . . . . It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635. While it is "obscenity and indecency" before us today, the experience of mankind -- both ancient and modern -- shows that this type of elastic phrase can, and most likely will, be synonymous with the political and maybe with the religious unorthodoxy of tomorrow.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - These principles guide us to our decision here. We have held that obscene speech and writings are not protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. The ordinance here in question, to be sure, only imposes criminal sanctions on a bookseller if in fact there is to be found in his shop an obscene book. But our holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; and we think this ordinance's strict liability feature would tend seriously to have that effect, by penalizing booksellers, even though they had not the slightest notice of the character of the books they sold. N24*
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N21* N22* Chief Justice Hughes declared for this Court: N23* "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. It was found impossible to conclude that this essential personal liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights of person and property. . . ." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707. It is too familiar for citation that such has been the doctrine of this Court, in respect of these freedoms, ever since. And it also requires no elaboration that the free publication and dissemination of books and other forms of the printed word furnish very familiar applications of these constitutionally protected freedoms. It is of course no matter that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices.
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Parties: Bates v. City of Little Rock
Date: 1960-02-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - it is now beyond dispute that freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly was considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry—a government dedicated to the establishment of justice and the preservation of liberty. U.S.Const., Amend. I. And it is now beyond dispute that freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.
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Parties: United States v. Raines
Date: 1960-02-29
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Parties: Talley v. California
Date: 1960-03-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, we held void on its face an ordinance that comprehensively forbade any distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license. Pamphlets and leaflects it was pointed out, 'have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty' and enforcement of the Griffin ordinance 'would restore the system of license and censorship in its baldest form.' Id., 303 U.S. at page 452, 58 S.Ct. at page 669. A year later we had before us four ordinances each forbidding distribution of leaflets—one in Irvington, New Jersey, one in Los Angeles, California, one in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and one in Worcester, Massachusetts. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155. Efforts were made to distinguish these four ordinances from the one held void in the Griffin case. The chief grounds urged for distinction were that the four ordinances had been passed to prevent either frauds, disorder, or littering, according to the records in these cases, and another ground urged was that two of the ordinances applied only to certain city areas. This Court refused to uphold the four ordinances on those grounds pointing out that there were other ways to accomplish these legitimate aims without abridging freedom of speech and press. Frauds, street littering and disorderly conduct could be denounced and punished as offenses, the Court said. Several years later we followed the Griffin and Schneider cases in striking down a Dallas, Texas, ordinance which was applied to prohibit the dissemination of information by the distribution of handbills. We said that although a city could punish any person for conduct on the streets if he violates a valid law, 'one who is rightfully on a street * * * carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion * * * by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - Talley makes no showing whatever to support his contention that a restraint upon his freedom of speech will result from the enforcement of the ordinance. The existence of such a restraint is necessary before we can strike the ordinance down.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I stand second to none in supporting Talley's right of free speech—but not his freedom of anonymith. The Constitution say nothing about freedom of anonymous speech. In fact, this Court has approved laws requiring no less than Los Angeles' ordinance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - All that Los Angeles requires is that one who exercises his right of free speech through writing or distributing handbills identify himself just as does one who speaks from the platform. The ordinance makes for the responsibility in writing that is present in public utterance. When and if the application of such an ordinance in a given case encroaches on First Amendment freedoms, then will be soom enough to strike that application down. But no such restraint has been shown here. After all, the public has some rights against which the enforcement of freedom of speech would be 'harsh and arbitrary in itself.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I stand second to none in supporting Talley's right of free speech—but not his freedom of anonymith. The Constitution say nothing about freedom of anonymous speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - All that Los Angeles requires is that one who exercises his right of free speech through writing or distributing handbills identify himself just as does one who speaks from the platform. The ordinance makes for the responsibility in writing that is present in public utterance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - We said that although a city could punish any person for conduct on the streets if he violates a valid law, N58* 'one who is rightfully on a street * * * carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion * * * by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I stand second to none in supporting Talley's right of free speech—but not his freedom of anonymity. The Constitution say nothing about freedom of anonymous speech. In fact, this Court has approved laws requiring no less than Los Angeles' ordinance. I submit that they control this case and require its approval under the attack made here.
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Parties: Flemming v. Nestor
Date: 1960-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - A basic constitutional infirmity of this Act, in my judgment, is that it is a part of a pattern of laws all of which violate the First Amendment out of fear that this country is in grave danger if it lets a handful of Communist fanatics or some other extremist group make their arguments and discuss their ideas. This fear, I think, is baseless. It reflects a lack of faith in the sturdy patriotism of our people and does not give to the world a true picture of our abiding strength. It is an unworthy fear in a country that has a Bill of Rights containing provisions for fair trials, freedom of speech, press and religion, and other specific safeguards designed to keep men free. I repeat once more that I think this Nation's greatest security lies, not in trusting to a momentary majority of this Court's view at any particular time of what is 'patently arbitrary,' but in wholehearted devotion to and observance of our constitutional freedoms.
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Parties: Shelton v. Tucker
Date: 1960-12-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - 'By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But, in view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers * * * has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Those decisions struck down licensing laws which vested in administrative officials a power of censorship over communications not confined within standards designed to curb the dangers of arbitrary or discriminatory official action. The 'breadth' with which the cases were concerned was the breadth of unrestricted discretion left to a censor, which permitted him to make his own subjective opinions the practically unreviewable measure of permissible speech.
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Parties: Wilkinson v. United States
Date: 1961-02-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Criticism of government finds sanctuary in several portions of the First Amendment. It is part of the right free speech. It embraces freedom of the press. Can editors be summoned before the Committee and be made to account for their editorials denouncing the Committee, its tactics, its practices, its policies? If petitioner can be questioned concerning his opposition to the Committee, then I see no reason why editors are immune.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The First Amendment rights involved here are more than freedom of speech and press. Bringing people together in peaceable assemblies is in the same category. De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278. 'The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.' Id., 299 U.S. at page 364, 57 S.Ct. at page 260. The right to petition 'for a redress of grievances' is also part of the First Amendment; it too is fundamental to 'the very idea of a government, republican in form.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The First Amendment rights involved here are more than freedom of speech and press. Bringing people together in peaceable assemblies is in the same category. De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278. N49* 'The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Since this is to be the rule under which the Committee will be permitted to operate, I think it necessary in the interest of fairness to those who may in the future wish to exercise their constitutional right to criticize the Committee that the true nature of those 'protections' be clearly set forth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - Our Constitution, in unequivocal terms, gives the right to each of us to say what we think without fear of the power of the Government. That principle has served us so well for so long that I cannot believe it necessary to allow any governmental group to reject it in order to preserve its own existence. Least of all do I believe that such a privilege should be accorded the House Un-American Activities Committee.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The First Amendment rights involved here are more than freedom of speech and press. Bringing people together in peaceable assemblies is in the same category. De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278. 'The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.' Id., 299 U.S. at page 364, 57 S.Ct. at page 260. The right to petition 'for a redress of grievances' is also part of the First Amendment; it too is fundamental to 'the very idea of a government, republican in form.' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - A scant 19 months before the hearing in question petitioner was summoned before this very Committee and refused to answer questions on substantially the same grounds as those he claimed in this instance. Nor did his conduct in the interim afford any basis for a hope that he might have repented, an inference which, by contrast, was possible in Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147, 151, 79 S.Ct. 191, 193, 3 L.Ed.2d 183, cited by the Government. For petitioner continued to proclaim his hostility to the Committee and his belief that it had no power to probe areas of free expression. He was not even called to testify at these hearings in Atlanta until the Committee learned that he was to be present in Atlanta to express his opposition to the Committee's work, as, of course, he had a right to do. In fact, the Committee's Staff Director came perilously close to admitting, on cross-examination by petitioner's counsel, that petitioner was called to the stand only because of his opposition to the Committee's activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - N31* 'The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.'
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Parties: Times Film Corp. v. Chicago
Date: 1961-01-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - we held that 'in light of * * * history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.' Even those in dissent there found that 'Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - '(T)he ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Blackstone's assertion: 'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.' 4 Bl.Comm. (Cooley, 4th Ed. 1899) 151. Blackstone probably here referred to the common law's definition of freedom of the press; he probably spoke of the situation existing in England after the disappearance of the licensing systems but during the existence of the law of crown libels.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - The ordinance before us in Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302, made unlawful the solicitation, without a permit, of members for an organization which requires the payment of membership dues. The ordinance stated that 'In passing upon such application the Mayor and Council shall consider the character of the applicant, the nature of the business of the organization for which members are desired to be solicited, and its effects upon the general welfare of citizens of the City of Baxley.' Id., 355 U.S. at page 315, 78 S.Ct. at page 278. Mr. Justice Whittaker, speaking for the Court, stated 'that the ordinance is invalid on its face because it makes enjoyment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech contingent upon the will of the Mayor and Council of the City and thereby constitutes a prior restraint upon, and abridges, that freedom.' Id., 355 U.S. at page 321, 78 S.Ct. at page 282. In Staub, the ordinance required a permit for solicitation; in the case decided today, the ordinance requires a permit for the exhibition of movies. If this is a valid distinction, it has not been so revealed. In Staub, the permit was to be granted on the basis of certain indefinite standards; in the case decided today, nothing different may be said.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - 'But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - 'The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and picture sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are further endangered by this 'most effective' means for confinement of ideas. It is axiomatic that the stroke of the censor's pen or the cut of his scissors will be a less contemplated decision than will be the prosecutor's determination to prepare a criminal indictment. The standards of proof, the judicial safeguards afforded a criminal defendant and the consequences of bringing such charges will all provoke the mature deliberation of the prosecutor. None of these hinder the quick judgment of the censor, the speedy determination to suppress. Finally, the fear of the censor by the composer of ideas acts as a substantial deterrent to the creation of new thoughts. See Tolstoy's declaration, note 6, supra. This is especially true of motion pictures due to the large financial burden that must be assumed by their producers. The censor's sword pierces deeply into the heart of free expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - It seems to me that the Court's opinion comes perilously close to holding that not only may motion pictures be censored but that a licensing scheme may also be applied to newspapers, books and periodicals, radio, television, public speeches, and every other medium of expression. The Court suggests that its decision today is limited to motion pictures by asserting that they are not 'necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method * * * tends to present its own peculiar problems.' 365 U.S. 49, 81 S.Ct. 395. But, this, I believe, is the invocation of a talismanic phrase. The Court, in no way, explains why moving pictures should be treated differently than any other form of expression, why moving pictures should be denied the protection against censorship 'a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N46* 'As early as 1644, John Milton, in an 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,' assailed an act of Parliament which had just been passed providing for censorship of the press previous to publication. He vigorously defended the right of every man to make public his honest views 'without previous censure'; and declared the impossibility of finding any man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time good enough to be allowed to perform it duties.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The vice of censorship through licensing and, more generally, the particular evil of previous restraint on the right of free speech have many times been recognized when this Court has carefully distinguished between laws establishing sundry systems of previous restraint on the right of free speech and penal laws imposing subsequent punishment on utterances and activities not within the ambit of the First Amendment's protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - There, a city ordinance proscribed the right of citizens to speak on religious matters in the city streets without an annual permit. Kunz had previously had his permit revoked because N47* 'he had ridiculed and denounced other religious beliefs in his meetings.' Id., 340 U.S. at page 292, 71 S.Ct. at page 314. Kunz was arrested for subsequently speaking in the city streets without a permit. The Court reversed Kunz' conviction
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - N48* 'We have here, then, an ordinance which gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - N59* It is true that 'each method (of expression) tends to present its own peculiar problems.' Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, supra, 343 U.S. at page 503, 72 S.Ct. at page 781. The Court has addressed itself on several occasions to these problems. In Schneider v. State of New Jersey, supra, 308 U.S. at pages 160 161, 60 S.Ct. at page 150, the Court stated, in reference to speaking in public, that 'a person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group of distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets.' The Court recognized that sound trucks call for particularized consideration when it said in Saia v. People of State of New York, supra, 334 U.S. at page 562, 68 S.Ct. at page 1150, 'Noise can be regulated by regulating decibels. The hours and place of public discussion can be controlled. * * * Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes.' But, the Court's decision today does not follow from this. Our prior decisions do not deal with the content of the speech; they deal only with the conditions surrounding its delivery. These conditions 'tend to present the problems peculiar to each method of expression.' Here the Court uses this magical phrase to cripple a basic principle of the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - There has been general criticism of the theory that Blackstone's statement was embodied in the First Amendment, the objection being "that the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional provisions'; and that 'the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a by-word, if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications.' 2 Cooley, Const. Lim., (8th Ed.,) p. 885.' Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, 283 U.S. at page 715, 51 S.Ct. at page 630; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, 297 U.S. at page 248, 56 S.Ct. at page 448. The objection has been that Blackstone's definition is too narrow; it had been generally conceded that the protection of the First Amendment extends at least to the interdiction of licensing and censorship and to the previous restraint of free speech.Near v. State
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - It is true that 'each method (of expression) tends to present its own peculiar problems.' Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, supra, 343 U.S. at page 503, 72 S.Ct. at page 781. The Court has addressed itself on several occasions to these problems. In Schneider v. State of New Jersey, supra, 308 U.S. at pages 160 161, 60 S.Ct. at page 150, the Court stated, in reference to speaking in public, that 'a person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group of distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets.' The Court recognized that sound trucks call for particularized consideration when it said in Saia v. People of State of New York, supra, 334 U.S. at page 562, 68 S.Ct. at page 1150, 'Noise can be regulated by regulating decibels. The hours and place of public discussion can be controlled. * * * Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes.' But, the Court's decision today does not follow from this. Our prior decisions do not deal with the content of the speech; they deal only with the conditions surrounding its delivery. These conditions 'tend to present the problems peculiar to each method of expression.' Here the Court uses this magical phrase to cripple a basic principle of the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - N28* N29* To me, this case clearly presents the question of our approval of unlimited censorship of motion pictures before exhibition through a system of administrative licensing. Moreover, the decision presents a real danger of eventual censorship for every form of communication, be it newspapers, journals, books, magazines, television, radio or public speeches. The Court purports to leave these questions for another day, but I am aware of no constitutional principle which permits us to hold that the communication of ideas through one medium may be censored while other media are immune. Of course each medium presents its own peculiar problems, but they are not of the kind which would authorize the censorship of one form of communication and not others. I submit that in arriving at its decision the Court has interpreted our cases contrary to the intention at the time of their rendition and, in exalting the censor of motion pictures, has endangered the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of all others engaged in the dissemination of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - N30* By its decision, the Court gives its assent to unlimited censorship of moving pictures through a licensing system, despite the fact that Chicago has chosen this most objectionable course to attain its goals without any apparent attempt to devise other means so as not to intrude on the constitutionally protected liberties of speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - But, the Court there found that this system of censorship by a state court, used only after it had already been determined that the publisher had previously violated the standard, had to fall before the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. It would seem that, a fortiori, the present system must also fall.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, provides another foreceful illustration. The Court held there that a license tax of two percent on the gross receipts from advertising of newspapers and periodicals having a circulation of over 20,000 a week was a form of prior restraint and therefore invalid. Certainly this would seem much less an infringement on the liberties of speech and press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than the classic system of censorship we now have before us.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - ]N31* 'It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disordely assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities.' Id., 307 U.S. at page 516, 59 S.Ct. at page 964. May anything less be said of Chicago's movie censorship plan?
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - N32* But, surely this is not to suggest that the Government might require that all newspapers be submitted to a censor in order to assist it in preventing such information N33* from reaching print. Yet in this case the Court gives its blessing to the censorship of all motion pictures in order to prevent the exhibition of those it feels to be constitutionally unprotected. N34*
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - One need not disagree with the Court that Chicago has chosen the most effective means of suppressing obscenity. Censorship has been so recognized for centuries. But, this is not to say that the Chicago plan, the old, abhorrent English system of censorship through licensing, is a permissible form of prohibiting unprotected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - N35* This is the delay occasioned by the censor; this is the injury done to the free communication of ideas. This damage is not inflicted by the ordinary criminal penalties. The threat of these penalties, intelligently applied, will ordinarily be sufficient to deter the exhibition of obscenity. However, if the exhibitor believes that his film is constitutionally protected, he will show the film, and, if prosecuted under criminal statute, will have ready that defense. The perniciousness of a system of censorship is that the exhibitor's belief that his film is constitutionally protected is irrelevant.Once the censor has made his estimation that the film is 'bad' and has refused to issue a permit, there is ordinarily no defense to a prosecution for showing the film without a license.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - N36* The Court, in no way, explains why moving pictures should be treated differently than any other form of expression, why moving pictures should be denied the protection against censorship N37* 'a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned.' Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, supra, 343 U.S. at page 503, 72 S.Ct. at page 781. (Emphasis added.) When pressed during oral argument, counsel for the city could make no meaningful distinction between the censorship of newspapers and motion pictures.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - The contention may be advanced that the impact of motion pictures is such that a licensing system of prior censorship is permissible. There are several answers to this, the first of which I think is the Constitution itself. Although it is an open question whether the impact of motion pictures is greater or less than that of other media, there is not much doubt that the exposure of television far exceeds that of the motion picture. See S.Rep. No. 1466, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5. But, even if the impact of the motion picture is greater than that of some other media, that fact constitutes no basis for the argument that motion pictures should be subject to greater suppression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - In this perspective we consider the prior decisions of this Court touching on the problem. Beginning over a third of a century ago in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 1925, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138, they have consistently reserved for future decision possible situations in which the claimed First Amendment privilege might have to give way to the necessities of the public welfare. It has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech are invalid. On the contrary, in Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 1931, 283 U.S. 697, 715—716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357, Chief Justice Hughes, in discussing the classic legal statements concerning the immunity of the press from censorship, observed that the principle forbidding previous restraint 'is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited * * *. (T)he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases.' These included, the Chief Justice found, utterances creating 'a hindrance' to the Government's war effort, and 'actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.' In addition, the Court said that 'the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications' and the 'security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.' Some years later, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Murphy, in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 1942, 315 U.S. 568, 571—572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, held that there were 'certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' Thereafter, as we have mentioned, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, supra, we found motion pictures to be within the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but we added that this was 'not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places.' At page 502 of 343 U.S., at page 781 of 72 S.Ct. Five years later, in Roth v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, we held that 'in light of * * * history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.' Even those in dissent there found that 'Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.' Id., 354 U.S. at page 514, 77 S.Ct. at page 1324. And, during the same Term, in Kingsley Books, Inc., v. Brown, 1957, 354 U.S. 436, 441, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1328, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469, after characterizing Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, as 'one of the landmark opinions' in its area, we took notice that Near 'left no doubts that 'Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an absolute right * * * the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.' * * * The judicial angle of vision,' we said there, 'in testing the validity of a statute like § 22—a (New York's injunctive remedy against certain forms of obscenity) is 'the operation and effect of the statute in substance." And as if to emphasize the point involved here, we added that 'The phrase 'prior restraint' is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.' Even as recently as our last Term we again observed the principle, albeit in an allied area, that the State possesses some measure of power 'to prevent the distribution of obscene matter.' Smith v. People of State of California, 1959, 361 U.S. 147, 155, 80 S.Ct. 215, 220, 4 L.Ed.2d 205.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Here, the Court ignores this considered principle and indiscriminately casts the net of control too broadly. See Niemotko v. State of Maryland, supra, 340 U.S. at page 282, 71 S.Ct. at page 333 (concurring opinion). By its decision, the Court gives its assent to unlimited censorship of moving pictures through a licensing system, despite the fact that Chicago has chosen this most objectionable course to attain its goals without any apparent attempt to devise other means so as not to intrude on the constitutionally protected liberties of speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, provides another foreceful illustration. The Court held there that a license tax of two percent on the gross receipts from advertising of newspapers and periodicals having a circulation of over 20,000 a week was a form of prior restraint and therefore invalid. Certainly this would seem much less an infringement on the liberties of speech and press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than the classic system of censorship we now have before us.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - In this perspective we consider the prior decisions of this Court touching on the problem. Beginning over a third of a century ago in Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 1925, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138, they have consistently reserved for future decision possible situations in which the claimed First Amendment privilege might have to give way to the necessities of the public welfare. It has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech are invalid. On the contrary, in Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 1931, 283 U.S. 697, 715—716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357, Chief Justice Hughes, in discussing the classic legal statements concerning the immunity of the press from censorship, observed that the principle forbidding previous restraint N25* 'is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited * * *. (T)he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases.' These included, the Chief Justice found, utterances creating 'a hindrance' to the Government's war effort, and 'actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.' In addition, the Court said that N26* 'the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications' and the 'security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.' Some years later, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Murphy, in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 1942, 315 U.S. 568, 571—572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, held that there were N27* 'certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' Thereafter, as we have mentioned, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, supra, we found motion pictures to be within the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but we added that this was N28* 'not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places.' At page 502 of 343 U.S., at page 781 of 72 S.Ct. Five years later, in Roth v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, we held that N29* 'in light of * * * history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - Petitioner would have us hold that the public exhibition of motion pictures must be allowed under any circumstances. The State's sole remedy, it says, is the invocation of criminal process under the Illinois pornography statute, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1959), c. 38, § 470, and then only after a transgression. But this position, as we have seen, is founded upon the claim of absolute privilege against prior restraint under the First Amendment—a claim without sanction in our cases. To illustrate its fallacy, we need only point to one of the 'exceptional cases' which Chief Justice Hughes enumerated in Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, namely, N30* 'the primary requirements of decency (that) may be enforced against obscene publications.' Moreover, we later held specifically N31* 'that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.' Roth v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. Chicago emphasizes here its duty to protect its people against the dangers of obscenity in the public exhibition of motion pictures. To this argument petitioner's only answer is that regardless of the capacity for, or extent of, such an evil, previous restraint cannot be justified. With this we cannot agree. We recognized in Burstyn, supra, that N32* 'capacity for evil * * * may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control,' 343 U.S. at page 502, 72 S.Ct. at page 780, and that motion pictures were not N33* 'necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression.
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Parties: Braden v. United States
Date: 1961-02-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - Both Barenblatt and Beauharnais are offspring of a constitutional doctrine that is steadily sacrificing individual freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition to governmental control. There have been many other such decisions and the indications are that this number will continue to grow at an alarming rate. For the presently prevailing constitutional doctrine, which treats the First Amendment as a mere admonition, leaves the liberty-giving freedoms which were intended to be protected by that Amendment completely at the mercy of Congress and this Court whenever a majority of this Court concludes, on the basis of any of the several judicially created 'tests' now in vogue, that abridgment of these freedoms is more desirable than freedom itself. Only a few days ago, the application of this constitutional doctrine wiped out the rule forbidding prior censorship of movies in an opinion that leaves the door wide open to, if indeed it does not actually invite, prior censorship of other means of publication. And the Blackstonian condemnation of prior censorship had long been thought, even by those whose ideas of First Amendment liberties have been most restricted, to be the absolute minimum of the protection demanded by that Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - N60* 'Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - The setting of the six questions which were asked petitioner and which he refused to answer shows nothing more than an exercise by him of First Amendment rights of speech and press and of petition to Congress. It was not shown that these activities were part of a matrix for the overthrow of government. It was not shown—unless the bare word of the Committee is taken as gospel—that these constitutional activities had any relation whatever to communism, subversion, or illegal activity of any sort or kind. It was not shown where and how the Committee was ever granted the right to investigate those who petition Congress for redress of grievances.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - Only a few days ago, the application of this constitutional doctrine wiped out the rule forbidding prior censorship of movies in an opinion that leaves the door wide open to, if indeed it does not actually invite, prior censorship of other means of publication. And the Blackstonian condemnation of prior censorship had long been thought, even by those whose ideas of First Amendment liberties have been most restricted, to be the absolute minimum of the protection demanded by that Amendment.
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Parties: Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP
Date: 1961-05-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Broad comprehensive regulations of those First Amendment rights have been repeatedly struck down (Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213), though the power to regulate the time, manner, and place of distribution was never doubted. As stated in Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U.S. 160—161, 60 S.Ct. 150, the municipal authorities have the right to N109* 'regulate the conduct of those using the streets,' to provide traffic regulations, to prevent 'throwing literature broadcast in the streets,' and the like. Yet, while public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience can be safeguarded by regulating the time and manner of solicitation (Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 306—307, 60 S.Ct. 904—905), those regulations need to be N110* 'narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil.'
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Parties: Konigsberg v. State Bar of California
Date: 1961-04-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association (N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488), as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes,' not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470; Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137; Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. On the other hand, general argulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Holding that 'libelous utterances' were not included in the 'speech' protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court there concluded that the petition which had been circulated fell within that exception and therefore outside the area of constitutionally protected speech because it made charges against the entire Negro population of this country. Thus, Beauharnais was held to have simultaneously 'libelled' some fifteen million people. And by this tremendous expansion of the concept of 'libel,' what some people might regard as a relatively minor exception to the full protection of freedom of speech had suddenly become a vehicle which could be used to justify a return to the vicious era of the laws of seditious libel, in which the political party in power, both in England and in this country, used such laws to put its opponents in jail.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - But I cannot agree that the questions asked Konigsberg with regard to his suspected membership in the Communist Party had nothing more than an 'incidental' effect upon his freedom of speech and association. Why does the Committee of Bar Examiners ask a bar applicant whether he is or has been a member of the Communist Party? The avowed purpose of such questioning is to permit the Committee to deny applicants admission to the Bar if they 'advocate' forcible overthrow of the Government. Indeed, that is precisely the ground upon which the majority is here upholding the Committee's right to ask Konigsberg these questions. I realize that there has been considerable talk, even in the opinions of this Court, to the effect that 'advocacy' is not 'speech.' But with the highest respect for those who believe that there is such a distinction, I cannot agree with it. For this reason, I think the conclusion is inescapable that this case presents the question of the constitutionality of action by the State of California designed to control the content of speech. As such, it is a 'direct,' and not an 'incidental' abridgment of speech. Indeed, if the characterization 'incidental' were appropriate here, it would be difficult to imagine what would constitute a 'direct' abridgment of speech. The use of the 'balancing test' under these circumstances thus permits California directly to abridge speech in explicit contradiction to the plain mandate of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The possibility of inquiry into their speech, the heavy burden upon them to establish its innocence, and the evil repercussions of inquiry despite innocence, would constrain them to speak their minds so noncommittally that no one could ever mistake their innocuous words for advocacy. This grave danger to freedom of speech could be averted without loss to legitimate investigation by shifting the burden to the examiners.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - The Court suggests that a 'literal reading of the First Amendment' would be totally unreasonable because it would invalidate many widely accepted laws. I do not know to what extent this is true. I do not believe, for example, that it would invalidate laws resting upon the premise that where speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct that is going on at the time, the speech can be used to illustrate, emphasize and establish the unlawful conduct. On the other hand, it certainly would invalidate all laws that abridge the right of the people to discuss matters of religious or public interest, in the broadest meaning of those terms, for it is clear that a desire to protect this right was the primary purpose of the First Amendment. Some people have argued, with much force, that the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment are limited to somewhat broad areas like those. But I believe this Nation's security and tranquility can best be served by giving the First Amendment the same broad construction that all Bill of Rights guarantees deserve.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - This Court reversed, with only one Justice dissenting, on the ground that the necessary effect of such an imposition of the burden of proofN124* 'can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.' Indeed, the majority opinion in the Speiser case distinguished the very cases upon which the majority here is relying on the ground thatN125* 'the oaths required in those cases performed a very different function from the declaration in issue here. In the earlier cases it appears that the loyalty oath, once signed, became conclusive evidence of the facts attested so far as the right of office was concerned. If the person took the oath he retained his position. The oath was not part of a device to shift to the officeholder the burden of proving his right to retain his position.' But that is precisely what is happening here. For, even though Konigsberg has taken an oath that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the Government, the Committee has persisted in the view that he has not as yet demonstrated his right to admission to the Bar. If that does not amount to the sort of shifting of the burden of proof that is proscribed by Speiser, I do not know what would.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - N123* Whatever may be the wisdom, however, of an approach that would reject exceptions to the plain language of the First Amendment based upon such things as 'libel,' 'obscenity' or 'fighting words,' such is not the issue in this case. For the majority does not, and surely would not, contend that the kind of speech involved in this case—wholly related as it is to conflicting ideas about governmental affairs and policies—falls outside the protection of the First Amendment, however narrowly that Amendment may be interpreted. So the only issue presently before us is whether speech that must be well within the protection of the Amendment should be given complete protection or whether it is entitled only to such protection as is consistent in the minds of a majority of this Court with whatever interest the Government may be asserting to justify its abridgment. The Court, by stating unequivocally that there are no 'absolutes' under the First Amendment, necessarily takes the position that even speech that is admittedly protected by the First Amendment is subject to the 'balancing test' and that therefore no kind of speech is to be protected if the Government can assert an interest of sufficient weight to induce this Court to uphold its abridgment. In my judgment, such a sweeping denial of the existence of any inalienable right to speak undermines the very foundation upon which the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and, indeed, our entire structure of government rest. The Founders of this Nation attempted to set up a limited government which left certain rights in the people—rights that could not be taken away without amendment of the basic charter of government. The majority's 'balancing test' tells us that this is not so. It tells us that no right to think, speak or publish exists in the people that cannot be taken away if the Government finds it sufficiently imperative or expedient to do so. Thus, the 'balancing test' turns our 'Government of the people, by the people and for the people' into a government over the people.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - I cannot believe that this Court would adhere to the 'balancing test' to the limit of its logic. Since that 'test' denies that any speech, publication or petition has an 'absolute' right to protection under the First Amendment, strict adherence to it would necessarily mean that there would be only a conditional right, not a complete right, for any American to express his views to his neighbors—or for his neighbors to hear those views. In other words, not even a candidate for public office, high or low, would have an 'absolute' right to speak in behalf of his candidacy, no newspaper would have an 'absolute' right to print its opinion on public governmental affairs, and the American people would have no 'absolute' right to hear such discussions. All of these rights would be dependent upon the accuracy of the scales upon which this Court weighs the respective interests of the Government and the people.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Indeed, that is precisely the ground upon which the majority is here upholding the Committee's right to ask Konigsberg these questions. I realize that there has been considerable talk, even in the opinions of this Court, to the effect that'advocacy' is not 'speech.' But with the highest respect for those who believe that there is such a distinction, I cannot agree with it. For this reason, I think the conclusion is inescapable that this case presents the question of the constitutionality of action by the State of California designed to control the content of speech. As such, it is a 'direct,' and not an 'incidental' abridgment of speech. Indeed, if the characterization 'incidental' were appropriate here, it would be difficult to imagine what would constitute a 'direct' abridgment of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - N126* Under our decision in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, the Fourteenth Amendment therefore protects Konigsberg from being denied admission to the Bar for his refusal to answer the questions. In Speiser we held that N127* '* * * when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - he recognition that California has subjected 'speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure' is, under the First Amendment, sufficient in itself to render the action of the State unconstitutional unless one subscribes to the doctrine that permits constitutionally protected rights to be 'balanced' away whenever a majority of this Court thinks that a State might have interest sufficient to justify abridgment of those freedoms. As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that doctrine for I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - I cannot believe that this Court would adhere to the 'balancing test' to the limit of its logic. Since that 'test' denies that any speech, publication or petition has an 'absolute' right to protection under the First Amendment, strict adherence to it would necessarily mean that there would be only a conditional right, not a complete right, for any American to express his views to his neighbors—or for his neighbors to hear those views. In other words, not even a candidate for public office, high or low, would have an 'absolute' right to speak in behalf of his candidacy, no newspaper would have an 'absolute' right to print its opinion on public governmental affairs, and the American people would have no 'absolute' right to hear such discussions. All of these rights would be dependent upon the accuracy of the scales upon which this Court weighs the respective interests of the Government and the people. It therefore seems to me that the Court's 'absolute' statement that there are no 'absolutes' under the First Amendment must be an exaggeration of its own views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - Thus, in my view, the majority has reached its decision here against the freedoms of the First Amendment by a fundamental misapplication of its own currently, but I hope only temporarily, prevailing 'balancing' test. The interest of the Committee in satisfying its curiosity with respect to Konigsberg's 'possible' membership in the Communist Party two decades ago has been inflated out of all proportion to its real value—the vast interest of the public in maintaining unabridged the basic freedoms of speech, press and assembly has been paid little if anything more than lip service—and important constitutional rights have once again been 'balanced' away. This, of course, is an ever-present danger of the 'balancing test' for the application of such a test is necessarily tied to the emphasis particular judges give to competing societal values. Judges, like everyone else, vary tremendously in their choice of values. This is perfectly natural and, indeed, unavoidable. But it is neither natural nor unavoidable in this country for the fundamental rights of the people to be dependent upon the different emphasis different judges put upon different values at different times. For those rights, particularly the First Amendment rights involved here, were unequivocally set out by the Founders in our Bill of Rights in the very plainest of language, and they should not be diluted by 'tests' that obliterate them whenever particular judges think values they most highly cherish outweigh the values most highly cherished by the Founders.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - The recognition that California has subjected 'speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure' is, under the First Amendment, sufficient in itself to render the action of the State unconstitutional unless one subscribes to the doctrine that permits constitutionally protected rights to be 'balanced' away whenever a majority of this Court thinks that a State might have interest sufficient to justify abridgment of those freedoms. As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that doctrine for I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - I think very little can be found in anything they ever said that would provide support for the 'balancing test' presently in use. Indeed, the idea of 'balancing' away First Amendment freedoms appears to me to be wholly inconsistent with the view, strongly espoused by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. The 'clear and present danger test' was urged as consistent with this view in that it protected speech in all cases except those in which danger was so imminent that there was no time for rational discussion. The 'balancing test,' on the other hand, rests upon the notion that some ideas are so dangerous that Government need not restrict itself to contrary arguments as a means of opposing them even where there is ample time to do so.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - I agree with Justices Holmes and Brandeis, however, that a primary purpose of the First Amendment was to insure that all ideas would be allowed to enter the 'competition of the market.' But I fear that the creation of 'tests' by which speech is left unprotected under certain circumstances is a standing invitation to abridge it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - N34* The danger of failing to construe the First Amendment in this manner is, I think, dramatically illustrated by the decision of this Court in Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, one of the cases relied upon for this holding today. In that case, a majority of this Court upheld the conviction of a man whose only 'crime' was the circulation of a petition to be presented to the City Council of Chicago urging that body to follow a policy of racial segregation in language that the State of Illinois chose to regard as 'libelous' against Negroes. Holding that 'libelous utterances' were not included in the 'speech protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court there concluded that the petition which had been circulated fell within that exception and therefore outside the area of constitutionally protected speech because it made charges against the entire Negro population of this country. Thus, Beauharnais was held to have simultaneously 'libelled' some fifteen million people. And by this tremendous expansion of the concept of 'libel,' what some people might regard as a relatively minor exception to the full protection of freedom of speech had suddenly become a vehicle which could be used to justify a return to the vicious era of the laws of seditious libel, in which the political party in power, both in England and in this country, used such laws to put its opponents in jail.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - The Court, by stating unequivocally that there are no 'absolutes' under the First Amendment, necessarily takes the position that even speech that is admittedly protected by the First Amendment is subject to the 'balancing test' and that therefore no kind of speech is to be protected if the Government can assert an interest of sufficient weight to induce this Court to uphold its abridgment. In my judgment, such a sweeping denial of the existence of any inalienable right to speak undermines the very foundation upon which the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and, indeed, our entire structure of government rest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association (N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488), as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes,' not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection.
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Parties: McGowan v. Maryland
Date: 1961-05-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 244 - N51* 'The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect.
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Segment in Paragraph: 252 - This freedom plainly includes freedom from religion with the right to believe, speak, write, publish and advocate antireligious programs.
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Parties: Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley
Date: 1961-05-29
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Parties: Braunfeld v. Brown
Date: 1961-05-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N50* 'The right of a state to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.
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Parties: Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc.
Date: 1961-05-29
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Parties: In re Anastaplo
Date: 1961-04-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - We have also held in Konigsberg that the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - N120* The petitioner George Anastaplo has been denied the right to practice law in the State of Illinois for refusing to answer questions about his views and associations. I think this action by the State violated rights guaranteed to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Parties: Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.
Date: 1961-10-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 214 - All the governmental activities set out above designed to suppress the freedom of American citizens to think their own views and speak their own thoughts and read their own selections, and even more, occurred under the 1798 Sedition Act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 237 - Freedom of association is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights. N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. So if we had only the question whether those who band together to espouse a political, educational, literary, civic, or ideological cause could be made to register, I would protest. The late Zechariah Chafee spoke of the danger in limiting our freedoms under political pressures. 'Universities,' he wrote, 'should not be transformed, as in Nazi Germany, into loud-speakers for the men who wield political power.' The Blessings of Liberty (1956) 241. There have been attempts here to interfere by law in a myriad of ways with the shaping of public opinion through many groups, attacked because they were nonconformists of one kind or another. As we said recently, the identification of members of groups and fear of reprisal 'might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.' Talley v. State of California, 362 U.S. 60, 65, 80 S.Ct. 536, 539, 4 L.Ed.2d 559. There is, in my view, a disability on the part of government to probe the intimacies of relationships in the myriad of lawful societies and groups in this country. See, for example, United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48, 56-58, 73 S.Ct. 543, 547, 551, 97 L.Ed. 770 (concurring opinion); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527, 80 S.Ct. 412, 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 8 0 (concurring opinion); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 401, 405-408, 81 S.Ct. 153, 154, 156-158, 5 L.Ed.2d 148 (dissenting opinion). From those precedents I would hopefully deduce two principles. First, no individual may be required to register before he makes a speech, for the First Amendment rights are not subject to any prior restraint. Second, a group engaged in lawful conduct may not be required to file with the Government a list of its members, no matter how unpopular it may be. For the disclosure of membership lists may cause harassment of members and seriously hamper their exercise of First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 132 - Thus the Thomas case is applicable here only insofar as it establishes that subjection to registration requirements may be a sufficient restraint upon the exercise of liberties protected by the First Amendment to merit that it be weighed in the constitutional balance. speak. E.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, in which this Court has struck down regulations requiring not merely registration but the securing of a license, issued either at the arbitrary discretion of licensing officials or by the application of licensing standards so broad or uncertain as to permit arbitrary action by officials, as prerequisite to the right to speak. E.g.,
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Segment in Paragraph: 236 - Registration, like licensing, may infringe speech'If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction. If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 199 - Talk about the desirability of revolution has a long and honorable history, not only in other parts of the world, but also in our own country. This kind of talk, like any other, can be used at the wrong time and for the wrong purpose. But, under our system of Government, the remedy for this danger must be the same remedy that is applied to the danger that comes from any other erroneous talk-education and contrary argument. If that remedy is not sufficient, the only meaning of free speech must be that the revolutionary ideas will be allowed to prevail.
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Segment in Paragraph: 131 - The Freedoms of Expression and Association protected by the First Amendment. The Communist Party would have us hold that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from requiring the registration and filing of information, including membership lists, by organizations substantially dominated or controlled by the foreign powers controlling the world Communist movement and which operate primarily to advance the objectives of that movement: the overthrow of existing government by any means necessary and the establishment in its place of a Communist totalitarian dictatorship (§§ 3(3), 2(1) and (6)). We cannot find such a prohibition in the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 145 - On the concrete, specific issue before us, N6* we hold that the obligation to give information identifying presses, without more and as applied to foreign-dominated organizations, does not fetter constitutionally protected free expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 132 - The present statute does not, of course, attach the registration requirement to the incident of speech, but to the incidents of foreign domination and of operation to advance the objectives of the world Communist movement-operation which, the Board has found here, includes extensive, long-continuing organizational, as well as 'speech,' activity. Thus the Thomas case is applicable here only insofar as it establishes that subjection to registration requirements may be a sufficient restraint upon the exercise of liberties protected by the First Amendment to merit that it be weighed in the constitutional balance. speak. E.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, in which this Court has struck down regulations requiring not merely registration but the securing of a license, issued either at the arbitrary discretion of licensing officials or by the application of licensing standards so broad or uncertain as to permit arbitrary action by officials, as prerequisite to the right to speak. E.g., Staub v. City of Blaxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302; Superior Films, Inc., v. Department of Education, 346 U.S 587, 74 S.Ct. 286, 98 L.Ed. 329; Gelling v. State of Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1359; Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098; Niemotko v. State of Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 328, 95 L.Ed. 267; Kunz v. People of State of New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280; Largent v. State of Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667, 87 L.Ed. 873; Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213; Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949. The present statute has no such licensing provision.
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Parties: Scales v. United States
Date: 1961-06-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 135 - When we allow petitioner to be sentenced to prison for six years for being a 'member' of the Communist Party, we make a sharp break with traditional concepts of First Amendment rights and make serious Mark Twain's lighthearted comment that 'It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - It is, of course, true that quasi-plitical parties or other groups that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical conspiracy, which is defined by its criminal purpose, so that all knowing association with the conspiracy is a proper subject for criminal proscription as far as First Amendment liberties are concerned. If there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired, but the membership clause, as here construed, does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with 'the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 L.Ed. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470. The clause does not make criminal all association with an organization which has been shown to engage in illegal advocacy. There must be clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend(s) to accomplish (the aims of the organization) by resort to violence.' Noto v. United States, post, 367 U.S. 290, to v. United States, post, 367 U.S. at page 299, 81 S.Ct. at page 1522. Thus the member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fallw ithin the ban of the statute: he lacks the requisite specific intent 'to bring about the overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances would permit.' Such a person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps merely optimistic, but he is not by this statute made a criminal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Little remains to be said concerning the claim that the statute infringes First Amendment freedoms. It was settled in Dennis that the advocacy with which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that a combination to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a political party, is not such association as is protected by the First Amendment. We can discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
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Parties: Torcaso v. Watkins
Date: 1961-06-19
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Parties: Poe v. Ullman
Date: 1961-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion. The leading cases on freedom of expression are generally framed with reference to public debate and discourse. But as Chafee said, 'the First Amendment and other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk. The law-makers, legislators and officials stay on the outside of that fence. But what the men inside the fence say when they are let alone is no concern of the law.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The actor on stage or screen, the artist whose creation is in oil or clay or marble, the poet whose reading public may be practically nonexistent, the musician and his musical scores, the counselor whether priest, parent or teacher no matter how small his audience—these too are beneficiaries of freedom of expression. The remark by President James A. Garfield that his ideal of a college was a log in the woods with a student at one end and Mark Hopkins at another (9 Dict.Am Biog., p. 216) puts the present problem in proper First Amendment dimensions. Of course a physician can talk freely and fully with his patient without threat of retaliation by the State.
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - Thus, for instance, when in that case and in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, the Court struck down laws which sought not to require what children must learn in schools, but to prescribe, in the first case, what they must not learn, and in the second, where they must acquire their learning, I do not think it was wrong to put those decisions on N52* 'the right of the individual to * * * establish a home and bring up children,' Meyer v. State of Nebraska, ibid., or on the basis that N53* 'The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only,' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at page 535, 45 S.Ct. at page 573. I consider this so, even though today those decisions would probably have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, concepts that are derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion. The leading cases on freedom of expression are generally framed with reference to public debate and discourse. But as Chafee said, N54* 'the First Amendment and other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk. The law-makers, legislators and officials stay on the outside of that fence. But what the men inside the fence say when they are let alone is no concern of the law.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - I consider this so, even though today those decisions would probably have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, concepts that are derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief. See
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Parties: Mapp v. Ohio
Date: 1961-10-19
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Parties: Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property
Date: 1961-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power. See generally Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476—1776; Hanson, Government and the Press, 1695—1763. It was a principal instrument for the enforcement of the Tudor licensing system.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - We held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, that 'obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.' But in Roth itself we expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity fashioned in that case and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of 'the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The question here is whether the use by Missouri in this case of the search and seizure power to suppress obscene publications involved abuses inimical to protected expression. We held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, that N4* 'obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.' But in Roth itself we expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity fashioned in that case and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of N5* 'the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The authority to the police officers under the warrants issued in this case, broadly to seize 'obscene * * * publications,' poses problems not raised by the warrants to seize 'gambling implements' and 'all intoxicating liquors' involved in the cases cited by the Missouri Supreme Court. 334 S.W.2d at page 125. For the use of these warrants implicates questions whether the procedures leading to their issuance and surrounding their execution were adequate to avoid suppression of constitutionally protected publications. N35* '* * * (T)he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn. * * * The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for * * * sensitive tools * * *.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460.It follows that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenitya § here involved without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.
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Parties: Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. St.
Date: 1961-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that '(o)ne who is compelled to contribute the fruits of his labor to support or promote political or economic programs or support candidates for public office is just as much deprived of his freedom of speech as if he were compelled to give his vocal support to doctrines he opposes.' I fully agree with this holding of the Georgia Supreme Court and would affirm its judgment with certain modifications of the relief granted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - I would therefore hold that § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, in authorizing application of the union-shop contract to the named protesting employees who are appellees here, violates the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - We said: 'It is argued that complusory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by this record. * * * if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case. For we pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold that the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments.' Id., 351 U.S. at page 238, 76 S.Ct. at page 721. See also 351 U.S. at page 242, 76 S.Ct. at page 723 (concurring opinion). Thus all that was held in Hanson was that § 2, Eleventh was constitutional in its bare authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to give 'financial support' to unions legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents. We sustained this requirement—and only this requirement—embodied in the statutory authorization of agreements under which 'all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class.' Clearly we passed neither upon forced association in any other aspect nor upon the issue of the use of exacted money for political causes which were opposed by the employment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - I am not so sure as the Court that the injunction bars 'the collection of all funds from anyone who can show that he is opposed to the expenditure of any of his money for political purposes which he disapproves.' So construed the injunction would take away the First Amendment right of employees to contribute their money voluntarily to a collective fund to be used to support and oppose candidates and causes even though individual contributors might disagree with particular choices of the group. So far as it may be ambiguous in this respect, I think the injunction should be modified to make sure that it does not interfere with the valuable rights of citizens to mae their individual voices heard through voluntary collective action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - The framers of the Bill of Rights lived in an era when overhanging threats to conduct deemed 'seditious' and lettres de cachet were current issues. Their concern was in protecting the right of the individual freely to express himself—especially his political beliefs—in a public forum, untrammeled by fear of punishment or of governmental censure.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - I think workers have as much right to their own views about matters affecting unions as they have to views about other matters in the fields of politics and economics. Indeed, some of their most strongly held views are apt to be precisely on the subject of unions, just as questions of law reform, court procedure, selection of judges and other aspects of the 'administration of justice' give rise to some of the deepest and most irreconcilable differences among lawyers. In my view, § 2, Eleventh can constitutionally authorize no more than to make a worker pay dues to a union for the sole purpose of defraying the cost of acting as his bargaining agent. Our Government has no more power to compel individuals to support union programs or union publications than it has to compel the support of political programs, employer programs or church programs. And the First Amendment, fairly construed, deprives the Government of all power to make any person pay out one single penny against his will to be used in any way to advocate doctrines or views he is against, whether economic, scientific, political, religious or any other.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - I cannot agree to treat so lightly the value of a man's constitutional right to be wholly free from any sort of governmental compulsion in the expression of opinions. It should not be forgotten that many men have left their native lands, languished in prison, and even lost their lives, rather than give support to ideas they were conscientiously against. The three workers who paid under protest here were forced under authority of a federal statute to pay all current dues or lose their jobs. They should get back all they paid with interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - Nevertheless, we unanimously held that the plaintiffs in Hanson had not been denied any right protected by the First Amendment. Despite our holding, the gist of the complaint here is that the expenditure of a portion of mandatory funds for political objectives denies free speech—the right to speak or to remain silent—to members who oppose, against the constituted authority of union desires, this use of their union dues. No one's desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed. The individual member may express his views in any public or private forum as freely as he could before the union collected his dues.
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - Nothing was further from congressional purpose than to be concerned with restrictions upon the right to speak. Its purpose was to eliminate 'free riders' in the bargaining unit. Inroads on free speech were not remotely involved in the legislative process. They were in nobody's mind. Congress legislated to correct what it found to be abuses in the domain of promoting industrial peace. This Court would stray beyond its powers were it to erect a far-fetched claim, derived from some ultimate relation between an obviously valid aim of legislation and an abstract conception of freedom, into a constitutional right.
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Segment in Paragraph: 105 - In conclusion, then, we are asked by union members who oppose these expenditures to protect their right to free speech—although they are as free to speak as ever—against governmental action which has permitted a union elected by democratic process to bargain for a union shop and to expend the funds thereby collected for purposes which are controlled by internal union choice. To do so would be to mutilate a scheme designed by Congress for the purpose of equitably sharing the cost of securing the benefits of union exertions;
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - Nevertheless, we unanimously held that the plaintiffs in Hanson had not been denied any right protected by the First Amendment. Despite our holding, the gist of the complaint here is that the expenditure of a portion of mandatory funds for political objectives denies free speech—the right to speak or to remain silent—to members who oppose, against the constituted authority of union desires, this use of their union dues. No one's desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed. The individual member may express his views in any public or private forum asf reely as he could before the union collected his dues. Federal taxes also may diminish the vigor with which a citizen can give partisan support to a political belief, but as yet no one would place such an impediment to making one's views effective within the reach of constitutionally protected 'free speech.'
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Parties: Lathrop v. Donohue
Date: 1961-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - The Supreme Court held that the requirement that appellant be an enrolled dues-paying member of the State Bar did not abridge his rights of freedom of association, and also that his rights to free speech were not violated because [**1828] the State Bar used his money to support legislation with which he disagreed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - That being so, I do not understand why it should become unconstitutional for the State Bar to use appellant's dues to fulfill some of the very purposes for which it was established. I am wholly unable to follow the force of reasoning which, on the one hand, denies that compulsory dues-paying membership in an Integrated Bar infringes "freedom of association," and, on the other, in effect affirms that such membership, to the extent it entails the use of a dissident member's dues for legitimate Bar purposes, infringes "freedom of speech." This is a refinement between two aspects of what, in circumstances like these, is essentially but a single facet of the "liberty" assured by the Fourteenth Amendment, see N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, [**1842] that is too subtle for me to grasp.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - I see no alternative (even at the risk of being thought to labor the obvious) but to deal in turn with each of the various specific impingements on "free speech" which have been suggested or intimated to flow from the State Bar's use of an objecting member's dues for the purposes involved in this case. As I understand things, it is said that the operation of the Integrated Bar tends (1) to reduce a dissident member's "economic capacity" to espouse causes in which he believes; (2) to further governmental "establishment" of political views; (3) to threaten development of a "guild system" of closed, self-regulating professions and businesses; (4) to "drown out" the voice of dissent by requiring all members of the Bar to lend financial support to the views of the majority; and (5) to interfere with freedom of belief by causing "compelled affirmation" of majority-held views. With deference, I am bound to say that, in my view, all of these arguments border on the chimerical.
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Segment in Paragraph: 156 - Joining is one method of expression. This freedom of association is not an absolute. For as I have noted in my opinion in International Assn. of Machinists v. Street, ante, p. 775, decided this day, the necessities of life put us into relations with others that may be undesirable or even abhorrent, if individual standards were to obtain. Yet if this right is to be curtailed by law, if the individual is to be compelled to associate with others in a common cause, then I think exceptional circumstances should be shown. I would treat laws of this character like any that touch on First Amendment rights. Congestion of traffic, street fights, riots and such may justify curtailment of opportunities or occasions to speak freely. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568. But when those laws are sustained, we require them to be "narrowly drawn" ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311) so as to be confined to the precise evil within the competence [***1228] of the legislature.
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Segment in Paragraph: 156 - The inroads of an integrated bar on the liberty and freedom of lawyers to espouse such causes as they choose was emphasized by William D. Guthrie
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Segment in Paragraph: 156 - The right of association is an important incident of First Amendment rights. The right to belong -- or not to belong -- is deep in the American tradition. Joining is one method of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - From a Constitutional standpoint, I think that there can be no doubt about Wisconsin's right to use appellant's dues in furtherance of any of the purposes now drawn in question. Orderly analysis requires [***1210] that there be considered, first, the respects in which it may be thought that the use of a member's dues for causes he is against impinges on his right of free speech, and second, the nature of the state interest offered to justify such use of the dues exacted from him.
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - This objection can be stated in either of two ways. First: The requirement of dues payments to be spent to further views to which the payor is opposed tends to increase the volume of the arguments he opposes and thereby to drown out his own voice in opposition, in violation of his Constitutional right to be heard. Second: The United States Constitution creates a scheme of federal and state governments each of which is to be elected on a one-man-one-vote basis and on a one-man-one-political-voice basis. Of course several persons may voluntarily cumulate their political voices, but no governmental force can require a single individual to contribute money to [**1845] support views to be adopted by a democratically organized group even if the individual is also free to say what he pleases separately.
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - Moreover, I do not think it can be said with any assurance that being required to contribute to the dispersion of views one opposes has a substantial limiting effect on one's right to speak and be heard. Certainly these rights would be limited if state action substantially reduced one's ability to reach his audience. But are these rights substantially affected by increasing the opposition's ability to reach the same audience? I can conceive of instances involving limited facilities, such as television time, which may go to the highest bidder, wherein increasing the resources of the opposition may tend to reduce a dissident's access to his audience. But before the Constitution comes into play, there should surely be some showing of a relationship between required financial support of the opposition and reduced ability to communicate, a showing I think hardly possible in the case of the legislative recommendations of the Wisconsin Bar. And, aside from the considerations of freedom from compelled affirmations of belief to be discussed later, I can find little basis for a right not to have one's opposition heard.
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Segment in Paragraph: 156 - The right of association is an important incident of First Amendment rights. The right to belong -- or not to belong -- is deep in the American tradition. Joining is one method of expression. This freedom of association is not an absolute.
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Parties: Garner v. Louisiana
Date: 1961-12-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 107 - But when a State seeks to subject to criminal sanctions conduct which, except for a demonstrated paramount state interest, would be within the range of freedom of expression as assured by the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot do so by means of a general and all-inclusive breach of the peace prohibition. It must bring the activity sought to be proscribed within the ambit of a statute or clause 'narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S., at 311, 60 S.Ct., at 906; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745. And of course that interest must be a legitimate one. A State may not 'suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 105 - Such a demonstration, in the circumstances of these two cases, is as much a part of theN121* 'free trade in ideas,' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (Holmes, J., dissenting), as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as 'speech.' It, like speech, appeals to good sense and to N122* 'the power of reason as applied through public discussion,' Whitney v. People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (Brandeis, J., concurring), just as much as, if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This Court has never limited the right to speak, a protected 'liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment, Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 629, 69 L.Ed. 1138, to mere verbal expression. Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633—634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Stromberg v. California, supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections.
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Segment in Paragraph: 105 - This Court has never limited the right to speak, a protected 'liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment, Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 629, 69 L.Ed. 1138, to mere verbal expression. Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633—634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Stromberg v. California, supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections. This is not to say, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches to demonstrations conducted on private property over the objection of the owner (as in Briscoe), just as it would surely not encompass verbal expression in a private home if the owner has not consented.
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Segment in Paragraph: 113 - In the absence of any Louisiana statute purporting to express the State's overriding interest in prohibiting petitioners' conduct as a clear and present danger to the welfare of the community, peaceful demonstration on public streets, and on private property with the consent of the owner, was constitutionally protected as a form of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 105 - If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Stromberg v. California, supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections. This is not to say, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches to demonstrations conducted on private property over the objection of the owner (as in Briscoe), just as it would surely not encompass verbal expression in a private home if the owner has not consented.
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Segment in Paragraph: 113 - In the absence of any Louisiana statute purporting to express the State's overriding interest in prohibiting petitioners' conduct as a clear and present danger to the welfare of the community, peaceful demonstration on public streets, and on private property with the consent of the owner, was constitutionally protected as a form of expression. Louisiana's breach of the peace statute drew no distinct line between presumably constitutionally protected activity and the conduct of the petitioners in Briscoe, as a criminal trespass statute might have done. The fact that in Briscoe, unlike Garner and Hoston, the management did not consent to the petitioners' remaining at the 'white' lunch counter does not serve to permit the application of this general breach of the peace statute to the conduct shown in that case. For the statute by its terms appears to be as applicable to 'incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech,' Winters v. People of State of New York, supra, 333 U.S., at 509, 68 S.Ct., at 667, as to that which is not within the range of such protection. Hence such a law gives no warning as to what may fairly be deemed to be within its compass.
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Parties: Killian v. United States
Date: 1961-12-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - As a prerequisite to his union's right to seek relief from unfair labor practices before the National Labor Relations Board, petitioner was compelled to subscribe to an oath which stated: (1) 'I am not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such Party;' and (2) 'I do not believe in, and I am not a member of nor do I support any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.' The Government now claims that in submitting to this compulsion petitioner made false statements as to his membership in and affiliation with the Communist Party, and on the basis of these allegedly false statements it seeks to send petitioner to prison. I agree with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS that if the Government is to be allowed to do this sort of thing at all, it should only be upon a showing that petitioner was a member who engaged in illegal activities in connection with his Communist Party membership. But I wish also to reiterate my own belief that our Constitution, properly interpreted and applied, would prohibit this prosecution completely—regardless of the nature of petitioner's connection with the Communist Party. I think the Constitution absolutely prohibits the Government from sending people to jail for 'crimes' that arise out of, and indeed are manufactured out of, the imposition of test oaths that invade the freedoms of belief and political association—freedoms which the Founders of our Nation recognized as indispensable to a democratic society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - But insofar as the record shows, he had a right to promote those beliefs alone or in association with others. All the beliefs I find espoused by Killian in this record were protected by the First Amendment. He had a right to advocate them alone or in conjunction with others.
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Parties: Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction
Date: 1961-12-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution. As we said in Smith v. People of State of California, N36* '* * * stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.' 361 U.S. 147, at 151, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed.2d 205. N37* 'The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.
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Parties: Russell v. United States
Date: 1962-05-21
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Parties: Wood v. Georgia
Date: 1962-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - '(f)ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism—a principle which all are zealous to preserve' (id., at 346, 66 S.Ct. at 1037), the Court reaffirmed its belief that the 'essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercion * * * (is) consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order.' Id., at 334, 66 S.Ct. at 1031. The Court's last occasion to consider the application of the clear and present danger principle to a case of the type under review was in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546. There the Court held that to warrant a sanction '(t)he fires which (the expression) kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Finally,we are told by the respondent that, because the petitioner is sheriff of Bibb County and thereby owes a special duty and responsibility to the court and its judges, his right to freedom of expression must be more severely curtailed than that of an average citizen. Under the circumstances of this case, this argument must be rejected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Subsequently, in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295, after noting that N55* '(f)ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism—a principle which all are zealous to preserve' (id., at 346, 66 S.Ct. at 1037), the Court reaffirmed its belief that the N56* 'essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercion * * * (is) consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N111* '* * * to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Finally, we are told by the respondent that, because the petitioner is sheriff of Bibb County and thereby owes a special duty and responsibility to the court and its judges, his right to freedom of expression must be more severely curtailed than that of an average citizen. Under the circumstances of this case, this argument must be rejected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - The petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the field of political controversy, particularly where his political life was at stake. Cf. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473. The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: N112* 'When a case is finished courts are subject to the same criticism as other people; but the propriety and necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument, or intimidation hardly can be denied.' The right of free speech, strong though it be, is not absolute; when the right to speak conflicts with the right to an impartial judicial proceeding, an accommodation must be made to preserve the essence of both.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Surely the Court cannot mean that attempts to influence judicial proceedings are punishable only if they are successful. Speech creating sufficient danger of an evil which the State may prevent may certainly be punished regardless of whether that evil materializes. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320—321, 71 S.Ct. 303, 306, 95 L.Ed. 267. Indeed, the test suggested by the court is even more stringent than that which it applies in determining whether a conviction should be set aside because of prejudicial 'outside' statements reaching a trial jury. In such cases, although the question is whether the rights of the accused have been infringed rather than whether there has been a clear and present danger of their infringement, it is necessary only to show a substantial likelihood that the verdict was affected, and it is no answer that each juror expresses his belief that he remains able to be fair and impartial. Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 728, 81 S.Ct. at 1645, 6 L.Ed.2d 751; cf. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312—313, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 1172, 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1207, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. The test for punishing attempts to influence a grand or petit jury should be less rather than more stringent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Men are entitled to speak as they please on matters vital to them; errors in judgment or unsubstantiated opinions may be exposed, of course, but not through punishment for contempt for the expression. Under our system of government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. Cf. Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378, 47 S.Ct. 641, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095. Hence, in the absence of some other showing of a substantive evil actually designed to impede the course of justice in justification of the exercise of the contempt power to silence the petitioner, his utterances are entitled to be protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Men are entitled to speak as they please on matters vital to them; errors in judgment or unsubstantiated opinions may be exposed, of course, but not through punishment for contempt for the expression. Under our system of government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. Cf. Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378, 47 S.Ct. 641, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095. Hence, in the absence of some other showing of a substantive evil actually designed to impede the course of justice in justification of the exercise of the contempt power to silence the petitioner, his utterances are entitled to be protected.
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Parties: Engel v. Vitale
Date: 1962-06-25
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Parties: Arlan's Dep't Store, Inc. v. Kentucky
Date: 1962-12-17
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Parties: NAACP v. Button
Date: 1963-01-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Thus we have affirmed the right 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - 'Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups * * *.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480. And just as it includes the right jointly to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, see Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137— 138, 81 S.Ct. 523, 529—530, 5 L.Ed.2d 464, so it must include the right to join together for purposes of obtaining judicial redress.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - But as we move away from speech alone and into the sphere of conduct—even conduct associated with speech or resulting from it the area of legitimate governmental interest expands. A regulation not directly suppressing speech or peaceable assembly, but having some impact on the form or manner of their exercise will be sustained if the regulation has a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental objective and does not unduly interfere with such individual rights. Thus, although the State may not prohibit all informational picketing, it may prevent mass picketing, Allen-Bradley Local, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154, and picketing for an unlawful objective, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834. Although it may not prevent advocacy of union membership, it can to some degree inquire into and define the qualifications of those who solicit funds from prospective members or who hold other positions of responsibility. A legislature may not wholly eliminate the right of collective action by workingmen, but it may to a significant extent dictate the form their organization shall take and may limit the demands that the organization may make on employers and others
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Petitioner challenges the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals on many grounds. But we reach only one: that Chapter 33 as construed and applied abridges the freedoms of the First Amendment, protected against state action by the Fourteenth. More specifically, petitioner claims that the chapter infringes the right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights. We think petitioner may assert this right on its own behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitutionally protected, which the statute would curtail. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660. We also think petitioner has standing to assert the corresponding rights of its members.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - ''Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups * * *.' Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250—251, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (plurality opinion). Cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364—366, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - We hold that Chapter 33 as construed violates the Fourteenth Amendment by unduly inhibiting protected freedoms of expression and association. In so holding, we reject two further contentions of respondents. The first is that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has guaranteed free expression by expressly confirming petitioner's right to continue its advocacy of civil-rights litigation. But in light of the whole decree of the court, the guarantee is of purely speculative value. As construed by the Court, Chapter 33, at least potentially, prohibits every cooperative activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful. If there is an internal tension between proscription and protection in the statute, we cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480. And just as it includes the right jointly to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, see Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137— 138, 81 S.Ct. 523, 529—530, 5 L.Ed.2d 464, so it must include the right to join together for purposes of obtaining judicial redress. We have passed the point where litigation is regarded as an evil that must be avoided if some accommodation short of a lawsuit can possibly be worked out. Litigation is often the desirable and orderly way of resolving disputes of broad public significance, and of obtaining vindication of fundamental rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - A regulation not directly suppressing speech or peaceable assembly, but having some impact on the form or manner of their exercise will be sustained if the regulation has a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental objective and does not unduly interfere with such individual rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - But litigation, whether or not associated with the attempt to vindicate constitutional rights, is conduct; it is speech plus. Although the State surely may not broadly prohibit individuals with a common interest from joining together to petition a court for redress of their grievances, it is equally certain that the State may impose reasonable regulations limiting the permissible form of litigation and the manner of legal representation within its borders.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - N7* The Court's contrary conclusion rests upon three basic lines of reasoning: (1) that in the context of the racial problem the NAACP's litigating activities are a form of political expression within the protection of the First Amendment, as extended to the States by the Fourteenth; (2) that no sufficiently compelling subordinating state interest has been shown to justify Virginia's particular regulation of these activities; and (3) that in any event Chapter 33 must fall because of vagueness, in that as construed by the state court the line between the permissible and impermissible under the statute is so uncertain as potentially to work a stifling of constitutionally protected rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - But litigation, whether or not associated with the attempt to vindicate constitutional rights, is conduct; it is speech plus. Although the State surely may not broadly prohibit individuals with a common interest from joining together to petition a court for redress of their grievances, it is equally certain that the State may impose reasonable regulations limiting the permissible form of litigation and the manner of legal representation within its borders. Thus the State may, without violating protected rights, restrict those undertaking to represent others in legal proceedings to properly qualified practitioners. And it may determine that a corporation or association does not itself have standing to litigate the interests of its shareholders or members—that only individuals with a direct interest of their own may join to press their claims in its courts. Both kinds of regulation are undeniably matters of legitimate concern to the State and their possible impact on the rights of expression and association is far too remote to cause any doubt as to their validity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit,
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - We hold that Chapter 33 as construed violates the Fourteenth Amendment by unduly inhibiting protected freedoms of expression and association. In so holding, we reject two further contentions of respondents. The first is that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has guaranteed free expression by expressly confirming petitioner's right to continue its advocacy of civil-rights litigation. But in light of the whole decree of the court, the guarantee is of purely speculative value. As construed by the Court, Chapter 33, at least potentially, prohibits every cooperative activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful.
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Parties: L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States
Date: 1962-11-19
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Parties: Edwards v. South Carolina
Date: 1963-02-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. '(A) function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech * * * is * * * protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. * * * There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The convictions of the petitioners, Negro high school and college students, for breach of the peace under South Carolina law are accepted by the Court 'as binding upon us to that extent' but are held violative of 'petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.' Petitioners, of course, had a right to peaceable assembly, to espouse their cause and to petition, but in my view the manner in which they exercised those rights was by no means the passive demonstration which this Court relates; rather, as the City Manager of Columbia testified, 'a dangerous situation was really building up' which South Carolina's courts expressly found had created 'an actual interference with traffic and an imminently threatened disturbance of the peace of the community.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N48* 'Where conduct is within the allowable limits of free speech, the police are peace officers for the speaker as well as for his hearers. But the power effectively to preserve order cannot be displaced by giving a speaker complete immunity. Here, there were two police officers present for 20 minutes. They interfered only when they apprehended imminence of violence. It is not a constitutional principle that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed against the crowd, whatever its size and temper, and not against the (demonstrators).'
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. N38* '(A) function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech * * * is * * * protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. * * * There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The convictions of the petitioners, Negro high school and college students, for breach of the peace under South Carolina law are accepted by the Court 'as binding upon us to that extent' but are held violative of 'petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.' Petitioners, of course, had a right to peaceable assembly, to espouse their cause and to petition, but in my view the manner in which they exercised those rights was by no means the passive demonstration which this Court relates; rather, as the City Manager of Columbia testified, 'a dangerous situation was really building up' which South Carolina's courts expressly found had created 'an actual interference with traffic and an imminently threatened disturbance of the peace of the community.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The question thus seems to me whether a State is constitutionally prohibited from enforcing laws to prevent breach of the peace in a situation where city officials in good faith believe, and the record shows, that disorder and violence are imminent, merely because the activities constituting that breach contain claimed elements of constitutionally protected speech and assembly. To me the answer under our cases is clearly in the negative.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Beginning, as did the South Carolina courts, with the premise that the petitioners were entitled to assemble and voice their dissatisfaction with segregation, the enlargement of constitutional protection for the conduct here is as fallacious as would be the conclusion that free speech necessarily includes the right to broadcast from a sound truck in the public streets. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). This Court said in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), that N40* '(t)he power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted.' Significantly, in holding that the petitioner's picketing was constitutionally protected in that case the Court took pains to differeniate it from N41* 'picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion * * * imminent and aggravated danger * * *.' Ibid. Here the petitioners were permitted without hindrance to exercise their rights of free speech and assembly. Their arrests occurred only after a situation arose in which the law-enforcement officials on the scene considered that a dangerous disturbance was imminent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N42* it is clear to us that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the petitioners under the circumstances disclosed by this record, South Carolina infringed the petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. N43* '(A) function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech * * * is * * * protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. * * * There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.' Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4—5, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896, 93 L.Ed. 1131. As in the Terminiello case, the courts of South Carolina have defined a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the petitioners if their speech N44* 'stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand.'
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Parties: United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.
Date: 1963-02-18
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Parties: Gideon v. Wainwright
Date: 1963-03-18
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Parties: Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm.
Date: 1963-03-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - 'It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - Joining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an associational activity that comes within the purview of the First Amendment, which provides in relevant part: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' 'Peaceably to assemble' as used in the First Amendment necessarily involves a coming together, whether regularly or spasmodically. Historically the right to assemble was secondary to the right to petition, the latter being the primary right. But today, as the Court stated in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278, 'The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.' Assembly, like speech, is indeed essential 'in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.' Id., p. 365, 57 S.Ct. p. 260. 'The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.' Ibid. A Free Society is made up of almost innumerable institutions through which views and opinions are expressed, opinion is mobilized, and social, economic, religious, educational, and political programs are formulated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - A coming together is often necessary for communication—for those who listen as well as for those who speak. Demosthenes, it is said, went to the seashore and declaimed to the waves in order to correct a stammer. But normally a speaker implies an audience. Joining a group is often as vital to freedom of expression as utterance itself. Registering as a student in a school or joining a faculty is as vital to freedom of expression as joining a church is to the free exercise of religion. Joining a political party may be as critical to expression of one's views as hiring reporters is to the establishment of a free press. Some have thought that political and academic affiliations have a preferred position under the due process version of the First Amendment. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261—267, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1220, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (concurring opinion). But the associational rights protected by the First Amendment are in my view much broader and cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as well as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - 'Freedom of religion and freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than the privilege to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.' Public Utilities Comm'n, etc., v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467—468, 72 S.Ct. 813, 823, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (dissenting opinion).
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - Government can intervene only when belief, thought, or expression moves into the realm of action that is inimical to society. That was Jefferson's view. In his Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom he spoke primarily of religious liberty but in terms applicable to freedom of the mind in all of its aspects. It was his view that in the Free Society men's ideas and beliefs, their speech and advocacy are no proper concern of government. Only when they become brigaded with action can government move against them.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida although, for substantially the same reasons stated by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS in his concurring opinion, I would prefer to reach our decision by a different approach. I agree with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to the States and protects the freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition from state abridgment with the same force and to the same degree that the First Amendment protects them from federal abridgment. That, as the cases cited by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS show, is what this Court has previously held. I agree also that these Amendments encompass freedom of the people to associate in an infinite number of organizations including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, of which petitioner here was president at the time it was under investigation by the Florida committee. In my view the constitutional right of association includes the privilege of any person to associate with Communists or anti-Communists, Socialists or anti-Socialists, or, for that matter, with people of all kinds of beliefs, popular or unpopular. I have expressed these views in many other cases and I adhere to them now. Since, as I believe, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and its members have a constitutional right to choose their own associates, I cannot understand by what constitutional authority Florida can compel answers to questions which abridge that right. Accordingly, I would reverse here on the ground that there has been a direct abridgment of the right of association of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and its members.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - 'Peaceably to assemble' as used in the First Amendment necessarily involves a coming together, whether regularly or spasmodically. Historically the right to assemble was secondary to the right to petition, the latter being the primary right. But today, as the Court stated in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278, N57* 'The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.' Assembly, like speech, is indeed essential N58* 'in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.' Id., p. 365, 57 S.Ct. p. 260. N59* 'The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The right of association has become a part of the bundle of rights protected by the First Amendment (see, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra), and the need for a pervasive right of privacy against government intrusion has been recognized, though not always given the recognition it deserves.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Nothing we say here impairs or denies the existence of the underlying legislative right to investigate or legislate with respect to subversive activities by Communists or anyone else; our decision today deals only with the manner in which such power may be exercised and we hold simply that groups which themselves are neither engaged in subversive or other illegal or improper activities nor demonstrated to have any substantial connections with such activities are to be protected in their rights of free and private association. As declared in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1209 (opinion of The Chief Justice),N115* 'It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political accociation, and freedom of communication of ideas * * *.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - N116* Joining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an associational activity that comes within the purview of the First Amendment, which provides in relevant part: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' 'Peaceably to assemble' as used in the First Amendment necessarily involves a coming together, whether regularly or spasmodically. Historically the right to assemble was secondary to the right to petition, the latter being the primary right. But today, as the Court stated in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278, 'The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.' Assembly, like speech, is indeed essential 'in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.' Id., p. 365, 57 S.Ct. p. 260. 'The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.' Ibid. A Free Society is made up of almost innumerable institutions through which views and opinions are expressed, opinion is mobilized, and social, economic, religious, educational, and political programs are formulated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - N117* 'Freedom of religion and freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than the privilege to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - Government can intervene only when belief, thought, or expression moves into the realm of action that is inimical to society. That was Jefferson's view. In his Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom he spoke primarily of religious liberty but in terms applicable to freedom of the mind in all of its aspects. It was his view that in the Free Society men's ideas and beliefs, their speech and advocacy are no proper concern of government. Only when they become brigaded with action can government move against them.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free speech and free association are fundamental and highly prized, and N45* 'need breathing space to survive.' N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. N46* 'Freedoms such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.' Bates v. Little Rock, supra, 361 U.S., at 523, 80 S.Ct., at 416. And, as declared in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S., at 462, 78 S.Ct., at 1171, N47* 'It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute (an) * * * effective * * * restraint on freedom of association * * *. This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. * * * Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.' So it is here.
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Parties: Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan
Date: 1963-02-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Stating that there is no N5* 'absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture,' 365 U.S., at 46, 81 S.Ct., at 393, this Court rejected that contention and remitted the petitioner to a challenge of an application of the city ordinance to specific films. The Court thus refused to countenance a 'broadside attack' on a system of regulation designed to prevent the dissemination of obscene matter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - (I)n Roth itself we expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity fashioned in that case and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of 'the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.' (354 U.S. at 488, 77 S.Ct. at 1311) * * * It follows that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity * * * without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - the vice of Rhode Island's system is apparent whatever one's view of the constitutional status of 'obscene' literature. This is censorship in the raw; and in my view the censor and First Amendment rights are incompatible. If a valid law has been violated, authors and publishers and vendors can be made to account. But they would then have on their side all the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, including trial by jury. From the viewpoint of the State that is a more cumbersome procedure, action on the majority vote of the censors being far easier. But the Bill of Rights was designed to fence in the Government and make its intrusions on liberty difficult and its interference with freedom of expression well-nigh impossible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The Providence regime is productive of capricious action. A five-to-four vote makes a book 'obscene.' The wrong is compounded when the issue, though closely balanced in the minds of sophisticated men, is resolved against freedom of expression and on the side of censorship. Judges, to be sure, often disagree as to the definition of obscenity. But an established administrative system that bans book after book, even though they muster four votes out of nine, makes freedom of expression much more precarious than it would be if unanimity were required.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - the central issue in this case—the accommodation that must be made between Rhode Island's concern with the problem of juvenile delinquency and the right of freedom of expression assured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - there is no showing that Rhode Island has put any roadblocks in the way of any distributor's or publisher's recourse to the courts to test the validity of the Commission's determination respecting any publication, or that the purpose of these procedures was to stifle freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - It could not well be suggested, as I think the Court concedes, that a prosecutor's announcement that he intended to enforce strictly the obscenity laws or that he would proceed against a particular publication unless withdrawn from circulation amounted to an unconstitutional restraint upon freedom of expression, still less that such a restraint would occur from the mere existence of a criminal obscenity statute. Conceding that the restrictive effect of the Commission's procedures on publishers, and a fortiori on independent distributors, may be greater than in either of those situations, I do not believe that the differences are of constitutional import, in the absence of either of the two factors indicated in the preceding paragraph. The circumstance that places the Commission's permissible procedures on the same constitutional level as the illustrations just given is the fact that in each instance the courts are open to the person affected, and that any material, however questionable, may be freely sponsored, circulated, read, or viewed until judicially condemned.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N113* Given the validity of state obscenity laws, Alberts v. State of California, supra, I think the Commission is constitutionally entitled (1) to express its views on the character of any published reading or other material; (2) to endeavor to enlist the support of law enforcement authorities, or the cooperation of publishers and distributors, with respect to any material the Commission deems obscene; and (3) to notify publishers, distributors, and members of the public with respect to its activities in these regards; but that it must take care to refrain from the kind of overbearing utterances already referred to and others that might tend to give any person an erroneous impression as to either the extent of the Commission's authority or the consequences of a failure to heed its warnings. Since the decision of the Court does not require reinstatement of the broad injunction issued by the trial court, and since the majority's opinion rests on the invalidity of the particular procedures the Commission has pursued, I find nothing in that opinion denying the Commission the right to conduct the activities, just enumerated, which I believe it is constitutionally entitled to carry on.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - While I join the opinion of the Court, I adhere to the views I expressed in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508—514, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1321—1324, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, respecting the very narrow scope of governmental authority to suppress publications on the grounds of obscenity. Yet as my Brother BRENNAN makes clear, the vice of Rhode Island's system is apparent whatever one's view of the constitutional status of 'obscene' literature. This is censorship in the raw; and in my view the censor and First Amendment rights are incompatible. If a valid law has been violated, authors and publishers and vendors can be made to account. But they would then have on their side all the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, including trial by jury. From the viewpoint of the State that is a more cumbersome procedure, action on the majority vote of the censors being far easier. But the Bill of Rights was designed to fence in the Government and make its intrusions on liberty difficult and its interference with freedom of expression well-nigh impossible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The Providence regime is productive of capricious action. A five-to-four vote makes a book 'obscene.' The wrong is compounded when the issue, though closely balanced in the minds of sophisticated men, is resolved against freedom of expression and on the side of censorship. Judges, to be sure, often disagree as to the definition of obscenity. But an established administrative system that bans book after book, even though they muster four votes out of nine, makes freedom of expression much more precarious than it would be if unanimity were required.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - We are not the first court to look through forms to the substance and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that regulation by the States of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.
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Parties: Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp
Date: 1963-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 191 - 'Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.'
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Parties: Sherbert v. Verner
Date: 1963-06-17
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Parties: Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry
Date: 1963-06-17
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Parties: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Date: 1964-03-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - While our Court has held that some kinds of speech and writings, such as N7* 'obscenity,' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, and N8* 'fighting words,' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1061, are not expression within the protection of the First Amendment, freedom to discus public affairs and public officials is unquestionably, as the Court today holds, the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the area of free discussion. To punish the exercise of this right to discuss public affairs or to penalize it through libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion of the very kind most needed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N92* It is true that the First Amendment was originally addressed only to action by the Federal Government, and that Jefferson, for one, while denying the power of Congress 'to control the freedom of the press,' recognized such a power in the States.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - To avoid placing such a handicap upon the freedoms of expression, we hold that if the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be contitutionally protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that protection because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Of the exercise of that power by the press, his Report said: 'In every state, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law. On this footing the freedom of the press has stood; on this foundation it yet stands * * *.' 4 Elliot's Debates, supra, p. 570. The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. We further hol that under the proper safeguards the evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for respondent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The second contention is that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are inapplicable here, at least so far as the Times is concerned, because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid, 'commercial' advertisement. The argument relies on Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262, where the Court held that a city ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and business advertising matter did not abridge the First Amendment freedoms, even as applied to a handbill having a commercial message on one side but a protest against certain official action on the other. The reliance is wholly misplaced. The Court in Chrestensen reaffirmed the constitutional protection for 'the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion'; its holding was based upon the factual conclusions that the handbill was 'purely commercial advertising' and that the protest against official action had been added only to evade the ordinance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - N93* It may be urged that deliberately and maliciously false statements have no conceivable value as free speech. That argument, however, is not responsive to the real issue presented by this case, which is whether that freedom of speech which all agree is constitutionally protected can be effectively safeguarded by a rule allowing the imposition of liability upon a jury's evaluation of the speaker's state of mind. If individual citizens may be held liable in damages for strong words, which a jury finds false and maliciously motivated, there can be little doubt that public debate and advocacy will be constrained. And if newspapers, publishing advertisments dealing with public issues, thereby risk liability, there can also be little doubt that the ability of minority groups to secure publication of their views on public affairs and to seek support for their causes will be greatly diminished.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - N94* This is not to say that the Constitution protects defamatory statements directed against the private conduct of a public official or private citizen. Freedom of press and of speech insures that government will respond to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by peaceful means. Purely private defendant has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amendment. This, of course, cannot be said 'where public officials are concerned or where public matters are involved. * * * (O)ne main function of the First Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - The Court thus rules that the Constitution gives citizens and newspapers a 'conditional privilege' immunizing nonmalicious misstatements of fact regarding the official conduct of a government officer. The impressive array of history and precedent marshaled by the Court, however, confirms my belief that the Constitution affords greater protection than that provided by the Court's standard to citizen and press in exercising the right of public criticism.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - This is not to say that the Constitution protects defamatory statements directed against the private conduct of a public official or private citizen. Freedom of press and of speech insures that government will respond to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by peaceful means. Purely private defendant has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amendment. This, of course, cannot be said N60* 'where public officials are concerned or where public matters are involved. * * * (O)ne main function of the First Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - I concur in reversing this half-million-dollar judgment against the New York Times Company and the four individual defendants. In reversing the Court holds that 'the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.' Ante, p. 283. I base my vote to reverse on the belief that the First and Fourteenth Amendments not merely 'delimit' a State's power to award damages to 'public officials against critics of their official conduct' but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The Court goes on to hold that a State can subject such critics to damages if 'actual malice' can be proved against them. 'Malice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment. Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - We would, I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding that at the very least it leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity. This Nation of our elects many of its important officials; so do the States, the municipalities, the counties, and even many precincts. These officials are responsible to the people for the way they perform their duties. While our Court has held that some kinds of speech and writings, such as'obscenity,' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, and 'fighting words,' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1061, are not expression within the protection of the First Amendment, freedom to discus public affairs and public officials is unquestionably, as the Court today holds, the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the area of free discussion. To punish the exercise of this right to discuss public affairs or to penalize it through libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion of the very kind most needed
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - criticism of governmentsaying what one pleases about public affairsThis Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public affairs and public officials. But I doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can be made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials. 'For a representative democracy ceases to exist the moment that the public functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibility to their constituents; and this happens whenever the constituent can be restrained in any manner from speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the conduct of those who may advise or execute it.' An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C.A.6th Cir. 1893); see also Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col.L.Rev. 875, 892 (1949). Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S., at 526, 78 S.Ct. at 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure N8* 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013. To avoid placing such a handicap upon the freedoms of expression, we hold that if the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be contitutionally protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that protection because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression. We hold that such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those operations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - It may be urged that deliberately and maliciously false statements have no conceivable value as free speech. That argument, however, is not responsive to the real issue presented by this case, which is whether that freedom of speech which all agree is constitutionally protected can be effectively safeguarded by a rule allowing the imposition of liability upon a jury's evaluation of the speaker's state of mind. If individual citizens may be held liable in damages for strong words, which a jury finds false and maliciously motivated, there can be little doubt that public debate and advocacy will be constrained.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - This is not to say that the Constitution protects defamatory statements directed against the private conduct of a public official or private citizen. Freedom of press and of speech insures that government will respond to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by peaceful means. Purely private defendant has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amendment. This, of course, cannot be said N48* 'where public officials are concerned or where public matters are involved. * * * (O)ne main function of the First Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.'
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Parties: Henry v. Rock Hill
Date: 1964-04-06
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Parties: Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia
Date: 1964-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly give railroad orkers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, statutory rights which would be vain and futile if the workers could not talk together freely as to the best course to follow. The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal organization necessarily includes the right to select a spokesman from their number who could be expected to give the wisest counsel.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly give railroad orkers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, statutory rights which would be vain and futile if the workers could not talk together freely as to the best course to follow.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The Court depends upon N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), to support its position. But there the vital fact was that the claimed privilege was a 'form of political expression' to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected civil rights. Personal injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a procedure for the settlement of damage claims. No guaranteed civil right is involved.
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Parties: NAACP v. Alabama
Date: 1964-06-01
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Parties: Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.
Date: 1964-06-01
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Parties: Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.
Date: 1964-06-01
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Parties: Baggett v. Bullitt
Date: 1964-06-01
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Parties: NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen
Date: 1964-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N87* N88* N89* 'The prohibition (of the House bill) reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering with freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - '* * * one of the apparent purposes of the amendment is to prevent unions from appealing to the general public as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute. This is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Because of the sweeping language of the House bill, and its implications for freedom of speech, the Senate conferees refused to accede to the House proposal without safeguards for the right of unions to appeal to the public, even by some conduct which might be 'coercive.' The result was the addition of the proviso. But it does not follow from the fact that some coercive conduct was protected by the proviso, that the exception 'other than picketing' indicates that Congress had determined that all consumer picketing was coercive.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Because of the language of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act and the legislative history set out in the opinions of the Court and of my Brother HARLAN, I feel impelled to hold that Congress, in passing this section of the Act, intended to forbid the striking employees of one business to picket the premises of a neutral business where the purpose of the picketing is to persuade customers of the neutral business not to buy goods supplied by the struck employer. Construed in this way, as I agree with Brother HARLAN that it must be, I believe, contrary to his view, that the section abridges freedom of speech and press in violation of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - N90* 'Picketing,' in common parlance and in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), includes at least two concepts: (1) patrolling, that is, standing or marching back and forth or round and round on the street, sidewalks, private property, or elsewhere, generally adjacent to someone else's premises; (2) speech, that is, arguments, usually on a placard, made to persuade other people to take the picketers' side of a controversy. See Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurring in Bakery & Pastry Drivers etc. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775, 62 S.Ct. 816, 819, 86 L.Ed. 1178. See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464—465, 70 S.Ct. 718, 720—721, 94 L.Ed. 985, and concurring opinions at 469, 70 S.Ct. at 723. While 'the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution,' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093, patrolling is, of course, conduct, not speech, and therefore is not directly protected by the First Amendment. It is because picketing includes patrolling that neither Thornhill nor cases that followed it lend 'support to the contention that peaceful picketing is beyond legislative control.' Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499—500, 69 S.Ct. 684, 690, 689, 93 L.Ed. 834. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160—161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155. However, when conduct not constitutionally protected, like patrolling, is intertwined, as in picketing, with constitutionally protected free speech and press, regulation of the non-protected conduct may at the same time encroach on freedom of speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - In short, N91* we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because the picketers are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which all picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express particular views. The result is an abridgment of the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - Congress has given careful and continued consideration to the problems of labor-management relations, and its attempts to effect an accommodation between the right of unions to publicize their position and the social desirability of limiting a form of communication likely to have effects caused by something apart from the message communicated, are entitled to great deference. The decision of Congress to prohibit secondary consumer picketing during labor disputes is, I believe, not inconsistent with the protections of the First Amendment, particularly when, as here, other methods of communication are left open.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - In the debates before passage of the House bill he stated that the amendments applied to consumer picketing of customer entrances to retail stores selling goods manufactured by a concern under strike, if the picketing were designed to N61* 'coerce or to restrain the employer of (the) second establishment, to get him not to do business with the manufacturer * * *,' and further that, 'of course, this bill and any other bill is limited by the constitutional right of free speech. If the purpose of the picketing is to coerce the retailer not to do business with the manufacturer'—then such a boycott could be stopped. (Italics supplied.)
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - No Conference Report was before the Senate when it passed the compromise bill, and it had the benefit only of Senator Kennedy's statement of the purpose of the proviso. He said that the proviso preserved 'the right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods. * * * We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but were able to persuade them to agree that the unions shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop * * * and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing * * *.' (Italics supplied.) This explanation does not compel the conclusion that the Conference Agreement contemplated prohibiting any consumer picketing at a secondary site beyond that which urges the public, in Senator Kennedy's words, to 'refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods.' To read into the Conference Agreement, on the basis of a single statement, an intention to prohibit all consumer picketing at a secondary site would depart from our practice of respecting the congressional policy not to prohibit peaceful picketing except to curb 'isolated evils' spelled out by the Congress itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - While N49* 'the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution,' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093, patrolling is, of course, conduct, not speech, and therefore is not directly protected by the First Amendment. It is because picketing includes patrolling that neither Thornhill nor cases that followed it lend N50* 'support to the contention that peaceful picketing is beyond legislative control.' Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499—500, 69 S.Ct. 684, 690, 689, 93 L.Ed. 834. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160—161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155. However, when conduct not constitutionally protected, like patrolling, is intertwined, as in picketing, with constitutionally protected free speech and press, regulation of the non-protected conduct may at the same time encroach on freedom of speech and press.
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Parties: United States v. Welden
Date: 1964-04-20
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Parties: Jacobellis v. Ohio
Date: 1964-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - N134* Motion pictures are within the ambit of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098. But in Both v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, we held that obscenity is not subject to those guarantees.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - We would reiterate, however, our recognition in Roth that obscenity is excluded from the constitutional protection only because it is 'utterly without redeeming social importance,' and that '(t)he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.' Id., 354 U.S., at 484, 487, 77 S.Ct., at 1310. It follows that material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512, or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N135* My reason for reversing is that I think the conviction of appellant or anyone else for exhibiting a motion picture abridges freedom of the press as safeguarded by the First Amendment, which is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - In this and other cases in this area of the law, which are coming to us in ever-increasing numbers, we are faced with the resolution of rights basic both to individuals and to society as a whole. Specifically, we are called upon to reconcile the right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the Federal Government and virtually every State has had laws proscribing obscenity since the Union was formed, and although this Court has recently decided that obscenity is not within the protection of the First Amendment, neither courts nor legislatures have been able to evolve a truly satisfactory definition of obscenity.In other areas of the law, terms like 'negligence,' although in common use for centuries, have been difficult to define except in the most general manner. Yet the courts have been able to function in such areas with a reasonable degree of efficiency. The obscenity problem, however, is aggravated by the fact that it involves the area of public expression, an area in which a broad range of freedom is vital to our society and is constitutionally protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - But since a mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a 'no evidence' standard, I am unwilling to give the important constitutional right of free expression such limited protection. However, protection of society's right to maintain its moral fiber and the effective administration of justice require that this Court not establish itself as an ultimate censor, in each case reading the entire record, viewing the accused material, and making an independent de novo judgment on the question of obscenity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N39* N40* My reason for reversing is that I think the conviction of appellant or anyone else for exhibiting a motion picture abridges freedom of the press as safeguarded by the First Amendment,
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - N9* Motion pictures are within the ambit of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098. But in Both v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, we held that obscenity is not subject to those guarantees. Application of an obscenity law to suppress a motion picture thus requires ascertainment of the 'dim and uncertain line' that often separates obscenity from constitutionally protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - We do not see how any 'local' definition of the 'community' could properly be employed in delineating the area of expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN pointed out in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, supra, 370 U.S., at 488, 82 S.Ct., at 1437, that a standard based on a particular local community would have N10* 'the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Since the present conviction is based upon exhibition of the film to the public at large and not upon its exhibition to children, the judgment must be reviewed under the strict standard applicable in determining the scope of the expression that is protected by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - N51* Motion pictures are within the ambit of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098. But in Both v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, we held that obscenity is not subject to those guarantees. Application of an obscenity law to suppress a motion picture thus requires ascertainment of the 'dim and uncertain line' that often separates obscenity from constitutionally protected expression.
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Parties: A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas
Date: 1964-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - For if seizure of books precedes an adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of onobscene books.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The Kansas courts may have been right to rely upon the Court's Roth holding in ordering these books burned or otherwise destroyed. For reasons stated in the Roth case in a dissent by MR. JUSTICE DOUBLAS, 354 U.S., at 508, 77 S.Ct., at 1321, in which I joined, I think the Roth case was wrongly decided. It is my belief, as stated in that dissent by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in my concurring opinions in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155, 80 S.Ct. 215, 219, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, and Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1366, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512, and in my dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267, 72 S.Ct. 725, 736, 96 L.Ed. 919, which MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joined, that the Kansas statute ordering the burning of these books is in plain violation of the unequivocal prohibition of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, against 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - In the typical censorship situation material is brought as a matter of course before some administrative authority, who then decides on its propriety. This means that the State establishes an administrative structure whereby all writings are reviewed before publication. By contrast, if the State uses its penal system to punish expression outside permissible bounds, the State does not comprehensively review any form of expression; it merely considers after the event utterances it has reason to suppose may be prohibited. The breadth of its review of expression is therefore much narrower and the danger that protected expression will be repressed is less. The operation of the Kansas statute resembles the operation of a penal rather than a licensing law in this regard since books are not as a matter of course subjected to prepublication state sanctioning but are reviewed only when the State has reason to believe they are obscene.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Any system of censorship, injunction, or seizure may of course to some extent serve to trammel, by delaying distribution or otherwise, freedom of expression; yet so may the threat of criminal prosecution, as this Court noted in Kingsley Books. The bringing of a criminal charge may result in a cessation of distribution during litigation, since even an accused relatively confident of the unlikelihood or impermissibility of conviction may well refuse to take the added risk of further criminal penalties that might obtain if he guesses wrong and continues to disseminate the questionable materials. More fundamentally, the delay argument seems artificial in the context of this case and in the area of obscenity generally. Both the incentive for officials to promote delay and the adverse consequences of delay are considerably less in this area than in the field of political and social expression. If controversial political writings attack those in power, government officials may benefit from suppression although society may suffer. In the area of obscenity, there is less chance that decision-makers will have interests which may affect their estimate of what is constitutionally protected and what is not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N52* 'For the use of these warrants implicates questions whether the procedures leading to their issuance and surrounding their execution were adequate to avoid suppression of constitutionally protected publications. '* * * (T)he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn. * * * The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for * * * sensitive tools * * *.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460. It follows that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity as here involved without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.'
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Parties: Bell v. Maryland
Date: 1964-06-22
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Parties: Aptheker v. Secretary of State
Date: 1964-06-22
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Parties: Stanford v. Texas
Date: 1965-01-18
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Parties: Cox v. La.
Date: 1965-01-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech * * * is * * * protected against censorship or punishment * *. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups."
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light because this was thought to be a means of social protest. Nor could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement. A group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech. See the discussion and cases cited in No. 49, post, at p. 480. We reaffirm the statement of the Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra, 336 U.S., at 502, 69 S.Ct., at 691, that "it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Also inherent in such a system allowing parades or meetings only with the prior permission of an official is the obvious danger to the right of a person or group not to be denied equal protection of the laws. See Niemotko v. State of Maryland, supra, 340 U.S., at 272, 284, 71 S.Ct., at 327, 333; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220. It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - We reaffirm the statement of the Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra, 336 U.S., at 502, 69 S.Ct., at 691, that N114* "it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Both definitions would allow persons to be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views. Yet, a N41* "function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech * * * is * * * protected against censorship or punishment * *. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups." Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131. In Terminiello convictions were not allowed to stand because the trial judge charged that speech of the defendants could be punished as a breach of the peace " 'if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.' " Id., 337 U.S., at 3, 69 S.Ct., at 895. The Louisiana statute, as interpreted by the Louisiana court, is at least as likely to allow conviction for innocent speech as was the charge of the trial judge in Terminiello. Therefore, as in Terminiello and Edwards the conviction under this statute must be reversed as the statute is unconstitutional in that it sweeps within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly. Maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion is a basic tenet of our constitutional democracy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The Sheriff testified that the sole aspect of the program to which he objected was "[t]he inflammatory manner in which he [Cox] addressed that crowd and told them to go on up town, go to four places on the protest list, sit down and if they don't feed you, sit there for one hour." Yet this part of Cox's speech obviously did not deprive the demonstration of its protected character under the Constitution as free speech and assembly.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Yet, a N53* "function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech * * * is * * * protected against censorship or punishment * *. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups." Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131. In Terminiello convictions were not allowed to stand because the trial judge charged that speech of the defendants could be punished as a breach of the peace " 'if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.' " Id., 337 U.S., at 3, 69 S.Ct., at 895. The Louisiana statute, as interpreted by the Louisiana court, is at least as likely to allow conviction for innocent speech as was the charge of the trial judge in Terminiello. Therefore, as in Terminiello and Edwards the conviction under this statute must be reversed as the statute is unconstitutional in that it sweeps within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly.
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Parties: Cox v. Louisiana
Date: 1965-01-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - These authorities make it clear, as the Court said in Giboney, that 'it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - There is a proper time and place for even the most peaceful protest and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all valid laws and regulations. There is an equally plain requirement for laws and regulations to be drawn so as to give citizens fair warning as to what is illegal; for regulation of conduct that involves freedom of speech and assembly not to be so broad in scope as to stifle First Amendment freedoms, which 'need breathing space to survive,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. This does not mean however, that these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned property. See National Labor Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1073, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (concurring opinion). Were the law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes and anywhere else could be compelled to listen against their will to speakers they did not want to hear. Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - Similarly the trial judge noted that although Louisiana respects freedom of speech and the right to picket, Louisiana courts "have held that picketing is unlawful when it is mass picketing."
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - We reaffirm the repeated holdings of this Court that our constitutional command of free speech and assembly is basic and fundamental and encompasses peaceful social protest, so important to the preservation of the freedoms treasured in a democratic society. We also reaffirm the repeated decisions of this Court that there is no place for violence in a democratic society dedicated to liberty under law, and that the right of peaceful protest does not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may do so at any time and at any place.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - cordoning off a public placeorder and libertyThe constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order. A restriction in that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light because this was thought to be a means of social protest. Nor could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement. A group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. This does not mean however, that these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned property. See National Labor Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1073, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (concurring opinion). Were the law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes and anywhere else could be compelled to listen against their will to speakers they did not want to hear. Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - The Louisiana law against obstructing the streets and sidewalks, while applied here so as to convict Negroes for assembling and picketing on streets and sidewalks for the purpose of publicly protesting racial discrimination, expressly provides that the statute shall not bar picketing and assembly by labor unions protesting unfair treatment of union members. I believe that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that if the streets of a town are open to some views, they must be open to all. It is worth noting in passing that the objectives of labor unions and of the group led by Cox here may have much in common. Both frequently protest discrimination against their members in the matter of employment. Compare New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561, 58 S.Ct. 703, 707, 82 L.Ed. 1012. This Louisiana law opens the streets for union assembly, picketing, and public advocacy, while denying that opportunity to groups protesting against racial discrimination. As I said above, I have no doubt about the general power of Louisiana to bar all picketing on its streets and highways. Standing, patrolling, or marching back and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated or prohibited. But by specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. And to deny this appellant and his group use of the streets because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing other groups to use the streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Standing, patrolling, or marching back and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated or prohibited. But by specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. And to deny this appellant and his group use of the streets because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing other groups to use the streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. This does not mean however, that these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned property. See National Labor Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1073, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (concurring opinion). Were the law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes and anywhere else could be compelled to listen against their will to speakers they did not want to hear. Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - Nor does such a statute infringe upon the constitutionally protected rights of free speech and free assembly. The conduct which is the subject of this statute—picketing and parading—is subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association.
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Parties: Garrison v. La.
Date: 1964-11-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - reckless falsehoods unknowing falsehoodsMoreover, even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - I think it is time to face the fact that the only line drawn by the Constitution is between 'speech' on the one side and conduct or overt acts on the other. The two often do blend. I have expressed the idea before: 'Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S., at 514, 77 S.Ct., at 1324 (dissenting opinion). Unless speech is so brigaded with overt acts of that kind there is nothing that may be punished; and no semblance of such a case is made out here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N116* I think it is time to face the fact that the only line drawn by the Constitution is between 'speech' on the one side and conduct or overt acts on the other. The two often do blend. I have expressed the idea before: N117* 'Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S., at 514, 77 S.Ct., at 1324 (dissenting opinion). Unless speech is so brigaded with overt acts of that kind there is nothing that may be punished; and no semblance of such a case is made out here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the same standard to the criminal remedy. Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. And since N11* '* * * erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and * * * it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need * * * to survive' * * *,' 376 U.S., at 271—272, 84 S.Ct. at 721, only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions. For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.
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Parties: United States v. Seeger
Date: 1965-03-08
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Parties: Henry v. Collins
Date: 1965-03-29
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Parties: Dombrowski v. Pfister
Date: 1965-04-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The statutory definition of 'a subversive organization' in § 359(5) incorporated in the offense created s 364(4), is substantially identical to that of the Washington statute which we considered in Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, 377 U.S., at 362, 363, n. 1, 84 S.Ct., at 1318. There the definition was used in a state statute requiring state employees to take an oath as a condition of employment. We held that the definition, as well as the oath based thereon, denied due process because it was unduly vague, uncertain and broad. Where, as here, protected freedoms of expression and association are similarly involved, we see no controlling distinction in the fact that the definition is used to provide a standard of criminality rather than the contents of a test oath. This overly broad statute also creates a 'danger zone' within which protected expression may be inhibited. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460. So long as the statute remains available to the State the threat of prosecutions of protected expression is a real and substantial one. Even the prospect of ultimate failure of such prosecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on protected expression.
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Parties: American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. Subversive Activities Control Board
Date: 1965-04-26
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Parties: Freedman v. Maryland
Date: 1965-03-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, N44* 'Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires * * * that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N42* On several occasions I have indicated my view that movies are entitled to the same degree and kind of protection under the First Amendment as other forms of expression. Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 588, 74 S.Ct. 286, 98 L.Ed. 329; Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 697, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1369, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512; Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78, 81 S.Ct. 391, 410, 5 L.Ed.2d 406. For the reasons there stated, I do not believe any form of censorship—no matter how speedy or prolonged it may be—is permissible. As I see it, a pictorial presentation occupies as preferred a position as any other form of expression. If censors are banned from the publishing business, from the pulpit, from the public platform—as they are—they should be banned from the theatre.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N43* The administration of a censorship system for motion pictures presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court—part of an independent branch of government—to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - The Maryland scheme fails to provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression, and this renders the § 2 requirement of prior submission of films to the Board an invalid previous restraint.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N54* Although the Court has said that motion pictures are not N55* 'necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression,' Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781, 96 L.Ed. 1098, it is as true here as of other forms of expression that N56* '(a)ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, 372 U.S. at 70, 83 S.Ct. at 639. N57* '* * * (U)nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity * * * without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.' Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127. The administration of a censorship system for motion pictures presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court—part of an independent branch of government—to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, N58* 'Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires * * * that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech.'
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Parties: Zemel v. Rusk
Date: 1965-05-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, political and other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Without those contacts First Amendment rights suffer. That is why in Kent v. Dulles, supra, we said that freedom of movement has 'large social values.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - In view of the different types of need for area restrictions asserted by the Government, the various reasons for travel abroad, the importance and constitutional underpinnings of the right of citizens and a free press to gather information about foreign countries—considerations which Congress did not focus upon—I would not infer, as the Court does, that Congress resolved the complex problem of area restrictions, which necessarily involves reconciling the rights of the citizen to travel with the Government's legitimate needs, by the re-enactment of a statute that history shows was designed to centralize authority to issue passports in the Secretary of State so as to prevent abuses arising from their issuance by unauthorized persons. Since I conclude that the Executive does not possess inherent power to impose area restrictions in peacetime, and that Congress has not considered the issue or granted such authority to the Executive, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - Speech plusAs I have said, the right to travel is at the periphery of the First Amendment, rather than at its core, largely because travel is, of course, more than speech: it is speech brigaded with conduct.
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Parties: Lamont v. Postmaster General
Date: 1965-05-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Here the Congress—expressly restrained by the First Amendment from 'abridging' freedom of speech and of press—is the actor. The Act sets administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail. Just as the licensing or taxing authorities in the Lovell, Thomas, and Murdock cases sought to control the flow of ideas to the public, so here federal agencies regulate the flow of mail. We do not have here, any more than we had in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 66 S.Ct. 456, 90 L.Ed. 586, any question concerning the extent to which Congress may classify the mail and fix the charges for its carriage. Nor do we reach the question whether the standard here applied could pass constitutional muster. Nor do we deal with the right of Customs to inspect material from abroad for contraband. We rest on the narrow ground that the addressee in order to receive his mail must request in writing that it be delivered. This amounts in our judgment to an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884; NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992. I think the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.
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Parties: Griswold v. Connecticut
Date: 1965-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - I n other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read (Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313) and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195, 73 S.Ct. 215, 220, 97 L.Ed. 216) indeed the freedom of the entire university community.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The right of 'association,' like the right of belief (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178), is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516—522, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - Had the doctor defendant here, or even the nondoctor defendant, been convicted for doing nothing more than expressing opinions to persons coming to the clinic that certain contraceptive devices, medicines or practices would do them good and would be desirable, or for telling people how devices could be used, I can think of no reasons at this time why their expressions of views would not be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which guarantee freedom of speech. Cf. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 12 L.Ed.2d 89; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. But speech is one thing; conduct and physical activities are quite another. See, e.g., Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554—555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471; Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563—564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 480, 13 L.Ed.2d 487; id., 575—584 (concurring opinion); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834; cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163—164, 25 L.Ed. 244. The two defendants here were active participants in an organization which gave physical examinations to women, advised them what kind of contraceptive devices or medicines would most likely be satisfactory for them, and then supplied the devices themselves, all for a graduated scale of fees, based on the family income. Thus these defendants admittedly engaged with others in a planned course of conduct to help people violate the Connecticut law. Merely because some speech was used in carrying on the conduct just as in ordinary life some speech accompanies most kinds of conduct—we are not in my view justified in holding that the First Amendment forbids the State to punish their conduct. Strongly as I desire to protect all First Amendment freedoms, I am unable to stretch the Amendment so as to afford protection to the conduct of these defendants in violating the Connecticut law. What would be the constitutional fate of the law if hereafter applied to punish nothing but speech is, as I have said, quite another matter.
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Parties: Estes v. Texas
Date: 1965-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 114 - So long as the television industry, like the other communications media, is free to send representatives to trials and to report on those trials to its viewers, there is no abridgment of the freedom of press. The right of the communications media to comment on court proceedings does not bring with it the right to inject themselves into the fabric of the trial process to alter the purpose of that process.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court proceedings. While maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this important function in a democratic society its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process. While the state and federal courts have differed over what spectators may be excluded from a criminal trial, 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834 (3d ed. 1940), the amici curiae brief of the National Association of Broadcasters and the Radio Television News Directors Association, says, as indeed it must, that 'neither of these two amendments (First and Sixth) speaks of an unlimited right of access to the courtroom on the part of the broadcasting media. * * *'
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Segment in Paragraph: 123 - Thus the right of 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the accused, and inhering in the institutional process by which justice is administered. Obviously, the publictrial guarantee is not violated if an individual member of the public cannot gain admittance to a courtroom because there are no available seats. The guarantee will already have been met, for the 'public' will be present in the form of those persons who did gain admission. Even the actual presence of the public is not guaranteed. A public trial implies only that the court must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum, and observe the trial process. It does not give anyone a concomitant right to photograph, record, broadcast, or otherwise transmit the trial proceedings to those members of the public not present, although to be sure, the guarantee of public trial does not of itself prohibit such activity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 124 - N279* N280* The rights to print and speak, over television as elsewhere, do not embody an independent right to bring the mechanical facilities of the broadcasting and printing industries into the courtroom. Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 112 - Nor does the exclusion of television cameras from the courtroom in any way impinge upon the freedoms of speech and the press. Court proceedings, as well as other public matters, are proper subjects for press coverage.
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Segment in Paragraph: 124 - N115* The free speech and press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are also asserted as embodying a positive right to televise trials, but the argument is greatly overdrawn.Unquestionably, television has become a very effective medium for transmitting news. Many trials are newsworthy, and televising them might well provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to the public. Furthermore, television is capable of performing an educational function by acquainting the public with the judicial process in action. Albeit these are credible policy arguments in favor of television, they are not arguments of constitutional proportions. The rights to print and speak, over television as elsewhere, do not embody an independent right to bring the mechanical facilities of the broadcasting and printing industries into the courtroom. Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Within the courthouse the only relevant constitutional consideration is that the accused be accorded a fair trial. If the presence of television substantially detracts from that goal, due process requires that its use be forbidden.
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Segment in Paragraph: 177 - While no First Amendment claim is made in this case, there are intimations in the opinions filed by my Brethren in the majority which strike me as disturbingly alien to the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees against federal or state interference with the free communication of information and ideas. The suggestion that there are limits upon the public's right to know what goes on in the courts causes me deep concern. The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of justifying its presence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption must lie in the area of First Amendment freedoms. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460. And the proposition that nonparticipants in a trial might get the 'wrong impression' from unfettered reporting and commentary contains an invitation to censorship which I cannot accept. Where there is no disruption of the N45* 'essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice,' '(f)reedom of discussion should be given the widest range.'
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Parties: Brown v. Louisiana
Date: 1966-02-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The Constitution of the State of Louisiana reiterates these guaranties. See Art. I, §§ 3, 5. As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights are no confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and religion, it does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - It is high time to challenge the assumption in which too many people have too long acquiesced, that groups that think they have been mistreated or that have actually been mistreated have a constitutional right to use the public's streets, buildings, and property to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want, without regard to whom such conduct may disturb.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - But I have never thought and do not now think that the First Amendment can sustain the startling doctrine the prevailing opinion here creates. The First Amendment, I think protects speech, writings, and expression of views in any manner in which they can be legitimately and validly communicated. But I have never believed that it gives any person or group of persons the constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they please, without regard to the rights of private or public property or to state law. Indeed a majority of this Court said as much in Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574, 85 S.Ct. 476, 485, 13 L.Ed.2d 487. Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and religion, it does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - The First Amendment, I think protects speech, writings, and expression of views in any manner in which they can be legitimately and validly communicated. But I have never believed that it gives any person or group of persons the constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they please, without regard to the rights of private or public property or to state law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - In Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551—552, 85 S.Ct. 453, 463, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, the Court declared this statute as construed unconstitutional for overbreadth: it N59* 'is unconstitutional in that it sweeps within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly.' This holding was concurred in by my Brothers Black, 379 U.S. 559, at 576—580, 85 S.Ct. 466, at 467—470, Harlan and White, id., at 591, 85 S.Ct. at 475. No limiting construction or legislative revision has intervened, and no circumstance of this case makes that declaration of invalidity less controlling here. The overbreadth of the statute recognized in Cox therefore requires the reversal of these convictions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The danger posed by the Louisiana courts' definition of 'breach of the peace'—that it might sweep within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected—is no less present when read in conjunction with 'public building' than when read with 'public street' and 'public sidewalk.' The constitutional protection for conduct in a public building undertaken to desegregate governmental services provided therein derives from both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, petition and assembly, and the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against racial segregation of governmental services and facilities. Overbreadth in the public building phase might inhibit the exercise of these constitutional rights by threatening punishment of the initial efforts to secure such desegregation.
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Parties: A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass.
Date: 1966-03-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - The Constitution forbids abridgment of 'freedom of speech, or of the press.' Censorship is the most notorious form of abridgment. It substitutes majority rule where minority tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - 'Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question in that body (Parliament), the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British Constitution."
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - To me it is plain, for instance, that Fanny Hill does not fall within this class and could not be barred from the federal mails. If further articulation is meaningful, I would characterize as 'hard-core' that prurient material that is patently offensive or whose indecency is self-demonstrating and I would describe it substantially as does Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion in Ginzburg, 383 U.S., p. 499, 86 S.Ct., p. 957. The Federal Government may be conceded a limited interest in excluding from the mails such gross pornography, almost universally condemned in this country. But I believe the dangers of national censorship and the existence of primary responsibility at the state level amply justify drawing the line at this point.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - I base my vote to reverse on my view that the First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression not brigaded with illegal action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - Four of the seven Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court conclude that Fanny Hill is obscene. 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403. Four of the seven judges of the New York Court of Appeals conclude that it is not obscene. Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71, 200 N.E.2d 760. To outlaw the book on such a voting record would be to let majorities rule where minorities were thought to be supreme. The Constitution forbids abridgment of 'freedom of speech, or of the press.' Censorship is the most notorious form of abridgment. It substitutes majority rule where minority tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - But the First Amendment, written in terms that are absolute, deprives the States of any power to pass on the value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression. Cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University, 360 U.S. 684, 688—689, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1365—1366, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098. Perhaps the most frequently assigned justication for censorship is the belief that erotica produce antisocial sexual conduct. But that relationship has yet to be proven. Indeed, if one were to make judgments on the basis of speculation, one might guess that literature of the most pornographic sort would, in many cases, provide a substitute—not a stimulus—for antisocial sexual conduct. See Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 Wayne L.Rev. 655, 661 and n. 19 (1964). As I read the First Amendment, judges cannot gear the literary diet of an entire nation to whatever tepid stuff is incapable of triggering the most demented mind. The First Amendment demands more than a horrible example or two of the perpetrator of a crime of sexual violence, in whose pocket is found a pornographic book, before it allows the Nation to be saddled with a regime of censorship.
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Parties: Ginzburg v. United States
Date: 1966-03-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - This group, like those embracing masochism, are anathema to the so-called stable majority. But why is freedom of the press and expression denied them? Are they to be barred from communicating in symbolisms important to them? When the Court today speaks of 'social value,' does it mean a 'value' to the majority? Why is not a minority 'value' cognizable?
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - This leads me to the conclusion, previously noted, that the First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed—whether orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive. I do not think it permissible to draw lines between the 'good' and the 'bad' and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone. If our Constitution permitted 'reasonable' regulation of freedom of expression, as do the constitutions of some nations, we would be in a field where the legislative and the judiciary would have much leeway. But under our charter all regulation or control of expression is barred. Government does not sit to reveal where the 'truth' is. People are left to pick and choose between competing offerings. There is no compulsion to take and read what is repulsive any more than there is to spend one's time poring over government bulletins, political tracts, or theological treatises. The theory is that people are mature enough to pick and choose, to recognize trash when they see it, to be attracted to the literature that satisfies their deepest need, and, hopefully, to move from plateau to plateau and finally reach the world of enduring ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - There does exist a distinct and easily identifiable class of material in which all of these elements coalesce. It is that, and that alone, which I think government may constitutionally suppress, whether by criminal or civil sanctions. I have referred to such material before as hardcore pornography, without trying further to define it. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, at 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, at 1683 (concurring opinion). In order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, I have set out in the margin a description, borrowed from the Solicitor General's brief, of the kind of thing to which I have reference. See also Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - My conclusion is that certainly after the fourteen separate opinions handed down in these three cases today no person, not even the most learned judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing in advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by this Court whether certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity' as that term is confused by the Court today. For this reason even if, as appears from the result of the three cases today, this country is far along the way to a censorship of the subjects about which the people can talk or write, we need not commit further constitutional transgressions by leaving people in the dark as to what literature or what words or what symbols if distributed through the mails make a man a criminal. As bad and obnoxious as I believe governmental censorship is in a Nation that has accepted the First Amendment as its basic ideal for freedom, I am compelled to say that censorship that would stamp certain books and literature as illegal in advance of publication or conviction would in some ways be preferable to the unpredictable book-by-book censorship into which we have now drifted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - I close this part of my dissent by saying once again that I think the First Amendment forbids any kind or type or nature of governmental censorship over views as distinguished from conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Though I do not suggest any way to solve the problems that may arise from sex or discussions about sex, of one thing I am confident, and that is that federal censorship is not the answer to these problems. I find it difficult to see how talk about sex can be placed under the kind of censorship the Court here approves without subjecting our society to more dangers than we can anticipate at the moment. It was to avoid exactly such dangers that the First Amendment was written and adopted. For myself I would follow the course which I believe is required by the First Amendment, that is, recognize that sex at least as much as any other aspect of life is so much a part of our society that its discussion should not be made a crime.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - We perceive no threat to First Amendment guarantees in thus holding that in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with respect to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth test. No weight is ascribed to the fact that petitioners have profited from the sale of publications which we have assumed but do not hold cannot themselves be adjudged obscene in the abstract; to sanction consideration of this fact might indeed induce self-censorship, and offend the frequently stated principle that commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment. Rather, the fact that each of these publications was created or exploited entirely on the basis of its appeal to prurient interests strengthens the conclusion that the transactions here were sales of illicit merchandise, not sales of constitutionally protected matter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - I think this is the ideal of the Free Society written into our Constitution. We have no business acting as censors or endowing any group with censorship powers. It is shocking to me for us to send to prison anyone for publishing anything, especially tracts so distant from any incitement to action as the ones before us.
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - Censorship reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself. It is a hallmark of an authoritarian regime. Long ago those who wrote our First Amendment charted a different course. They believed a society can be truly strong only when it is truly free. In the realm of expression they put their faith, for better or for worse, in the enlightened choice of the people, free from the interference of a policeman's intrusive thumb or a judge's heavy hand. So it is that the Constitution protects coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity no less than elegance. A book worthless to me may convey something of value to my neighbor. In the free society to which our Constitution has committed us, it is for each to choose for himself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - the frequently stated principle that commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment. Rather, the fact that each of these publications was created or exploited entirely on the basis of its appeal to prurient interests strengthens the conclusion that the transactions here were sales of illicit merchandise, not sales of constitutionally protected matter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - Because such is the mandate of our Constitution, there is room for only the most restricted view of this Court's decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. In that case the Court held that N60* 'obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.' Id., at 485, 77 S.Ct., at 1309. The Court there characterized obscenity as that which is N61* 'utterly without redeeming social importance,' id., at 484, 77 S.Ct., at 1309, N62* 'deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest,' id., at 487, 77 S.Ct., at 1310, and N63* 'goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.' Id., at 487, n. 20, 77 S.Ct., at 1310. In Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 8 L.Ed.2d 639, I joined Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion adding 'patent indecency' as a further essential element of that which is not constitutionally protected.
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Parties: Mishkin v. New York
Date: 1966-03-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Accordingly, I wish once more to express my objections to saddling this Court with the irksome and inevitably unpopular and unwholesome task of finally deciding by a case-by-case, sight-by-sight personal judgment of the members of this Court what pornography (whatever that means) is too hard core for people to see or read. If censorship of views about sex or any other subject is constitutional then I am reluctantly compelled to say that I believe the tedious, time-consuming and unwelcome responsibility for finally deciding what particular discussions or opinions must be suppressed in this country, should, for the good of this Court and of the Nation, be vested in some governmental institution or institutions other than this Court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - Distorting or stretching that Amendment by reading it as granting unreviewable power to this Court to perform the legislative function of fixing punishments for all state and national offenses offers a sadly inadequate solution to the multitudinous problems generated by what I consider to be the un-American policy of censoring the thoughts and opinions of people. The only practical answer to these concededly almost unanswerable problems is, I think, for this Court to decline to act as a national board of censors over speech and press but instead to stick to its clearly authorized constitutional duty to adjudicate cases over things and conduct. Halfway censorship methods, no matter how laudably motivated, cannot in my judgment protect our cherished First Amendment freedoms from the destructive aggressions of both state and national government. I would reverse this case and announce that the First and Fourteenth Amendments taken together command that neither Congress nor the States shall pass laws which in any manner abridge freedom of speech and press—whatever the subjects discussed. I think the Founders of our Nation in adopting the First Amendment meant precisely that the Federal Government should pass 'no law' regulating speech and press but should confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct.
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Parties: Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers
Date: 1966-02-21
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Parties: Rosenblatt v. Baer
Date: 1966-02-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - Unconditional freedom to criticize the way such public functions are performed is in my judgment necessarily included in the guarantees of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - I think the publication here, discussing the way an agent of government does his governmental job, is the very kind that the First Amendment was adopted primarily to protect. The article here sued on as libelous discusses the use of the public's money to take care of the public's business by a paid agent of the public. Unconditional freedom to criticize the way such public functions are performed is in my judgment necessarily included in the guarantees of the First Amendment. And the right to criticize a public agent engaged in public activities cannot safely, and should not, depend upon whether or not that agent is arbitrarily labeled a 'public official.' Nor should the right to criticize depend upon how high a position in government a public agent may occupy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The only sure way to protect speech and press against these threats is to recognize that libel laws are abridgments of speech and press and therefore are barred in both federal and state courts by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I repeat what I said in the New York Times case that N260* 'An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.'
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Parties: De Gregory v. Attorney Gen. of New Hampshire
Date: 1966-04-04
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Parties: Elfbrandt v. Russell
Date: 1966-04-18
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Parties: Ashton v. Kentucky
Date: 1966-05-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
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Parties: Mills v. Alabama
Date: 1966-05-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the one here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the one here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.
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Parties: Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter
Date: 1966-04-19
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Parties: Gojack v. United States
Date: 1966-06-13
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Parties: Georgia v. Rachel
Date: 1966-06-20
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Parties: Greenwood v. Peacock
Date: 1966-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - 'By permitting determination of the invalidity of these statutes without regard to the permissibility of some regulation on the facts of particular cases, we have, in effect, avoided making vindication of freedom of expression await the outcome of protracted litigation. Moreover, we have not thought that the improbability of successful prosecution makes the case different. The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.'
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Parties: Bond v. Floyd
Date: 1966-12-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected. The State argues that the New York Times principle should not be extended to statements by a legislator because the policy of encouraging free debate about governmental operations only applies to the citizencritic of his government. We find no support for this distinction in the New York Times case or in any other decision of this Court. The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constitutents can be fully informed by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person they have elected to represent them. We therefore hold that the disqualification of Bond from membership in the Georgia House because of his statements violated Bond's right of free expression under the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - Thus, we do not quarrel with the State's contention that the oath provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions do not violate the First Amendment. But this requirement does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. Such a power could be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to dissent from national or state policy or that of a majority of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loyalty to the Constitution. Certainly there can be no question but that the First Amendment protects expressions in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam and to the Selective Service system.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - TThe interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constitutents can be fully informed by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person they have elected to represent them. We therefore hold that the disqualification of Bond from membership in the Georgia House because of his statements violated Bond's right of free expression under the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Of course, a State may constitutionally require an oath to support the Constitution from its legislators which it does not require of its private citizens. But this difference in treatment does not support the exclusion of Bond, for while the State has an interest in requiring its legislators to swear to a belief in constitutional processes of government, surely the oath gives it no interest in limiting its legislators' capacity to discuss their views of local or national policy. The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. The central commitment of the First Amendment, as summarized in the opinion of the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), is that N12* 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' We think the rationale of the New York Times case disposes of the claim that Bond's statements fell outside the range of constitutional protection. Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected.
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Parties: Time, Inc. v. Hill
Date: 1967-01-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - 'The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of * * * (freedom of the press).' Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 667, 92 L.Ed. 840. Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in such a case than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if innocent or merely negligent, '* * * it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need * * * to survive' * * *.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S., at 271—272, 84 S.Ct., at 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. As James Madison said, 'Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing, and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.' 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 571 (1876 ed.). We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be a most elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society. Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense involved in their defense, must inevitably cause publishers to 'steer * * * wider of the unlawful zone,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - I acquiesce in the application here of the narrower constitutional view of New York Times with the belief that this doctrine too is bound to pass away as its application to new cases proves its inadequacy to protect freedom of the press from destruction in libel cases and other cases like this one. The words'malicious' and particularly 'reckless disregard of the truth' can never serve as effective substitutes for the First Amendment words: '* * * make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - As intimated in my separate opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 and in the opinion of my Brother BLACK in the same case, id., at 94, 86 S.Ct., at 680, state action to abridge freedom of the press is barred by the First and Fourteenth Amendments where the discussion concerns matters in the public domain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The 'freedom of the press' guaranteed by the First Amendment, and as reflected in the Fourteenth, cannot be thought to insulate all press conduct from review and responsibility for harm inflicted. The majority would allow sanctions against such conduct only when it is morally culpable. I insist that it can also be reached when it creates a severe risk of irremediable harm to individuals involuntarily exposed to it and powerless to protect themselves against it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - I do not believe that we must or should, in deference to those whose views are absolute as to the scope of the First Amendment, be ingenious to strike down all state action, however circumspect, which penalizes the use of words as instruments of aggression and personal assault. There are great and important values in our society, none of which is greater than those reflected in the First Amendment, but which are also fundamental and entitled to this Court's careful respect and protection. Among these is the right to privacy, which has been eloquently extolled by scholars and members of this Court. Judge Cooley long ago referred to this right as the right 'to be let alone.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N65* 'The use of calculated falsehood * * * would put a different cast on the constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published * * * should enjoy a like immunity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Finally, if the judicial balancing choice of constitutional changes is to be adopted by this Court, I could wish it had not started on the First Amendment. The freedoms guaranteed by that Amendment are essential freedoms in a government like ours. That Amendment was deliberately written in language designed to put its freedoms beyond the reach of government to change while it remained unrepealed. If judges have, however, by their own fiat today created a right of privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free press that the Constitution created, then tomorrow and the next day and the next, judges can create more rights that balance away other cherished Bill of Rights freedoms. If there is any one thing that could strongly indicate that the Founders were wrong in reposing so much trust in a free press, I would suggest that it would be for the press itself not to wake up to the grave danger to its freedom, inherent and certain in this 'weighing process.' Life's conduct here was at most a mere understandable and incidental error of fact in reporting a newsworthy event. One does not have to be a prophet to foresee that judgments like the one we here reverse can frighten and punish the press so much that publishers will cease trying to report news in a lively and readable fashion as long as there is—and there always will be doubt as to the complete accuracy of the newsworthy facts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - I do not believe that the First Amendment precludes effective protection of the right of privacy—or, for that matter, an effective law of libel. I do not believe that we must or should, in deference to those whose views are absolute as to the scope of the First Amendment, be ingenious to strike down all state action, however circumspect, which penalizes the use of words as instruments of aggression and personal assault.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - Particularly where the right of privacy is invaded by words—by the press or in a book or pamphlet the most careful and sensitive appraisal of the total impact of the claimed tort upon the congeries of rights is required. I have no hesitancy to say, for example, that where political personalities or issues are involved or where the event as to which the alleged invasion of privacy occurred is in itself a matter of current public interest, First Amendment values are supreme and are entitled to at least the types of protection that this Court extended in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). But I certainly concur with the Court that the greatest solicitude for the First Amendment does not compel us to deny to a State the right to provide a remedy for reckless falsity in writing and publishing an article which irresponsibly and injuriously invades the privacy of a quiet family for no purpose except dramatic interest and commercial appeal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - Particularly where the right of privacy is invaded by words—by the press or in a book or pamphlet the most careful and sensitive appraisal of the total impact of the claimed tort upon the congeries of rights is required. I have no hesitancy to say, for example, that where political personalities or issues are involved or where the event as to which the alleged invasion of privacy occurred is in itself a matter of current public interest, First Amendment values are supreme and are entitled to at least the types of protection that this Court extended in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). But I certainly concur with the Court that the greatest solicitude for the First Amendment does not compel us to deny to a State the right to provide a remedy for reckless falsity in writing and publishing an article which irresponsibly and injuriously invades the privacy of a quiet family for no purpose except dramatic interest and commercial appeal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - I acquiesce in the application here of the narrower constitutional view of New York Times with the belief that this doctrine too is bound to pass away as its application to new cases proves its inadequacy to protect freedom of the press from destruction in libel cases and other cases like this one. The words 'malicious' and particularly 'reckless disregard of the truth' can never serve as effective substitutes for the First Amendment words: '* * * make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.' Experience, I think, is bound to prove that First Amendment freedoms can no more be permanently diluted or abridged by this Court's action than could the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel. I think the fate that befell Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799), is already foreseeable, even if only dimly, for the New York Times' dilution of First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - I do not believe that the First Amendment precludes effective protection of the right of privacy—or, for that matter, an effective law of libel. I do not believe that we must or should, in deference to those whose views are absolute as to the scope of the First Amendment, be ingenious to strike down all state action, however circumspect, which penalizes the use of words as instruments of aggression and personal assault. There are great and important values in our society, none of which is greater than those reflected in the First Amendment, but which are also fundamental and entitled to this Court's careful respect and protection. Among these is the right to privacy, which has been eloquently extolled by scholars and members of this Court. Judge Cooley long ago referred to this right as the right N118* 'to be let alone.' In 1890, Warren and Brandeis published their famous article 'The Right to Privacy,' in which they eloquently argued that theN119* 'excesses' of the press in 'overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency' made it essential that the law recognize a right to privacy, distinct from traditional remedies for defamation, to protect private individuals against the unjustifiable infliction of mental pain and distress.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093. 'No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be a most elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - I, too, believe that freedom of the press, of speech, assembly, and religion, and the freedom to petition are of the essence of our liberty and fundamental to our values. See, e.g., Brown v. State of Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966). I agree with the statement of my Brother Brennan, speaking for the Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), that 'These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.' But I do not believe that whatever is in words, however much of an aggression it may be upon individual rights, is beyond the reach of the law, no matter how heedless of others' rights—how remote from public purpose, how reckless, irresponsible, and untrue it may be. I do not believe that the First Amendment precludes effective protection of the right of privacy—or, for that matter, an effective law of libel. I do not believe that we must or should, in deference to those whose views are absolute as to the scope of the First Amendment, be ingenious to strike down all state action, however circumspect, which penalizes the use of words as instruments of aggression and personal assault. There are great and important values in our society, none of which is greater than those reflected in the First Amendment, but which are also fundamental and entitled to this Court's careful respect and protection. Among these is the right to privacy, which has been eloquently extolled by scholars and members of this Court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - The words 'malicious' and particularly 'reckless disregard of the truth' can never serve as effective substitutes for the First Amendment words: '* * * make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.' Experience, I think, is bound to prove that First Amendment freedoms can no more be permanently diluted or abridged by this Court's action than could the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel. I think the fate that befell Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799), is already foreseeable, even if only dimly, for the New York Times' dilution of First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Two essential principles seem to underlie the Court's rejection of the mere falsity criterion in New York Times. The first is the inevitability of some error in the situation presented in free debate especially when abstract matters are under consideration. Certainly that is illustrated here in the difficulty to be encountered in making a precise description of the relationship between the Hill incident and The Desperate Hours. The second is the Court's recognition that in many areas which are at the center of public debate 'truth' is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to the pre-existing prejudices of a jury the determination of what is 'true' may effectively institute a system of censorship. Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heritage cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity. See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213. 'The marketplace of ideas' where it functions still remains the best testing ground for truth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - I acquiesce in the application here of the narrower constitutional view of New York Times with the belief that this doctrine too is bound to pass away as its application to new cases proves its inadequacy to protect freedom of the press from destruction in libel cases and other cases like this one. The words 'malicious' and particularly 'reckless disregard of the truth' can never serve as effective substitutes for the First Amendment words: '* * * make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.' Experience, I think, is bound to prove that First Amendment freedoms can no more be permanently diluted or abridged by this Court's action than could the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. N13* 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093. N14* 'No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression.' Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 269, 62 S.Ct. 190, 196, 86 L.Ed. 192. We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest. N15* 'The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of * * * (freedom of the press).' Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 667, 92 L.Ed. 840. Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in such a case than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if innocent or merely negligent, N16* />'* * * it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need * * * to survive' * * *.'
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Parties: Adderley v. Florida
Date: 1966-11-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - That interpretation is, of course, binding on us, leaving only the question of whether conviction of the state offense, thus defined, unconstitutionally deprives petitioners of their rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition. We hold it does not. The sheriff, as jail custodian, had power, as the state courts have here held, to direct that this large crowd of people get off the grounds. There is not a shred of evidence in this record that this power was exercised, or that its exercise was sanctioned by the lower courts, because the sheriff objected to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed with the objectives of their protest. The record reveals that he objected only to their presence on that part of the jail grounds reserved for jail uses. There is no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large groups of the public been permitted to gather on this portion of the jail grounds for any purpose. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff's order to remove themselves from what amounted to the curtilage of the jailhouse. The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this 'area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate * * *.' Such an argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra, at 554—555 and 563—564, 85 S.Ct. at 464 and 480. We reject it again. The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - N62* Such was the case of Edwards v. South Carolina, where aggrieved people N63* 'peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government' to express their grievances to the citizens of the State as well as to the legislature. 372 U.S., at 235, 83 S.Ct., at 683. Edwards was in the tradition of Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049, where the public streets were said to be N64* 'immemorially associated' with 'the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions.' Id., at 574, 61 S.Ct., at 765. When we allow Florida to construe her 'malicious trespass' statute to bar a person from going on property knowing it is not his own and to apply that prohibition to public property, we discard Cox and Edwards. Would the case be any different if, as is common, the demonstration took place outside a building which housed both the jail and the legislative body? I think not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff's order to remove themselves from what amounted to the curtilage of the jailhouse. The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this 'area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate * * *.' Such an argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra, at 554—555 and 563—564, 85 S.Ct. at 464 and 480. We reject it again. The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.
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Parties: Garrity v. N.J.
Date: 1967-01-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N66* 'The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - 'The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.' Id., at 220, 29 N.E., at 517—518.
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Parties: Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents
Date: 1967-01-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - But even the Feinberg Law provision, applicable primarily to activities of teachers, who have captive audiences of young minds, are subject to these limitations in favor of freedom of expression and association; the stifling effect on the academic mind from curtailing freedom of association in such manner is manifest, and has been documented in recent studies.
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 -
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - The issue here is a very narrow one. It is not freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, or of association, even in the Communist Party. It is simply this: May the State provide that one who, after a hearing with full judicial review, is found to have wilfully and deliberately advocated, advised, or taught that our Government should be overthrown by force or violence or other unlawful means; or to have wilfully and deliberately printed, published, etc., any book or paper that so advocated and to have personally advocated such doctrine himself; or to have wilfully and deliberately become a member of an organization that advocates such doctrine, is prima facie disqualified from teaching in its university? My answer, in keeping with all of our cases up until today, is 'Yes'!
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The Court also stated that a teacher denied employment because of membership in a listed organization N67* 'is not thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice.'
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Parties: Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham
Date: 1967-04-17
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Parties: Redrup v. New York
Date: 1967-05-08
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Parties: Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts
Date: 1967-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279—280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, this Court held that '(t)he constitutional guarantees (of freedom of speech and press) require * * * a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - '(t)he guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs * * *.' and affirmed that freedom of discussion 'must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The modern history of the guarantee of freedom of speech and press mainly has been one of a search for the outer limits of that right. From the fountainhead opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Schenck, Abrams, and Whitney, which considered the problem when the disruptive effects of speech might strip the protection from the speaker, to our recent decision in Adderley v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, where we found freedom of speech not to include a freedom to trespass, the Court's primary concern has been to determine the extent of the right and the surrounding safeguards necessary to give it 'breathing space.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - It is significant that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press falls between the religious guarantees and the guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances in the text of the First Amendment, the principles of which are carried to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It partakes of the nature of both, for it is as much a guarantee to individuals of their personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community, see Holt, Of the Liberty of the Press, in Nelson, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court 18—19, as it is a social necessity required for the 'maintenance of our political system and an open society.' Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, 385 U.S., at 389, 87 S.Ct., at 543. It is because of the personal nature of this right that we have rejected all manner of prior restraint on publication, Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Federal securities regulation, mail fraud statutes, and common-law actions for deceit and misrepresentation are only some examples of our understanding that the right to communicate information of public interest is not 'unconditional.' See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1191. However, as our decision in New York Times makes explicit, while protected activity may in some respects be subjected to sanctions, it is not open to all forms of regulation. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent 'the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential * * *.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - But the basic theory of libel has not changed, and words defamatory of another are still placed 'in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.' Prosser, The Law of Torts § 108, at 792. Thus some antithesis between freedom of speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - N95* Our resolution of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in the context of the numerous statutes and cases which allow ideologically neutral, and generally applicable regulatory measures to be applied to publication, makes clear, however, that neither the interests of the publisher nor those of society necessarily preclude a damage award based on improper conduct which creates a false publication. It is the conduct element, therefore, on which we must principally focus if we are successfully to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions and the freedom of speech and press. Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to content of the speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair balance between the interests of the community in free circulation of information and those of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done by the circulation of defamatory falsehood.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Cf. Sulzberger, Responsibility and Freedom, in Nelson, Freedom of the Press from
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not subject to the restraints of the political process, 'public figures,' like 'public officials,' often play an influential role in ordering society. And surely as a class these 'public figures' have as ready access as 'public officials' to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.' The fact that they are not amenable to the restraints of the political process only underscores the legitimate and substantial nature of the interest, since it means that public opinion may be the only instrument by which society can attempt to influence their conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - I am satisfied that the evidence here discloses that degree of reckless disregard for the truth of which we spoke in New York Times andGarrison. Freedom of the press under the First Amendment does not include absolute license to destroy lives or careers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - The law of libel has, of course, changed substantially since the early days of the Republic, and this change is N68* 'the direct consequence of the friction between it * * * and the highly cherished right of free speech.' State v. Browne, 86 N.J.Super. 217, 228, 206 A.2d 591, 597. The emphasis has shifted from criminal to civil remedies, from the protection of absolute social values to the safeguarding of valid personal interests. Truth has become an absolute defense in almost all cases, and privileges designed to foster free communication are almost universally recognized. But the basic theory of libel has not changed, and words defamatory of another are still placed N69* 'in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.' Prosser, The Law of Torts § 108, at 792. Thus some antithesis between freedom of speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy.
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Phrase match: cherished right of free speech.' State
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - It is significant that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press falls between the religious guarantees and the guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances in the text of the First Amendment, the principles of which are carried to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It partakes of the nature of both, for it is as much a guarantee to individuals of their personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community, see Holt, Of the Liberty of the Press, in Nelson, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court 18—19, as it is a social necessity required for theN128* 'maintenance of our political system and an open society.'
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Phrase match: the right to petition for redress
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The fact that dissemination of information and opinion on questions of public concern is ordinarily a legitimate, protected and indeed cherished activity does not mean, however, that one may in all respects carry on that activity exempt from sanctions designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of others. A business N129* 'is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.' Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 132—133, 57 S.Ct. 650, 656, 81 L.Ed. 953. Federal securities regulation, mail fraud statutes, and common-law actions for deceit and misrepresentation are only some examples of our understanding that the right to communicate information of public interest is not 'unconditional.' See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1191. However, as our decision in New York Times makes explicit, while protected activity may in some respects be subjected to sanctions, it is not open to all forms of regulation. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent N130* 'the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential * * *.'
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Phrase match: the right to communicate information of
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279—280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, this Court held that '(t)he constitutional guarantees (of freedom of speech and press) require * * * a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'
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Phrase match: freedom of speech and press) require
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - However, as our decision in New York Times makes explicit, while protected activity may in some respects be subjected to sanctions, it is not open to all forms of regulation. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent N46* 'the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential * * *.' 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed.). Our touchstones are that acceptable limitation must neither affect N47* 'the impartial distribution of news' and ideas, Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 301 U.S., at 133, 57 S.Ct., at 656, nor because of their history or impact constitute a special burden on the press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660, nor deprive our free society of the stimulating benefit of varied ideas because their purveyors fear physical or economic retribution solely because of what they choose to think and publish.
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Phrase match: to prevent 'the censorship of the press
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Parties: NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
Date: 1967-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The requirements of adherence to democratic principles, fair procedures and freedom of speech apply to the election of union officials and extend into all aspects of union affairs. In the present case the procedures followed for calling the strikes and disciplining the recalcitrant members fully comported with these requirements, and were in every way fair and democratic.
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Phrase match: and freedom of speech apply to
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Parties: Walker v. Birmingham
Date: 1967-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - When protest takes the form of mass demonstrations, parades, or picketing on public streets and sidewalks, the free passage of traffic and the prevention of public disorder and violence become important objects of legitimate state concern. As the Court stated, in Cox v. State of Louisiana, N6* 'We emphatically reject the notion * * * that the First and Fourteenth Amendmets afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.'
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Phrase match: of freedom to those who would
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The vitality of First Amendment protections has, as a result, been deemed to rest in large measure upon the ability of the individual to take his chances and express himself in the face of such restraints, armed with the ability to challenge those restraints if the State seeks to penalize that expression. The most striking examples of the right to speak first and challenge later, and of peculiar moment for the present case, are the cases concerning the ability of an individual to challenge a permit or licensing statute giving broad discretion to an individual or group, such as the Birmingham permit ordinance, despite the fact that he dd not attempt to obtain a permit or license. In Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302, the accused, prosecuted for soliciting members for an organization without a permit, contended that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it made exercise of freedom of speech contingent upon the will of the issuing authority and therefore was an invalid prior restraint—the same contention made by petitioners with regard to the Birmingham ordinance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - In the present case we are confronted with a collision between Alabama's interest in requiring adherence to orders of its courts and the constitutional prohibition against abridgment of freedom of speech, more particularly 'the right of the people peaceably to assemble,' and the right 'to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - The ability to exercise protected protest at a time when such exercise would be effective must be as protected as the beliefs themselves. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248—250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 448—449, 80 L.Ed. 660; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949. It is a flagrant denial of constitutional guarantees to balance away this principle in the name of 'respect for judicial process.' To preach 'respect' in this context is to deny the right to speak at all.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - The Court today lets loose a devastatingly destructive weapon for infringement of freedoms jealously safeguarded not so much for the benefit of any given group of any given persuasion as for the benefit of all of us. We cannot permit fears of 'riots' and 'civil disobedience' generated by slogans like 'Black Power' to divert our attention from what is here at stake—not violence or the right of the State to control its streets and sidewalks, but the insulation from attack of ex parte orders and legislation upon which they are based even when patently impermissible prior restraints on the exercise of First Amendment rights, thus arming the state courts with the power to punish as a 'contempt' what they otherwise could not punish at all. Constitutional restrictions against abridgments of First Amendment freedoms limit judicial equally with legislative and executive power. Convictions for contempt of court orders which invalidly abridge First Amendment freedoms must be condemned equally with convictions for violation of statutes which do the same thing. I respectfully dissent.
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Phrase match: the right of the State to
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - I believe it is patently unconstitutional on its face. Our decisions have conis tently held that picketing and parading are means of expression protected by the First Amendment, and that the right to picket or parade may not be subjected to the unfettered discretion of local officials.
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Phrase match: the right to picket or parade
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Picketing and parading are methods of expression protected by the First Amendment against both state and federal abridgment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235—236, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683—684, 9 L.Ed.2d 697; Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 546—548, 85 S.Ct. 453, 459—461, 13 L.Ed.2d 471. Since they involve more than speech itself and implicate street traffic, the accommodation of the public and the like, they may be regulated as to the times and places of the demonstrations. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160—161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150—151, 84 L.Ed. 155; Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049; Poulos v. State of New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405—406, 73 S.Ct. 760, 766—767, 97 L.Ed. 1105. But a State cannot deny the right to use streets or parks or other public grounds for the purpose of petitioning for the redress of grievances.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - The right to defy an unconstitutional statute is basic in our scheme. Even when an ordinance requires a permit to make a speech, to deliver a sermon, to picket, to parade, or to assemble, it need not be honored when it is invalid on its face.
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Phrase match: The right to defy an unconstitutional
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The vitality of First Amendment protections has, as a result, been deemed to rest in large measure upon the ability of the individual to take his chances and express himself in the face of such restraints, armed with the ability to challenge those restraints if the State seeks to penalize that expression. The most striking examples of the right to speak first and challenge later, and of peculiar moment for the present case, are the cases concerning the ability of an individual to challenge a permit or licensing statute giving broad discretion to an individual or group, such as the Birmingham permit ordinance, despite the fact that he did not attempt to obtain a permit or license.
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Phrase match: the right to speak first and
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - Our decisions have conis tently held that picketing and parading are means of expression protected by the First Amendment, and that the right to picket or parade may not be subjected to the unfettered discretion of local officials.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Picketing and parading are methods of expression protected by the First Amendment against both state and federal abridgment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235—236, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683—684, 9 L.Ed.2d 697; Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 546—548, 85 S.Ct. 453, 459—461, 13 L.Ed.2d 471. Since they involve more than speech itself and implicate street traffic, the accommodation of the public and the like, they may be regulated as to the times and places of the demonstrations.
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Parties: United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
Date: 1967-12-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech, assembly, and
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - As I stated at greater length in my dissenting opinion in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448, 452—455, 83 S.Ct. 328, 345, 347, 349, 9 L.Ed.2d 405,the freedom of expression guaranteed against state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of individuals not only to speak but also to unite to make their speech effective.
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Phrase match: the freedom of expression guaranteed against
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - the First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political.N70* 'Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.'
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Phrase match: the right of petition was insured
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - the freedom of expression guaranteed against state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of individuals not only to speak but also to unite to make their speech effective. The latter right encompasses the right to join together to obtain judicial redress. However, litigation is more than speech; it is conduct. And the States may reasonably regulate conduct even though it is related to expression.
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Phrase match: the right to join together to
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - As I stated at greater length in my dissenting opinion in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448, 452—455, 83 S.Ct. 328, 345, 347, 349, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, the freedom of expression guaranteed against state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of individuals not only to speak but also to unite to make their speech effective. The latter right encompasses the right to join together to obtain judicial redress. However, litigation is more than speech; it is conduct. And the States may reasonably regulate conduct even though it is related to expression. The pivotal point is how these competing interests should be resolved in this instance.
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Phrase match: make their speech effective. The latter
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Parties: Zwickler v. Koota
Date: 1967-12-05
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Parties: United States v. Robel
Date: 1967-12-11
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Parties: W. E. B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark
Date: 1967-12-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Legislation curbing or penalizing advocacy even of ideas we despise is, I submit, at war with the First Amendment. Under our Constitution one's belief or ideology is of no concern to government. One can think as he likes, embrace any philosophy he chooses, and select the politics that best fits his ideals or needs. That is all implicit in the First Amendment rights of assembly, petition, and expression. Those rights merely enforce, protect, or sanction the beliefs or ideology to which one is committed. So does the right of association which we have said over and again to be part and parcel of those First Amendment rights. Basic in this scheme of values is the immunity of beliefs, ideas, and ideology from government inquiry, probing, or surveillance.
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Phrase match: the right of association which we
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Parties: Katz v. United States
Date: 1967-12-18
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Parties: Whitehill v. Elkins
Date: 1967-11-06
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Appellant Whitehill was denied employment in the state university as a temporary lecturer by reason of his refusal to sign an oath that more than meets the requirements of Gerende. He was asked only whether he is now, in one way or another engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government by force or violence. References to international conferences, controversial discussions, support of minority candidates, academic freedom and the like cannot disguise the fact that Whitehill was asked simply to disclaim actual, present activity amounting in effect to treasonable conduct. Allusions to the constitutional amending process cannot obscure the fact that this oath makes no reference to 'alteration' of our form of government or to 'believing in' or 'being a member of' anything whatsoever. The oath itself, then, in no way violates, jeopardizes, or beclouds appellant's freedom of speech or of association. So much, indeed, the Court's opinion appears to concede.
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Phrase match: s freedom of speech or of
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Parties: Schneider v. Smith
Date: 1968-01-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The First Amendment's ban against Congress 'abridging' freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the 'associational freedom' (Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 490, 81 S.Ct. 247) that goes with those rights creates a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate.
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Phrase match: abridging' freedom of speech, the right
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The purpose of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, unlike more recent models promoting a welfare state, was to take government off the backs of people. The First Amendment's ban against Congress 'abridging' freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the 'associational freedom' (Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 490, 81 S.Ct. 247) that goes with those rights creates a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate. This is the philosophy of Jefferson that N49* '(t)he opinions of men are not the object ov civil government, nor under its jurisdiction * * *. (I)t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order * * *.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: freedom of speech, the right peaceably
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Parties: Cameron v. Johnson
Date: 1968-04-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The argument centers on the fact that the proscription of the statute embraces picketing employed as a vehicle for constitutionally protected protest. But N17* 'picketing and parading (are) subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association,' Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563, 85 S.Ct. 476, 480, 13 L.Ed.2d 487, and this statute does not prohibit picketing so intertwined unless engaged in in a manner which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to or from the courthouse. Prohibition of conduct which has this effect does not abridge constitutional liberty N18* 'since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to * * * distribute information or opinion.'
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Parties: Ginsberg v. New York
Date: 1968-04-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - It is enough for the purposes of this case that we inquire whether it was constitutionally impermissible for New York, insofar as § 484—h does so, to accord minors under 17 a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see. We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors.
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Phrase match: of freedom of expression constitutionally secured
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - For its mandate (originally applicable only to the Federal Government but now applicable to the States as well by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment) is directed to any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' I appreciate that there are those who think that 'obscenity' is impliedly excluded; but I have indicated on prior occasion why I have been unable to reach that conclusion. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482, 86 S.Ct. 942, 953, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1682, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1321, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (dissenting opinion). And the corollary of that view, as I expressed it in Public Utilities Comm'n of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467, 468, 72 S.Ct. 813, 823, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (dissenting opinion), is that Big Brother can no more say what a person shall listen to or read than he can say what shall be published.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - For its mandate (originally applicable only to the Federal Government but now applicable to the States as well by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment) is directed to any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' I appreciate that there are those who think that 'obscenity' is impliedly excluded; but I have indicated on prior occasion why I have been unable to reach that conclusion. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482, 86 S.Ct. 942, 953, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1682, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1321, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (dissenting opinion). And the corollary of that view, as I expressed it in Public Utilities Comm'n of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467, 468, 72 S.Ct. 813, 823, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (dissenting opinion), is that Big Brother can no more say what a person shall listen to or read than he can say what shall be published.
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Phrase match: freedom of speech, or of the
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - This is not to say that the Court and Anthony Comstock are wrong in concluding that the kind of literature New York condemns does harm. As a matter of fact, the notion of censorship is founded on the belief that speech and press sometimes do harm and therefore can be regulated. I once visited a foreign nation where the regime of censorship was so strict that all I could find in the bookstalls were tracts on religion and tracts on mathematics. Today the Court determines the constitutionality of New York's law regulating the sale of literature to children on the basis of the reasonableness of the law in light of the welfare of the child. If the problem of state and federal regulation of 'obscenity' is in the field of substantive due process, I see no reason to limit the legislatures to protecting children alone. The 'juvenile delinquents' I have known are mostly over [390 U.S. 629, 655] 50 years of age. If rationality is the measure of the validity of this law, then I can see how modern Anthony Comstocks could make out a case for "protecting" many groups in our society, not merely children.
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Phrase match: the notion of censorship is founded on
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - obscenity is not protected expression and may be suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase N64* 'clear and present danger' in its application to protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press.
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Parties: Interstate Circuit v. Dallas
Date: 1968-04-22
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Parties: St. Amant v. Thompson
Date: 1968-04-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N48* But New York Times and succeeding cases have emphasized that the stake of the people in public business and the conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment policies. Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones. We adhere to this view and to the line which our cases have drawn between false communications which are protected and those which are not
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Phrase match: protect against self-censorship and thus adequately
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Parties: Duncan v. Louisiana
Date: 1968-05-20
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Parties: Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza
Date: 1968-05-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The reason why labor unions may normally picket a place of business is that the picketing occurs on public streets which are available to all members of the public for a variety of purposes that include communication with other members of the public. The employer businessman cannot interfere with the pickets' communication because they have as much right to the sidewalk and street as he does and because the labor laws prevent such interference under various circumstances; the Government may not interfere on his behalf, absent obstruction, violence, or other valid statutory justification, because the First Amendment forbids official abridgment of the right of free speech.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right of free speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N71* The fact that Lovell, Schneider, and Jamison were concerned with handbilling rather than picketing is immaterial so far as the question is solely one of right of access for the purpose of expression of views. Handbilling, like picketing, involves conduct other than speech, namely, the physical presence of the person distributing leaflets on municipal property. If title to municipal property is, standing alone, an insufficient basis for prohibiting all entry onto such property for the purpose of distributing printed matter, it is likewise an insufficient basis for prohibiting all entry for the purpose of carrying an informational placard.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - In addition, the exercise of First Amendment rights may be regulated where such exercise will unduly interfere with the normal use of the public property by other members of the public with an equal right of access to it. Thus it has been held that persons desiring to parade along city streets may be required to secure a permit in order that municipal authorities be able to limit the amount of interference with use of the sidewalks by other members of the public by regulating the time, place, and manner of the parade.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N67* The corporation had posted notices in the stores stating that the premises were private property and that no solicitation of any kind without written permission would be permitted. Appellant Marsh was told that she must have a permit to distribute her literature and that a permit would not be granted to her. When she declared that the company rule could not be utilized to prevent her from exercising her constitutional rights under the First Amendment, she was ordered to leave Chickasaw. She refused to do so and was arrested for violating Alabama's criminal trespass statute. In reversing her conviction under the statute, this Court held that the fact that the property from which appellant was sought to be ejected for exercising her First Amendment rights was owned by a private corporation rather than the State was an insufficient basis to justify the infringement on appellant's right to free expression occasioned thereby. Likewise the fact that appellant Marsh was herself not a resident of the town was not considered material.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - N68* The majority of this Court affirms petitioners' contentions. N69* But I cannot accept them, for I believe that, whether this Court likes it or not, the Constitution recognizes and supports the concept of private ownership of property. The Fifth Amendment provides that '(n)o person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' This means to me that there is no right to picket on the private premises of another to try to convert the owner or others to the views of the pickets.
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Phrase match: no right to picket on the
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - These pickets do have a constitutional right to speak about Weis' refusal to hire union labor, but they do not have a constitutional right to compel Weis to furnish them a place to do so on its property.
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Phrase match: constitutional right to speak about Weis
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - N70* The reason why labor unions may normally picket a place of business is that the picketing occurs on public streets which are available to all members of the public for a variety of purposes that include communication with other members of the public. The employer businessman cannot interfere with the pickets' communication because they have as much right to the sidewalk and street as he does and because the labor laws prevent such interference under various circumstances; the Government may not interfere on his behalf, absent obstruction, violence, or other valid statutory justification, because the First Amendment forbids official abridgment of the right of free speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - And of course picketing, that is patrolling, is not free speech and not protected as such. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834; Hughes v. Superior Court of State of California, in and for Contra Costa County, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985. These pickets do have a constitutional right to speak about Weis' refusal to hire union labor, but they do not have a constitutional right to compel Weis to furnish them a place to do so on its property.
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Phrase match: not free speech and not protected
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - We start from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855 (1941); Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1942); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341, 78 S.Ct. 779, 2 L.Ed.2d 809 (1958). To be sure, this Court has noted that picketing involves elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling, and has indicated that because of this intermingling of protected and unprotected elements, picketing can be subjected to controls that would not be constitutionally permissible in the case of pure speech. See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court of State of California in and for Contra Costa County, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S.Ct. 1166, 1 L.Ed.2d 1347 (1957); Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182. Nevertheless, no case decided by this Court can be found to support the proposition that the nonspeech aspects of peaceful picketing are so great as to render the provisions of the First Amendment inapplicable to it altogether.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - As we observed earlier, the mere fact that speech is accompanied by conduct does not mean that the speech can be suppressed under the guise of prohibiting the conduct. Here it is perfectly clear that a prohibition against trespass on the mall operates to bar all speech within the shopping center to which respondents object. Yet this Court stated many years ago, N33* '(O)ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Picketing is free speech plus, the plus being physical activity that may implicate traffic and related matters. Hence the latter aspects of picketing may be regulated.
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Phrase match: is free speech plus, the plus
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - They hold out the mall as 'public' for purposes of attracting customers and facilitating delivery of merchandise. Picketing in regard to labor conditions at the Weis Supermarket is directly related to that shopping center business. Why should respondents be permitted to avoid this incidence of carrying on a public business in the name of 'private property'? It is clear to me that they may not, when the public activity sought to be prohibited involves constitutionally protected expression respecting their business.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - To hold that store owners are compelled by law to supply picketing areas for pickets to drive store customers away is to create a court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private ownership of property rests in this country. And of course picketing, that is patrolling, is not free speech and not protected as such. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834; Hughes v. Superior Court of State of California, in and for Contra Costa County, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985. These pickets do have a constitutional right to speak about Weis' refusal to hire union labor, but they do not have a constitutional right to compel Weis to furnish them a place to do so on its property.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - We start from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855 (1941); Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1942); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341, 78 S.Ct. 779, 2 L.Ed.2d 809 (1958). To be sure, this Court has noted that picketing involves elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling, and has indicated that because of this intermingling of protected and unprotected elements, picketing can be subjected to controls that would not be constitutionally permissible in the case of pure speech.
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Parties: United States v. O'Brien
Date: 1968-05-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - Thus, in Grosjean the Court, having concluded that the right of publications to be free from certain kinds of taxes was a freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment, struck down a statute which on its face did nothing other than impose just such a tax. Similarly, in Gomillion, the Court sustained a complaint which, if true, established that the N61* 'inevitable effect,' 364 U.S., at 341, 81 S.Ct. at 127, of the redrawing of municipal boundaries was to deprive the petitioners of their right to vote for no reason other than that they were Negro. In these cases, the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect—the N62* 'necessary scope and operation,' McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59, 24 S.Ct. 769, 777, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904)—abridged constitutional rights. The statute attacked in the instant case has no such inevitable unconstitutional effect, since the destruction of Selective Service certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive. Accordingly, the statute itself is constitutional.
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Phrase match: a freedom of the press protected
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - Thus, in Grosjean the Court, having concluded that the right of publications to be free from certain kinds of taxes was a freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment, struck down a statute which on its face did nothing other than impose just such a tax. Similarly, in Gomillion, the Court sustained a complaint which, if true, established that the N72* 'inevitable effect,' 364 U.S., at 341, 81 S.Ct. at 127, of the redrawing of municipal boundaries was to deprive the petitioners of their right to vote for no reason other than that they were Negro. In these cases, the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect—the N73* 'necessary scope and operation,' McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59, 24 S.Ct. 769, 777, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904)—abridged constitutional rights. The statute attacked in the instant case has no such inevitable unconstitutional effect, since the destruction of Selective Service certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive. Accordingly, the statute itself is constitutional.
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Phrase match: the right of publications to be
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - A law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records.
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Phrase match: abridges free speech on its face
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N34* We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
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Phrase match: be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when 'speech and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
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Parties: Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.
Date: 1968-06-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - While criminal sanctions and damage awards have a somewhat different impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech from dismissal from employment, it is apparent that the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting speech. We have already noted our disinclination to make an across-the-board equation of dismissal from public employment for remarks critical of superiors with awarding damages in a libel suit by a public official for similar criticism. However, in a case such as the present one, in which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be.
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Phrase match: to freedom of speech from dismissal
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - While criminal sanctions and damage awards have a somewhat different impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech from dismissal from employment, it is apparent that the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting speech. We have already noted our disinclination to make an across-the-board equation of dismissal from public employment for remarks critical of superiors with awarding damages in a libel suit by a public official for similar criticism. However, in a case such as the present one, in which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be.
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Phrase match: the right to freedom of speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.
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Phrase match: his right to speak on issues
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Parties: Board of Education v. Allen
Date: 1968-06-10
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Parties: Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia
Date: 1968-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - The procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the officer's conclusions was not a procedure 'designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,' id., at 732, 81 S.Ct., at 1716, and therefore fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. See Freedman v. State of Maryland
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Phrase match: to freedom of expression. See Freedman
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Parties: Flast v. Cohen
Date: 1968-06-10
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Parties: Carroll v. President & Comm'Rs of Princess Anne
Date: 1968-11-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - prior restraintthis Court said that N66* '(n)o one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot.' See also Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 294, 61 S.Ct. 552, 555, 85 L.Ed. 836 (1941). Ordinarily, the State's constitutionally permissible interests are adequately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak has been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached. The impact and consequences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are materially different from those of prior restraint. Prior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgment.
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech sanctions incitement
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - As the Court said in Freedman v. State of Maryland, supra, at 58, 85 S.Ct., at 739, a noncriminal process of prior restraints upon expression N49* 'avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - We do not here challenge the principle that there are special, limited circumstances in which speech is so interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not protected by the broad guarantee of the First Amendment. In Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, at 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, at 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), this Court said that N65* '(n)o one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot.' See also Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 294, 61 S.Ct. 552, 555, 85 L.Ed. 836 (1941). Ordinarily, the State's constitutionally permissible interests are adequately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak has been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached. The impact and consequences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are materially different from those of prior restraint. Prior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgment.
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Parties: Williams v. Rhodes
Date: 1968-10-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, lies at the root of these cases. The right of association is one form of N63* 'orderly group activity' (NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405), protected by the First Amendment. The right N64* 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas' (NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488), is one activity of that nature that has First Amendment protection. As we said in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 N65* 'freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, lies at the root of these cases. The right of association is one form of 'orderly group activity' (NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405), protected by the First Amendment. The right N74* 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas' (NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488), is one activity of that nature that has First Amendment protection. As we said in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 N75* 'freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.' And see Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296, 81 S.Ct. 1333, 1335, 6 L.Ed.2d 301. At the root of the present controversy is the right to vote—a N76* 'fundamental political right' that is 'preservative of all rights.' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220. The rights of expression and assembly may be N77* 'illusory if the right to vote is undermined.'
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Phrase match: The right of association is one
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Cumbersome election machinery can effectively suffocate the right of association, the promotion of political ideas and programs of political action, and the right to vote. The totality of Ohio's requirements has those effects. It is unnecessary to decide whether Ohio has an interest, 'compelling' or not, in abridging those rights, because N78* 'the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field.' Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61, 81 S.Ct. 997, 1012, 6 L.Ed.2d 105 (Black, J., dissenting). Appellees would imply that N79* 'no kind of speech is to be protected if the Government can assert an interest of sufficient weight to induce this Court to uphold its abridgment.'
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Phrase match: the right of association, the promotion
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment.
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Phrase match: the right of individuals to associate
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - Instead, by denying the appellants any opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the President is selected, the State has eliminated the basic incentive that all political parties have for conducting such activities, thereby depriving appellants of much of the substance, if not the form, of their protected rights. The right to have one's voice heard and one's views considered by the appropriate governmental authority is at the core of the right of political association.
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Phrase match: the right of political association
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, lies at the root of these cases. The right of association is one form of N71* 'orderly group activity' (NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405), protected by the First Amendment. The right N72* 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas' (NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488), is one activity of that nature that has First Amendment protection. As we said in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 N73* 'freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.' And see Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296, 81 S.Ct. 1333, 1335, 6 L.Ed.2d 301. At the root of the present controversy is the right to vote—a N74* 'fundamental political right' that is 'preservative of all rights.' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220. The rights of expression and assembly may be N75* 'illusory if the right to vote is undermined.'
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Phrase match: the right to vote—a 'fundamental
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Cumbersome election machinery can effectively suffocate the right of association, the promotion of political ideas and programs of political action, and the right to vote. The totality of Ohio's requirements has those effects. It is unnecessary to decide whether Ohio has an interest, N76* 'compelling' or not, in abridging those rights, because 'the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field.'
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Phrase match: the right to vote. The totality
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - It is true that Ohio has not directly limited appellants' right to assemble or discuss public issues or solicit new members. Compare Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945); De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937); Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Instead, by denying the appellants any opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the President is selected, the State has eliminated the basic incentive that all political parties have for conducting such activities, thereby depriving appellants of much of the substance, if not the form, of their protected rights. The right to have one's voice heard and one's views considered by the appropriate governmental authority is at the core of the right of political association.
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Phrase match: appellants' right to assemble or discuss
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - The requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause remains the same—no matter what the institution to which the decision is entrusted, political groups have a right to be heard before it.
Notes:
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Parties: Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham
Date: 1969-01-13
Identifiers:
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Parties: Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church
Date: 1969-01-27
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Parties: Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.
Date: 1969-02-24
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Segment Sets:
Segment in Paragraph: 8 - First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047 (1923), this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputations, society.
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Phrase match: to freedom of expression. Any departure
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views. As Judge Gewin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit, said, school officials cannot suppress N67* 'expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases. It is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases. Our Court has decided precisely the opposite.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - Here the Court should accord Iowa educational institutions the same right to determine for themselves to what extent free expression should be allowed in its schools as it accorded Mississippi with reference to freedom of assembly. But even if the record were silent as to protests against the Vietnam war distracting students from their assigned class work, members of this Court, like all other citizens, know, without being told, that the disputes over the wisdom of the Vietnam war have disrupted and divided this country as few other issues over have. Of course students, like other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the wounded and the dead being their friends and neighbors. It was, of course, to distract the attention of other students that some students insisted up to the very point of their own suspension from school that they were determined to sit in school with their symbolic armbands.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - It was on the foregoing argument that this Court sustained the power of Mississippi to curtail the First Amendment's right of peaceable assembly. And the same reasons are equally applicable to curtailing in the States' public schools the right to complete freedom of expression. Iowa's public schools, like Mississippi's university, are operated to give students an opportunity to learn, not to talk politics by actual speech, or by 'symbolic' speech. And, as I have pointed out before, the record amply shows that public protest in the school classes against the Vietnam war 'distracted from that singleness of purpose which the state (here Iowa) desired to exist in its public educational institutions.' Here the Court should accord Iowa educational institutions the same right to determine for themselves to what extent free expression should be allowed in its schools as it accorded Mississippi with reference to freedom of assembly. But even if the record were silent as to protests against the Vietnam war distracting students from their assigned class work, members of this Court, like all other citizens, know, without being told, that the disputes over the wisdom of the Vietnam war have disrupted and divided this country as few other issues over have. Of course students, like other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the wounded and the dead being their friends and neighbors. It was, of course, to distract the attention of other students that some students insisted up to the very point of their own suspension from school that they were determined to sit in school with their symbolic armbands.
Notes:
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N79* The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right to freedom of expression
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - N80* N81* Assuming that the Court is correct in holding that the conduct of wearing armbands for the purpose of conveying political ideas is protected by the First Amendment, cf., e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949), the crucial remaining questions are whether students and teachers may use the schools at their whim as a platform for the exercise of free speech—'symbolic' or 'pure'—and whether the courts will allocate to themselves the function of deciding how the pupils' school day will be spent. While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or censor the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleased and when he pleases. This Court has already rejected such a notion. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965), for example, the Court clearly stated that the rights of free speech and assembly N82* 'do not mean that everyone with opinions or bbliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time.'
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Phrase match: a right to give speeches or
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases.
Notes:
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Phrase match: complete right to freedom of speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - And the same reasons are equally applicable to curtailing in the States' public schools the right to complete freedom of expression. Iowa's public schools, like Mississippi's university, are operated to give students an opportunity to learn, not to talk politics by actual speech, or by 'symbolic' speech. And, as I have pointed out before, the record amply shows that public protest in the school classes against the Vietnam war 'distracted from that singleness of purpose which the state (here Iowa) desired to exist in its public educational institutions.' Here the Court should accord Iowa educational institutions the same right to determine for themselves to what extent free expression should be allowed in its schools as it accorded Mississippi with reference to freedom of assembly. But even if the record were silent as to protests against the Vietnam war distracting students from their assigned class work, members of this Court, like all other citizens, know, without being told, that the disputes over the wisdom of the Vietnam war have disrupted and divided this country as few other issues over have. Of course students, like other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the wounded and the dead being their friends and neighbors. It was, of course, to distract the attention of other students that some students insisted up to the very point of their own suspension from school that they were determined to sit in school with their symbolic armbands.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right to complete freedom of
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to 'pure speech' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966).
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
Notes:
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or censor the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleased and when he pleases. This Court has already rejected such a notion. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965), for example, the Court clearly stated that the rights of free speech and assembly N35* 'do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases. It is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases. Our Court has decided precisely the opposite.
Notes:
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Phrase match: freedom of speech and expression than
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - I deny, therefore, that it has been the 'unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years' that 'students' and 'teachers' take with them into the 'schoolhouse gate' constitutional rights to 'freedom of speech or expression.' Even Meyer did not hold that. It makes no reference to 'symbolic speech' at all; what it did was to strike down as 'unreasonable' and therefore unconstitutional a Nebraska law barring the teaching of the German language before the children reached the eighth grade.One can well agree with Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Sutherland, as I do, that such a law was no more unreasonable than it would be to bar the teaching of Latin and Greek to pupils who have not reached the eighth grade. In fact, I think the majority's reason for invalidating the Nebraska law was that it did not like it or in legal jargon that it 'shocked the Court's conscience,' 'offended its sense of justice, or' was 'contrary to fundamental concepts of the English-speaking world,' as the Court has sometimes said. See, e.g. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, and Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561. The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases. It is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases. Our Court has decided precisely the opposite. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed. 149.
Notes:
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Phrase match: no reference to 'symbolic speech' at all; what it did
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Parties: Epperson v. Ark.
Date: 1968-11-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Our courts, however, have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom of speech and inquiry
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - These precedents inevitably determine the result in the present case. The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment. It is much too late to argue that the State may impose upon the teachers in its schools any conditions that it chooses, however restrictive they may be of constitutional guarantees.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do not want discussed. This Court has said that the rights of free speech N78* 'while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: constitutional right to teach sociological, economic
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Parties: Golden v. Zwickler
Date: 1969-03-04
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Parties: Gregory v. Chicago
Date: 1969-03-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I, of course, do not mean to say or even to intimate that freedom of speech, press, assembly, or petition can be abridged so long as the First Amendment remains unchanged in our Constitution. But to say that the First Amendment grants those broad rights free from any exercise of governmental power to regulate conduct, as distinguished from speech, press, assembly, or petition, would subject all the people of the Nation to the uncontrollable whim and arrogance of speakers, and writers, and protesters, and grievance bearers.
Notes:
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Phrase match: that freedom of speech, press, assembly
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - I believe that our Constitution, written for the ages, to endure except as changed in the manner it provides, did not create a government with such monumental weaknesses. N36* Speech and press are, of course, to be free, so that public matters can be discussed with impunity. But picketing and demonstrating can be regulated like other conduct of men. I believe that the homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary and the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, marching, tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the minds of men, women, and children with fears of the unknown.
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Phrase match: monumental weaknesses. "monumental weaknesses" being permiting anyone with a complaint to do anything he pleased wherever and wheneverSpeech and press are
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - I, of course, do not mean to say or even to intimate that freedom of speech, press, assembly, or petition can be abridged so long as the First Amendment remains unchanged in our Constitution. But to say that the First Amendment grants those broad rights free from any exercise of governmental power to regulate conduct, as distinguished from speech, press, assembly, or petition, would subject all the people of the Nation to the uncontrollable whim and arrogance of speakers, and writers, and protesters, and grievance bearers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - " The disorderly conduct ordinance under which these petitioners were charged and convicted is not, however, a narrowly drawn law, particularly designed to regulate certain kinds of conduct such as marching or picketing or demonstrating along the streets or highways. Nor does it regulate the times or places or manner of carrying on such activities. To the contrary, it might better be described as a meat-ax ordinance, gathering in one comprehensive definition of an offense a number of words which have a multiplicity of meanings, some of which would cover activity specifically protected by the First Amendment. The average person charged with its violation is necessarily left uncertain as to what conduct and attitudes of mind would be enough to convict under it. Who, for example, could possibly foresee what kind of noise or protected speech would be held to be 'improper'?
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Parties: Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States
Date: 1969-03-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N68* 'It would be strange indeed * * * if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary.
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Phrase match: for freedom of the press which
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: not. Freedom of the press from
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Parties: Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham
Date: 1969-03-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N3* It is argued, however, that what was involved here was not 'pure speech,' but the use of public streets and sidewalks, over which a municipality must rightfully exercise a great deal of control in the interest of traffic regulation and public safety. N4* That, of course, is true. We have emphasized before this that 'the First and Fourteenth Amendments (do not) afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.'
Notes:
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Phrase match: of freedom to those who would
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N80* It may be suggested, however, that Shuttlesworth's dilemma was of his own making. He could have requested a permit months in advance of Good Friday, thereby allowing Alabama's administrative and judicial machinery the necessary time to operate fully before the date set for the march. But such a suggestion ignores the principle established. in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 61, 85 S.Ct. 734, 738—741, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), which prohibits the States from requiring persons to invoke unduly cumbersome and time-consuming procedures before they may exercise their constitutional right of expression. Freedman holds that if the State is to protect the public from obscene movies, it must afford exhibitors a speedy administrative or judicial right of review, lest N81* 'the victorious exhibitor might find the most propitious opportunity for exhibition (passed).' Id., at 61, 85 S.Ct., at 740. The Freedman principle is applicable here. The right to assemble peaceably to voice political protest is at least as basic as the right to exhibit a motion picture which may have some aesthetic value.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - After the Commissioner declared that he lacked the power to act, it was reasonable to believe that no public authority would act in time. Since neither the city nor the State provided sufficiently expedited procedures for the consideration of parade permits, petitioner Shuttlesworth cannot be punished for the exercise of his constitutionally protected right of political expression.
Notes:
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Phrase match: protected right of political expression
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - And our decisions have made clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.
Notes:
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Phrase match: the right of free expression for
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N83* The right to assemble peaceably to voice political protest is at least as basic as the right to exhibit a motion picture which may have some aesthetic value. Moreover, slow-moving procedures have a much more severe impact in the instant case than they had in Freedman. Though a movie exhibitor might suffer some financial loss if he were obliged to wait for a year or two while the administrative and judicial mills ground out a result, it is nevertheless quite likely that the public would ultimately see the film. In contrast, timing is of the essence in politics. It is almost impossible to predict the political future; and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all.
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Phrase match: The right to assemble peaceably to
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - It is argued, however, that what was involved here was not 'pure speech,' but the use of public streets and sidewalks, over which a municipality must rightfully exercise a great deal of control in the interest of traffic regulation and public safety. That, of course, is true. We have emphasized before this that N37* 'the First and Fourteenth Amendments (do not) afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.' Cox v. Louisiana,
Notes:
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Phrase match: not 'pure speech,' but the use
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - There can be no doubt that the Birmingham ordinance, as it was written, conferred upon the City Commission virtually unbridled and absolute power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or 'demonstration' on the city's streets or public ways. For in deciding whether or not to withhold a permit, the members of the Commission were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.' This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. 'It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.' Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322, 78 S.Ct. 277, 282, 2 L.Ed.2d 302. And our decisions have made clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.
Notes:
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Phrase match: is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - Since neither the city nor the State provided sufficiently expedited procedures for the consideration of parade permits, petitioner Shuttlesworth cannot be punished for the exercise of his constitutionally protected right of political expression.
Notes:
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Parties: Hadnott v. Amos
Date: 1969-03-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - First Amendment rights which include the right to band together for the advancement of political beliefs.
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Parties: Scofield v. NLRB
Date: 1969-04-01
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Parties: Stanley v. Georgia
Date: 1969-04-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. N84* 'This freedom (of speech and press) * * * necessarily protects the right to receive * * *.' Martin v. City of Struthers
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N85* These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library. Georgia contends that appellant does not have these rights, that there are certain types of materials that the individual may not read or even possess. Georgia justifies this assertion by arguing that the films in the present case are obscene. But we think that mere categorization of these films as 'obscene' is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. N38* 'This freedom (of speech and press) * * * necessarily protects the right to receive * * *.' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307—308, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 1496 1497, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 667, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948), is fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this case—a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home—that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - N66* However, neither Roth nor any subsequent decision of this Court dealt with the precise problem involved in the present case. Roth was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of a federal obscenity statute. The defendant in a companion case, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), was convicted of 'lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books, and (of) writing, composing and publishing an obscene advertisement of them * * *.' Id., at 481, 77 S.Ct., at 1307. None of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the proposition that N67* 'this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press' were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most part with use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form of public distribution or dissemination. Moreover, none of this Court's decisions subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for private possession of obscene materials. Those cases dealt with the power of the State and Federal Governments to prohibit or regulate certain public actions taken or intended to be taken with respect to obscene matter. Indeed, with one exception, we have been unable to discover any case in which the issue in the present case has been fully considered.
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Parties: Street v. New York
Date: 1969-04-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - the N87* 'right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - N86* 'The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. * * * (F)reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
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Segment in Paragraph: 159 - If the arsonist asserted that he was burning his shirt or trousers or shoes as a protest against the Government's fiscal policies, for example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment shelter would prevail against the State's claim of a right to avert danger to the public and to avoid obstruction to traffic as a result of the fire. This is because action, even if clearly for serious protest purposes, is not entitled to the pervasive protection that is given to speech alone.
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - The teaching of Stromberg is that, if there is any possibility the general verdict below rests on speech or conduct entitled to constitutional protection, then the conviction must be reversed. The Strombery analysis cannot be applied to appellant's conviction as the factual patterns in the two cases are distinct. The record leaves no doubt that appellant did burn the flag. Nor can appellant argue that his act was not an act of desecration. The trial judge emphatically stated that the issue was whether appellant burned the flag to destroy it in a dignified manner or to cast contempt upon it. Appellant's conviction therefore must be based upon a finding that he desecrated the flag by burning and neither he nor the Court suggests otherwise. We are not confronted with a jury trial and the consequent inability to determine the basis for the verdict below. The trial judge at the very outset of the trial made known his view that appellant's motivation for burning the flag was the probative issue. Combining this act of burning with a verbalization of the reasons for it does not allow the Court to avoid determining the constitutionality of appellant's conduct. Since there can be no claim that appellant was convicted for his speech, Stromberg simply does not apply.
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Segment in Paragraph: 140 - It passes my belief that anything in the Federal Constitution bars a State from making the deliberate burning of the American flag an offense. It is immaterial to me that words are spoken in connection with the burning. It is the burning of the flag that the State has set its face against. N39* 'It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.' Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 688, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). In my view this quotation from the Giboney case precisely applies here. The talking that was done took place 'as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute' against burning the American flag in public. I would therefore affirm this conviction.
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Segment in Paragraph: 159 - If a statute provided that it is a misdemeanor to burn one's shirt or trousers or shoes on the public thoroughfare, it could hardly be asserted that the citizen's constitutional right is violated. If the arsonist asserted that he was burning his shirt or trousers or shoes as a protest against the Government's fiscal policies, for example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment shelter would prevail against the State's claim of a right to avert danger to the public and to avoid obstruction to traffic as a result of the fire. This is because action, even if clearly for serious protest purposes, is not entitled to the pervasive protection that is given to speech alone. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303—304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). It may be subjected to reasonable regulation that appropriately takes into account the competing interests involved.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - he claims that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is overbroad, both on its face and as applied, because the section makes it a crime 'publicly (to) defy * * * or cast contempt upon (an American flag) by words * * *.' (Emphasis added.) Second, he contends that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is vague and imprecise because it does not clearly define the conduct which it forbids. Third, he asserts that New York may not constitutionally punish one who publicly destroys or damages an American flag as a means of protest, because such an act constitutes expression protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. We deem it unnecessary to consider the latter two arguments, for we hold that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, was unconstitutionally applied in appellant's case because it permitted him to be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag.
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Segment in Paragraph: 155 - The Court is obviously wrong in reversing the judgment below because it believes that Street was unconstitutionally convicted for speaking. Reversal can follow only if the Court reaches the conviction for flag burning and finds that conviction, as well as the assumed conviction for speech, to be violative of the First Amendment. For myself, without the benefit of the majority's thinking if it were to find flag burning protected by the First Amendment, I would sustain such a conviction. I must dissent.
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Parties: Watts v. United States
Date: 1969-04-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - Certainly the statute under which petitioner was convicted is constitutional on its face. The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of physical violence. See H.R.Rep. No. 652, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). Nevertheless, a statute such as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.
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Parties: Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
Date: 1969-06-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Thirty years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by Congress until 1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, reinforce the natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act authorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public issues, and that the FCC is free to implement this requirement by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridgment of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed by § 326 of the Act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N69* There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all. N70* 'Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern. To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present representative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airways anything but their own views of fundamental questions. The statute, long administrative practice, and cases are to this effect.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - N82* Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same 'right' to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N83* This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a major role to play as the Congress itself recognized in § 326, which forbids FCC interference with 'the right of free speech by means of radio communication.' Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475, 60 S.Ct. 693, 697, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361—362, 75 S.Ct. 855, 857—858, 99 L.Ed. 1147 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). N84* '(S)peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74—75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1965). It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - N88* Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - N89* Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same 'right' to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N90* No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license becauseN91* 'the public interest' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - A license permits broadcasting, but the lisensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N92* N93* Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475, 60 S.Ct. 693, 697, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361—362, 75 S.Ct. 855, 857—858, 99 L.Ed. 1147 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). '(S)peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74—75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1965). It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N94* Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broadcast week. The ruling and regulations at issue here do not go quite so far. They assert that under specified circumstances, a licensee must offer to make available a reasonable amount of broadcast time to those who have a view different from that which has already been expressed on his station. The expression of a political endorsement, or of a personal attack while dealing with a controversial public issue, simply triggers this time sharing. As we have said, the First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - N40* N41* Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945).
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - N50* In 1959 the Congress amended the statutory requirement of § 315 that equal time be accorded each political candidate to except certain appearances on news programs, but added that this constituted no exception 'from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public inportance.' Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (emphasis added). This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced that the phrase 'public interest,' which had been in the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. And here this principle is given special force by the equally venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction. Here, the Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation. Thirty years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by Congress until 1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, reinforce the natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act authorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public issues, and that the FCC is free to implement this requirement by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridgment of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed by § 326 of the Act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - There is no question here of the Commission's refusal to permit the broadcaster to carry a particular program or to publish his own views; of a discriminatory refusal to require the licensee to broadcast certain views which have been denied access to the airwaves; of government censorship of a particular program contrary to § 326; or of the official government view dominating public broadcasting. Such questions would raise more serious First Amendment issues. But we do hold that the Congress and the Commission do not violate the First Amendment when they require a radio or television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and political editorials.
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Parties: Brandenburg v. Ohio
Date: 1969-06-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N95* 'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. As we said in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297—298, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1520—1521, 6 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961), N42* 'the mere abstract teaching * * * of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.'
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Parties: NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.
Date: 1969-06-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - we do note that an employer's free speech right to communicate his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the Board. Thus, § 8(c) (29 U.S.C. § 158(c)) merely implements the First Amendment by requiring that the expression of 'any views, argument, or opinion' shall not be 'evidence of an unfair labor practice,' so long as such expression contains 'no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit' in violation of § 8(a)(1). Section 8(a)(1), in turn, prohibits interference, restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
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Parties: Levy v. Parker
Date: 1969-08-02
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Parties: Jones v. Lemond
Date: 1969-09-15
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Parties: Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc.
Date: 1970-01-19
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Parties: Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp
Date: 1970-03-03
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Parties: Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc.
Date: 1970-03-09
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Parties: Jones v. State Board of Education
Date: 1970-02-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N71* 'First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N43* '(A) function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.'
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Parties: Dandridge v. Williams
Date: 1970-04-06
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Parties: Bachellar v. Maryland
Date: 1970-04-20
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Parties: Walz v. Tax Com. of New York
Date: 1970-05-04
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Parties: Welsh v. United States
Date: 1970-06-15
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Parties: Schacht v. United States
Date: 1970-05-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - This clause on its face simply restricts § 772(f)'s authorization to those dramatic portrayals that do not 'tend to discredit' the military, but, when this restriction is read together with 18 U.S.C. § 702, it becomes clear that Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor wearing a military uniform to say things during his performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed Forces. An actor, like everyone else in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic performance. The last clause of § 772(f) denies this constitutional right to an actor who is wearing a military uniform by making it a crime for him to say things that tend to bring the military into discredit and disrepute.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - This brings us to petitioner's complaint that giving force and effect to the last clause of § 772(f) would impose an unconstitutional restraint on his right of free speech. We agree. This clause on its face simply restricts § 772(f)'s authorization to those dramatic portrayals that do not 'tend to discredit' the military, but, when this restriction is read together with 18 U.S.C. § 702, it becomes clear that Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor wearing a military uniform to say things during his performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed Forces. An actor, like everyone else in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic performance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - An actor, like everyone else in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic performance. The last clause of § 772(f) denies this constitutional right to an actor who is wearing a military uniform by making it a crime for him to say things that tend to bring the military into discredit and disrepute.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - An actor, like everyone else in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic performance. The last clause of § 772(f) denies this constitutional right to an actor who is wearing a military uniform by making it a crime for him to say things that tend to bring the military into discredit and disrepute. In the present case Schacht was free to participate in any skit at the demonstration that praised the Army, but under the final clause of § 772(f) he could be convicted of a federal offense if his portrayal attacked the Army instead of praising it. In light of our earlier finding that the skit in which Schacht participated was a 'theatrical production' within the meaning of § 772(f), it follows that his conviction can be sustained only if he can be punished for speaking out against the role of our Army and our country in Vietnam. Clearly punishment for this reason would be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech. The final clause of § 772(f), which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment.
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Parties: Greenbelt Cooperative Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler
Date: 1970-05-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - This was error of constitutional magnitude, as our decisions have made clear. N72* 'This definition of malice is constitutionally insufficient where discussion of public affairs is concerned; '(w)e held in New York Times that a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true." Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, at 84, 86 S.Ct. at 675. N73* '(E)ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood. Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred;
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - This case involves newspaper reports of public meetings of the citizens of a community concerned with matters of local governmental interest and importance. The very subject matter of the news reports, therefore, is one of particular First Amendment concern.N74* 'The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means * * * is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, supra, 283 U.S. at 369, 51 S.Ct. at 536. N75* 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093. Because the threat or actual imposition of pecuniary liability for alleged defamation may impair the unfettered exercise of these First Amendment freedoms, the Constitution imposes stringent limitations upon the permissible scope of such liability.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - Should New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), be extended to preclude liability for injury to reputation caused by employing words of double meaning, one of which is libelous, whenever the publisher claims in good faith to have intended the innocent meaning? I think not. The New York Times case was an effort to effectuate the policies of the First Amendment by recognizing the difficulties of ascertaining the truth of allegations about a public official whom the newspaper is investigating with an eye to publication. Absent protection for the nonreckless publication of 'facts' that subsequently prove to be false, the danger is that legitimate news and communication will be suppressed. But it is quite a different thing, not involving the same danger of self-censorship, to immunize professional communicators from liability for their use of ambiguous language and their failure to guard against the possibility that words known to carry two meanings, one of which imputes commission of a crime, might seriously damage the object of their comment in the eyes of the average reader. I see no reason why the members of a skilled calling should not be held to the standard of their craft and assume the risk of being misunderstood—if they are—by the ordinary reader of their publications. If it is thought that the First Amendment requires more protection for the media in this respect in accurately reporting events and statements occurring at official meetings, it would be preferable directly to carve out a wider privilege for such reporting.
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Parties: United States v. Sisson
Date: 1970-06-29
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Parties: Blount v. Rizzi
Date: 1971-01-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Our discussion appropriately begins with Mr. Justice Holmes' frequently quoted admonition that,N68* 'The United Sttaes may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the ues of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues * * *.' United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437, 41 S.Ct. 352, 363, 65 L.Ed. 704 (1921) (dissenting opinion); see also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965). Since § 4006 on its face, and § 4007 as applied, are procedures designed to deny use of the mails to commercial distributors of obscene literature, those procedures violate the First Amendment unless they include built-in safeguards against curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, for Government N69* 'is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity * * * without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.'
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Parties: Baird v. State Bar of Ariz.
Date: 1971-02-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - 'The First Amendment's ban against Congress 'abridging' freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the N76* 'associational freedom' N77* that goes with those rights creates a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N78* 'We have also held in Konigsberg that the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment.' (Footnote omitted.)
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Parties: Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond
Date: 1971-02-23
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Parties: In re Stolar
Date: 1971-02-23
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Parties: Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy
Date: 1971-02-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The application of the traditional concepts of tort law to the conduct of a political campaign is bound to raise dangers for freedom of speech and of the press. The reasonable-man standard of liability, for example, serves admirably the essential function of imposing an objective and socially acceptable limit on the freedom of an individual to act with relation to others. But under our system of government, we have chosen to afford protection even to N80* 'opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (Holmes, J., dissenting). A community that imposed legal liability on all statements in a political campaign deemed 'unreasonable' by a jury would have abandoned the First Amendment as we know it.
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Parties: Time, Inc. v. Pape
Date: 1971-02-24
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Parties: Younger v. Harris
Date: 1971-02-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - As the standards of certainty in statutes containing criminal sanctions are higher than those in statutes containing civil sanctions, so are the standards of certainty touching on freedom of expression higher than those in other areas. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515—516, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed. 840.N79* 'There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act or in regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.' Where freedom of expression is at stake these requirements must be more sedulously enforced.
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Parties: Boddie v. Connecticut
Date: 1971-03-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - No less than these rights, the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of practicality, must be protected against denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals.
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Parties: Gillette v. United States
Date: 1971-03-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - I think the Hughes view is the constitutional view. It is true that the First Amendment speaks of the free exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of conscience or belief. Yet conscience and belief are the main ingredients of First Amendment rights. They are the bedrock of free speech as well as religion. The implied First Amendment right of 'conscience' is certainly as high as the 'right of association' which we recognized in Shelton v. Tucker
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - It is true that the First Amendment speaks of the free exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of conscience or belief. Yet conscience and belief are the main ingredients of First Amendment rights. They are the bedrock of free speech as well as religion. The implied First Amendment right of 'conscience' is certainly as high as the 'right of association' which we recognized in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. Some indeed have thought it higher.
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Parties: United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan
Date: 1971-04-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - We held in that case that the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers the right to cooperate in helping and advising one another in asserting their rights under the FELA. While not deciding every question that possibly could be raised, our opinion left no doubt that workers have a right under the First Amendment to act collectively to secure good, honest lawyers to assert their claims against railroads.
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Parties: Boyle v. Landry
Date: 1971-02-23
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Parties: United States v. Reidel
Date: 1971-05-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - The focus of this language was on freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy of one's home. It does not require that we fashion or recognize a constitutional right in people like Reidel to distribute or sell obscene materials. The personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read obscenity in their homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on whether the materials are obscene or whether obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights to have and view that material in private are independently saved by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such. In other words, the N81* 'right to receive' recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of infringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The analogous constitutionally protected interest in the Stanley situation which restricts governmental efforts to proscribe obscenity is the First Amendment right of the individual to be free from governmental programs of thought control, however such programs might be justified in terms of permissible state objectives. For me, at least, Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such. In other words, the N85* 'right to receive' N86* recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of infringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Whatever the scope of the N96* 'right to receive' referred to in Stanley, it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here—dealings that Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - The right Stanley asserted was 'the right to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.' 394 U.S., at 565, 89 S.Ct., at 1248. The Court's response was that N97* 'a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the though of giving government the power to control men's minds.' Ibid. The focus of this language was on freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy of one's home. It does not require that we fashion or recognize a constitutional right in people like Reidel to distribute or sell obscene materials.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - Reidel is in a wholly different position. He has no complaints about governmental violations of his private thoughts or fantasies, but stands squarely on a claimed First Amendment right to do business in obscenity and use the mails in the process. But Roth has squarely placed obscenity and its distribution outside the reach of the First Amendment and they remain there today. Stanley did not overrule Roth and we decline to do so now.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - I join the opinion of the Court which, as I understand it, holds that the Federal Government may prohibit the use of the mails for commercial distribution of materials properly classifiable as obscene. The Court today correctly rejects the contention that the recognition in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), that private possession of obscene materials is constitutionally privileged under the First Amendment carries with it a N98* 'right to receive' such materials through any modes of distribution as long as adequate precautions are taken to prevent the dissemination to unconsenting adults and children. Appellee here contends, in effect, that the Stanley 'right to receive' language, 394 U.S., at 564—565, 89 S.Ct., at 1247—1248, constituted recognition that obscenity was constitutionally protected for its content. Governmental efforts to proscribe obscenity as such would, on this interpretation, not be constitutional; rather, the power of both the State and Federal Governments would now be restricted to the regulation of the constitutionally protected right to engage in this category of 'speech' in light of otherwise permissible state interests, such as the protection of privacy or the protection of children.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - > For me, at least, Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such. In other words, the N99* 'right to receive' recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of infringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - I join the opinion of the Court which, as I understand it, holds that the Federal Government may prohibit the use of the mails for commercial distribution of materials properly classifiable as obscene. The Court today correctly rejects the contention that the recognition in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), that private possession of obscene materials is constitutionally privileged under the First Amendment carries with it a 'right to receive' such materials through any modes of distribution as long as adequate precautions are taken to prevent the dissemination to unconsenting adults and children. Appellee here contends, in effect, that the Stanley 'right to receive' language, 394 U.S., at 564—565, 89 S.Ct., at 1247—1248, constituted recognition that obscenity was constitutionally protected for its content. Governmental efforts to proscribe obscenity as such would, on this interpretation, not be constitutional; rather, the power of both the State and Federal Governments would now be restricted to the regulation of the constitutionally protected right to engage in this category of 'speech in light of otherwise permissible state interests, such as the protection of privacy or the protection of children.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - That interpretation of Stanley, however, is flatly inconsistent with the square holding of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957): N70* 'We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - In view of Stanley's explicit reaffirmance of Roth, I do not read the former case as limiting governmental power to deal with obscenity to modes of regulation geared to public interests to be judicially assessed as legitimate or illegitimate in light of the nature of obscenity as a special category of constitutionally protected speech. Rather, I understand Stanley to rest in relevant part on the proposition that the power which Roth recognized in both State and Federal Governments to proscribe obscenity as constitutionally unprotected cannot be exercised to the exclusion of other constitutionally protected interests of the individual. That treatment of Stanley is consistent with the Court's approach to the problem of prior restraints in the obscenity area; if government chooses a system of prior restraints as an aid to its goal of proscribing obscenity, the system must be designed to minimize impact on speech which is constitutionally protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), Roth was convicted under § 1461 for mailing obscene circulars and advertising. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that N71* 'obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,' id., at 485, 77 S.Ct., at 1309, and that § 1461, N72* 'applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, do(es) not offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited.' Id., at 492, 77 S.Ct., at 1313. Roth has not been overruled. It remains the law in this Court and governs this case. Reidel, like Roth, was charged with using the mails for the distribution of obscene material. His conviction, if it occurs and the materials are found in fact to be obscene, would be no more vulnerable than was Roth's.
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Parties: United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs
Date: 1971-06-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - In Freedman v. Maryland, supra, we struck down a state scheme for administrative licensing of motion pictures, holding 'that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Thus, for the foreseeable future this Court must sit as a Board of Supreme Censors, sifting through books and magazines and watching movies because some official fears they deal too explicitly with sex. I can imagine no more distasteful, useless, and time-consuming task for the members of this Court than perusing this material to determine whether it has 'redeeming social value.' This absurd spectacle could be avoided if we would adhere to the literal command of the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press * * *.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - But a port of entry is not a traveler's home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search. Customs officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned in this case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country. Whatever the scope of the right to receive obscenity adumbrated in Stanley, that right, as we said in Reidel, does not extent to one who is seeking, as was Luros here to distribute obscene materials to the public, nor does it extend to one seeking to import obscene materials from abroad, whether for private use or public distribution. As we held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and reiterated today in Reidel, supra, obscenity is not within the scope of First Amendment protection. Hence Congress may declare it contraband and prohibit its importation, as it has elected in § 1305(a) to do.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - It would seem to me that if a citizen had a right to possess'obscene' material in the privacy of his home he should have the right to receive it voluntarily through the mail. Certainly when a man legally purchases such material abroad he should be able to bring it with him through customs to read later in his home. The mere act of importation for private use can hardly be more offensive to others than is private perusal in one's home. The right to read and view and literature and pictures at home is hollow indeed if it does not include a right to carry that material privately in one's luggage when entering the country.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Perhaps, however, the plurality reasons silently that a prohibition against importation of obscene materials for private use is constitutionally permissible because it is necessary to prevent ultimate commercial distribution of obscenity. It may feel that an importer's intent to distribute obscene materials commercially is so difficult to prove that all such importation may be outlawed without offending the First Amendment. A very similar argument was made by the State in Stanley when it urged that enforcement of a possession law was necessary because of the difficulties of proving intent to distribute or actual distribution. However, the Court unequivocally rejected that argument because an individual's right to N102* 'read or observe what he pleases' is so 'fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - Furthermore, any argument that all importation may be banned to stop possible commercial distribution simply ignores numerous holdings of this Court that legislation touching on First Amendment freedoms must be precisely and narrowly drawn to avoid stifling the expression the Amendment was designed to protect. Certainly the Court has repeatedly applied the rule against overbreadth in past censorship cases, as in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957), where we held that the State could not quarantine N57* 'the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Certainly claimant Luros has standing to raise the claim that the customs statute's failure to provide for prompt judicial decision renders it unconstitutional. Our previous decisions make clear that such censorship statutes may be challenged on their face as a violation of First Amendment rights 'whether or not (a defendant's) conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute.' Freedman v. Maryland, supra, 380 U.S., at 56, 85 S.Ct., at 737. This is true because of the N58* 'danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Since this censorship statute is unconstitutional on its face, and claimant has standing to challenge it as such, that should end the case without further ado.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - I particularly regret to see the Court revive the doctrine of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), that 'obscenity' is speech for some reason unprotected by the First Amendment. As the Court's many decisions in this area demonstrate, it is extremely difficult for judges or any other citizens to agree on what is 'obscene.' Since the distinctions between protected speech and 'obscenity' are so elusive and obscure, almost every 'obscenity' case involves difficult constitutional issues. After Roth our docket and those of other courts have constantly been crowded with cases where judges are called upon to decide whether a particular book, magazine, or movie may be banned. I have expressed before my view that I can imagine no task for which this Court of lifetime judges is less equipped to deal.
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Parties: Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe
Date: 1971-05-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - No prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court. Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy, the apparent basis for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by this record. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970), relied on by respondent, is not in point; the right of privacy involved in that case is not shown here.
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Parties: Cohen v. Cal.
Date: 1971-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said,N2* '(o)ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N82* Appellant's conviction, then, rests squarely upon his exercise of the 'freedom of speech' protected from arbitrary governmental interference by the Constitution and can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the manner in which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the substantive message it conveys. This does not end the inquiry, of course, for the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The rationale of the California court is plainly untenable. At most it reflects an 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance (which) is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen. There may be some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional values, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of expression. The argument amounts to little more than the self-defeating proposition that to avoid physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate that censorship themselves.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - At the outset, we cannot overemphasize that, in our judgment, most situations where the State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or more of the various established exceptions, discussed above but not applicable here, to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual expression. Equally important to our conclusion is the constitutional backdrop against which our decision must be made. The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The rationale of the California court is plainly untenable. At most it reflects an N100* 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance (which) is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, N101* '(o)ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970), we have at the same time consistently stressed that N44* 'we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.' Id., at 738, 90 S.Ct., at 1491. The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated. That is whyN45* '(w)holly neutral futilities * * * come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons,' Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528, 68 S.Ct. 665, 676, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and why N46* 'so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The rationale of the California court is plainly untenable. At most it reflects an N56* 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance (which) is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen. There may be some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional values, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of expression. The argument amounts to little more than the self-defeating proposition that to avoid physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate that censorship themselves. Cf. Ashton v. Kentucky,
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Parties: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia
Date: 1971-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - The threats to society's interest in freedom of the press that are involved in punitive and presumed damages can largely be eliminated by restricting the award of damages to proved, actual injuries. The jury's wide-ranging discretion will largely be eliminated since the award will be based on essentially objective, discernible factors. And the self-censhorship that results from the uncertainty created by the discretion as well as the self-censorship resulting from the fear of large judgments themselves would be reduced. At the same time, soceity's interest in protecting individuals from defamation will still be fostered.
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - The effect of imposing liability without fault is to place 'the printed, written or spoken word in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.' W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 108, p. 792 (3d ed. 1964). Clearly, this is inconsistent with the concepts of freedom of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Our efforts to live and work together in a free society not completely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encompass far more than politics in a narrow sense. N83* 'The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs.' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967). N84* 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N85* '* * * Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials."
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since New York Times the concept that the First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public official,' 'public figure,' or 'private individual,' as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 531—532, 540 (1970).
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Pennsylvania libel law recognizes that society's interest in protecting individual reputation often yields to other important social goals. In this case, the vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care would not provide adequate 'breathing space' for these great freedoms. Reasonable care is an N86* 'elusive standard' that 'would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S., at 389, 87 S.Ct., at 543. Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be deterred.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - the possibility of such error, even beyond the vagueness of the negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate. These dangers for freedom of speech and press led us to reject the reasonable-man standard of liability as 'simply inconsistent' with our national commitment under the First Amendment when sought to be applied to the conduct of a political campaign. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276, 91 S.Ct. 621, 627, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). The same considerations lead us to reject that standard here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - the principal failing of the plurality opinion is its inadequate appreciation of the limitations imposed by the legal process in accommondating the tension between state libel laws and the federal constitutional protection given to freedom of speech and press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - I think that where the purpose and effect of the law are to redress actual and measurable injury to private individuals that was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the publication, there is no necessary conflict with the values of freedom of speech. Just as an automobile negligently driven can cost a person his physical and mental well-being and the fruits of his labor, so can a printing press negligently set.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - New York Times, supra, and Curtis Publishing Co., supra, established that where the injured party is a 'public figure' or a 'public official,' the interest in freedom of speech dictates that the States forgo their interest in compensating for actual harm, even upon a basis generally applicable to all members of society, unless the plaintiff can show that the injurious publication was false and was made 'with 'actual malice'— that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - To begin, it does no violence, in my judgment, to the value of freedom of speech and press to impose a duty of reasonable care upon those who would exercise these freedoms. I do not think it can be gainsaid that the States have a substantial interest in encouraging speakers to carefully seek the truth before they communicate, as well as in compensating persons actually harmed by false descriptions of their personal behavior.
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - However, where the amount of punitive damages awarded bears a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done, I cannot agree that the Constitution must be read to prohibit such an award. Indeed, as I understand it, my Brother MARSHALL's objection to my position is not that the interest in freedom of speech dictates eliminating such judgments, but that this result is compelled by the need to avoid involving courts in an 'ad hoc balancing' of 'the content of the speech and the surrounding circumstances,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - The manner in which unlimited discretion may be exercised is plainly unpredictable. And fear of the extensive awards that may be given under the doctrine must necessarily produce the impingement on freedom of the press recognized in New York Times.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - The unlimited discretion exercised by juries in awarding punitive and presumed damages compounds the problem of self-censorship that necessarily results from the awarding of huge judgments. This discretion allows juries to penalize heavily the unorthodox and the unpopular and exact little from others. Such free wheeling discretion presents obvious and basic threats to society's interest in freedom of the press. And the utility of the discretion in fostering society's interest in protecting individuals from defamation is at best vague and uncertain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - This case lends itself to more limited adjudication. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan itself made clear that discussion of the official actions of public servants such as the police is constitutionally privileged. N87* 'The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials' is, in the language of that case, 'a fundamental principle of the American form of government.' 376 U.S., at 275, 84 S.Ct., at 723. Discussion of the conduct of public officials cannot, however, be subjected to artificial limitations designed to protect others involved in an episode with officials from unfavorable publicity. Such limitations would deprive the public of full information about the official action that took place.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - This Court has recognized this imperative: N88* '(T)o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.' St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). We thus hold that a libel action, as here, by a private individual against a licensed radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Calculated falsehood, of course, falls outside N89* 'the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech.' Garrison v. Louisiana,
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - New York Times gives the broadcasting media and the press the right not only to censure and criticize officials but also to praise them and the concomitant right to censure and criticize their adversaries. To extend constitutional protection to criticism only of officials would be to authorize precisely that sort of thought control that the First Amendment forbids government to exercise.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Some members of the Court seem haunted by fears of self-censorship by the press and of damage judgments that will threaten its financial health. But technology has immeasurably increased the power of the press to do both good and evil. Vast communication combines have been built into profitable ventures. My interest is not in protecting the treasuries of communicators but in implementing the First Amendment by insuring that effective communication which is essential to the continued functioning of our free society. I am not aware that self-censorship has caused the press to tread too gingerly in reporting 'news' concerning private citizens and private affairs or that the reputation of private citizens has received inordinate protection from falsehood. I am not convinced that we must fashion a constitutional rule protecting a whole range of damaging falsehoods and so shift the burden from those who publish to those who are injured.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - In this case, the vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care would not provide adequate 'breathing space' for these great freedoms. Reasonable care is an N52* 'elusive standard' that 'would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S., at 389, 87 S.Ct., at 543. Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be deterred.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - The unlimited discretion exercised by juries in awarding punitive and presumed damages compounds the problem of self-censorship that necessarily results from the awarding of huge judgments. This discretion allows juries to penalize heavily the unorthodox and the unpopular and exact little from others. Such free wheeling discretion presents obvious and basic threats to society's interest in freedom of the press. And the utility of the discretion in fostering society's interest in protecting individuals from defamation is at best vague and uncertain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - In libel cases, however, we view an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent misstatement—the three-quarter-million-dollar jury verdict in this case could rest on such an error—but the possibility of such error, even beyond the vagueness of the negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate. These dangers for freedom of speech and press led us to reject the reasonable-man standard of liability as 'simply inconsistent' with our national commitment under the First Amendment when sought to be applied to the conduct of a political campaign. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276, 91 S.Ct. 621, 627, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). The same considerations lead us to reject that standard here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - First, as a general matter, the States have a perfectly legitimate interest, exercised in a variety of ways, in redressing and preventing careless conduct, no matter who is responsible for it, that inflicts actual, measurable injury upon individual citizens. Secondly, there is no identifiable value worthy of constitutional protection in the publication of falsehoods. Third, although libel law provides that truth is a complete defense, that principle, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional interest in freedom of speech and press. For we have recognized that it is inevitable that there will be N53* 'some error in the situation presented in free debate,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406, 87 S.Ct. 534, 551, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967) (opinion of this writer), a process that needs 'breathing space,' NAA CP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), to flourish, and that N54* 'putting to the pre-existing prejudices of a jury the determination of what is 'true' may effectively institute a system of censorship.' Time, Inc. v. Hill,
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - Moreover, any system that punishes certain speech is likely to induce self-censorship by those who would otherwise exercise their constitutional freedom. Given the constitutionally protected interest in unfettered speech, it requires an identifiable, countervailing state interest, consistent with First Amendment values, to justify a regulatory scheme that produces such results. And, because the presence of such values dictates closer scrutiny of this aspect of state tort law than the Fourteenth Amendment would otherwise command, it may well be that certain rules, impervious to constitutional attack when applied to ordinarly human conduct, may have to be altered or abandoned where used to regulate speech. Finally, as determined in New York Times, the constitutional interest in tolerance of falsehood as well as the need to adjust competing societal interests, prohibits, at a minimum, the imposition of liability without fault.
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - However, our cases establish, I think, that, unless he has knowledge to the contrary, a speaker is entitled to presume that he is addressing an audience that is not especially susceptible to distress at the specter of open, uninhibited, robust speech. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957). Thus, I think the speaker should be free from a duty to compensate for actual harm inflicted by his falsehoods where the defamation would not have caused such harm to a person of average sensibilities unless, of course, the speaker knew that his statements were made concerning an unusually sensitive person. In short, I think the First Amendment does protect generally against the possibility of self-censorship in order to avoid unwitting affronts to the frail and the queasy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - I cannot agree that the First Amendment gives special protection to the press from '(t)he very possibility of having to engage in litigation,' ante, at 52 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Were this assertion tenable, I do not see why the States could ever enforce their libel laws. Cf. my Brother BLACK's opinion, ante, at 57. Further, it would certainly cast very grave doubts upon the constitutionality of so-called 'right-of-reply statutes' advocated by the plurality, ante, at 47, n. 15, and ultimately treat the application of any general law to a publisher or broadcaster as an important First Amendment issue. The notion that such an interest, in the context of a purely private libel, is a significant independent constitutional value is an unfortunate consequence of the plurality's single-minded devotion to the task of preventing self-censorship, regardless of the purposes for which such restraint is induced or the evils its exercise tends to avoid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - N55* Our notions of liberty require a free and vigorous press that presents what it believes to be information of interest or importance; not timorous, afraid of an error that leaves it open to liability for hundreds of thousands of dollars. The size of the potential judgment that may be rendered against the press must be the most significant factor in producing self-censorship—a judgment like the one rendered against Metromedia would be fatal to many smaller publishers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - The threats to society's interest in freedom of the press that are involved in punitive and presumed damages can largely be eliminated by restricting the award of damages to proved, actual injuries. The jury's wide-ranging discretion will largely be eliminated since the award will be based on essentially objective, discernible factors. And the self-censhorship that results from the uncertainty created by the discretion as well as the self-censorship resulting from the fear of large judgments themselves would be reduced. At the same time, soceity's interest in protecting individuals from defamation will still be fostered. The victims of the defamation will be compensated for their real injuries.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - Moreover, any system that punishes certain speech is likely to induce self-censorship by those who would otherwise exercise their constitutional freedom. Given the constitutionally protected interest in unfettered speech, it requires an identifiable, countervailing state interest, consistent with First Amendment values, to justify a regulatory scheme that produces such results.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - Where the State cannot point to any tangible danger, even knowingly erroneous publication is entitled to constitutional protection because of the interest in avoiding an inquiry into the mere truth or falsity of speech. Moreover, such a scheme would impose a burden on speaking not generally placed upon constitutionally unprotected conduct—the payment of private fines for conduct which, although not conformed to established limits of care, causes no harm in fact.
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Parties: Jenness v. Fortson
Date: 1971-06-21
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Parties: Lemon v. Kurtzman
Date: 1971-06-28
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Parties: Tilton v. Richardson
Date: 1971-06-28
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Parties: New York Times Co. v. United States
Date: 1971-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - They especially feared that the new powers granted to a central government might be interpreted to permit the government to curtail freedom of religion, press, assembly, and speech. In response to an overwhelming public clamor, James Madison offered a series of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of government to abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment in three parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which proclaimed: 'The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.' The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. Yet the Solicitor General argues and some members of the Court appear to agree that the general powers of the Government adopted in the original Constitution should be interpreted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic guarantees of the Bill of Rights adopted later. I can imagine no greater perversion of history. Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men that they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom * * * of the press * * *.' Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment provides that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing inf'ormation. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, c. V (1970);
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Segment in Paragraph: 131 - Each provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court. See, for example, Near v. Minnesota, ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 51 S.Ct. 625, 628, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow right of the Government to prevent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N103* 'The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.' The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. Yet the Solicitor General argues and some members of the Court appear to agree that the general powers of the Government adopted in the original Constitution should be interpreted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic guarantees of the Bill of Rights adopted later. I can imagine no greater perversion of history. Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men that they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom * * * of the press * * *.' Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denominate this right as the public 'right to know'; by implication, the Times asserts a sole trusteenship of that right by virtue of its journalistic 'scoop.' The right is asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout 'fire' in a crowded theater if there was no fire.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, c. V (1970); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States,
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - The Government argues that in addition to the inherent power of any government to protect itself, the President's power to conduct foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief give him authority to impose censorship on the press to protect his ability to deal effectively with foreign nations and to conduct the military affairs of the country. Of course, it is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948); Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1382, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943); United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936). And in some situations it may be that under whatever inherent powers the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President's mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in Chief, there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publication of material damaging to 'national security,' however that term may be defined.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - In response to an overwhelming public clamor, James Madison offered a series of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of government to abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment in three parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which proclaimed: N4* 'The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.'
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Parties: Griffin v. Breckenridge
Date: 1971-06-07
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Parties: Pryor v. United States
Date: 1971-10-29
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Parties: Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, Inc.
Date: 1972-01-10
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Parties: California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
Date: 1972-01-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - But it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. . . . Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - 'Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.'
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Parties: United States v. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc.
Date: 1972-01-24
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Parties: Cruz v. Beto
Date: 1972-03-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - None of our holdings under the First Amendment requires that, in addition to being allowed freedom of religious belief, prisoners be allowed freely to evangelize their views among other prisoners.
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Parties: Gooding v. Wilson
Date: 1972-03-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within 'narrowly limited classes of speech.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - '(T)his Court does not see any policy reasons for upholding the right of a person to use the type of language expressed by this petitioner. It strains the concept of freedom of speech out of proportion when it is argued that such language is and should be protected.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - N90* '(T)his Court does not see any policy reasons for upholding the right of a person to use the type of language expressed by this petitioner. It strains the concept of freedom of speech out of proportion when it is argued that such language is and should be protected.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - Our decisions since Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state power constitutionally to punish 'fighting' words under carefully drawn statutes not also susceptible of application to protected expression,
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - It was clear, therefore, that in Cox not only the language of the statute, but the facts of the very case before the Court, involving as it did protected political speech concerning a burning issue of great social concern, were cogent and persuasive evidence of the statute's potential for sweeping and improper applications. By way of contrast, there is nothing in the language of the Georgia statute, or even in the isolated and ancient Georgia decisions relied on by the Court today that indicates that the statute involved in this case has ever been applied to suppress speech even remotely comparable to that involved in Cox.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. N73* 'Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.'
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Parties: Cole v. Richardson
Date: 1972-04-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - 'The First Amendment . . . leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - It is precisely because these oaths are minimal, requiring only that nominal expression of allegiance 'which, by the common law, every citizen was understood to owe his sovereign,' Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F.Supp., at 341, that they have been sustained. That they are minimal intrusions into the freedom of government officials and employees to think, speak, and act makes them constitutional; it does not mean that greater intrusions will be tolerated. On the contrary, each time this Court has been faced with an attempt by government to make the traditional support oath more comprehensive or demanding, it has struck the oath down. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, supra; Baggett v. Bullitt, supra; cf. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S.Ct. 339, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966).
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N104* N105* 'The First Amendment . . . leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.' Yates v. United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 344, 77 S.Ct., at 1090. (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). This oath, however, requires that appellee 'oppose' that which she has an indisputable right to advocate. Yet the majority concludes that the promise of 'opposition'—exacted as a condition of public employment—is a mere redundancy which does not impair appellee's freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N74* When faced with an 'imminent clear and present danger,' governments may be able to compel citizens to do things that would ordinarily be beyond their authority to mandate. But, such emergency governmental power is a far cry from compelling every state employee in advance of any such danger to promise in any and all circumstances to conform speech and conduct to opposing an 'overthrow' of the government. The Constitution severely circumscribes the power of government to force its citizens to perform symbolic gestures of loyalty. Cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). Since the overbreadth of the oath tends to infringe areas of speech and conduct that may be protected by the Constitution, I believe that it cannot stand.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - A review of the oath cases in this Court will put the instant oath into context. We have made clear that neither federal nor state government may condition employment on taking oaths that impinge on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments respectively, as for example those relating to political beliefs. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 91 S.Ct. 720, 27 L.Ed.2d 749 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 209, 91 S.Ct. 1772, 1774, 29 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in result). Nor may employment be conditioned on an oath that one has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities such as the following: criticizing institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that approves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and supporting candidates for political office.
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Parties: Wis. v. Yoder
Date: 1972-05-15
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Parties: Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan
Date: 1972-05-30
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Parties: Colten v. Ky.
Date: 1972-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Based on our own examination of the record, we perceive no justification for setting aside the conclusion of the state court that when arrested appellant was not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. Colten insists that in seeking to arrange transportation for Mendez and in observing the issuance of a traffic citation he was disseminating and receiving information. But this is a strained, near-frivolous contention and we have little doubt that Colten's conduct in refusing to move on after being directed to do so was not, without more, protected by the First Amendment. Nor can we believe that Colten, although he was not trespassing or disobeying any traffic regulation himself, could not be required to move on. He had no constitutional right to observe the issuance of a traffic ticket or to engage the issuing officer in conversation at that time.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - popular sovereigntySince when have we Americans been expected to bow submissively to authority and speak with awe and reverence to those who represent us? The constitutional theory is that we the people are the sovereigns, the state and federal officials only our agents. We who have the final word can speak softly or angrily. We can seek to challenge and annoy, as we need not stay docile and quiet. The situation might have indicated that Colten's techniques were illsuited to the mission he was on, that diplomacy would have been more effective. But at the constitutional level speech need not be a sedative; it can be disruptive.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N47* '(A) function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - As the Kentucky statute was construed by the state court, however, a crime is committed only where there is no bona fide intention to exercise a constitutional right—in which event, by definition, the statute infringes no protected speech or conduct or where the interest so clearly outweighs the collective interest sought to be asserted that the latter must be deemed insubstantial. The court hypothesized, for example, that one could be convicted for disorderly conduct if at a symphony concert he arose and began lecturing to the audience on leghorn chickens. 467 S.W.2d, at 377. In so confining the reach of its statute, the Kentucky court avoided the shortcomings of the statute invalidated in the Cox case. Individuals may not be convicted under the Kentucky statute merely for expressing unpopular or annoying ideas. The statute comes into operation only when the individual's interest in expression, judged in the light of all relevant factors, is 'minuscule' compared to a particular public interest in preventing that expression or conduct at that time and place. As we understand this case, appellant's own conduct was not immune under the First Amendment and neither is his conviction vulnerable on the ground that the statute threatens constitutionally protected conduct of others.
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Parties: Moose Lodge
Date: 1972-06-12
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Parties: Flower v. United States
Date: 1972-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - N106* N107* Under such circumstances the military has abandoned any claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue. The base commandant can no more order petitioner off this public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city police order any leafleteer off any public street. Cf. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 s.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938), Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). '(S)treets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion,' 308 U.S., at 163, 60 S.Ct. at 151. N108* '(O)ne who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966), suggests that civilian authorities may draw reasonable distinctions, based on the purpose for which public buildings and grounds are used, in according the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms in such buildings and on such grounds. Simply because some activities and individuals are allowed on government property does not require the abandonment of otherwise allowable restrictions on its use. Indeed, it is generally recognized that demonstrations on courthouse grounds can be prohibited in order to protect the proper exercise of the judicial function. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562, 85 S.Ct. 476, 479, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965). See also 63 Stat. 617, § 6, 40 U.S.C. § 13k (prohibiting any demonstrations on the grounds surrounding this Court). Similarly, the unique requirements of military morale and security may well necessitate control over certain persons and activities on the base, even while normal traffic flow through the area can be tolerated.
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Parties: Pipefitters Local Union v. United States
Date: 1972-06-22
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Parties: Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB
Date: 1972-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights. See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (C.A.5), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730, 65 S.Ct. 66, 89 L.Ed. 585 (1944).
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157, guarantees to employees the right to 'selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations.' This guarantee includes both the right of union officials to discuss organization with employees, and the right of employees to discuss organization among themselves. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 'to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed' in § 7. But organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - " 'Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other. The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; the union may not always insist that the employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - I agree with the Court that this case should have been considered under N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 76 S.Ct. 679, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956). That case is, as the opinion of the Court suggests, narrower than Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968). It does not purport to interpret the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) so as to give union members the same comprehensive rights to free expression on the private property of an employer that the First Amendment gives to all citizens on private property that is the functional equivalent of a public business district. But Babcock is, in another sense, even broader than Logan Valley. It holds that where a union has no other means at its disposal to communicate with employees other than to use the employer's property, or where the union is denied the access to employees that the employer gives anti-union forces, the union may communicate with employees on the property of the employer. Congress gave unions this right in Section 7 of the NLRA, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157. The First Amendment gives no such broad right to use private property to ordinary citizens.
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Parties: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner
Date: 1972-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - We must remember that it is a balance that we are striking—a balance between the freedom to speak, a freedom that is given a preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and the freedom of a private property owner to control his property. When the competing interests are fairly weighed, the balance can only be struck in favor of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech. In ordering this accommodation the courts below erred in their interpretation of this Court's decisions in Marsh and Logan Valley.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - Petitioner's interests, on the other hand, pale in comparison. For example, petitioner urges that respondents' First Amendment activity would disturb the Center's customers. It is undisputed that some patrons will be disturbed by any First Amendment activity that goes on, regardless of its object. But, there is no evidence to indicate that speech directed to topics unrelated to the shopping center would be more likely to impair the motivation of customers to buy than speech directed to the uses to which the Center is put, which petitioner concedes is constitutionally protected under Logan Valley. On the contrary, common sense would indicate that speech that is critical of a shopping center or one or more of its stores is more likely to deter consumers from purchasing goods or services than speech on any other subject. Moreover, petitioner acknowledges that respondents have a constitutional right to 'leaflet' on any subject on public streets and sidewalks within Lloyd Center. It is difficult for me to understand why leafletting in the Mall would be so much more disturbing to the Center's customers.
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Parties: Laird v. Tatum
Date: 1972-06-26
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Parties: Grayned v. City of Rockford
Date: 1972-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - We held in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544—545, 85 S.Ct. 453, 458—459, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, that a State could not infringe the right of free speech and free assembly by convicting demonstrators under a 'disturbing the peace' ordinance where all that the students in that case did was to protest segregation and discrimination against blacks by peaceably assembling and marching to the courthouse where they sang, prayed, and listened to a speech, but where there was no violence, no rioting, no boisterous conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - N91* 'In considering the right of a municipality to control the use of public streets for the expression of religious (or political) views, we start with the words of Mr. Justice Roberts that N92* 'Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' Hague v. C.I.Q., 1939, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423.' Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293, 71 S.Ct. 312, 314, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951). See Shuttles-worth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152, 89 S.Ct. 935, 939, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Recognizing that N261* "wide exposure to . . . robust exchange of ideas" is an 'important part of the educational process' and should be nurtured, id., at 512, 89 S.Ct., at 739, we concluded that free expression could not be barred from the school campus. We made clear that 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression,' id., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737, and that particular expressive activity could not be prohibited because of a 'mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,' Id., at 509, 89 S.Ct., at 738. But we nowhere suggested that students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for his unlimited expressive purposes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Subject to such reasonable regulation, N19* however, peaceful demonstrations in public places are protected by the First Amendment. Of course, where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as expression under the First Amendment.
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Parties: Healy v. James
Date: 1972-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 6, 91 S.Ct. 702, 705, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296, 81 S.Ct. 1333, 1335, 6 L.Ed.2d 301 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (Harlan, J., for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that associational right.
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Parties: Kois v. Wisconsin
Date: 1972-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - 'The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - But, as the Roth Court emphasized, 'sex and obscenity are not synonymous. . . . The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.'
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Parties: Bd. of Regents v. Roth
Date: 1972-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - We said in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, 70 S.Ct. 674, 685, 94 L.Ed. 925, that freedom of speech was abridged when the only restraint on its exercise was withdrawal of the privilege to invoke the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216, we held that an applicant could not be denied the opportunity for public employment because he had exercised his First Amendment rights.
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Parties: Perry v. Sindermann
Date: 1972-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - And he has alleged that this public criticism was within the First and Fourteenth Amendments' protection of freedom of speech. Plainly, these allegations present a bona fide constitutional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for termination of his employment.
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Parties: Gravel v. United States
Date: 1972-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - Whether the Speech or Debate Clause extends to the informing function is an issue whose importance goes beyond the fate of a single Senator or Congressman. What is at stake is the right of an elected representative to inform, and the public to be informed, about matters relating directly to the workings of our Government. The dialogue between Congress and people has been recognized, from the days of our founding, as one of the necessary elements of a representative system. We should not retreat from that view merely because, in the course of that dialogue, information may be revealed that is embarrassing to the other branches of government or violates their notions of necessary secrecy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - The federal courts do become vitally involved whenever their power is sought to be invoked either to protect the press against censorship as in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822, or to protect the press against punishment for publishing 'secret' documents or to protect an individual against his disclosure of their contents for any of the purposes of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - To summon Beacon Press through its officials before the grand jury and to inquire into why it did what it did and its publication plans is 'abridging' the freedom of the press contrary to the command of the First Amendment. In light of the fact that these documents were part of the official Senate record, Beacon Press has violated no valid law, and the grand jury's scrutiny of it reduces to '(e)xposure purely for the sake of exposure.' Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S., at 82, 79 S.Ct., at 1047 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770, where a legislative committee inquired of a publisher of political tracts as to its customers' identities, N60* '(i)f the present inquiry were sanctioned the press would be subjected to harassment that in practical effect might be as serious as censorship.' Id., at 57, 73 S.Ct., at 551 (concurring opinion). Under our Constitution the Government has no surveillance over the press. That includes, as we held in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822, the prohibition against prior restraints. Yet criminal punishment for or investigations of what the press publishes, though a different species of abridgment, is nonetheless within the ban of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Branzburg v. Hayes
Date: 1972-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Col.L.Rev. 838 (1971). N1* As Madison wrote: 'A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.' 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information,
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16—17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280—1281, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 730, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2148—2149, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), (Stewart, J., concurring); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (CA3 1958); In the Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954). In Zemel v. Rusk, supra, for example, the Court sustained the Government's refusal to validate passports to Cuba even though that restriction N93* 'render(ed) less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that country.' 381 U.S., at 16, 85 S.Ct., at 1281. The ban on travel was held constitutional, for N94* '(t)he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N95* 'Is to answer it, since it involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with impunity and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of those governmental duties upon the performance of which the freedom of all, including that of the press, depends. . . . It suffices to say that however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right, as every other right enjoyed in human society, is subject to the restraints which separate right from wrong-doing.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - N96* N97* The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods. Cf. In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F.Supp. 573, 574 (ND Cal.1970). Freedom of the press is a N98* which N99* 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111, 63 S.Ct. 870, 874, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Of course, the press has the right to abide by its agreement not to publish all the information it has, but the right to withhold news is not equivalent to a First Amendment exemption from the ordinary duty of all other citizens to furnish relevant information to a grand jury performing an important public function. Private restraints on the flow of information are not so favored by the First Amendment that they override all other public interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 97 - The reporter's constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source stems from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the public. It is this basic concern that underlies the Constitution's protection of a free press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, because the guarantee is N262* 'not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by which news is assembled and disseminated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Col.L.Rev. 838 (1971).N263* As Madison wrote: 'A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.' 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - Finally, and most important, when governmental officials possess an unchecked power to compel newsmen to disclose information received in confidence, sources will clearly be deterred from giving information, and reporters will clearly be deterred from publishing it, because uncertainty about exercise of the power will lead to N61* 'self-censorship.' Smith v. California,
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - Again, the commonsense understanding that such deterrence will occur is buttressed by concrete evidence. The existence of deterrent effects through fear and self-censorship was impressively developed in the District Court in Caldwell. Individual reporters and commentators have noted such effects. Surveys have verified that an unbridled subpoena power will substantially impair the flow of news to the public, especially in sensitive areas involving governmental officials, financial affairs, political figures, dissidents, or minority groups that require in-depth, investigative reporting.
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Parties: Kleindienst v. Mandel
Date: 1972-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - N100* N101* 'It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . .. It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - In saying these things, I am merely repeating established First Amendment law. Indeed, this Court has already applied that law in a case concerning the entry of communist doctrine from foreign lands. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965), this Court held that the right of an American addressee to receive communist political propaganda from abroad could not be fettered by requiring the addressee to request in writing its delivery from the Post Office. See id., at 308, 85 S.Ct., at 1497 (Brennan, J., concurring). The burden imposed on the right to receive information in our case is far greater than in Lamont, with far less justification.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - N264* learnThe First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and publish but also the right to hear, to learn, to know.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - receipt of informationtruthAs the majority correctly demonstrates, in a variety of contexts this Court has held that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, the freedom to hear as well as the freedom to speak. The reason for this is that the First Amendment protects a process, in Justice Brandeis' words, N265* 'reason as applied through public discussion,' Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (concurring opinion); and the right to speak and hear including the right to inform others and to be informed about public issues—are inextricably part of that process. The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin. But the coin itself is the process of thought and discussion. The activity of speakers becoming listeners and listeners becoming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is the 'means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.' Ibid.; see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). Its protection is 'a fundamental principle of the American government.' Whitney v. California, supra, 274 U.S., at 375, 47 S.Ct., at 648. The First Amendment means that Government has no power to thwart the process of free discussion, to 'abridge' the freedoms necessary to make that process work.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - 'It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. N110* 'This freedom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to receive . . ..' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943) . . ..' Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969).
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The Court there held that a labor organizer's right to speak and the rights of workers 'to hear what he had to say,' id., at 534, 65 S.Ct. at 324, were both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The Court there held that a labor organizer's right to speak and the rights of workers N2* 'to hear what he had to say,' id., at 534, 65 S.Ct. at 324, were both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership.
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Parties: Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley
Date: 1972-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - '(I)n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737. Some labor picketing is peaceful, some disorderly; the same is true of picketing on other themes. No labor picketing could be more peaceful or less prone to violence than Mosley's solitary vigil. In seeking to restrict nonlabor picketing that is clearly more disruptive than peaceful labor picketing, Chicago may not prohibit all nonlabor picketing at the school forum.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - I join the Court's opinion but with the reservation that some of the language used in the discussion of the First Amendment could, if read out of context, be misleading. Numerous holdings of this Court attest to the fact that the First Amendment does not literally mean that we 'are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.' This statement is subject to some qualifications,
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - In this case, the ordinance itself describes impermissible picketing not in terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter. The regulation N59* 'thus ship(s) from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.' This is never permitted. In spite of this, Chicago urges that the ordinance is not improper content censorship, but rather a device for preventing disruption of the school. Cities certainly have a substantial interest in stopping picketing which disrupts a school. 'The crucial question, however, is whether (Chicago's ordinance) advances that objective in a manner consistent with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.'
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Parties: Cal. v. La Rue
Date: 1972-12-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - 'An actor, like everyone else in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic performance.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - N121* For while '(m)ere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, (they are) insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital' as freedom of speech. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). Rather, in order to restrict speech, the State must show that the speech is 'used in such circumstances and (is) of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that (it) will bring about the substantive evils that (the State) has a right to prevent.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.' Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - It may be that the Government has an interest in suppressing lewd or 'indecent' speech even when it occurs in private among consenting adults. Cf. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1408, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). That interest, however, must be balanced against the overriding interest of our citizens in freedom of thought and expression. Our prior decisions on obscenity set such a balance and hold that the Government may suppress expression treating with sex only if it meets the three-pronged Roth-Memoirs test.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Nothing in the language or history of the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes the States to use their liquor licensing power as a means for the deliberate inhibition of protected, even if distasteful, forms of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - It is senseless to say that a play is 'speech' within the meaning of the First Amendment, but that the individual gestures of the actors are 'conduct' which the State may prohibit.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - 'We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express in idea.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - But as the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the commission of public acts that may themselves violate valid penal statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly increases. States may sometimes proscribe expression that is directed to the accomplishment of an end that the State has declared to be illegal when such expression consists, in part, of 'conduct' or 'action,' Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). In O'Brien, supra, the Court suggested that the extent to which 'conduct' was protected by the First Amendment depended on the presence of a N20* 'communicative element,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N75* If, as these many cases hold, movies, plays, and the dance enjoy constitutional protection, it follows, ineluctably I think, that their component parts are protected as well. It is senseless to say that a play is 'speech within the meaning of the First Amendment, but that the individual gestures of the actors are 'conduct' which the State may prohibit. The State may no more allow movies while punishing the 'acts' of which they are composed than it may allow newspapers while punishing the 'conduct' of setting type.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Yet even if one were to concede that such a link existed, N76* it would hardly justify a broadscale attack on First Amendment freedoms. The only way to stop murders and drugs abuse is to punish them directly. But the State's interest in controlling material dealing with sex is secondary in nature. It can control rape and prostitution by punishing those acts, rather than by punishing the speech that is one step removed from the feared harm. Moreover, because First Amendment rights are at stake, the State must adopt this 'less restrictive alternative' unless it can make a compelling demonstration that the protected activity and criminal conduct are so closely linked that only through regulation of one can the other be stopped.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - It should thus be evident that, under the standards previously developed by this Court, the California regulations are overbroad: They would seem to suppress not only obscenity outside the scope of the First Amendment, but also speech that is clearly protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - It should be clear, however, that the absence of criminal sanctions is insufficient to immunize state regulation from constitutional attack. On the contrary, 'this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry.' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403—404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). For N77* '(i)t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.' Id., at 404, 84 S.Ct., at 1794. As we pointed out only last Term, N78* '(f)or at least a quarter century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even thought the government may deny him the benefit for any number or reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not act. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The California regulation at issue here clearly applies to some speech protected by the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also, no doubt, to some speech and conduct which are unprotected under our prior decisions. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The State points out, however, that the regulation does not prohibit speech directly, but speaks only to the conditions under which a license to sell liquor by the drink can be granted and retained. But, as Mr. Justice MARSHALL carefully demonstrates in Part II of his dissenting opinion, by requiring the owner of a nightclub to forgo the exercise of certain rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, the State has imposed an unconstitutional condition on the grant of a license.
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Parties: Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n
Date: 1972-12-18
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Parties: United States v. Kras
Date: 1973-01-10
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Parties: Roe v. Wade
Date: 1973-01-22
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Parties: Papish v. Board of Curators of University of Missouri
Date: 1973-03-19
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Parties: San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez
Date: 1973-04-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted. These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented by judicial instrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - For example, a law that provided that newspapers could be published only by people who had resided in the State for five years could be superficially viewed as invidiously discriminating against an identifiable class in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But, more basically, scuch a law would be invalid simply because it abridged the freedom of the press. Numerous cases in this Court illustrate this principle.
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Parties: Lemon v. Kurtzman
Date: 1973-04-02
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Parties: Hall v. Cole
Date: 1973-05-21
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Parties: Doe v. McMillan
Date: 1973-05-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - 'The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process.'
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Parties: United States v. State Tax Com
Date: 1973-06-04
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Parties: Kenosha v. Bruno
Date: 1973-06-11
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Parties: Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee
Date: 1973-05-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - That 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' is a restraint on government action, not that of private persons. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461, 72 S.Ct. 813, 820, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952). The Court has not previously considered whether the action of a broadcast licensee such as that challenged here is 'governmental action' for purposes of the First Amendment. The holding under review thus presents a novel question, and one with far-reaching implications.
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Segment in Paragraph: 178 - N112* We ourselves have, of course, made great inroads on the First Amendment of which obscenity is only one of the many examples. So perhaps we are inching slowly toward a controlled press. But the regime of federal supervision under the Fairness Doctrine is contrary to our constitutional mandate and makes the broadcast licensee an easy victim of political pressures and reduces him to a timid and submissive segment of the press whose measure of the public interest will now be echoes of the dominant political voice that emerges after every election. The affair with freedom of which we have been proud will now bear only a faint likeness of our former robust days.
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Segment in Paragraph: 180 - N113* We have allowed ominous inroads to be made on the historic freedom of the newspapers. The effort to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers failed only by a narrow margin and actually succeeded for a brief spell in imposing prior restraint on our press for the first time in our history.
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Segment in Paragraph: 191 - N114* Experience has shown that unrestrained power cannot be trusted to serve the public weal even though it be in governmental hands. The fate of the First Amendment should not be so jeopardized. The constitutional mandate that the Government shall make 'no law' abridging freedom of speech and the press is clear; the orders and rulings of the Commission are covered by that ban; and it must be carefully confined lest broadcasting—now our most powerful media—be used to subdue the minorities or help produce a Nation of people who walk submissively to the executive's motions of the public good.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N107* In analyzing the broadcasters' claim that the Fairness Doctrine and two of its component rules violated their freedom of expression, we held that '(n)o one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because 'the public interest' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech." Id., at 389, 89 S.Ct., at 1806. Although the broadcaster is not without protection under the First Amendment, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166, 68 S.Ct. 915, 933, 92 L.Ed. 1260 (1948), '(i)t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - N108* The First Amendment prohibits the Government from imposing controls upon the press. Private broadcasters are surely part of the press. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166, 68 S.Ct. 915, 933, 92 L.Ed. 1260. Yet here the Court of Appeals held, and the dissenters today agree, that the First Amendment requires the Government to impose controls upon private broadcasters—in order to preserve First Amendment 'values.' The appellate court accomplished this strange convolution by the simple device of holding that private broadcasters are Government. This is a step along a path that could eventually lead to the proposition that private newspapers 'are' Government. Freedom of the press would then be gone. In its place we would have such governmental controls upon the press as a majority of this Court at any particular moment might consider First Amendment 'values' to require. It is a frightening specter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 126 - N110* There is never a paucity of arguments in favor of limiting the freedom of the press. The Court of Appeals concluded that greater Government control of press freedom is acceptable here because of the scarcity of frequencies for broadcasting. But there are many more broadcasting stations than there are daily newspapers. And it would require no great ingenuity to argue that newspapers too are Government. After all, newspapers get Government mail subsidies and a limited antitrust immunity. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals would then lead to the conclusion that the First Amendment requires that newspapers, too, be compelled to open their pages to all comers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 142 - The Government as owner and manager would not, as I see it, be free to pick and choose such news items as it desired. For by the First Amendment it may not censor or enact or enforce any other 'law' abridging freedom of the press. Politics, ideological slants, rightist or leftist tendencies could play no part in its design of programs.
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Segment in Paragraph: 145 - '(A)ny effort to solve the broader problems of a monopoly press by forcing newspapers to cover all 'newsworthy' events and print all viewpoints, under the watchful eyes of petty public officials, is likely to undermine such independence as the press now shows without achieving any real diversity.' The System of Freedom of Expression 671 (1970).
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Segment in Paragraph: 151 - 'It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 152 - Of course there is private censorship in the newspaper field. But for one publisher who may suppress a fact, there are many who will print it. But if the Government is the censor, administrative fiat, not freedom of choice, carries the day.
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Segment in Paragraph: 153 - 'It is an insufficiently noticed aspect of the First Amendment that it contemplates the vigorous use of self-help by the opponents of given doctrines, ideas, and political positions. It is not the theory that all ideas and positions are entitled to flourish under freedom of discussion. It is rather then that they must survive and endure against hostile criticism. There is perhaps a paradox in that the suppression of speech by speech is part and parcel of the principle of freedom of speech. Indeed, one big reason why policy dictates that government keep its hands off communication is that, in this area, self-help of criticism is singularly effective.
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Segment in Paragraph: 167 - N111* But the press in a realistic sense is likewise not available to all. Small or 'underground' papers appear and disappear; and the weekly is an established institution. But the daily papers now established are unique in the sense that it would be virtually impossible for a competitor to enter the field due to the financial exigencies of this era. The result is that in practical terms the newspapers and magazines, like TV and radio, are available only to a select few. Who at this time would have the folly to think he could combat the New York Times or Denver Post by building a new plant and becoming a competitor? That may argue for a redefinition of the responsibilities of the press in First Amendment terms. But I do not think it gives us carte blanche to design systems of supervision and control or empower Congress to read the mandate in the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press' to mean that Congress may, acting directly or through any of its agencies such as the FCC make 'some' laws 'abridging' freedom of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 175 - The Court in today's decision by endorsing the Fairness Doctrine sanctions a federal saddle on broadcast licensees that is agreeable to the traditions of nations that never have known freedom of press and that is tolerable in countries that do not have a written constitution containing prohibitions as absolute as those in the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 192 - N115* Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484, involved a prosecution of a newspaper editor for publishing, contrary to a state statute, an editorial on election day urging the voters to vote against the existing city commission and to replace it with a mayor-council government. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, reversed the judgment saying: '(T)he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the one here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.' Id., at 219, 86 S.Ct., at 1437. I would apply the same test to TV or radio.
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Segment in Paragraph: 201 - N116* The command of the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' is, on its face, directed at governmental rather than private action. Nevertheless, our prior decisions make clear that '(c)onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon (governmental) action.' Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 488, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966). Thus, the reach of the First Amendment depends not upon any formalistic 'private-public' dichotomy but, rather, upon more functional considerations concerning the extent of governmental involvement in, and public character of, a particular 'private' enterprise.
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Segment in Paragraph: 232 - N117* N118* In light of these considerations, the Court would concede, I assume, that our citizens have at least an abstract right to express their views on controversial issues of public importance. But freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum—whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have consistently held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for the expression of his views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 116 - N104* N105* The dissenting opinion today argues, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, that only a limited right of access is sought by the respondents and required by the First Amendment, and that such a limited right would not turn broadcasters into common carriers. The respondents argue, somewhat differently, that the Constitution requires that only 'responsible' individuals and groups be given the right to purchase advertising. These positions are said to be arrived at by somehow balancing 'competing First Amendment values.' But if private broadcasters are Government, how can the First Amendment give only a limited right to those who would speak? Since when has the First Amendment given Government the right to silence all speakers it does not consider 'responsible?'
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Segment in Paragraph: 122 - N106* If the 'public interest' language of the statute were intended to enact the substance of the First Amendment, a discussion of whether broadcaster action is governmental action would indeed be superfluous. For anything that Government could not do because of the First Amendment, the broadcasters could not do under the statute. But this theory proves far too much, since it would make the statutory scheme, with the emphasis on broadcaster discretion and its proscription on interference with 'the right of free speech by means of radio communication,' a nullity. Were the Government really operating the electronic press, it would, as my Brother DOUGLAS points out, be prevented by the First Amendment from selection of broadcast content and the exercise of editorial judgment. It would not be permitted in the name of 'fairness' to deny time to any person or group on the grounds that their views had been heard 'enough.' Yet broadcasters perform precisely these functions and enjoy precisely these freedoms under the Act. The constitutional and statutory issues in these cases are thus quite different.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N107* N108* N109* Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public resource, there is also present an unusual order of First Amendment values. Red Lion discussed at length the application of the First Amendment to the broadcast media. In analyzing the broadcasters' claim that the Fairness Doctrine and two of its component rules violated their freedom of expression, we held that N110* '(n)o one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because 'the public interest' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech." Id., at 389, 89 S.Ct., at 1806. Although the broadcaster is not without protection under the First Amendment, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166, 68 S.Ct. 915, 933, 92 L.Ed. 1260 (1948), N111* '(i)t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Thus, under the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters are responsible for providing the listening and viewing public with access to a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance. The basic principle underlying that responsibility is N112* 'the right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter . . ..' Report of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). Consistent with that philosophy, the Commission on several occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 183 - The right of the people to know has been greatly undermined by our decisions requiring, under pain of contempt, a reporter to disclose the sources of the information he comes across in investigative reporting.
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Segment in Paragraph: 188 - Under the statute if Congress does not act, this new regime of secrecy will be imposed on the Nation and the right of people to know will be further curtailed. The proposed code sedulously protects the Government; it does not protect newsmen. It indeed pointedly omits any mention of the privilege of newsmen to protect their confidential sources.
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Segment in Paragraph: 192 - Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484, involved a prosecution of a newspaper editor for publishing, contrary to a state statute, an editorial on election day urging the voters to vote against the existing city commission and to replace it with a mayor-council government. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, reversed the judgment saying: '(T)he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.
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Segment in Paragraph: 218 - With considerations such as these in mind, we have specifically declared that, in the context of radio and television broadcasting, the First Amendment protects N113* 'the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . ..' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 390, 89 S.Ct. at 1807. And, because N114* '(i)t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee,' N115* '(i)t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 227 - Nor are these cases concerned solely with the adequacy of coverage of those views and issues which generally are recognized as 'newsworthy.' For also at stake is the right of the public to receive suitable access to new and generally unperceived ideas and opinions. Under the Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster is required to present only 'representative community views and voices on controversial issues' of public importance. Thus, by definition, the Fairness Doctrine tends to perpetuate coverage of those 'views and voices' that are already established, while failing to provide for exposure of the public to those 'views and voices' that are novel, unorthodox, or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 231 - Moreover, a proper balancing of the competing First Amendment interests at stake in this controversy must consider, not only the interests of broadcasters and of the listening and viewing public, but also the independent First Amendment interest of groups and individuals in effective self-expression. See, e.g., T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 4—7 (1666); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1941). N116* '(S)peech concerning public affairs . . . is the essence of self-government,' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74—75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), and the First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the right of the public to hear debate, but also the right of individuals to participate in that debate and to attempt to persuade others to their points of view.
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Segment in Paragraph: 232 - In light of these considerations, the Court would concede, I assume, that our citizens have at least an abstract right to express their views on controversial issues of public importance. But freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum—whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have consistently held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for the expression of his views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 237 - N117* Although the overriding need to avoid overcrowding of the airwaves clearly justifies the imposition of a ceiling on the number of individuals who will be permitted to operate broadcast stations and, indeed, renders it N118* 'idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish,' it does not in any sense dictate that the continuing First Amendment rights of all nonlicensees be brushed aside entirely. Under the existing system, broadcast licensees are granted a preferred status with respect to the airwaves, not because they have competed successfully in the free market but rather, 'because of their initial government selection . . ..' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 400, 89 S.Ct. at 1812. And, in return for that 'preferred status,' licensees must respect the competing First Amendment rights of others. Thus, although the broadcaster has a clear First Amendment right to be free from Government censorship in the expression of his own views and, indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable journalistic control over the use of his facilities, N119* '(t)he right of free speech of a broadcaster . . . does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 232 - But freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum—whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 237 - N98* Thus, although the broadcaster has a clear First Amendment right to be free from Government censorship in the expression of his own views and, indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable journalistic control over the use of his facilities, N99* '(t)he right of free speech of a broadcaster . . . does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.' Id.,
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Segment in Paragraph: 172 - And it is anathema to the First Amendment to allow Government any role of censorship over newspapers, magazines, books, art, music, TV, radio, or any other aspect of the press. There is unhappiness in some circles at the impotence of Government. But if there is to be a change, let it come by constitutional amendment. The Commission has an important role to play in curbing monopolistic practices, in keeping channels free from interference, in opening up new channels as technology develops. But it has no power of censorship.
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Segment in Paragraph: 173 - N64* N65* It is said, of course, that Government can control the broadcasters because their channels are in the public domain in the sense that they use the airspace that is the common heritage of all the people. But parks are also in the public domain. Yet people who speak there do not come under Government censorship. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450—453, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668—669, 82 L.Ed. 949; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515—516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963—964, 83 L.Ed. 1423. It is the tradition of Hyde Park, not the tradition of the censor, that is reflected in the First Amendment. TV and radio broadcasters are a vital part of the press; and since the First Amendment allows no Government control over it, I would leave this segment of the press to its devices.
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Segment in Paragraph: 221 - N66* As a practical matter, the Court's reliance on the Fairness Doctrine as an 'adequate' alternative to editorial advertising seriously overestimates the ability—or willingness—of broadcasters to expose the public to the 'widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' As Professor Jaffe has noted, 'there is considerable possibility the broadcaster will exercise a large amount of self-censorship and try to avoid as much controversy as he safely can.' Indeed, in light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audience, and therefore their profits, it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and controversiality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints. Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and, in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply 'bad business' to espouse—or even to allow others to espouse—the heterodox or the controversial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only established—or at least moderated—views to enter the broadcast world's 'marketplace of ideas.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 232 - we have consistently held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for the expression of his views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 237 - Although the overriding need to avoid overcrowding of the airwaves clearly justifies the imposition of a ceiling on the number of individuals who will be permitted to operate broadcast stations and, indeed, renders it N67* 'idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish,' it does not in any sense dictate that the continuing First Amendment rights of all nonlicensees be brushed aside entirely. Under the existing system, broadcast licensees are granted a preferred status with respect to the airwaves, not because they have competed successfully in the free market but rather, 'because of their initial government selection . . ..' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 400, 89 S.Ct. at 1812. And, in return for that 'preferred status,' licensees must respect the competing First Amendment rights of others. Thus, although the broadcaster has a clear First Amendment right to be free from Government censorship in the expression of his own views and, indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable journalistic control over the use of his facilities, N68* '(t)he right of free speech of a broadcaster . . . does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 191 - N1* >N2* Experience has shown that unrestrained power cannot be trusted to serve the public weal even though it be in governmental hands. The fate of the First Amendment should not be so jeopardized. The constitutional mandate that the Government shall make 'no law' abridging freedom of speech and the press is clear; the orders and rulings of the Commission are covered by that ban; and it must be carefully confined lest broadcasting—now our most powerful media—be used to subdue the minorities or help produce a Nation of people who walk submissively to the executive's motions of the public good.
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Parties: Kaplan v. California
Date: 1973-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - This case squarely presents the issue of whether expression by words alone can be legally 'obscene' in the sense of being unprotected by the First Amendment. When the Court declared that obscenity is not a form of expression protected by the First Amendment, no distinction was made as to the medium of the expression.
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Parties: United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film
Date: 1973-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N119* N120* I know of no constitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, postcard, or film may be made contraband because of its contents. The Constitution never purported to give the Federal Government censorship or oversight over literature or artistic productions, save as they might be governed by the Patent and Copyright Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - I know of no constitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, postcard, or film may be made contraband because of its contents. The Constitution never purported to give the Federal Government censorship or oversight over literature or artistic productions, save as they might be governed by the Patent and Copyright Clause of Art.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - At the very beginning, however, the First Amendment applied only to the Federal Government and there is not the slightest evidence that the Framers intended to put the newly created federal regime into the role of ombudsman over literature. Tying censorship to the movement of literature or films in interstate commerce or into foreign commerce would have been an easy way for a government of delegated powers to impair the liberty of expression. It was to bar such suppression that we have the First Amendment.
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Parties: United States v. Orito
Date: 1973-06-21
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Parties: Miller v. California
Date: 1973-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - The idea that the First Amendment permits punishment for ideas that are 'offensive' to the particular judge or jury sitting in judgment is astounding. No greater leveler of speech or literature has ever been designed. To give the power to the censor, as we do today, is to make a sharp and radical break with the traditions of a free society. The First Amendment was not fashioned as a vehicle for dispensing tranquilizers to the people.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - N69* Today the Court retreats from the earlier formulations of the constitutional test and undertakes to make new definitions. This effort, like the earlier ones, is earnest and well intentioned. The difficulty is that we do not deal with constitutional terms, since 'obscenity' is not mentioned in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. And the First Amendment makes no such exception from 'the press' which it undertakes to protect nor, as I have said on other occasions, is an exception necessarily implied, for there was no recognized exception to the free press at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted which treated 'obscene' publications differently from other types of papers, magazines, and books. So there are no constitutional guidelines for deciding what is and what is not 'obscene.' The Court is at large because we deal with tastes and standards of literature. What shocks me may be sustenance for my neighbor. What causes one person to boil up in rage over one pamphlet or movie may reflect only his neurosis, not shared by others. We deal here with a regime of censorship which, if adopted, should be done by constitutional amendment after full debate by the people.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - These doleful anticipations assume that courts cannot distinguish commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amendment, from commercial exploitation of obscene material. Moreover, state regulation of hard-core pornography so as to make it unavailable to nonadults, a regulation which Mr. Justice Brennan finds constitutionally permissible, has all the elements of 'censorship' for adults; indeed even more rigid enforcement techniques may be called for with such dichotomy of regulation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N21* has abandoned his former position and now maintains that no formulation of this Court, the Congress, or the States can adequately distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment from protected expression, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2642, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Paradoxically, Mr. Justice BRENNAN indicates that suppression of unprotected obscene material is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting adults, as in this case, and to juveniles, although he gives no indication of how the division between protected and nonprotected materials may be drawn with greater precision for these purposes than for regulation of commercial exposure to consenting adults only.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - But today, for the first time since Roth was decided in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations
Date: 1973-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - Whatever validity the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own facts, it certainly does not stand for the proposition hat the advertising pages of a newspaper are outside the protection given the newspaper by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - In any event, I believe the First Amendment freedom of press includes the right of a newspaper to arrange the content of its paper, whether it be news items, editorials, or advertising, as it sees fit.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - But I believe that Pittsburgh Press by reason of the First Amendment may publish what it pleases about any law without censorship or restraint by Government. The First Amendment does not require the press to reflect any ideological or political creed reflecting the dominant philosophy, whether transient or fixed. It may use its pages and facilities to denounce a law and urge its repeal or, at the other extreme, denounce those who do not respect its letter and spirit.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N79* The present order does not endanger arguably protected speech. Because the order is based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct, this is not a case in which the Court is asked to speculate as to the effect of publication. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). Moreover, the order is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary. And because no interim relief was granted, the order will not have gone into effect before our final determination that the actions of Pittsburgh Press were unprotected.
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Parties: Norwood v. Harrison
Date: 1973-06-25
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Parties: Levitt v. Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty
Date: 1973-06-25
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Parties: Heller v. New York
Date: 1973-06-25
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Parties: Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
Date: 1973-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The other reason I could not bring myself to conclude that 'obscenity' was not covered by the First Amendment was that prior to the adoption of our Constitution and Bill of Rights the Colonies had no law excluding 'obscenity' from the regime of freedom of expression and press that then existed. I could find no such laws; and more important, our leading colonial expert, Julius Goebel, could find none, J. Goebel, Development of Legal Institutions (1946); J. Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor (1937). So I became convinced that the creation of the 'obscenity' exception to the First Amendment was a legislative and judicial tour de force; that if we were to have such a regime of censorship and punishment, it should be done by constitutional amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - This history caused us to conclude in Roth 'that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment (that 'Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .') was not intended to protect every utterance.' 354 U.S., at 483, 77 S.Ct., at 1308. It also caused us to hold, as numerous prior decisions of this Court had assumed, see id., at 481, 77 S.Ct., at 1306, that obscenity could be denied the protection of the First Amendment and hence suppressed because it is a form of expression 'utterly without redeeming social importance,' id., at 484, 77 S.Ct., at 1309, as 'mirrored in the universal judgment that (it) should be restrained . . ..'
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Segment in Paragraph: 104 - Whatever the extent of state power to regulate in those areas, it should be clear that the view I espouse today would introduce a large measure of clarity to this troubled area, would reduce the institutional pressure on this Court and the rest of the State and Federal Judiciary, and would guarantee fuller freedom of expression while leaving room for the protection of legitimate governmental interests. Since the Supreme Court of Georgia erroneously concluded that the State has power to suppress sexually oriented material even in the absence of distribution to juveniles or exposure to unconsenting adults, I would reverse that judgment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - N120* 'In (Reidel), the Supreme Court expressly held that the government could constitutionally prohibit the distribution of obscene materials through the mails, even though the distribution be limited to willing recipients who state that they are adults, and, further, that the constitutional right of a person to possess obscene material in the privacy of his own home, as expressed in the Stanley case, does not carry with it the right to sell and deliver such material. . . . Those who choose to pass through the front door of the defendant's theater and purchase a ticket to view the films and who certify thereby that they are more than 21 years of age are willing recipients of the material in the same legal sense as were those in the Reidel case, who, after reading the newspaper advertisements of the material, mailed an order to the defendant accepting his solicitation to sell them the obscene booklet there. That case clearly establishes once and for all that the sale and delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not protected under the first amendment.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The other reason I could not bring myself to conclude that 'obscenity' was not covered by the First Amendment was that prior to the adoption of our Constitution and Bill of Rights the Colonies had no law excluding 'obscenity' from the regime of freedom of expression and press that then existed. I could find no such laws; and more important, our leading colonial expert, Julius Goebel, could find none, J. Goebel, Development of Legal Institutions (1946); J. Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor (1937). So I became convinced that the creation of the 'obscenity' exception to the First Amendment was a legislative and judicial tour de force; that if we were to have such a regime of censorship and punishment, it should be done by constitutional amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The other reason I could not bring myself to conclude that 'obscenity' was not covered by the First Amendment was that prior to the adoption of our Constitution and Bill of Rights the Colonies had no law excluding 'obscenity' from the regime of freedom of expression and press that then existed. I could find no such laws; and more important, our leading colonial expert, Julius Goebel, could find none, J. Goebel, Development of Legal Institutions (1946); J. Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor (1937). So I became convinced that the creation of the 'obscenity' exception to the First Amendment was a legislative and judicial tour de force; that if we were to have such a regime of censorship and punishment, it should be done by constitutional amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), the Court held that obscenity, although expression, falls outside the area of speech or press constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against state or federal infringement. But at the same time we emphasized in Roth that N22* 'sex and obscenity are not synonymous,' id., at 487, 77 S.Ct., at 1310, and that matter which is sexually oriented but not obscene is fully protected by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - The alternative adopted by the Court today recognizes that a prohibition against any depiction or description of human sexual organs could not be reconciled with the guarantees of the First Amendment. But the Court does retain the view that certain sexually oriented material can be considered obscene and therefore unprotected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To describe that unprotected class of expression, the Court adopts a restatement of the Roth-Memoirs definition of obscenity: N23* 'The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . .. (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' Miller v. California, 413 U.S., at 24, 93 S.Ct., at 2615. In apparent illustration of 'sexual conduct,' as that term is used in the test's second element, the Court identifies '(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,' and '(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - And today's restatement will likely have the effect, whether or not intended, of permitting far more sweeping suppression of sexually oriented expression, including expression that would almost surely be held protected under our current formulation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - Thus, the Court's new formulation will not relieve us of 'the awesome task of making case by case at once the criminal and the constitutional law.' And the careful efforts of state and lower federal courts to apply the standard will remain an essentially pointless exercise, in view of the need for an ultimate decision by this Court. In addition, since the status of sexually oriented material will necessarily remain in doubt until final decision by this Court, the new approach will not diminish the chill on protected expression that derives from the uncertainty of the underlying standard. I am convinced that a definition of obscenity in terms of physical conduct cannot provide sufficient clarity to afford fair notice, to avoid a chill on protected expression, and to minimize the institutional stress, so long as that definition is used to justify the outright suppression of any material that is asserted to fall within its terms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), the Court held that obscenity, although expression, falls outside the area of speech or press constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against state or federal infringement. But at the same time we emphasized in Roth that N80* 'sex and obscenity are not synonymous,' id., at 487, 77 S.Ct., at 1310, and that matter which is sexually oriented but not obscene is fully protected by the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The essence of our problem in the obscenity area is that we have been unable to provide 'sensitive tools' to separate obscenity from other sexually oriented but constitutionally protected speech, so that efforts to suppress the former do not spill over into the suppression of the latter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - Any effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state power must resort to such indefinite concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them. Although we have assumed that obscenity does exist and that we 'know it when (we) see it,' Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U.S., at 197, 84 S.Ct., at 1683 (Stewart, J., concurring), we are manifestly unable to describe it in advance except by reference to concepts so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - The problems of fair notice and chilling protected speech are very grave standing alone. But it does not detract from their importance to recognize that a vague statute in this area creates a third, although admittedly more subtle, set of problems. These problems concern the institutional stress that inevitably results where the line separating protected from unprotected speech is excessively vague. In Roth we conceded that N81* 'there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls . . ..' 354 U.S., at 491—492, 77 S.Ct., at 1313. Our subsequent experience demonstrates that almost every case is 'marginal.' And since the 'margin' marks the point of separation between protected and unprotected speech, we are left with a system in which almost every obscenity case presents a constitutional question of exceptional difficulty. N82* 'The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is . .. an individual matter, and in the nature of things every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional standards.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - Our experience since Roth requires us not only to abandon the effort to pick out obscene material on a case-by-case basis, but also to reconsider a fundamental postulate of Roth: that there exists a definable class of sexually oriented expression that may be totally suppressed by the Federal and State Governments. Assuming that such a class of expression does in fact exist, I am forced to conclude that the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - But we reject the claim that the State of Georgia is here attempting to control the minds or thoughts of those who patronize theaters. Preventing unlimited display or distribution of obscene material, which by definition lacks any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as communication, Miller v. California, supra, 413 U.S., at 24, 34, 93 S.Ct., at 2615, 2620, is distinct from a control of reason and the intellect. Cf. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972); Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 485—487, 77 S.Ct., at 1309—1310; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101—102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 743—744, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); Finnis, 'Reason and Passion': The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 222, 229 230, 241—243 (1967). Where communication of ideas, protected by the First Amendment, is not involved, or the particular privacy of the home protected by Stanley, or any of the other 'areas or zones' of constitutionally protected privacy, the mere fact that, as a consequence, some human 'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be incidentally affected does not bar the State from acting to protect legitimate state interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - To summarize, we have today reaffirmed the basic holding of Roth v. United States, supra, that obscene material has no protection under the First Amendment. See Miller v. California, supra, and Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 37 L.Ed.2d 492. We have directed our holdings, not at thoughts or speech, but at depiction and description of specifically defined sexual conduct that States may regulate within limits designed to prevent infringement of First Amendment rights. We have also reaffirmed the holdings of United States v. Reidel, supra, and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, supra, that commerce in obscene material is unprotected by any constitutional doctrine of privacy.
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Parties: Roaden v. Ky.
Date: 1973-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Seizing a film then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a bookstore. Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. The seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements because we examine what is 'unreasonable' in the light of the values of freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - N121* Seizing a film then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a bookstore. Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. The seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness.
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Parties: United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers
Date: 1973-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 114 - But it is now settled that Government employment may not be denied or penalized 'on a basis that infringes (the employee's) constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.' See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570.
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Segment in Paragraph: 114 - If Government employment were only a 'privilege,' then all sorts of conditions might be attached. But it is now settled that Government employment may not be denied or penalized N83* 'on a basis that infringes (the employee's) constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.'
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Parties: Broadrick v. Okla.
Date: 1973-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - The mere existence of a statute that sweeps too broadly in areas protected by the First Amendment 'results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview. . . . Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, § 818 is directed, by its terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, § 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that § 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers, supra. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that § 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Whatever one's view of the desirability or constitutionality of legislative efforts to restrict the political activities of government employees, one must regard today's decision upholding § 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration Act as a wholly unjus tified retreat from fundamental and previously well-established First and Fourteenth Amendment principles. For the purposes of this decision, the Court assumes—perhaps even concedes—that the statute at issue here sweeps too broadly, barring speech and conduct that are constitutionally protected even under the standards announced in United Public Workers v. Mitchell
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Although the Court declines to hold the Oklahoma Act unconstitutional on its face, it does expressly recognize that overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing a 'chilling effect' on protected expression. Nevertheless, the Court reasons that the function of the doctrine 'attenuates as the otherwiseunprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws the reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.' Ante, at 615. Where conduct is involved, a statute's overbreadth must henceforth be 'substantial' before the statute can properly be found invalid on its face.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.
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Parties: Hunt v. McNair
Date: 1973-06-25
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Parties: Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
Date: 1973-06-25
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Parties: Sloan v. Lemon
Date: 1973-06-25
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Parties: Hess v. Indiana
Date: 1973-11-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - Indiana's disorderly conduct statute was applied in this case to punish only spoken words. It hardly needs repeating that '(t)he constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within 'narrowly limited classes of speech." Gooding v. Wilson, supra, 405 U.S. at 521—522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106. The words here did not fall within any of these 'limited classes.' In the first place, it is clear that the Indiana court specifically abjured any suggestion that Hess' words could be punished as obscene under Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and its progeny. Indeed, after Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971), such a contention with regard to the language at issue would not be tenable. By the same token, any suggestion that Hess' speech amounted to 'fighting words,' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), could not withstand scrutiny.
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Parties: Holtzman v. Schlesinger
Date: 1973-08-04
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Parties: Norwell v. Cincinnati
Date: 1973-11-05
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Parties: Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb
Date: 1974-01-09
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Parties: Lewis v. New Orleans
Date: 1974-02-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - The speech uttered by Mrs. Lewis to the arresting officer 'plainly' was profane, 'plainly' it was insulting, and 'plainly' it was fighting. It therefore is within the reach of the ordinance, as narrowed by Louisiana's highest court. The ordinance, moreover, poses no significant threat to protected speech. And it reflects a legitimate community interest in the harmonious administration of its laws. Police officers in this day perhaps must be thick skinned and prepared for abuse, but a wanton, high-velocity, verbal attack often is but a step away from violence or passioned reaction,
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - In sum, § 49-7 punishes only spoken words. It can therefore withstand appellant's attack upon its facial constitutionality only if, as authoritatively construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, it is not susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-22, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1784, 1787, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895-896, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); Gooding v. Wilson, supra, 405 U.S., at 520, 92 S.Ct., at 1105. Since § 49-7, as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is susceptible of application to protected speech, the section is constitutionally overbroad and therefore is facially invalid.
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Parties: Johnson v. Robison
Date: 1974-03-04
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Parties: SMITH v. GOGUEN
Date: 1974-03-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - If the statute is thus limited to acts which affect the physical integrity of the flag, the question remains whether the State has sought only to punish those who impair the flag's physical integrity for the purpose of disparaging it as a symbol, while permitting impairment of its physical integrity by those who do not seek to disparage it as a symbol. If that were the case, holdings like Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970), suggest that such a law would abridge the right of free expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - There is a good deal of doubt on this record that Goguen was trying to communicate any particular idea, and had he been convicted under a statute which simply prohibited improper display of the flag I would be satisfied to conclude that his conduct in wearing the flag on the seat of his pants did not come within even the outermost limits of that sort of 'expressive conduct' or 'symbolic speech' which is entitled to any First Amendment protection. But Goguen was convicted of treating the flag contemptuously by the act of wearing it where he did, and I have difficulty seeing how Goguen could be found by a jury to have treated the flag contemptuously by his act and still not to have expressed any idea at all. There are, therefore, in my opinion, at least marginal elements of 'symbolic speech' in Goguen's conduct as reflected by this record.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - I agree with Mr. Justice WHITE in his conclusion that the Massachusetts flag statute is not unconstitutionally vague. I disagree with his conclusion that the words 'treats contemptuously' are necessarily directed at protected speech and that Goguen's conviction for his immature antic therefore cannot withstand constitutional challenge.
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Parties: Am. Party of Tex. v. White
Date: 1974-03-26
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Parties: Arnett v. Kennedy
Date: 1974-04-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 141 - Appellee is in my view being penalized by the Federal Government for exercising his right to speak out. The excuse or pretense is an Act of Congress and an agency's regulations promulgated under it in the teeth of the First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ..' Losing one's job with the Federal Government because of one's discussion of an issue in the public domain is certainly an abridgment of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 139 - There is more than employment and a job at issue in this case. The stake of the federal employee is not only in a livelihood, but in his right to speak guaranteed by the First Amendment. He is charged with having stated that his superior and the superior's assistant had attempted to bribe a representative of a community action organization with whom the agency (OEO) had dealings. He is charged with having stated that those men offered a bribe of $100,000 in OEO funds to that organization if its representative would sign a statement against appellee and another OEO employee. This statement in my view was on a subject in the public domain. We all know merely by living in Washington, D.C., the storms that have swept through that agency and its branches. It has dealt with inflammatory problems in the solution of which inflammatory utterances are often made. I realize that it is the tradition of the Court to 'balance' the right of free speech against other governmental interests and to sustain the First Amendment right only when the Court deems that in a given situation its importance outweighs competing interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 191 - The importance of Government employees' being assured of their right to freely comment on the conduct of Government, to inform the public of abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors, must be self-evident in these times. In Pickering, this Court specifically upheld the right of a public employee to criticize the conduct of his superiors. Id., at 573 574, 88 S.Ct. at 1737—1738. In fact, it appears that one of the primary purposes of the LloydLa Follette Act was to protect such criticism from official retribution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 194 - The 'efficiency of the service' standard would appear to bring within its reach, as permissible grounds for dismissal, even truthful criticism of an agency that in any way tends to disrupt its operation. One can be sure, for example, that the young man's criticism in Senator La Follette's example disrupted the operation of the Chicago Post Office. It seems clear that the standard could be construed to punish such protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 198 - Employees are likely to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably safe, for N84* 'the threat of dismissal from public employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech.' Pickering, 391 U.S., at 574, 88 S.Ct., at 1737. The dismissal standard hangs over their heads like a sword of Damocles, threatening them with dismissal for any speech that might impair the 'efficiency of the service.' That this Court will ultimately vindicate an employee if his speech is constitutionally protected is of little consequence—for the value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs—not that it drops. For every employee who risks his job by testing the limits of the statute, many more will choose the cautious path and not speak at all.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Since Congress when it enacted the Lloyd-La Follette Act did so with the intention of conferring job protection rights on federal employees which they had not previously had, it obviously did not intend to authorize discharge under the Act's removal standard for speech which is constitutionally protected. The Act proscribes only that public speech which improperly damages and impairs the reputation and efficiency of the employing agency, and it thus imposes no greater controls on the behavior of federal employees than are necessary for the protection of the Government as an employer. Indeed the Act is not directed at speech as such, but at employee behavior, including speech, which is detrimental to the efficiency of the employing agency. We hold that the language 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' in the Act excludes constitutionally protected speech, and that the statute is therefore not overbroad.
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Parties: California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz
Date: 1974-04-01
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Parties: PROCUNIER v. MARTINEZ
Date: 1974-04-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result, and censorship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Of course, none of these precedents directly controls the instant case. In O'Brien the Court considered a federal statute which on its face prohibited certain conduct having no necessary connection with freedom of speech. This led the Court to differentiate between 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements of a single course of conduct, a distinction that has little relevance here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - As the Court noted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), First Amendment guarantees must be 'applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment.' Tinker concerned the interplay between the right to freedom of speech of public high school students and 'the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.' Id., at 507, 89 S.Ct., at 737. In overruling a school regulation prohibiting the wearing of antiwar armbands, the Court undertook a careful analysis of the legitimate requirements of orderly school administration in order to ensure that the students were afforded maximum freedom of speech consistent with those requirements. The same approach was followed in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972), where the Court considered the refusal of a state college to grant official recognition to a group of students who wished to organize a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a national student organization noted for political activism and campus disruption. The Court found that neither the identification of the local student group with the national SDS, nor the purportedly dangerous political philosophy of the local group, nor the college administration's fear of future, unspecified disruptive activities by the students could justify the incursion on the right of free association. The Court also found, however, that this right could be limited if necessary to prevent campus disruption, id., at 189—190, n. 20, 92 S.Ct., at 2350, and remanded the case for determination of whether the students had in fact refused to accept reasonable regulations governing student conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result, and censorship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Applying the teachings of our prior decisions to the instant context, we hold that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met. First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Thus a restriction on inmate correspondence that furthers an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad. This does not mean, of course, that prison administrators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the failure to censor a particular letter. Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's duty.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - On the basis of this standard, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. The regulations invalidated by that court authorized, inter alia, censorship of statements that 'unduly complain' or 'magnify grievances,' expression of 'inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views,' and matter deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherwise inappropriate.' These regulations fairly invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship. Not surprisingly, some prison officials used the extraordinary latitude for discretion authorized by the regulations to suppress unwelcome criticism.
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Parties: Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon
Date: 1974-05-15
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Parties: Alexander v. "americans United"
Date: 1974-05-15
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Parties: Allee v. Medrano
Date: 1974-05-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The appellees sought to do no more than organize a lawful union to better the situation of one of the most economically oppressed classes of workers in the country. Because of the intimidation by state authorities, their lawful effort was crushed. The workers, and their leaders and organizers were placed in fear of exercising their constitutionally protected rights of free expression, assembly, and association. Potential supporters of their cause were placed in fear of lending their support.
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Parties: Wheeler v. Barrera
Date: 1974-06-10
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Parties: Parker v. Levy
Date: 1974-06-19
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Parties: Pell v. Procunier
Date: 1974-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - In No. 73—918, the media plaintiffs ask us to hold that the limitation on press interviews imposed by § 415.071 violates the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They contend that, irrespective of what First Amendment liberties may or may not be retained by prison inmates, members of the press have a constitutional right to interview any inmate who is willing to speak with them, in the absence of an individualized determination that the particular interview might create a clear and present danger to prison security or to some other substantial interest served by the corrections system.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), the Court went further and acknowledged that 'news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,' id., at 707, 92 S.Ct., at 2670, for 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated, id., at 681, 92 S.Ct., at 2656. In Branzburg the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not abridged by requiring reporters to disclose the identity of their confidential sources to a grand jury when that information was needed in the course of a good-faith criminal investigation. The Court there could 'perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings (was) insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial,' id., at 690—691, 92 S.Ct., at 2661.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - For the reasons stated, we reverse the District Court's judgment that § 415.071 infringes the freedom of speech of the prison inmates and affirm its judgment that that regulation does not abridge the constitutional right of a free press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - In Nos. 73—918 and 73—1265, the media claim that the state and federal prison regulations here, by flatly prohibiting interviews with inmates selected by the press, impinge upon the First Amendment's free press guarantee, directly protected against federal infringement and protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the claim, the Court notes that the ban on access to prisoners applies as well to the general public, and it holds that N122* 'newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - In dealing with the free press guarantee, it is important to note that the interest it protects is not possessed by the media themselves. In enjoining enforcement of the federal regulation in No. 73—1265, Judge Gesell did not vindicate any right of the Washington Post, but rather the right of the people, the true sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in an informed manner. N123* 'The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know. The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the people.'Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2692, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - As with the prisoners' free speech claim, no one asserts that the free press right is such that the authorities are powerless to impose reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of interviews to effectuate prison discipline and order. The only issue here is whether the complete ban on interviews with inmates selected by the press goes beyond what is necessary for the protection of these interests and infringes upon our cherished right of a free press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - In No. 73—754, the inmate plaintiffs claim that § 415.071, by prohibiting their participation in face-to-face communication with newsmen and other members of the general public, violates their right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the constitutional right of free speech has never been thought to embrace a right to require a journalist or any other citizen to listen to a person's views, let alone a right to require a publisher to publish those views in his newspaper, see Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (CA3 1967); Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (CA7 1970); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (CA9 1971), we proceed upon the hypothesis that under some circumstances the right of free speech includes a right to communicate a person's views to any willing listener, including a willing representative of the press for the purpose of publication by a willing publisher.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The constitutional guarantee of a free press 'assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967), and secures 'the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials,' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S.Ct. 209, 217, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). By the same token, "(a)ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 574 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Correlatively, the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public to receive such information and ideas as are published.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N124* 'It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally. . . . Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded.' Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 684—685, 92 S.Ct., at 2658. Similarly, newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N232* Although the constitutional right of free speech has never been thought to embrace a right to require a journalist or any other citizen to listen to a person's views, let alone a right to require a publisher to publish those views in his newspaper, see Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (CA3 1967); Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (CA7 1970); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (CA9 1971), we proceed upon the hypothesis that under some circumstances the right of free speech includes a right to communicate a person's views to any willing listener, including a willing representative of the press for the purpose of publication by a willing publisher.
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - Although the constitutional right of free speech has never been thought to embrace a right to require a journalist or any other citizen to listen to a person's views, let alone a right to require a publisher to publish those views in his newspaper, see Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (CA3 1967); Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (CA7 1970); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (CA9 1971), we proceed upon the hypothesis that under some circumstances the right of free speech includes a right to communicate a person's views to any willing listener, including a willing representative of the press for the purpose of publication by a willing publisher.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - In Branzburg the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not abridged by requiring reporters to disclose the identity of their confidential sources to a grand jury when that information was needed in the course of a good-faith criminal investigation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - One such alternative available to California prison inmates is communication by mail. Although prison regulations, until recently, called for the censorship of statements, inter alia, that 'unduly complain' or 'magnify grievances,' that express 'inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views,' or that were deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherwise inappropriate,' we recently held that 'the Department's regulations authorized censorship of prisoner mail far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands,' and accordingly affirmed a district court judgment invalidating the regulations. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 416, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1813, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). In addition, we held that '(t)he interests of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a 'liberty' interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), the Court went further and acknowledged that N3* 'news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,' id., at 707, 92 S.Ct., at 2670, for N4* 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated, id., at 681, 92 S.Ct., at 2656. In Branzburg the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not abridged by requiring reporters to disclose the identity of their confidential sources to a grand jury when that information was needed in the course of a good-faith criminal investigation.
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Parties: Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co.
Date: 1974-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - The Court did not hold that the government is wholly free to restrict press access to newsworthy information. To the contrary, we recognized explicitly that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press does extend to some of the antecedent activities that make the right to publish meaningful: 'Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.' Id., at 681, 92 S.Ct., at 2656. We later reiterated this point by noting that 'news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections . . ..' Id., at 707, 92 S.Ct., at 2670.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - As the Court observed in Zemel: '(T)here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.' 381 U.S., at 16—17, 85 S.Ct., at 1281. It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify under the stringent standards of First Amendment review every regulation that might affect in some tangential way the availability of information to the news media. But to my mind it is equally impermissible to conclude that no governmental inhibition of press access to newsworthy information warrants constitutional scrutiny. At some point official restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to require the government to justify such regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary authority and administrative convenience. It is worth repeating our admonition in Branzburg that 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.' 408 U.S., at 681, 92 S.Ct. at 2656.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Some years ago, Professor Chafee pointed out that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects two kinds of interests: 'There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The Court rejects this claim on the ground that N125* 'newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.' Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 834, 94 S.Ct., at 2810. It is said that First Amendment protections for newsgathering by the press reach only so far as the opportunities available for the ordinary citizen to have access to the source of news. Because the Bureau of Prisons does not specifically discriminate against the news media, its absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews is not susceptible to constitutional attack. In the Court's view, this is true despite the factual showing that the interview ban precludes effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances. From all that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so long as it does not single out the media for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - N126* What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs. No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny. As the Solicitor General made the point, '(t)he First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-government.' Brief for Petitioners 47—48. It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues. And public debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression. Kleindienst v. Mandel,
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - This constitutionally established role of the news media is directly implicated here. For good reasons, unrestrained public access is not permitted. The people must therefore depend on the press for information concerning public institutions. The Bureau's absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews negates the ability of the press to discharge that function and thereby substantially impairs the right of the people to a free flow of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government. The underlying right is the right of the public generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the public's right. I therefore conclude that the Bureau's ban against personal interviews must be put to the test of First Amendment review
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - The absolute interview ban precludes accurate and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances and thereby substantially negates the ability of the news media to inform the public on those subjects. Because the interview ban significantly impairs the constitutional interest of the people in a free flow of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government, it is appropriate that the Bureau be put to a heavy burden of justification for that policy. But it does not follow that the Bureau is under the same heavy burden to justify any measure of control over press acccess to prison inmates. Governmental regulation that has no palpable impact on the underlying right of the public to the information needed to assert ultimate control over the political process is not subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. Common sense and proper respect for the constitutional commitment of the affairs of state to the Legislative and Executive Branches should deter the Judiciary from chasing the right-of-access rainbows that an advocate's eye can spot in virtually all governmental actions. Governmental regulations should not be policed in the name of a 'right to know' unless they significantly affect the societal function of the First Amendment. I therefore believe that a press interview policy that substantially accommodates the public's legitimate interest in a free flow of information and ideas about federal prisons should survive constitutional review. The balance should be struck between the absolute ban of the Bureau and an uninhibited license to interview at will.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - We find this case constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495, and thus fully controlled by the holding in that case. N127* '(N)ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.' Id., 417 U.S., at 834, 94 S.Ct., at 2810. The proposition N128* 'that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally . . . finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court.' Id., at 834—835, 94 S.Ct., at 2810. Thus, since Policy Statement 1220.1A N129* 'does not deny the press access to sources of information available to members of the general public,' id., at 835, 94 S.Ct., at 2810, we hold that it does not abridge the freedom that the First Amendment guarantees.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Respondents assert a constitutional right to gather news. In the language of the Court of Appeals, they claim a right of access by the press to newsworthy events. However characterized, the gist of the argument is that the constitutional guarantee of a free press may be rendered ineffective by excessive restraints on access to information and therefore that the Government may not enforce such restrictions absent some substantial justification for doing so. In other words, respondents contend that the First Amendment protects both the dissemination of news and the antecedent activity of obtaining the information that becomes news.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - It is true, of course, that the Branzburg decision rejected an argument grounded in the assertion of a First Amendment right to gather news and that the opinion contains language which, when read in isolation, may be read to support the majority's view. E.g., 408 U.S., at 684—685, 92 S.Ct., at 2658. Taken in its entirety, however, Branzburg does not endorse so sweeping a rejection of First Amendment challenges to restraints on access to news. The Court did not hold that the government is wholly free to restrict press access to newsworthy information. To the contrary, we recognized explicitly that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press does extend to some of the antecedent activities that make the right to publish meaningful: N233* 'Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Some years ago, Professor Chafee pointed out that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects two kinds of interests: N101* 'There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way.' Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1954).
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - We declined to analyze that case in terms of 'prisoners' rights,' for we concluded that censorship of prisoner mail, whether incoming or outgoing, impinges on the interest in communication of both the inmate and the nonprisoner correspondent: N70* 'Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.'
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Parties: In re Lewis
Date: 1974-07-04
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Parties: Jenkins v. Georgia
Date: 1974-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Thus, the Court's new formulation will not relieve us of N24* 'the awesome task of making case by case at once the criminal and the constitutional law.' And the careful efforts of state and lower federal courts to apply the standard will remain an essentially pointless exercise, in view of the need for an ultimate decision by this Court. In addition, since the status of sexually oriented material will necessarily remain in doubt until final decision by this Court, the new approach will not diminish the chill on protected expression that derives from the uncertainty of the underlying standard. I am convinced that a definition of obscenity in terms of physical conduct cannot provide sufficient clarity to afford fair notice, to avoid a chill on protected expression, and to minimize the institutional stress, so long as that definition is used to justify the outright suppression of any material that is asserted to fall within its terms.'
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Parties: Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo
Date: 1974-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - The appellee and supporting advocates of an enforceable right of access to the press vigorously argue that government has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views reach the public. The contentions of access proponents will be set out in some detail. It is urged that at the time the First Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1791 as part of our Bill of Rights the press was broadly representative of the people it was serving. While many of the newspapers were intensely partisan and narrow in their views, the press collectively presented a broad range of opinions to readers. Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pamphlets and books provided meaningful alternatives to the organized press for the expression of unpopular ideas and often treated events and expressed views not covered by conventional newspapers. A true marketplace of ideas existed in which there was relatively easy access to the channels of communication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Government-enforced right of access inescapably N130* 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate,' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - N131* 'Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes. The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - One need not think less of the First Amendment to sustain reasonable methods for allowing the average citizen to redeem a falsely tarnished reputation. Nor does one have to doubt the genuine decency, integrity, and good sense of the vast majority of professional journalists to support the right of any individual to have his day in court when he has been falsely maligned in the public press. The press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - It held that free speech was enhanced and not abridged by the Florida right-of-reply statute, which in that court's view, furthered the 'broad societal interest in the free flow of information to the public.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - But though a newspaper may publish without government censorship, it has never been entirely free from liability for what it chooses to print.
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Parties: Old Dominion Branch
Date: 1974-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The primary source of protection for union freedom of speech under the NLRA, however, particularly in an organizational context, is the guarantee in § 7 of the Act of the employees' rights 'to form, join, or assist labor organizations.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - a labor union for publicly expressing, during the heat of an organizational drive, its highly pejorative but not too surprising opinion of 'scabs.' I agree that this expression is protected and that the judgments below cannot stand.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - Such words N27* were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union's strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose unionization. Expression of such an opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - If the States were not limited to the same extent as the Federal Government in restraining discussion, the pre-emptive effect of federal labor regulations would be crucial. But I have always thought that the application of the First Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth leaves the States as constitutionally impotent as the Federal Government in enforcing such restrictions. This conclusion is compelled if freedom of speech is regarded, as I think it must, be as a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship within the meaning of that term in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than some ephemeral right protected against state intrusion only to the extent a majority of this Court might view as 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - A bare majority of this Court disagreed, however, and held that the NLRA did not completely pre-empt the application of state laws to libels published during labor disputes. The Court found that the exercise of state jurisdiction over such defamation actions would be a 'merely peripheral concern' of the federal labor laws, within the meaning of Garmon, as long as appropriate substantive limitations were imposed to insure that the freedom of speech guaranteed by federal law was protected. Further, the Court recognized an N85* "overriding state interest' in protecting (state) residents from malicious libels.' 383 U.S., at 61, 86 S.Ct., at 662. Mr. Justice Clark, writing the opinion for the Court, also pointed out that application of state law to libels occurring during labor disputes would not significantly interfere with the NLRB's role in considering arguable contemporaneous violations of the Act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - In light of this basic purpose, we see nothing in the Executive Order which indicates that it intended to restrict in any way the robust debate which has been protected under the NLRA. Such evidence as is available, rather, demonstrates that the same tolerance for union speech which has long characterized our labor relations in the private sector has been carried over under the Executive Order.
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Parties: Lehman v. Shaker Heights
Date: 1974-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - seg> In asking us to force the system to accept his message as a vindication of his constitutional rights, the petitioner overlooks the constitutional rights of the commuters. While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it. In my view the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Of course, not even the right of political self-expression is completely unfettered.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Applying these principles, the Court has long recognized the public's right of access to public streets and parks for expressive activity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The rights of the speaker clash with those of the audience, and the audience's rights prevail.While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it. In my view the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Certainly, noncommercial public service advertisements convey messages of public concern and are clearly protected by the First Amendment. And while it is possible that commercial advertising may be accorded less First Amendment protection than speech concerning political and social issues of public importance, compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), with Schneider v. State of N.J., 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), and Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951), with Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), it is 'speech' nonetheless, often communicating information and ideas found by many persons to be controversial.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - That the discrimination is among entire classes of ideas, rather than among points of view within a particular class, does not render it any less odious. Subject matter or content censorship in any form is forbidden.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - Moreover, even if it were possible to draw a manageable line between controversial and noncontroversial messages, thecity's practice of censorship for the benefit of 'captive audiences' still would not be justified. This is not a case where an unwilling or unsuspecting rapid transit rider is powerless to avoid messages he deems unsettling. The advertisements accepted by the city and Metromedia are not broadcast over loudspeakers in the transit cars. The privacy of the passengers is not, therefore, dependent upon their ability N71* 'to sit and to try not to listen.' Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469, 72 S.Ct. 813, 824, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1150, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). Rather, all advertisements accepted for display are in written form. Transit passengers are not forced or compelled to read any of the messages, nor are they 'incapable of declining to receive (them),' ante, at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - The plurality opinion, however, contends that as long as the city limits its advertising space to 'innocuous and less controversial commercial and service oriented advertising,' no First Amendment forum is created. Ante, at 304. I find no merit in that position. Certainly, noncommercial public service advertisements convey messages of public concern and are clearly protected by the First Amendment. And while it is possible that commercial advertising may be accorded less First Amendment protection than speech concerning political and social issues of public importance, compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), with Schneider v. State of N.J., 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), and Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951), with Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), it is 'speech nonetheless, often communicating information and ideas found by many persons to be controversial. There can be no question that commercial advertisements, when skillfully employed, are powerful vehicles for the exaltation of commercial values. Once such messages have been accepted and displayed, the existence of a forum for communication cannot be gainsaid. To hold otherwise, and thus sanction the city's preference for bland commercialism and noncontroversial public service messages over 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues, would reverse the traditional priorities of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Gertz v. Robert Welch
Date: 1974-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated, 'some antithesis between freedom of speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - Moreover, the argument that private persons should not be required to prove New York Times knowing-or-reckless falsity because they do not assume the risk of defamation by freely entering the public arena 'bears little relationship either to the values protected by the First Amendment or to the nature of our society.' Id., at 47, 91 S.Ct., at 1822. Social interaction exposes all of us to some degree of public view. This Court has observed that '(t)he risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - N123* Contrary to some popular notions, freedom of the press was sharply curtailed in colonial America. Seditious libel was punished as a contempt by the colonial legislatures and as a criminal offense in the colonial courts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - 'No one can doubt that, in any well-governed society, the legislature has both the right and the duty to prohibit certain forms of speech. Libelous assertions may be, and must be, forbidden and punished. So too must slander. . . . All these necessities that speech be limited are recognized and provided for under the Constitution. They were not unknown to the writers of the First Amendment. That amendment, then, we may take it for granted, does not forbid the abridging of speech. But, at the same time, it does forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech. It is to the solving of that paradox, that apparent self-contradiction, that we are summoned if, as free men, we wish to know what the right of freedom of speech is.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - Unlike the right of privacy which, by the terms of the Fourth Amendment, must be accommodated with reasonable searches and seizures and warrants issued by magistrates, the rights of free speech and of a free press were protected by the Framers in verbiage whose prescription seems clear. I have stated before my view that the First Amendment would bar Congress from passing any libel law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - For some 200 years—from the very founding of the Nation—the law of defamation and right of the ordinary citizen to recover for false publication injurious to his reputation have been almost exclusively the business of state courts and legislatures. Under typical state defamation law, the defamed private citizen had to prove only a false publication that would subject him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Given such publication, general damage to reputation was presumed, while punitive damages required proof of additional facts. The law governing the defamation of private citizens remained untouched by the First Amendment because until relatively recently, the consistent view of the Court was that libelous words constitute a class of speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, subject only to limited exceptions carved out since 1964.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - N132* 'No one can doubt that, in any well-governed society, the legislature has both the right and the duty to prohibit certain forms of speech. Libelous assertions may be, and must be, forbidden and punished. So too must slander. . . . All these necessities that speech be limited are recognized and provided for under the Constitution. They were not unknown to the writers of the First Amendment. That amendment, then, we may take it for granted, does not forbid the abridging of speech. But, at the same time, it does forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech. It is to the solving of that paradox, that apparent self-contradiction, that we are summoned if, as free men, we wish to know what the right of freedom of speech is.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 117 - The central meaning of New York Times, and for me the First Amendment as it relates to libel laws, is that seditious libel criticism of government and public officials—falls beyond the police power of the State. 376 U.S., at 273—276, 84 S.Ct., at 722 724. In a democratic society such as ours, the citizen has the privilege of criticizing his government and its officials. But neither New York Times nor its progeny suggests that the First Amendment intended in all circumstances to deprive the private citizen of his historic recourse to redress published falsehoods damaging to reputation or that, contrary to history and precedent, the Amendment should now be so interpreted. Simply put, the First Amendment did not confer a N133* 'license to defame the citizen.' W. Douglas, The Right of the People
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - I can conceive of no privilege or immunity with a higher claim to recognition against state abridgment than the freedoms of speech and of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Allowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725: N72* 'Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.' The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - We recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725, that a rule requiring a critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all of his factual contentions would inevitably lead to self-censorship when publishers, fearful of being unable to prove truth or unable to bear the expense of attempting to do so, simply eschewed printing controversial articles.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - Unlike the right of privacy which, by the terms of the Fourth Amendment, must be accommodated with reasonable searches and seizures and warrants issued by magistrates, the rights of free speech and of a free press were protected by the Framers in verbiage whose prescription seems clear. I have stated before my view that the First Amendment would bar Congress from passing any libel law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - There this Court defined a constitutional privilege intended to free criticism of public officials from the restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights demonstrations by black students in Alabama and impliedly condemning the performance of local law-enforcement officials. A police commissioner established in state court that certain misstatements in the advertisement referred to him and that they constituted libel per se under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a N86* 'rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions' would deter protected speech, id., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725, and announced the constitutional privilege designed to counter that effect
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - The law governing the defamation of private citizens remained untouched by the First Amendment because until relatively recently, the consistent view of the Court was that libelous words constitute a class of speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, subject only to limited exceptions carved out since 1964.
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Segment in Paragraph: 115 - N87* 'In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725, 735, 96 L.Ed. 919. At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and press.'
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Parties: Spence v. Wash.
Date: 1974-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N134* '(T)he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). This Court has long recognized, for example, that some forms of expression are not entitled to any protection at all under the First Amendment, despite the fact that they could reasonably be thought protected under its literal language. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The Court has further recognized that even protected speech may be subject to reasonable limitation when important countervailing interests are involved. Citizens are not completely free to commit perjury, to libel other citizens, to infringe copyrights, to incite riots, or to interfere unduly with passage through a public thoroughfare. The right of free speech, though precious, remains subject to reasonable accommodation to other valued interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - N102* But if absolute assurance of tranquility is required, we may as well forget about free speech. Under such a requirement, the only 'free' speech would consist of platitudes. That kind of speech does not need constitutional protection.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - We reverse on the ground that as applied to appellant's activity N25* the Washington statute impermissibly infringed protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - It is therefore necessary to determine whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for as the Court noted in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), N26* '(w)e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.' But the nature of appellant's activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - He displayed it as a flag of his country in a way closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used to convey ideas. Moreover, his message was direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First Amendment. Given the protected character of his expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts, the conviction must be invalidated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N88* '(T)he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). This Court has long recognized, for example, that some forms of expression are not entitled to any protection at all under the First Amendment, despite the fact that they could reasonably be thought protected under its literal language. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The Court has further recognized that even protected speech may be subject to reasonable limitation when important countervailing interests are involved. Citizens are not completely free to commit perjury, to libel other citizens, to infringe copyrights, to incite riots, or to interfere unduly with passage through a public thoroughfare.
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Parties: Wolff v. McDonnell
Date: 1974-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - Furthermore, freedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom from inspection or perusal.
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Parties: Hamling v. United States
Date: 1974-06-24
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Parties: J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Washington
Date: 1974-06-25
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Parties: Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp
Date: 1974-07-29
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Parties: Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen.
Date: 1974-12-27
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Parties: American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n
Date: 1974-12-17
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Parties: Cousins v. Wigoda
Date: 1975-01-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association. N135* 'There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.'
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Parties: United States v. Mazurie
Date: 1975-01-21
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Parties: United States v. American Friends Service Committee
Date: 1974-10-29
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Parties: United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Com.
Date: 1975-02-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press. It is to me shocking that a radio station or a newspaper can be regulated by a court or by a commission, to the extent of being prevented from publishing any item of 'news' of the day. So to hold would be a prior restraint of a simple and unadulterated form, barred by constitutional principles.
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Parties: Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
Date: 1975-03-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business. In preserving that form of government the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - These are impressive credentials for a right of privacy, but we should recognize that we do not have at issue here an action for the invasion of privacy involving the appropriation of one's name or photograph, a physical or other tangible intrusion into a private area, or a publication of otherwise private information that is also false although perhaps not defamatory. The version of the privacy tort now before us—termed in Georgia 'the tort of public disclosure,' 231 Ga., at 60, 200 S.E.2d, at 130—is that in which the plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press. The face-off is apparent, and the appellants urge upon us the broad holding that the press may not be made criminally or civilly liable for publishing information that is neither false nor misleading but absolutely accurate, however damaging it may be to reputation or individual sensibilities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records generally available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man. Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law. The rule would invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and that should be made available to the public. At the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.
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Parties: Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad
Date: 1975-03-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - '(T)he basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint 'avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.' Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58, 85 S.Ct. 734, 739, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1403, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419—421, 91 S.Ct. 423, 429, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 141—142, 88 S.Ct. 754, 756, 19 L.Ed.2d 966 (1968). See also Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 489—490, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2793, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S., at 70—71, 83 S.Ct. at 639; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957). In Freedman the Court struck down a state scheme for the licensing of motion pictures, holding 'that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.' 380 U.S., at 58, 85 S.Ct. at 739. We held in Freedman, and we reaffirm here, that a system of prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it lacks certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The Court glosses over this distinction by treating a community-owned theater as if it were the same as a city park or city street, which it is not. The Court's decisions have recognized that city streets and parks are traditionally open to the public, and that permits or licenses to use them are not ordinarily required. N136* '(O)ne who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.' Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943). The Court has therefore held that where municipal authorities seek to exact a license or permit for those who wish to use parks or streets for the purpose of exercising their right of free speech, the standards governing the licensing authority must be objective, definite, and nondiscriminatory. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). But until this case the Court has not equated a public auditorium, which must of necessity schedule performances by a process of inclusion and exclusion, with public streets and parks.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - 'I do not believe any form of censorship no matter how speedy or prolonged it may be—is permissible.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - A municipal theater is no less a forum for the expression of ideas than is a public park, or a sidewalk; the forms of expression adopted in such a forum may be more expensive and more structured than those typically seen in our parks and streets, but they are surely no less entitled to the shelter of the First Amendment. As soon as municipal officials are permitted to pick and choose, as they are in all existing socialist regimes, between those productions which are 'clean and healthful and culturally uplifting' in content and those which are not, the path is cleared for a regime of censorship under which full voice can be given only to those views which meet with the approval of the powers that be.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Our distaste for censorship reflecting the natural distaste of a free people—is deep-written in our law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Only if we were to conclude that live drama is unprotected by the First Amendment—or subject to a totally different standard from that applied to other forms of expression—could we possibly find no prior restraint here. Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). By its nature, theater usually is the acting out—or singing out— of the written word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or conduct. But that is no reason to hold theater subject to a drastically different standard.
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Parties: Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.
Date: 1975-03-18
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Parties: Meek v. Pittenger
Date: 1975-06-23
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Parties: Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund
Date: 1975-05-27
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Parties: United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss.
Date: 1975-06-02
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Parties: Bigelow v. Virginia
Date: 1975-06-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - The policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion, and '(t)he guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent 'the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential . . .'
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear 'public interest.' Portions of its message, most prominently the lines, 'Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency requirements,' involve the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - To the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - The policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion, and '(t)he guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent 'the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential . . .'
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Although other categories of speech—such as fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481—485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1306—1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2614, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), or libel, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), or incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969)—have been held unprotected, no contention has been made that the particular speech embraced in the advertisement in question is within any of these categories.
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Parties: Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
Date: 1975-06-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - In short, the screen of a drive-in theater is not N74* 'so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.' Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1415, 18 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967). Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - The Court asserts that the State may shield the public from selected types of speech and allegedly expressive conduct, such as nudity, only when the speaker or actor invades the privacy of the home or where the degree of captivity of an unwilling listener is such that it is impractical for him to avoid the exposure by averting his eyes. The Court concludes 'that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.' Ante, at 212. If this broadside is to be taken literally, the State may not forbid 'expressive' nudity on the public streets, in the public parks, or any other public place since other persons in those places at that time have a 'limited privacy interest' and may merely look the other way.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, N89* 'we are inescapably captive audiences fror many purposes.' Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, 397 U.S., at 736, 90 S.Ct., at 1490. Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent the narrow circumstances described above, the burden normally falls upon the viewer to N90* 'avoid further bombardment of (his) sensibilities simply by averting (his) eyes.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N91* The ordinance seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in theater is not N92* 'so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.' Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1415, 18 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967). Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra. Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by any other governmental interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.
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Parties: Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.
Date: 1975-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Although the customary 'barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. In LaRue, however, we concluded that the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing and that a State could therefore ban such dancing as a part of its liquor license program.
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Parties: Nebraska Press Asso. v. Stuart
Date: 1975-11-20
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Parties: Rose v. Locke
Date: 1975-11-17
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Parties: United States v. Powell
Date: 1975-12-02
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Parties: Buckley v. Valeo
Date: 1976-02-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a "basic constitutional freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S., at 57, 94 S.Ct., at 307, that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society."
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - N124* Second, and more fundamentally, the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate § 608(a)'s restriction upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy. We therefore hold that § 608(a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional.
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Segment in Paragraph: 882 - The Court attempts to make the Act seem less restrictive by casting the problem as one that goes to freedom of association rather than freedom of speech. I have long thought freedom of association and freedom of expression were two peas from the same pod.
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Segment in Paragraph: 924 - The disclosure requirements and the limitations on contributions and expenditures are challenged as invalid abridgments of the right of free speech protected by the First Amendment. I would reject these challenges. I agree with the Court's conclusion and much of its opinion with respect to sustaining the disclosure provisions. I am also in agreement with the Court's judgment upholding the limitations on contributions. I dissent, however, from the Court's view that the expenditure limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) and (e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that N137* "(e)ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee N138* " 'freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,' " a freedom that encompasses " '(t)he right to associate with the political party of one's choice.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a N139* "basic constitutional freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S., at 57, 94 S.Ct., at 307, that is N140* "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society."
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - We turn then to the basic First Amendment question whether § 608(e)(1), even as thus narrowly and explicitly construed, impermissibly burdens the constitutional right of free expression. The Court of Appeals summarily held the provision constitutionally valid on the ground that "section 608(e) is a loophole-closing provision only" that is necessary to prevent circumvention of the contribution limitations. 171 U.S.App.D.C., at 204, 519 F.2d, at 853. We cannot agree.
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - In considering this provision we must apply the same strict standard of scrutiny, for the right of associational privacy developed in NAACP v. Alabama derives from the rights of the organization's members to advocate their personal points of view in the most effective way.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.
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Segment in Paragraph: 881 - The Court's attempt to distinguish the communication inherent in political contributions from the speech aspects of political expenditures simply "will not wash."We do little but engage in word games unless we recognize that people candidates and contributors spend money on political activity because they wish to communicate ideas, and their constitutional interest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or someone else utters the words.
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Segment in Paragraph: 935 - In any event, as it should be unnecessary to point out, money is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in the context of political campaigns. I accept the reality that communicating with potential voters is the heart of an election campaign and that widespread communication has become very expensive. There are, however, many expensive campaign activities that are not themselves communicative or remotely related to speech. Furthermore, campaigns differ among themselves. Some seem to spend much less money than others and yet communicate as much as or more than those supported by enormous bureaucracies with unlimited financing. The record before us no more supports the conclusion that the communicative efforts of congressional and Presidential candidates will be crippled by the expenditure limitations than it supports the contrary.
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Segment in Paragraph: 878 - I agree fully with that part of the Court's opinion that holds unconstitutional the limitations the Act puts on campaign expenditures which "place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate." Ante, at 58-59. Yet when it approves similarly stringent limitations on contributions, the Court ignores the reasons it finds so persuasive in the context of expenditures. For me contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - The ceiling on personal expenditures by candidates on their own behalf, like the limitations on independent expenditures contained in § 608(e)(1), imposes a substantial restraint on the ability of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression. The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - the provisions of the Act that impose a $1,000 limitation on contributions to a single candidate, § 608(b)(1), a $5,000 limitation on contributions by a political committee to a single candidate, § 608(b)(2), and a $25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual during any calendar year, § 608(b)(3), are constitutionally valid. These limitations, along with the disclosure provisions, constitute the Act's primary weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions. The contribution ceilings thus serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion. By contrast, the First Amendment requires the invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling, § 608(e)(1), its limitation on a candidate's expenditures from his own personal funds, § 608(a), and its ceilings on overall campaign expenditures, § 608(c). These provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 924 - The disclosure requirements and the limitations on contributions and expenditures are challenged as invalid abridgments of the right of free speech protected by the First Amendment. I would reject these challenges. I agree with the Court's conclusion and much of its opinion with respect to sustaining the disclosure provisions. I am also in agreement with the Court's judgment upholding the limitations on contributions. I dissent, however, from the Court's view that the expenditure limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) and (e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 934 - As an initial matter, the argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much. Compulsory bargaining and the right to strike, both provided for or protected by federal law, inevitably have increased the labor costs of those who publish newspapers, which are in turn an important factor in the recent disappearance of many daily papers. Federal and state taxation directly removes from company coffers large amounts of money that might be spent on larger and better newspapers. The antitrust laws are aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price fixing, which gouge the consumer. It is also true that general price controls have from time to time existed and have been applied to the newspapers or other media. But it has not been suggested, nor could it be successfully, that these laws, and many others, are invalid because they siphon off or prevent the accumulation of large sums that would otherwise be available for communicative activities.
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Parties: Time, Inc. v. Firestone
Date: 1976-03-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - ". . . Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business."
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Although N75* calculated falsehood" is no part of the expression protected by the central meaning of the First Amendment, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), error and misstatement is recognized as inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. New York Times, supra, 376 U.S., at 271-272, 84 S.Ct., at 721-722. Therefore, in order to avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict or simple fault liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin for error protecting some misstatements so that the N76* "freedoms of expression . . . have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.' " Ibid. N77* "(T)o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones."
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - The First Amendment insulates from defamation liability a margin for error sufficient to ensure the avoidance of crippling press self-censorship in the field of reporting public judicial affairs.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Although N28* "calculated falsehood" is no part of the expression protected by the central meaning of the First Amendment, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), error and misstatement is recognized as inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate.
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Parties: Hudgens v. NLRB
Date: 1976-03-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - The foundation of Logan Valley consisted of this Court's decisions recognizing a right of access to streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public places historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights. E. g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963-964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). Thus, the Court in Logan Valley observed that access to such forums N141* "cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." 391 U.S., at 315, 88 S.Ct., at 1607. The importance of access to such places for speech-related purposes is clear, for they are often the only places for effective speech and assembly.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - For while a municipality may constitutionally impose reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on the use of its streets and sidewalks for First Amendment purposes, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 73 S.Ct. 760, 97 L.Ed. 1105, and may even forbid altogether such use of some of its facilities, see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149; what a municipality may Not do under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is to discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125. N234* "Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212. It conversely follows, therefore, that if the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment right to enter that shopping center distribute handbills concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a First Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe Co.
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Parties: McKinney v. Alabama
Date: 1976-03-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - The Constitution obviously cannot force anyone to exercise the freedom of expression which it guarantees.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Although Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), held that the concept of obscenity as defined in that case is not unconstitutionally vague, we have "expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity . . . and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of 'the protection of freedom of speech and press' " for nonobscene material. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1715, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127, 1135 (1961). "(T)he Fourteenth Amendment requires that regulation by the States of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66, 83 S.Ct. 631, 637, 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 590 (1963).
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - A civil procedure that complies with the commands of the First Amendment and due process may serve the public interest in controlling obscenity without exposing the marketer to the risks and the stigma of a criminal prosecution, and thus protect, by minimizing the risk of marketer self-censorship, the right to the free publication and dissemination of constitutionally protected literature.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Moreover, the possible erroneous imposition of civil sanctions under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard simply creates too great a risk of self-censorship by those engaged in dissemination of printed material pertaining to sex.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - In the civil adjudication of obscenity Vel non, the bookseller has at stake such an "interest of transcending value"—protection of his right to disseminate and the public's right to receive material protected by the First Amendment. Protection of those rights demands that the factfinder be almost certain—convinced beyond a reasonable doubt—that the materials are not constitutionally immune from suppression. Although Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), held that the concept of obscenity as defined in that case is not unconstitutionally vague, we haveN29* "expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity . . . and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of 'the protection of freedom of speech and press' " for nonobscene material. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1715, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127, 1135 (1961). "(T)he Fourteenth Amendment requires that regulation by the States of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line."
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Parties: Greer v. Spock
Date: 1976-03-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - N78* "Our distaste for censorship reflecting the natural distaste of a free people is deep-written in our law."
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - Those cases permitting public expression without characterizing the locale involved as a public forum, together with those cases recognizing the existence of a public forum, albeit qualifiedly, evidence the desirability of a flexible approach to determining when public expression should be protected. Realizing that the permissibility of a certain form of public expression at a given locale may differ depending on whether it is asked if the locale is public forum or if the form of expression is compatible with the activities occurring at the locale, it becomes apparent that there is need for a flexible approach. Otherwise, with the rigid characterization of a given locale as not a public forum, there is the danger that certain forms of public speech at the locale may be suppressed, even though they are basically compatible with the activities otherwise occurring at the locale.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - But that a rally is disruptive of the usual activities in an unrestricted area is not to say that it is necessarily disruptive so as significantly to impair training or defense, thereby requiring its prohibition. Additionally, this Court has recognized that some quite disruptive forms of public expression are protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - As applied in this case, the foregoing considerations require that the leaflet-distribution activities proposed by respondents be permitted in those streets and lots unrestricted to civilian traffic. Those areas do not differ in their nature and use from city streets and lots where open speech long has been protected.
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Parties: Fisher v. United States
Date: 1976-04-21
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Parties: Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell
Date: 1976-05-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - It can hardly be denied that an ordinance requiring the door-to-door campaigner to identify himself discourages free speech. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960), invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring handbills to carry the name and address of persons writing, printing, or distributing them. Since the requirement destroyed anonymity, "(t)here (could) be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression," Id., at 64, 80 S.Ct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Surely "the guarantees of freedom of speech and due process of law embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment," ante, at 611, do not require that an ordinance validly requiring the identification of citizens must specify every way in which they may satisfactorily provide that information.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Perhaps an even greater threat lies in the impermissible burden they impose upon political expression, the core conduct protected by the First Amendment. Unquestionably the lifeblood of today's political campaigning must be the work of volunteers. The oppressive financial burden of campaigns makes reliance on volunteers absolutely essential and, in light of the enormous significance of citizen participation to the preservation and strength of the democratic ideal, absolutely desirable, indeed indispensable. Offensive to the sensibilities of private citizens, identification requirements such as the Oradell ordinance, even in their least intrusive form, must discourage that participation.
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Parties: Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
Date: 1976-05-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N235* Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear from the decided cases. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965), the Court upheld the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad. More recently, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581, 33 L.Ed.2d 683, 691 (1972), we acknowledged that this Court has referredo a First Amendment right to "receive information and ideas," and that freedom of speech " 'necessarily protects the right to receive.' " And in
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Our question is whether speech which does N103* "no more than propose a commercial transaction," Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S., at 385, 93 S.Ct., at 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d, at 677, is so removed from any N104* "exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942), and from N105* "'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1506 (1957), that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805, the Court concluded that N79* "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." As the Court had previously recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, however, factual errors are inevitable in free debate, and the imposition of liability for erroneous factual assertions can N80* "dampe(n) the vigor and limi(t) the variety of public debate" by inducing "self-censorship." Id., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725, 11 L.Ed.2d, at 706. In order to provide ample N81* "breathing space" for free expression, the Constitution places substantial limitations on the discretion of government to permit recovery for libelous communications.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The appellants contend that the advertisement of prescription drug prices is outside the protection of the First Amendment because it is "commercial speech." There can be no question that in past decisions the Court has given some indication that commercial speech is unprotected. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, supra, the Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited the distribution of any "handbill, circular . . . or other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street." The Court concluded that, although the First Amendment would forbid the banning of all communication by handbill in the public thoroughfares, it imposed "no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." 316 U.S., at 54, 62 S.Ct., at 921, 86 L.Ed., at 1265. Further support for a "commercial speech" exception to the First Amendment may perhaps be found in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951), where the Court upheld a conviction for violation of an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions. The Court reasoned: "The selling . . . brings into the transaction a commercial feature," and it distinguished Martin v. Struthers, supra, where it had reversed a conviction for door-to-door distribution of leaflets publicizing a religious meeting, as a case involving "no element of the commercial." 341 U.S., at 642-643, 71 S.Ct., at 932-933, 95 L.Ed., at 1248-1249. Moreover, the Court several times has stressed that communications to which First Amendment protection was given were Not "purely commercial."
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Last Term, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), the notion of unprotected "commercial speech" all but passed from the scene. We reversed a conviction for violation of a Virginia statute that made the circulation of any publication to encourage or promote the processing of an abortion in Virginia a misdemeanor. The defendant had published in his newspaper the availability of abortions in New York. The advertisement in question, in addition to announcing that abortions were legal in New York, offered the services of a rerral agency in that State. We rejected the contention that the publication was unprotected because it was commercial. Chrestensen's continued validity was questioned and its holding was described as "distinctly a limited one" that merely upheld "a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed." 421 U.S., at 819, 95 S.Ct., at 2231, 44 L.Ed.2d, at 610. We concluded that N93* "the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection," and we observed that the N94* "relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas."
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59, 96 S.Ct. 612, 642-654, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S., at 384, 93 S.Ct., at 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d, at 676; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 266, 84 S.Ct., at 718-719, 11 L.Ed.2d, at 698. Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is "sold" for profit,
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - There are undoubted difficulties with an effort to draw a bright line between "commercial speech" on the one hand and "protected speech" on the other, and the Court does better to face up to these difficulties than to attempt to hide them under labels. In this case, however, the Court has unfortunately substituted for the wavering line previously thought to exist between commercial speech and protected speech a no more satisfactory line of its own that between "truthful" commercial speech, on the one hand, and that which is "false and misleading" on the other. The difficulty with this line is not that it wavers, but on the contrary that it is simply too Procrustean to take into account the congeries of factors which I believe could, quite consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, properly influence a legislative decision with respect to commercial advertising.
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Parties: Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich
Date: 1976-10-04
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Parties: Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works
Date: 1976-06-21
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Parties: Runyon v. McCrary
Date: 1976-06-25
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Parties: Elrod v. Burns
Date: 1976-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - And, though freedom of belief is central, N30* "(t)he First Amendme protects political association as well as political expression." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 11, 96 S.Ct. at 632. N31* "There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - Particularly pertinent to the constitutionality of the practice of patronage dismissals are Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In Keyishian, the Court invalidated New York statutes barring employment merely on the basis of membership in "subversive" organizations. Keyishian squarely held that political association alone could not, consistently with the First Amendment, constitute an adequate ground for denying public employment. In Perry, the Court broadly rejected thealidity of limitations on First Amendment rights as a condition to the receipt of a governmental benefit, stating that the government N95* "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
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Parties: Young v. Am. Mini Theatres
Date: 1976-10-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - N142* Since "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice," Ante, at 70, the Court implies that these films are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution. This stands "Voltaire's immortal comment," Ibid., on its head. For if the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression that more than a "few of us" would take up arms to defend, then the right of free expression would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - A remark attributed to Voltaire characterizes our zealous adherence to the principle that the government may not tell the citizen what he may or may not say. Referring to a suggestion that the violent overthrow of tyranny might be legitimate, he said: N236* "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." The essence of that comment has been repeated time after time in our decisions invalidating attempts by the government to impose selective controls upon the dissemination of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the N237* 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N239* Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law, which require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect protected expression be content neutral except in the limited context of a captive or juvenile audience. In place of these principles the Court invokes a concept wholly alien to the First Amendment. Since "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice," Ante, at 70, the Court implies that these films are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution. This stands "Voltaire's immortal comment," Ibid., on its head. N240* For if the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression that more than a "few of us" would take up arms to defend, then the right of free expression would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The Court must never forget that the consequences of rigorously enforcing the guarantees of the First Amendment are frequently unpleasant. Much speech that seems to be of little or no value will enter the market place of ideas, threatening the quality of our social discourse and, more generally, the serenity of our lives. But that is the price to be paid for constitutional freedom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the N86* 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - This case does not involve a simple zoning ordinance, or a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, or a regulation of obscene expression or other speech that is entitled to less than the full protection of the First Amendment. The kind of expression at issue here is no doubt objectionable to some, but that fact does not diminish its protected status any more than did the particular content of the "offensive" expression in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - This case does not involve a simple zoning ordinance, or a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, or a regulation of obscene expression or other speech that is entitled to less than the full protection of the First Amendment. The kind of expression at issue here is no doubt objectionable to some, but that fact does not diminish its protected status
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - What this case does involve is the constitutional permissibility of selective interference with protected speech whose content is thought to produce distasteful effects. It is elementary that a prime function of the First Amendment is to guard against just such interference. By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law, which require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect protected expression be content neutral except in the limited context of a captive or juvenile audience.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - On several occasions we have determined that a defendant whose own speech was unprotected had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute which purported to prohibit protected speech, or even speech arguably protected. This exception from traditional rules of standing to raise constitutional issues has reflected the Court's judgment that the very existence of some statutes may cause persons not before the Court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-614, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-2917, 37 L.Ed.2d 830. The exception is justified by the overriding importance of maintaining a free and open market for the interchange of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - Even within the area of protected speech, a difference in content may require a different governmental response. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, we recognized that the First Amendment places limitations on the States' power to enforce their libel laws. We held that a public official may not recover damages from a critic of his official conduct without proof of "malice" as specially defined in that opinion. Implicit in the opinion is the assumption that if the content of the newspaper article had been different that is, if its subject matter had not been a public official a lesser standard of proof would have been adequate.
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Parties: Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart
Date: 1976-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - N82* (I)t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the (First Amendment's) guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S., at 713, 51 S.Ct., at 630. See also, e. g., id., at 716-717, 51 S.Ct., at 631; Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249, 56 S.Ct. 444, 448, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). Prior restraints are N83* "the essence of censorship," Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, 283 U.S., at 713, 51 S.Ct., at 630, and N84* "(o)ur distaste for censorship reflecting the natural distaste of a free people is deep-written in our law." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1244, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975).
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - N85* A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a criminal process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship shows." T. Emerson,
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - Respondents correctly contend that "the (First Amendment) protection even as to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited." Near v. Minnesota, supra, 283 U.S., at 716, 51 S.Ct., at 631. However, the exceptions to the rule have been confined to "exceptional cases." Ibid. The Court in Near, the first case in which we were faced with a prior restraint against the press, delimited three such possible exceptional circumstances. The first two exceptions were that N96* "the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications," and that "(t)he security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government (for) (t)he constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that have all the effect of force. . . .' " Ibid. These exceptions have since come to be interpreted as situations in which the "speech" involved is not encompassed within the meaning of the First Amendment. See, E. g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1306, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n. *, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2147, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id., at 731 n. 1, 91 S.Ct., at 2153 (White, J., concurring). And even in these situations, adequate and timely procedures are mandated to protect against any restraint of speech that does come within the ambit of the First Amendment. See, E. g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957). Thus, only the third category in Near contemplated the possibility that speech meriting and entitled to constitutional protection might nevertheless be suppressed before publication in the interest of some overriding countervailing interest
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Parties: Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n
Date: 1976-12-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - For the First Amendment does not command N241* "that people who want to (voice) their views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please."
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - The court recognized that both the Federal and State Constitutions protect freedom of speech and the right to petition the government, but noted that these rights may be abridged in the face of N5* "'a clear and present danger that (the speech) will bring about the substantive evils that (the legislature) has a right to prevent.'
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Parties: Craig v. Boren
Date: 1976-12-20
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Parties: Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle
Date: 1977-01-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - That question of whether speech of a government employee is constitutionally protected expression necessarily entails striking N97* "a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). There is no suggestion by the Board that Doyle violated any established policy, or that its reaction to his communication to the radio station was anything more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's action in making the memorandum public. We therefore accept the District Court's finding that the communication was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Parties: Marks v. United States
Date: 1977-03-01
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Parties: Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court of Oklahoma
Date: 1977-03-07
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Parties: Wooley v. Maynard
Date: 1977-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of "individual freedom of mind." Id., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably N143* 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate,'
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182-1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); id., at 645, 63 S.Ct., at 1188 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of N242* "individual freedom of mind."
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - The District Court found for appellees on the ground that the obscuring of the motto N1* was protected "symbolic speech." This Court, in relying upon a ground expressly avoided by the District Court, appears to disagree with the ground adopted by the District Court; indeed it points out that appellees' claim of symbolic expression has been "substantially undermined" by their very complaint in this action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N2* I not only agree with the Court's implicit recognition that there is no protected "symbolic speech" in this case, but I think that that conclusion goes far to undermine the Court's ultimate holding that there is an element of protected expression here. The State has not forced appellees to "say" anything; and it has not forced them to communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to "speech," such as wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a symbolic gesture. The State has simply required that all noncommercial automobiles bear license tags with the state motto, "Live Free or Die." Appellees have not been forced to affirm or reject that motto; they are simply required by the State, under its police power, to carry a state auto license tag for identification and registration purposes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - The Court holds that a State is barred by the Federal Constitution from requiring that the state motto be displayed on a state license plate. The path that the Court travels to reach this result demonstrates the difficulty in supporting it. The Court holds that the required display of the motto is an unconstitutional "required affirmation of belief." The District Court, however, expressly refused to consider this contention, and noted that, in an analogous case, a decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had reached precisely the opposite result. See State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972). The District Court found for appellees on the ground that the obscuring of the motto was protected "symbolic speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N98* The District Court held that by covering up the state motto "Live Free or Die" on his automobile license plate, Mr. Maynard was engaging in symbolic speech and that "New Hampshire's interest in the enforcement of its defacement statute is not sufficient to justify the restriction on (appellee's) constitutionally protected expression." 406 F.Supp., at 1389. We find it unnecessary to pass on the "symbolic speech" issue, since we find more appropriate First Amendment grounds to affirm the judgment of the District Court. We turn instead to what in our view is the essence of appellees' objection to the requirement that they display the motto "Live Free or Die" on their automobile license plates.
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Parties: Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.
Date: 1977-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - What distinguishes the public-sector union from the political party and the distinction is a limited one is that most of its members are employees who share similar economic interests and who may have a common professional perspective on some issues of public policy. Public school teachers, for example, have a common interest in fair teachers' salaries and reasonable pupil-teacher ratios. This suggests the possibility of a limited range of probable agreement among the class of individuals that a public-sector union is organized to represent. But I am unable to see why the likelihood of an area of consensus in the group should remove the protection of the First Amendment for the disagreements that inevitably will occur. Certainly, if individual teachers are ideologically opposed to public-sector unionism itself, as are the appellants in this case, ante, at 212-213, one would think that compelling them to affiliate with the union by contributing to it infringes their First Amendment rights to the same degree as compelling them to contribute to a political party.Under the First Amendment, the protection of speech does not turn on the likelihood or frequency of its occurrence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - I agree with the Court as far as it goes, but I would make it more explicit that compelling a government employee to give financial support to a union in the public sector regardless of the uses to which the union puts the contribution impinges seriously upon interests in free speech and association protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Splawn v. California
Date: 1977-06-06
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Parties: United States v. Ramsey
Date: 1977-06-06
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening of international mail in search of customs violations, under the above guidelines, impermissibly chills the exercise of free speech.Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to consider the constitutional reach of the First Amendment in this area in the absence of the existing statutory and regulatory protection.
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Parties: Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l
Date: 1977-06-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - An editorial and an advertisement in the same newspaper may contain misleading matter in equal measure. Although each is a form of protected expression, one may be censored while the other may not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - Appellants contend that advertisements of contraceptive products would be offensive and embarrassing to those exposed to them, and that permitting them would legitimize sexual activity of young people. But these are classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment. At least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.
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Parties: Ward v. Illinois
Date: 1977-06-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The Court's second theory is that, in any event, the Illinois statute is sufficiently specific to satisfy Miller. Although the statute does not contain an "exhaustive list" of specific examples, ante, at 776, it passes muster because it contains a generic reference to "the kinds of sexual conduct which may not be represented or depicted under the obscenity laws . . .," ibid. (emphasis in original). To hold that the list need not be exhaustive is to hold that a person can be prosecuted although the materials he sells are not specifically described in the list. Only five years ago, the Court promised that "no one" could be so prosecuted, Miller, 413 U.S., at 27, 93 S.Ct., at 2616. And if the statute need only describe the "kinds" of proscribed sexual conduct, it adds no protection to what the Constitution itself creates. For in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642, this Court held that the Constitution protected all expression which is not N32* "within either of the two examples given in Miller" or "sufficiently similar to such material to justify similar treatment."
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Parties: Lefkowitz v. Cunningham
Date: 1977-06-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Just as constitutionally protected speech may disclose a valid reason for terminating the speaker's employment, so may constitutionally protected silence provide a valid reason for refusing or terminating employment in certain sensitive public positions.
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Parties: Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro
Date: 1977-05-02
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Parties: National Socialist Party v. Skokie
Date: 1977-06-14
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Parties: Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.
Date: 1977-06-23
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Parties: Wolman v. Walter
Date: 1977-06-24
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Parties: Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.
Date: 1977-10-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - I think my Brother POWELL persuasively demonstrates in his opinion that the Court's opinion offers very little guidance as to the extent or nature of permissible state regulation of professions such as law and medicine. I would join his opinion except for my belief that once the Court took the first step down the 'slippery slope' in Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, the possibility of understandable and workable differentiations between protected speech and unprotected speech in the field of advertising largely evaporated. Once the exception of commercial speech from the protection of the First Amendment which had been established by Valentine v. Chrestensen, supra, was abandoned, the shift to case-by-case adjudication of First Amendment claims of advertisers was a predictable consequence.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - such speech N99* But a consideration of competing interests reinforced our view that should not be withdrawn from protection merely because it proposed a mundane commercial transaction. Even though the speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such speech in certain contexts. See, e. g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - The use of overbreadth analysis reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowingunprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - But the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context. As was acknowledged in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S., at 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct., at 1830, there are N100* 'commonsense differences' between commercial speech and other varieties. See also id., at 775-781, 96 S.Ct., at 1832-1835 (concurring opinion). Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation. See id., at 771-772 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. at 1830-1831. Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the scope of protection are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a product or service that he provides, and presumably he can determine more readily than others whether his speech is truthful and protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Since the advertiser knows his product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech. Id., at 771-772, n. 24, 96 S.Ct. at 1830. And any concern that strict requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit spontaneity seems inapplicable because commercial speech generally is calculated.
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Parties: Nixon v. Adm'r of General Servs.
Date: 1977-06-28
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Parties: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
Date: 1977-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right of publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N144* 'A TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity, unless the actual intent of the TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure the individual.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N145* The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that petitioner had 'a right of publicity' that gave him 'personal control over commercial display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of his talents.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N146* 'The rationale for (protecting the right of publicity) is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.'
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Parties: New York v. Cathedral Academy
Date: 1977-12-06
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Parties: Pac. Union Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall
Date: 1977-08-02
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Parties: National Broadcasting Co. v. Niemi
Date: 1978-02-10
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Parties: Nixon v. Warner Communications
Date: 1978-04-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N147* Our decision in that case merely affirmed the right of the press to publish accurately information contained in court records open to the public. Since the press serves as the information-gathering agent of the public, it could not be prevented from reporting what it had learned and what the public was entitled to know.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public.N243* "Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public."
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Parties: McDaniel v. Paty
Date: 1978-04-19
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Parties: National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States
Date: 1978-04-25
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Parties: First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti
Date: 1978-04-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - N148* Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide dissemination. N149* "[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it. ' . . . the liberty of the press is no greater and no less . . .' than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic." ,
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - The self-expression of the communicator is not the only value encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to as the right to hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas. Any communication of ideas, and consequently any expenditure of funds which makes the communication of ideas possible, it can be argued, furthers the purposes of the First Amendment. This proposition does not establish, however, that the right of the general public to receive communications financed by means of corporate expenditures is of the same dimension as that to hear other forms of expression. In the first place, as discussed supra, corporate expenditures designed to further political causes lack the connection with individual self-expression which is one of the principal justifications for the constitutional protection of speech provided by the First Amendment. Ideas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection. Secondly, the restriction of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much less severely upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions upon individual speech. Even the complete curtailment of co porate communications concerning political or ideological questions not integral to day-to-day business functions would leave individuals, including corporate shareholders, employees, and customers, free to communicate their thoughts. Moreover, it is unlikely that any significant communication would be lost by such a prohibition. These individuals would remain perfectly free to communicate any ideas which could be conveyed by means of the corporate form. Indeed, such individuals could even form associations for the very purpose of promoting political or ideological causes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes. A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States permit commercial corporations to exist. So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain open to protect the corporation's interest in its property, it has no need, though it may have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection. Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide dissemination. N244* "The purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it. ' . . . the liberty of the press is no greater and no less . . .' than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic."
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - Corporate speech is not the same as individual speechThe self-expression of the communicator is not the only value encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to as the right to hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - Until recently, it was not thought that any persons, natural or artificial, had any protected right to engage in commercial speech. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-770, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1825-1829, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Although the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation's right of commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - N106* Indeed most pre-First Amendment commentators who employed the term N107* "'freedom of speech' with great frequency, used it synonomously with freedom of the press."
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw. A commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the N33* "free flow of commercial information."
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - Until recently, it was not thought that any persons, natural or artificial, had any protected right to engage in commercial speech. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-770, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1825-1829, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Although the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation's right of commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to business," it also may limit other corporations—religious, charitable, or civic—to their respective "business" when addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment. Especially where, as here, the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended.
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Parties: Landmark Communications v. Va.
Date: 1978-05-01
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Parties: Pinkus v. United States
Date: 1978-05-23
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Parties: In re Primus
Date: 1978-05-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - This Court's decision in Button makes clear, however, that N87* "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect," and that N88* "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." 371 U.S., at 438, 83 S.Ct., at 340; see Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S., at 222-223, 88 S.Ct., at 356. Because of the danger of censorship through selective enforcement of broad prohibitions, and N89* "[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in [this] area only with narrow specificity."
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N34* This Court reversed: N35* "We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of [state law] and the Canons of Professional Ethics." 371 U.S., at 428-429, 83 S.Ct., at 335. The solicitation of prospective litigants, many of whom were not members of the NAACP or the Conference, for the purpose of furthering the civil-rights objectives of the organization and its members was held to come within the right N36* " 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.' "
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Parties: Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n
Date: 1978-05-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Moreover, "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 691, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.Ed.2d 756 (1969), corporate proxy statements, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970), the exchange of price and production information among competitors, American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct. 114, 66 L.Ed. 284 (1921), and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1942, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2637, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973).
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - To the extent that in-person solicitation of business may constitutionally be subjected to more substantial state regulation as to time, place, and manner than printed advertising of legal services, it is not because such solicitation has "traditionally" been banned, nor because one form of commercial speech is of less value than another under the First Amendment. Rather, any additional restrictions can be justified only to the degree that dangers which the State has a right to prevent are actually presented by conduct attendant to such speech, thus increasing the relative "strength of the State's countervailing interest in prohibition," ante, at 455.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - N101* Our holdings today deal only with situations at opposite poles of the problem of attorney solicitation. In their aftermath, courts and professional associations may reasonably be expected to look to these opinions for guidance in redrafting the disciplinary rules that must apply across a spectrum of activities ranging from clearly protected speech to clearly proscribable conduct. A large number of situations falling between the poles represented by the instant facts will doubtless occur. In considering the wisdom and constitutionality of rules directed at such intermediate situations our fellow members of the Bench and Bar must be guided not only by today's decisions, but also by our decision last Term in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). There, we held that truthful printed advertising by private practitioners regarding the availability and price of certain legal services was protected by the First Amendment. In that context we rejected many of the general justifications for rules applicable to one intermediate situation not directly addressed by the Court today—the commercial but otherwise "benign" solicitation of clients by an attorney.
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Parties: Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
Date: 1978-05-31
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - It seems to me self-evident that police searches of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press. The most immediate and obvious First Amendment injury caused by such a visitation by the police is physical disruption of the operation of the newspaper.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that the press can fulfill its constitutionally designated function of informing the public, because important information can often be obtained only by an assurance that the source will not be revealed. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-736, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2671-2677, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (dissenting opinion). And the Court has recognized that " 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Perhaps as a matter of abstract policy a newspaper office should receive no more protection from unannounced police searches than, say, the office of a doctor or the office of a bank. But we are here to uphold a Constitution. And our Constitution does not explicitly protect the practice of medicine or the business of banking from all abridgment by government. It does explicitly protect the freedom of the press.
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Parties: FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
Date: 1978-06-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - More importantly, in the cases relied on by those petitioners, unlike the instant case, denial of a benefit had the effect of abridging freedom of expression, since the denial was based solely on the content of constitutionally protected speech; in Speiser veterans were deprived of a special property-tax exemption if they declined to subscribe to a loyalty oath, while in Elrod certain public employees were discharged or threatened with discharge because of their political affiliation. As we wrote in National Broadcasting, supra, N102* "the issue before us would be wholly different" if "the Commission [were] to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views." 319 U.S., at 226, 63 S.Ct., at 1014. Here the regulations are not content related; moreover, their purpose and effect is to promote free speech, not to restrict it.
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Parties: Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
Date: 1978-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. [Citing Pell v. Procunier, supra.] The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by the quarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in American society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the special needs of the press in performing it effectively.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - An official prison policy of concealing such knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally. The Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once government has opened its doors.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, offers even less support for the respondents' position. Its observation, in dictum, that N150* "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections," 408 U.S., at 707, 92 S.Ct., at 2670, in no sense implied a constitutional right of access to news sources. That observation must be read in context; it was in response to the contention that forcing a reporter to disclose to a grand jury information received in confidence would violate the First Amendment by deterring news sources from communicating information. Id., at 680, 92 S.Ct., at 633. There is an undoubted right to gather news "from any source by means within the law," id., at 681-682, 92 S.Ct., at 2657, but that affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels others—private persons or governments—to supply information.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Pell v. Procunier, and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., also assumed that there is no constitutional right of access such as the Court of Appeals conceived. In those cases the Court declared, explicitly and without reservation, that the media have N151* "no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public," Pell, 417 U.S., at 834, 94 S.Ct., at 2810, Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 850, 94 S.Ct., at 2815, and on that premise the Court sustained prison regulations that prevented media interviews with inmates.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - In discussing the importance of an "untrammeled press," the Court in Grosjean readily acknowledged the need for "informed public opinion" as a restraint upon misgovernment. 297 U.S., at 250, 56 S.Ct., at 449. N246* It also criticized the tax at issue because it limited "the circulation of information to which the public [was] entitled." Ibid. But nothing in the Court's holding implied a special privilege of access to information as distinguished from a right to publish information which has been obtained; Grosjean dealt only with government attempts to burden and restrain a newspaper's communication with the public. The reference to a public entitlement to information meant no more than that the government cannot restrain communication of whatever information the media acquire—and which they elect to reveal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - There is an undoubted right to gather news N247* "from any source by means within the law," id., at 681-682, 92 S.Ct., at 2657, but that affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels others—private persons or governments—to supply information.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - "There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. N248* The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information."
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public and the press had been consistently denied any access to the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail, that there had been excessive censorship of inmate correspondence, and that there was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether respondents established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits did not depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to special treatment beyond that accorded the public at large. Rather, the probable existence of a constitutional violation rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic community access to knowledge about how its servants were treating some of its members who have been committed to their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
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Parties: FCC v. Pacifica Found.
Date: 1978-07-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - Whatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch stations or flick the "off" button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment protection. To reach a contrary balance, as does the Court, is clearly to follow Mr. Justice STEVENS' reliance on animal metaphors, ante, at 750-751,N152* "to burn the house to roast the pig."
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - N249* N250* Whatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch stations or flick the "off" button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment protection. To reach a contrary balance, as does the Court, is clearly to follow Mr. Justice STEVENS' reliance on animal metaphors, ante, at 750-751,N251* "to burn the house to roast the pig."
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - To insure that the FCC's regulation of protected speech does not exceed these bounds, my Brother POWELL is content to rely upon the judgment of the Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems it prudent to rely on this Court's ability accurately to assess the worth of various kinds of speech. For my own part, even accepting that this case is limited to its facts,I would place the responsibility and the right to weed worthless and offensive communications from the public airways where it belongs and where, until today, it resided: in a public free to choose those communications orthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor's hand.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - As demonstrated above, neither of the factors relied on by both the opinion of my Brother POWELL and the opinion of my Brother STEVENS—the intrusive nature of radio and the presence of children in the listening audience—can, when taken on its own terms, support the FCC's disapproval of the Carlin monologue. These two asserted justifications are further plagued by a common failing: the lack of principled limits on their use as a basis for FCC censorship. No such limits come readily to mind, and neither of the opinions constituting the Court serve to clarify the extent to which the FCC may assert the privacy and children-in-the-audience rationales as justification for expunging from the airways protected communications the Commission finds offensive. Taken to their logical extreme, these rationales would support the cleansing of public radio of any "four-letter words" whatsoever, regardless of their context. The rationales could justify the banning from radio of a myriad of literary works, novels, poems, and plays by the likes of Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway, Ben Jonson, Henry Fielding, Robert Burns, and Chaucer; they could support the suppression of a good deal of political speech, such as the Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the basis for imposing sanctions for the broadcast of certain portions of the Bible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - It is quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law in an effort to reshape its fabric to cover the patently wrong result the Court reaches in this case dangerous as well as lamentable. Yet there runs throughout the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS another vein I find equally disturbing: a depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the censorship of communications solely because of the words they contain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - We held in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195, that the government's interest in the N37* "well-being of its youth" and in supporting N38* "parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. Id., at 640 and 639, 88 S.Ct., at 1280. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - N106* Without question, the privacy interests of an individual in his home are substantial and deserving of significant protection. In finding these interests sufficient to justify the content regulation of protected speech, however, the Court commits two errors. First, it misconceives the nature of the privacy interests involved where an individual voluntarily chooses to admit radio communications into his home. Second, it ignores the constitutionally protected interests of both those who wish to transmit and those who desire to receive broadcasts that many including the FCC and this Court—might find offensive.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - N103* A second difference, not without relevance, is that broadcasting—unlike most other forms of communication—comes directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, supra, 422 U.S., at 209, 95 S.Ct., at 2272; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S., at 21, 91 S.Ct., at 1786; Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 7 6 (1970). Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in public before they turn away, see, e. g., Erznoznik, supra, 422 U.S., at 210-211, 95 S.Ct., at 2273-2274; but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903-909, 92 S.Ct. 2479-2481, 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting), a different order of values obtains in the home.
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence deserving of less protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - Although these words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. Some uses of even the most offensive words are unquestionably protected. See, e. g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 94 S.Ct. 326, 38 L.Ed.2d 303. Indeed, we may assume, arguendo, t at this monologue would be protected in other contexts. Nonetheless, the constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context. It is a characteristic of speech such as this that both its capacity to offend and its "social value," to use Mr. Justice Murphy's term, vary with the circumstances. Words that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another.
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - N104* For the second time in two years, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976), the Court refuses to embrace the notion, completely antithetical to basic First Amendment values, that the degree of protection the First Amendment affords protected speech varies with the social value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court. See opinion of Mr. Justice POWELL, ante, at 761-762. Moreover, as do all parties, all Members of the Court agree that the Carlin monologue aired by Station WBAI does not fall within one of the categories of speech, such as N105* "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 7 6, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), that is totally without First Amendment protection. This conclusion, of course, is compelled by our cases expressly holding that communications containing some of the words found condemnable here are fully protected by the First Amendment in other contexts. See Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914, 92 S.Ct. 2507, 33 L.Ed.2d 326 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 2499, 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 92 S.Ct. 2479, 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Yet despite the Court's refusal to create a sliding scale of First Amendment protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the worth of a communication's content, and despite our unanimous agreement that the Carlin monologue is protected speech, a majority of the Court nevertheless finds that, on the facts of this case, the FCC is not constitutionally barred from imposing sanctions on Pacifica for its airing of the Carlin monologue. This majority apparently believes that the FCC's disapproval of Pacifica's afternoon broadcast of Carlin's "Dirty Words" recording is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). Both the opinion of my Brother STEVENS and the opinion of my Brother POWELL rely principally on two factors in reaching this conclusion: (1) the capacity of a radio broadcast to intrude into the unwilling listener's home, and (2) the presence of children in the listening audience. Dispassionate analysis, removed from individual notions as to what is proper and what is not, starkly reveals that these justifications, whether individually or together, simply do not support even the professedly moderate degree of governmental homogenization of radio communications—if, indeed, such homogenization can ever be moderate given the pre-eminent status of the right of free speech in our constitutional scheme—that the Court today permits.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his home to radio communications retains privacy interests of sufficient moment to justify a ban on protected speech if those interests are N107* "invaded in an essentially intolerable manner," Cohen v. California, supra, 403 U.S., at 21, 91 S.Ct., at 1786, the very fact that those interests are threatened only by a radio broadcast precludes any intolerable invasion of privacy; for unlike other intrusive modes of communication, such as sound trucks, N108* "[t]he radio can be turned off,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - The opinions of both my Brother POWELL and my Brother STEVENS take the FCC at its word, and consequently do no more than permit the Commission to censor the afternoon broadcast of the "sort of verbal shock treatment," opinion of Mr. Justice POWELL, ante, at 757, involved here. To insure that the FCC's regulation of protected speech does not exceed these bounds, my Brother POWELL is content to rely upon the judgment of the Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems it prudent to rely on this Court's ability accurately to assess the worth of various kinds of speech. For my own part, even accepting that this case is limited to its facts, I would place the responsibility and the right to weed worthless and offensive communications from the public airways where it belongs and where, until today, it resided: in a public free to choose those communications orthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor's hand.
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - The absence of any hesitancy in the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS to approve the FCC's censorship of the Carlin monologue on the basis of two demonstrably inadequate grounds is a function of their perception that the decision will result in little, if any, curtailment of communicative exchanges protected by the First Amendment. Although the extent to which the Court stands ready to countenance FCC censorship of protected speech is unclear from today's decision, I find the reasoning by which my Brethren conclude that the FCC censorship they approve will not significantly infringe on First Amendment values both disingenuous as to reality and wrong as a matter of law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - The Court apparently believes that the FCC's actions here can be analogized to the zoning ordinances upheld in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). For two reasons, it is wrong. First, the zoning ordinances found to pass constitutional muster in Young had valid goals other than the channeling of protected speech. Id., 427 U.S., at 71 n. 34, 96 S.Ct., at 2453 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 80, 96 S.Ct., at 2457 (POWELL, J., concurring). No such goals are present here. Second, and crucial to the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS in Young —opinions, which, as they do in this case, supply the bare five-person majority of the Court the ordinances did not restrict the access of distributors or exhibitors to the market or impair the viewing public's access to the regulated material. Id., at 62, 71 n. 35, 96 S.Ct., at 2453 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 77, 96 S.Ct., at 2455 (POWELL, J., concurring). Again, this is not the situation here. Both those desiring to receive Carlin's message over the radio and those wishing to send it to them are prevented from doing so by the Commission's actions. Although, as my Brethren point out, Carlin's message may be disseminated or received by other means, this is of little consolation to those broadcasters and listeners who, for a host of reasons, not least among them financial, do not have access to, or cannot take advantage of, these other means.
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - N109* The statute pursuant to which the Commission acted, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.), makes it a federal offense to utter "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication." The Commission held, and the Court today agrees, that "indecent" is a broader concept than "obscene" as the latter term was defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, because language can be "indecent" although it has social, political, or artistic value and lacks prurient appeal. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97-98. But this construction of § 1464, while perhaps plausible, is by no means compelled. To the contrary, I think that "indecent" should properly be read as meaning no more than "obscene." Since the Carlin monologue concededly was not "obscene," I believe that the Commission lacked statutory authority to ban it. Under this construction of the statute, it is unnecessary to address the difficult and important issue of the Commission's constitutional power to prohibit speech that would be constitutionally protected outside the context of electronic broadcasting.
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Parties: New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich
Date: 1978-07-11
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Parties: New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich
Date: 1978-08-01
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Parties: New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich
Date: 1978-08-04
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Parties: General Council on Fin. & Admin. v. Cal. Superior Court
Date: 1978-09-01
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Parties: Boston v. Anderson
Date: 1978-10-20
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Parties: Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist.
Date: 1979-01-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - The Court of Appeals also concluded that there is no constitutional right to "press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient," saying that to afford public employees the right to such private expression "would in effect force school principals to be ombudsmen, for damnable as well as laudable expressions." Id., at 1319. We are unable to agree that private expression of one's views is beyond constitutional protection, and therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case so that it may consider the contentions of the parties freed from this erroneous view of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - Although it found the District Court's findings not clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals concluded that because petitioner had privately expressed her complaints and opinions to the principal, her expression was not protected under the First Amendment. Support for this proposition was thought to be derived from Pickering, supra, Perry, supra, and Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), which were found to contain "[t]he strong implication . . . that private expression by a public employee is not constitutionally protected." 555 F.2d, at 1318. The Court of Appeals also concluded that there is no constitutional right to "press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient," saying that to afford public employees the right to such private expression "would in effect force school principals to be ombudsmen, for damnable as well as laudable expressions." Id., at 1319. We are unable to agree that private expression of one's views is beyond constitutional protection, and therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case so that it may consider the contentions of the parties freed from this erroneous view of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - Noting that the free speech rights of public employees are not absolute, the Court held that in determining whether a government employee's speech is constitutionally protected, N110* "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern" must be balanced against "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 391 U.S., at 568, 88 S.Ct., at 1734. The Court concluded that under the circumstances of that case "the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate [was] not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public."
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Parties: Friedman v. Rogers
Date: 1979-02-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - After weighing the First Amendment interests identified in Virginia Pharmacy against the State's interests in regulating the speech in question, the Court concluded that the truthful advertising the prices at which routine legal services will be performed also is protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - N111* "Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805-806 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49, and n. 10, 81 S.Ct. 997, 1005-1006, 6 L.Ed.2d 105, 116 (1961). Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely."
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Parties: NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
Date: 1979-03-21
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Parties: Herbert v. Lando
Date: 1979-04-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - In recognition of the social values served by the First Amendment, our decisions have referred to N153* "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - As this Court recognized in Sullivan, error is inevitable in such debate, and, if forced to guarantee the truth of all assertions, potential critics might suppress statements believed to be accurate N90* "because of doubt whether [truthfulness] can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." 376 U.S., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725. Such self-censorship would be incompatible with the tenets on which the First Amendment and our democratic institutions are founded. Under a representative system of government, an informed electorate is a precondition of responsive decisionmaking. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936); A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 88-89 (1948). To secure public exposure to the widest possible range of information and insights, some margin of error must be tolerated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood. Given the required proof, however, damages N91* liability for defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - If the publication is false but there is an exonerating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this effect. Why should not the plaintiff be permitted to inquire before trial? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no undue self-censorship will result from permitting the relevant inquiry. Only knowing or reckless error will be discouraged; and unless there is to be an absolute First Amendment privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless conduct, which respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be threatened.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N112* Until New York Times, the prevailing jurisprudence was that N113* "[l]ibelous utterances [are not] within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . ." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725, 735, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-483, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1307-1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707-708, 51 S.Ct. 625, 628, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). The accepted view was that neither civil nor liability for defamatory publications abridges freedom of speech or freedom of the press, and a majority of jurisdictions made publishers liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of their intent.New York Times and Butts effected major changes in the standards applicable to civil libel actions. Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for defamation must prove knowing or reckless falsehood in order to establish liability.
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Parties: Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees
Date: 1979-04-30
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Parties: Bell v. Wolfish
Date: 1979-05-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S., at 555-556, 94 S.Ct., at 2974-2975. So, for example, our cases have held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see Pell v. Procunier, supra; Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964); that they are protected against invidious discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968); and that they may claim the protection of the Due Process Clause to prevent additional deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, see Meachum v. Fano, supra; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - That individuals have a fundamental First Amendment right to receive information and ideas is beyond dispute.
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Parties: Ambach v. Norwick
Date: 1979-04-17
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Parties: County Court v. Allen
Date: 1979-06-04
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Parties: Marchioro v. Chaney
Date: 1979-06-04
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Parties: Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union
Date: 1979-06-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Accepting that the Constitution guarantees workers the right individually or collectively to voice their views to their employers, see Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979); cf. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 173-175, 97 S.Ct. 421, 425-426, 50 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976), the Constitution does not afford such employees the right to compel employers to engage in a dialogue or even to listen.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Even assuming that appellees have the financial resources to pursue this case through the Arizona courts, appellees may well avoid speech that is perhaps constitutionally protected throughout the long course of that litigation, because such speech might fall within the cold shadow of criminal liability. The potential for this self-censorship is abhorrent to the First Amendment. It should be permitted by a court in equity only for the most important of reasons.
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Parties: Lo-Ji Sales v. New York
Date: 1979-06-11
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Parties: Hutchinson v. Proxmire
Date: 1979-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - N313* Therefore, although a speech delivered in the house of commons is privileged, and the member cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere; yet, if he publishes his speech, and it contains libellous matter, he is liable to an action and prosecution therefor, as in common cases of libel. And the same principles seem applicable to the privilege of debate and speech in congress. No man ought to have a right to defame others under colour of a performance of the duties of his office.
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Parties: Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n
Date: 1979-06-26
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Parties: Gannett Co. v. DePasquale
Date: 1979-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - If the constitutional right of the press and public to access is to have substance, representatives of these groups must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion. But this opportunity extends no farther than the persons actually present at the time the motion for closure is made, for the alternative would require substantial delays in trial and pretrial proceedings while notice was given to the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - Thus, the trial court found that the representatives of the press did have a right of access of constitutional dimension, but held, under the circumstances of this case, that this right was outweighed by the defendants' right to a fair trial. In short, the closure decision was based "on an assessment of the competing societal interests involved . . . rather than on any determination that First Amendment freedoms were not implicated."
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Segment in Paragraph: 112 - Early colonial charters reflected the view that open proceedings were an essential quality of a court of justice, and they cast the concept of a public trial in terms of a characteristic of the system of justice, rather than of a right of the accused. Indeed, the first public-trial provision to appear in America spoke in terms of the right of the public, not the accused, to attend trials
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Segment in Paragraph: 157 - Petitioner, as a newspaper publisher, enjoys the same right of access to the Jackson v. Denno hearing at issue in this case as does the general public. And what petitioner sees and hears in the courtroom it may, like any other citizen, publish or report consistent with the First Amendment. N154* "Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S., at 362-363, 86 S.Ct., at 1522. Reporters for newspaper, television, and radio N155* "are entitled to the same rights as the general public" to have access to the courtroom, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S., at 540, 85 S.Ct., at 1631, where they "are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective media." Id., at 541-542, 85 S.Ct., at 1632. N156* "[O]nce a public hearing ha[s] been held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint."
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N314* Similarly, in Estes v. Texas, supra, the Court held that a defendant was deprived of his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the televising and broadcasting of his trial. In rejecting the claim that the media representatives had a constitutional right to televise the trial, the Court stated that N315* the purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned."
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Parties: Jones v. Wolf
Date: 1979-07-02
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Parties: Morland v. Sprecher
Date: 1979-07-02
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Parties: Brown v. Glines
Date: 1980-01-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N316* The circulation of petitions is indisputably protected First Amendment activity. Petitioning involves a bundle of related First Amendment rights: the right to express ideas, see, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 1366, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), the right to be exposed to ideas expressed by others, see, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965); id., at 308, 85 S.Ct., at 1497 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, 319 U.S., at 143, 63 S.Ct., at 863, the right to communicate with government, see, e. g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963); cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 513, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (Roberts, J.), and the right to associate with others in the expression of opinion, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 612, 632, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2346, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). The petition is especially suited for the exercise of all of these rights: It serves as a vehicle of communication; as a classic means of individual affiliation with ideas or opinions; and as a peaceful yet effective method of amplifying the views of the individual signers. Indeed, the petition is a traditionally favored method of political expression and participation. See, e. g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-553, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 619-620 (Cooley ed., 1873); cf. White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 289, 11 L.Ed. 591 (1845).
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - By mandating that proposed petitions be subjected to command approval, the regulations impose a prior restraint. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 865, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1230, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-553, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 45-46, 81 S.Ct. 391, 392-393, 5 L.Ed.2d 403 (1961). Although the First Amendment bar against prior restraints is not absolute, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 590, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2817, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment), the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prior censorship of expression can be justified only by the most compelling governmental interests
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - N92* We have identified specific safeguards that are indispensable if a system of prior approval is to avoid First Amendment pitfalls. These include (1) the requirement that the burden of justifying censorship fall upon the censor, see New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714, 91 S.Ct., at 2141; Freedman v. Maryland, supra, 380 U.S., at 58, 85 S.Ct., at 738, (2) the condition that administrative suppression must be subject to speedy judicial review, see Blount v. Rizzi, supra, 400 U.S., at 417, 91 S.Ct., at 428, and (3) the rule that those whose First Amendment interests are at stake be given notice and an opportunity to be heard during suppression proceedings, see Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, supra, 393 U.S., at 181-183, 89 S.Ct., at 351-352; cf. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S., at 417-419, 94 S.Ct., at 1814.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N114* Thus far, only the interest in averting a virtually certain prospect of imminent, severe injury to the Nation in time of war has been generally considered a sufficiently weighty ground for prior restraint of constitutionally protected speech. See, e. g., New York Times, 403 U.S., at 726 -727, 91 S.Ct., at 2147-2148 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 730, 91 S.Ct., at 2149 (STEWART, J., concurring). The instant regulations, however, explicitly require commanding officers to suppress petitioning for reasons far less urgent than imminent, serious, peril to the United States or its citizens. The maintenance of military discipline, morale, and efficiency are undeniably important, but they are not always, and in every situation, to be regarded as more compelling than a host of other governmental interests which we have found insufficient to warrant censorship.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N115* " 'Speech that is protected in the civil population may . . . undermine the effectiveness of response to command.' " Parker v. Levy, supra, 417 U.S., at 759, 94 S.Ct., at 2563, quoting United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972). Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, N116* "the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S., at 758, 94 S.Ct., at 2563. The rights of military men must yield somewhat N117* " 'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . .' " Id., at 744, 94 S.Ct., at 2556, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953) (plurality opinion). Speech likely to interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base.
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Parties: Secretary of Navy v. Huff
Date: 1980-01-21
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Parties: Snepp v. United States
Date: 1980-02-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N317* the Court seems unaware of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to criticize his government. Inherent in this prior restraint is the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - I do not believe, however, that the Agency has any authority to censor its employees' publication of unclassified information on the basis of its opinion that publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests" or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the contracts he signed; rather, the Agency itself limited its censorship power to preventing the disclosure of "classified" information. Moreover, even if such a wide-ranging prior restraint would be good national security policy, I would have great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't
Date: 1980-02-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Although Cantwell turned on the free exercise clause, the Court has subsequently understood Cantwell to have implied that soliciting funds involves interests protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951), for example, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting "solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise" from entering private property without permission. The petitioner in Breard had been going door to door soliciting subscriptions for magazines. Despite petitioner's invocation of both freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the Court distinguished the "commercial feature" of the transactions from their informational overtone.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Addressing the question left open in Schneider, the Court recognized that while municipalities may not unduly restrict the right of communicating information in the public streets, N157* "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." 316 U.S., at 54, 62 S.Ct., at 921. The Court reasoned that unlike speech "communicating information and disseminating opinion" commercial advertising implicated only the solicitor's interest in pursuing "a gainful occupation."
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Although Cantwell turned on the free exercise clause, the Court has subsequently understood Cantwell to have implied that soliciting funds involves interests protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - The issue before us, then, is not whether charitable solicitations in residential neighborhoods are within the protections of the First Amendment. It is clear that they are. N118* "[O]ur cases long have protected speech even though it is in the form of . . . a solicitation to pay or contribute money,
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - The 75-percent requirement in the village ordinance plainly is insufficiently related to the governmental interests asserted in its support to justify its interference with protected speech. N119* "Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law. Trespasses may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient than . . . [deciding in advance] what information may be disseminated from house to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press."
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Parties: Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan
Date: 1980-02-20
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Parties: Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press
Date: 1980-03-03
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Parties: Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.
Date: 1980-03-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Prior restraints are distinct from, and more dangerous to free speech than, criminal statutes because, through caprice, mistake, or purpose, the censor may forbid speech which is constitutionally protected, and because the speaker may be punished for disobeying the censor even though his speech was protected. Those dangers are entirely absent here. An injunction against the showing of unnamed obscene motion pictures does not and cannot bar the exhibitor from showing protected material, nor can the exhibitor be punished, through contempt proceedings, for showing such material. The Art. 4667(a) injunction, in short, does not impose a traditional prior restraint. On the contrary, it seems to me functionally indistinguishable from a criminal obscenity statute. Since an appropriately worded criminal statute is constitutionally valid, I believe that Art. 4667(a) is valid also.
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Parties: Branti v. Finkel
Date: 1980-03-31
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - In support of the holding in Perry that even an employee with no contractual right to retain his job cannot be dismissed for engaging in constitutionally protected speech, the Court had stated:
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N120* "For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
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Parties: Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum
Date: 1980-03-03
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Parties: Carey v. Brown
Date: 1980-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - For the right to communicate is not limitless. E. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 480, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965). Even peaceful picketing may be prohibited when it interferes with the operation of vital governmental facilities , see, e. g., ibid. (picketing or parading prohibited near courthouses); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (demonstrations prohibited on jailhouse grounds), or when it is directed toward an illegal purpose, see, e. g., Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S.Ct. 1166, 1 L.Ed.2d 1347 (1957) (prohibition of picketing directed toward achieving "union shop" in violation of state law).
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The central difficulty with this argument is that it forthrightly presupposes that labor picketing is more deserving of First Amendment protection than are public protests over other issues, particularly the important economic, social, and political subjects about which these appellees wish to demonstrate. We reject that proposition. Cf. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 444-449 (1970) (suggesting that nonlabor picketing is more akin to pure expression than labor picketing and thus should be subject to fewer restrictions). Public-issue picketing, "an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form," Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963), has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."
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Parties: Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
Date: 1980-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment N12* embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern . . . ." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1436, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). In the mailing that triggered the regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means by which Consolidated Edison may participate in the public debate on this question and other controversial issues of national interest and importance. Thus, the Commission's prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the heart of the freedom to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on the ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to freedom of speech. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), we rejected the contention that a State may confine corporate speech to specified issues. That decision recognized that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501, 72 S.Ct. 777, 779-780, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952). Freedom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . ."
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of a "law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on "controversial issues of public policy" is plainly such a regulation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience cannot avoid objectional speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on the ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to freedom of speech. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), we rejected the contention that a State may confine corporate speech to specified issues. That decision recognized that N122* "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Id., at 777, 98 S.Ct., at 1416. Because the state action limited protected speech, we concluded that the regulation could not stand absent a showing of a compelling state interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The state action is neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, nor a permissible subject-matter regulation, nor a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest.
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Parties: Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
Date: 1980-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - N144* The First Amendment, however, does not always require a clear and present danger to be present before the government may regulate speech. Although First Amendment protection is not limited to the "exposition of ideas" on public issues, see, e. g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 667, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948)—both because the line between the informing and the entertaining is elusive and because art, literature, and the like may contribute to important First Amendment interests of the individual in freedom of speech—it is well established that the government may regulate obscenity even though it does not present a clear and present danger. Compare, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2635, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). Indecent speech, at least when broadcast over the airwaves, also may be regulated absent a clear and present danger of the type described by Mr. Justice Brandeis and required by this Court in Brandenburg. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). And in a slightly different context this Court declined to apply the clear-and-present-danger test to a conspiracy among members of the press in violation of the Sherman Act because to do so would "degrade" that doctrine. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1418, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945). Nor does the Court today apply the clear-and-present-danger test in invalidating New York's ban on promotional advertising. As noted above, in these and other contexts the Court has clearly rejected the notion that there must be a free "marketplace of ideas."
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Segment in Paragraph: 97 - This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising
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Segment in Paragraph: 97 - N164* We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N127* In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an economist's dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser protection because the subject matter concerns only the economic interests of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward. Thus, the Court's first definition of commercial speech is unquestionably too broad.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - N128* I remain of the view that the Court unlocked a Pandora's Box when it "elevated" commercial speech to the level of traditional political speech by according it First Amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). The line between "commercial speech," and the kind of speech that those who drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be a technically or intellectually easy one to draw, but it surely produced far fewer problems than has the development of judicial doctrine in this area since Virginia Board. For in the world of political advocacy and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a "fraudulent" idea: there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as very sound proposals that will receive the imprimatur of the "marketplace of ideas" through our majoritarian system of election and representative government. The free flow of information is important in this context not because it will lead to the discovery of any objective "truth," but because it is essential to our system of self-government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The Commission also has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant's commercial expression. To further its policy of conservation, the Commission could attempt to restrict the format and content of Central Hudson's advertising. It might, for example, require that the advertisements include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under current conditions and for the foreseeable future. Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842, 90 S.Ct. 50, 24 L.Ed.2d 93 (1969). In the absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central Hudson's advertising.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - I am inclined to think that Mr. Justice STEVENS is correct that the Commission's order prohibits more than mere proposals to engage in certain kinds of commercial transactions, and therefore I agree with his conclusion that the ban surely violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But even on the assumption that the Court is correct that the Commission's order reaches only commercial speech, I agree with Mr. Justice BLACKMUN that "[n]o differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information."
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - This reasoning falls short of establishing that appellant's advertising is not commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. Monopoly over the supply of a product provides no protection from competition with substitutes for that product. Electric utilities compete with suppliers of fuel oil and natural gas in several markets, such as those for home heating and industrial power. This Court noted the existence of interfuel competition 45 years ago, see West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72, 55 S.Ct. 316, 321, 79 L.Ed. 761 (1935). Each energy source continues to offer peculiar advantages and disadvantages that may influence consumer choice. For consumers in those competitive markets, advertising by utilities is just as valuable as advertising by unregulated firms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - The differences articulated by the Court, see ante, at 564, n. 6, justify a more permissive approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for the purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coercion, and these differences explain why doctrines designed to prevent "chilling" of protected speech are inapplicable to commercial speech. No differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - While this Court has stated that the "capacity [of speech] for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source," First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1416, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), the source of the speech nevertheless may be relevant in determining whether a given message is protected under the First Amendment. When the source of the speech is a state-created monopoly such as this, traditional First Amendment concerns, if they come into play at all, certainly do not justify the broad interventionist role adopted by the Court today.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - N121* The test adopted by the Court thus elevates the protection accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope of the First Amendment to a level that is virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech. I think the Court in so doing has effectively accomplished the "devitalization" of the First Amendment that it counseled against in Ohralik. I think it has also, by labeling economic regulation of business conduct as a restraint on "free speech," gone far to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such as Lochner and Tyson & Brother v. Banton,
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - While it is true that an important objective of the First Amendment is to foster the free flow of information, identification of speech that falls within its protection is not aided by the metaphorical reference to a "marketplace of ideas." There is no reason for believing that the marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more than there is to believe that the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic decisions in the commercial market. See, e. g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 964, 967-981 (1978). Indeed, many types of speech have been held to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment, thereby subject to governmental regulation, despite this Court's references to a marketplace of ideas. See, e. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (fighting words); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) (group libel); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity). It also has been held that the government has a greater interest in regulating some types of protected speech than others. See, e. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (indecent speech); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, supra (commercial speech). And as this Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344, n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, n. 9, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974): "Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo [the] harm of a defamatory falsehood. Indeed the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." The Court similarly has recognized that false and misleading commercial speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - The above examples illustrate that in a number of instances government may constitutionally decide that societal interests justify the imposition of restrictions on the free flow of information. When the question is whether a given commercial message is protected, I do not think this Court's determination that the information will "assist" consumers justifies judicial invalidation of a reasonably drafted state restriction on such speech when the restriction is designed to promote a concededly substantial state interest. I consequently disagree with the Court's conclusion that the societal interest in the dissemination of commercial information is sufficient to justify a restriction on the State's authority to regulate promotional advertising by utilities; indeed, in the case of a regulated monopoly, it is difficult for me to distinguish "society" from the state legislature and the Public Service Commission. Nor do I think there is any basis for concluding that individual citizens of the State will recognize the need for and act to promote energy conservation to the extent the government deems appropriate, if only the channels of communication are left open. Thus, even if I were to agree that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, I would hold here that the State's decision to ban promotional advertising, in light of the substantial state interest at stake, is a constitutionally permissible exercise of its power to adopt regulations designed to promote the interests of its citizens.
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - While I agree that when the government attempts to regulate speech of those expressing views on public issues, the speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it presents "a clear and present danger" of a substantive evil that the government has a right to prohibit, see, e. g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919), I think it is important to recognize that this test is appropriate in the political context in light of the central importance of such speech to our system of self-government.
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Parties: Walter v. United States
Date: 1980-06-20
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Parties: Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins
Date: 1980-06-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - The same would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or distribute pamphlets in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of a private building. The property owner or proprietor would be faced with a choice: he either could permit his customers to receive a mistaken impression or he could disavow the messages. Should he take the first course, he effectively has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should he choose the second, he had been forced to speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain issues. N14* The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself from the views expressed on his property, see ante, at 87, cannot restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all."
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - To require the owner to specify the particular ideas he finds objectionable enough to compel a response would force him to relinquish his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure." Ibid. Thus, the right to control one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners will not assume that the messages expressed on private property are those of the owner.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - In many situations, a right of access is no less intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For example, a law requiring that a newspaper permit others to use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First Amendment right to select material for publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2093, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) (plurality opinion). Such a right of access burdens the newspaper's N158* "fundamental right to decide what to print or omit."
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - But an owner who strongly objects to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of access would extend may oppose ideological activities N159* "of any sort" that are not related to the purposes for which he has invited the public onto his property. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 213, 241, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1802, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). To require the owner to specify the particular ideas he finds objectionable enough to compel a response would force him to relinquish his N160* "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure." Ibid. Thus, the right to control one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners will not assume that the messages expressed on private property are those of the owner.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - To require the owner to specify the particular ideas he finds objectionable enough to compel a response would force him to relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure." Ibid. Thus, the right to control one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners will not assume that the messages expressed on private property are those of the owner.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - N318* In that case, we said that N319* a system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 U.S., at 714, 97 S.Ct., at 1435. This principle on its face protects a person who refuses to allow use of his property as a marketplace for the ideas of others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, are invalid if they infringe the freedom of expression and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' contention that "a private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 85. I agree that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights under the Taking Clause. There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, are invalid if they infringe the freedom of expression and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' contention that "a private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 85. I agree that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case. But some of the language in the Court's opinion is unnecessarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action that transforms privately owned property into a forum for the expression of the public's views could raise serious First Amendment questions.
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Parties: In re Roche
Date: 1980-07-23
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Parties: Harris v. McRae
Date: 1980-06-30
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Parties: Richmond Newspapers v. Va.
Date: 1980-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen.N13* "In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a "right of access," cf. Gannett, supra, 443 U.S., at 397, 99 S.Ct., at 2914 (POWELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), or a "right to gather information," for we have recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and "of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg, 408 U.S., at 681, 92 S.Ct., at 2656.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2599-2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 553, I explained at length why Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice POWELL, and I were convinced that "[a]n official prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Id., at 38, 98 S.Ct., at 2609. Since Mr. Justice MARSHALL and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the contrary conclusion expressed in the prevailing opinions. Today, however, for the first time, the Court uneqeuivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may not be suppressed, see, e. g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 364, 100 S.Ct. 594, 600, 609, 611, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2802, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); id., at 590, 96 S.Ct., at 2817 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630-631, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), the First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access to information,
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown, recognition of this pervades the centuries-old history of open trials and the opinions of this Court. Supra, at 564-575, and n. 9.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the process itself; the conduct of trials N165* "before as many of the people as chuse to attend" was regarded as one of "the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government." 1 Journals 106, 107. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees. N166* "[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. N167* "In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.'"
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a N168* "right of access," cf. Gannett, supra, 443 U.S., at 397, 99 S.Ct., at 2914 (POWELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), or a N169* "right to gather information," for we have recognized that N170* "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - N171* "The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental."
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - Whatever the ultimate answer to that question may be with respect to pretrial suppression hearings in criminal cases, the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - But this does not mean that the First Amendment right of members of the public and representatives of the press to attend civil and criminal trials is absolute. Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and members of the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. "In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.' " Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). What this means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a "right of access," cf. Gannett, supra, 443 U.S., at 397, 99 S.Ct., at 2914 (POWELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), or N321* a "right to gather information," for we have recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - The right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press; and their affinity to the right of assembly is not without relevance. From the outset, the right of assembly was regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. "The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937). People assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also to listen, observe, and learn; indeed, they may "assembl[e] for any lawful purpose," Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519, 59 S.Ct. 954, 965, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.).Subject to the traditional time, place, and manner restrictions, see, e. g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 560-564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 478-480, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965), streets, sidewalks, and parks are places traditionally open, where First Amendment rights may be exercised, see Hague v. CIO, supra, at 515, 59 S.Ct., at 963 (opinion of Roberts, J.); a trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally—and representatives of the media—have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
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Segment in Paragraph: 114 - I am driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must provide some measure of protection for public access to the trial. The opinion in partial dissent in Gannett explained that the public has an intense need and a deserved right to know about the administration of justice in general; about the prosecution of local crimes in particular; about the conduct of the judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, police officers, other public servants, and all the actors in the judicial arena; and about the trial itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2599-2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 553, I explained at length why Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice POWELL, and I were convinced that "[a]n official prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Id., at 38, 98 S.Ct., at 2609. Since Mr. Justice MARSHALL and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the contrary conclusion expressed in the prevailing opinions. Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - I explained at length why Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice POWELL, and I were convinced that N123* "[a]n official prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Id., at 38, 98 S.Ct., at 2609. Since Mr. Justice MARSHALL and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the contrary conclusion expressed in the prevailing opinions. Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Stone v. Graham
Date: 1980-11-17
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Parties: Democratic Party of United States v. Wis.
Date: 1981-02-25
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Parties: Fcc v. Wncn Listeners Guild
Date: 1981-03-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - N322* Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals judgment should be affirmed because, even if not violative of the Act, the Policy Statement conflicts with the First Amendment rights of listeners "to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). Red Lion held that the Commission's "fairness doctrine" was consistent with the public-interest standard of the Communications Act and did not violate the First Amendment, but rather enhanced First Amendment values by promoting "the presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the public." Id., at 385, 89 S.Ct., at 1804. Although observing that the interests of the people as a whole were promoted by debate of public issues on the radio, we did not imply that the First Amendment grants individual listeners the right to have the Commission review the abandonment of their favorite entertainment programs. The Commission seeks to further the interests of the listening public as a whole by relying on market forces to promote diversity in radio entertainment formats and to satisfy the entertainment preferences of radio listeners. This policy does not conflict with the First Amendment.
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Parties: Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.
Date: 1981-04-06
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Parties: Flynt v. Ohio
Date: 1981-05-18
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Parties: Schad v. Mt. Ephraim
Date: 1981-06-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Were I a resident of Mount Ephraim, I would not expect my right to attend the theater or to purchase a novel to be contingent upon the availability of such opportunities in "nearby" Philadelphia, a community in whose decisions I would have no political voice. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (" N323* 'One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place,' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - The Borough of Mount Ephraim has not attempted to suppress the point of view of anyone or to stifle any category of ideas. To say that there is a First Amendment right to impose every form of expression on every community, including the kind of "expression" involved here, is sheer nonsense. To enshrine such a notion in the Constitution ignores fundamental values that the Constitution ought to protect. To invoke the First Amendment to protect the activity involved in this case trivializes and demeans that great Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - It would be a substantial step beyond Mini Theatres to conclude that a town or county may legislatively prevent its citizens from engaging in or having access to forms of protected expression that are incompatible with its majority's conception of the "decent life" solely because these activities are sufficiently available in other locals.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - It may be that some forms of live entertainment would create problems that are not associated with the commercial uses presently permitted in Mount Ephraim. Yet this ordinance is not narrowly drawn to respond to what might be the distinctive problems arising from certain types of live entertainment, and it is not clear that a more selective approach would fail to address those unique problems if any there are. The Borough has not established that its interests could not be met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - As the Mount Ephraim Code has been construed by the New Jersey courts—a construction that is binding upon us—"live entertainment," including nude dancing, is "not a permitted use in any establishment" in the Borough of Mount Ephraim. App. to Juris. Statement 12a. By excluding live entertainment throughout the Borough, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). See also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 61, 62, 96 S.Ct., at 2447-2448. Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it displays the nude human figure. N124* "[N]udity alone" does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment. Jenkins v. Georgia, supra, 418 U.S., at 161, 94 S.Ct., at 2755. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, 422 U.S., at 211-212, 213, 95 S.Ct., at 2274. Furthermore, as the state courts in this case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - Even assuming that the "expression" manifested in the nude dancing that is involved here is somehow protected speech under the First Amendment, the Borough of Mount Ephraim is entitled to regulate it.
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Parties: Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness
Date: 1981-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N145* Relying on a general, speculative fear of disorder, the State of Minnesota has placed a significant restriction on respondents' ability to exercise core First Amendment rights. This restriction is not narrowly drawn to advance the State's interests, and for that reason is unconstitutional. "[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). If the State had a reasonable concern that distribution in certain parts of the fairgrounds—for example, entrances and exits—would cause disorder, it could have drafted its Rule to prohibit distribution of literature at those points. If the State felt it necessary to limit the number of persons distributing an organization's literature, it could, within reason, have done that as well. It had no right, however, to ban all distribution of literature outside the booths.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to "reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention."
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N324* Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). If the State had a reasonable concern that distribution in certain parts of the fairgrounds—for example, entrances and exits—would cause disorder, it could have drafted its Rule to prohibit distribution of literature at those points. If the State felt it necessary to limit the number of persons distributing an organization's literature, it could, within reason, have done that as well. It had no right, however, to ban all distribution of literature outside the booths.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - For Rule 6.05 to be valid as a place and manner restriction, it must also be sufficiently clear that alternative forums for the expression of respondents' protected speech exist despite the effects of the Rule. Rule 6.05 is not vulnerable on this ground. First, the Rule does not prevent ISKCON from practicing Sankirtan anywhere outside the fairgrounds. More importantly, the Rule has not been shown to deny access within the forum in question. Here, the Rule does not exclude ISKCON from the fairgrounds, nor does it deny that organization the right to conduct any desired activity at some point within the forum. Its members may mingle with the crowd and orally propagate their views. The organization may also arrange for a booth and distribute and sell literature and solicit funds from that location on the fairgrounds itself. The Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum in that it exists to provide a means for a great number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commercial, religious, or political, to a large number of people in an efficient fashion. Considering the limited functions of the Fair and the combined area within which it operates, we are unwilling to say that Rule 6.05 does not provide ISKCON and other organizations with an adequate means to sell and solicit on the fairgrounds. The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to N125* "reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 453, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). Rule 6.05 does not unnecessarily limit that right within the fairgrounds.
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Parties: New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca
Date: 1981-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - In California v. LaRue, instead of relying on the simplistic reasoning employed by the Court today, the majority analyzed the issue by balancing the State's interests in preventing specifically identified social harms against the minimal interest in protected expression implicated by nude dancing. The opinion reflected the view that the degree of protection afforded by the First Amendment is a variable, and that the slight interest in free expression implicated by naked and lewd dancing was plainly outweighed by the State's interest—supported by explicit legislative findings—in maintaining order and decency.
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - The New York Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.2d 524, 429 N.Y.S.2d 616, 407 N.E.2d 460, declared the statute unconstitutional, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 50 N.Y.2d 524, 429 N.Y.S.2d 616, 407 N.E.2d 460. It reasoned that topless dancing was a form of protected expression under the First Amendment and that the State had not demonstrated a need for prohibiting "licensees from presenting nonobscene topless dancing performances to willing customers. . . ." Id., at 529, 429 N.Y.S.2d, at 619, 407 N.E.2d, at 463. The dissent contended that the statute was well within the State's power, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, to regulate the sale of liquor within its boundaries. We agree with the reasoning of the dissent
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N39* "Although the customary 'barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 [93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342] (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. In LaRue, however, we concluded that the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing and that a State could therefore ban such dancing as part of its liquor license control program."
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Parties: Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard
Date: 1981-06-01
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Parties: United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns
Date: 1981-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - Reluctance to treat the letterboxes as public forums might stem not from the Postal Service's approval of their form but instead from the fact that their ownership and use remain in the hands of private individuals. Even that hesitation, I should think, would be misguided, for those owners necessarily retain the right to receive information as a counterpart of the right of speakers to speak
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - That appellee civic associations enjoy the First Amendment right of free expression cannot be doubted; both their purposes and their practices fall within the core of the First Amendment's protections. We have long recognized the constitutional rights of groups which seek, as appellees do, to "communicate ideas, positions on local issues, and civic information to their constituents" through written handouts and thereby to promote the free discussion of governmental affairs so central to our democracy. See, e. g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-147, 63 S.Ct. 862, 864, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). By traveling door to door to hand-deliver their messages to the homes of community members, appellees employ the method of written expression most accessible to those who are not powerful, established, or well financed. "Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people." Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, at 146, 63 S.Ct., at 864. See Schneider v. State, supra, at 164, 60 S.Ct., at 152. Moreover, "[f]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111, 63 S.Ct. 870, 874, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). And such freedoms depend on liberty to circulate; " 'indeed, without circulation, the publication would be of little value.' " Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960), quoting Lovell v. Griffin, supra, 303 U.S., at 452, 58 S.Ct., at 669.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - N325* There is neither historical nor constitutional support for the characterization of a letterbox as a public forum. Letterboxes are an essential part of the nationwide system for the delivery and receipt of mail, and since 1934 access to them has been unlawful except under the terms and conditions specified by Congress and the Postal Service. As such, it is difficult to accept appellees' assertion that because it may be somewhat more efficient to place their messages in letterboxes there is a First Amendment right to do so. The underlying rationale of appellees' argument would seem to foreclose Congress or the Postal Service from requiring in the future that all letterboxes contain locks with keys being available only to the homeowner and the mail carrier.
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - N326* Reluctance to treat the letterboxes as public forums might stem not from the Postal Service's approval of their form but instead from the fact that their ownership and use remain in the hands of private individuals. Even that hesitation, I should think, would be misguided, for those owners necessarily retain the right to receive information as a counterpart of the right of speakers to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - If the owner welcomes messages from his neighbors, from the local community organization, or even from the newly arrived entrepreneur passing out free coupons, it is presumptively unreasonable to interfere with his ability to receive such communications. The nationwide criminal statute at issue here deprives millions of homeowners of the legal right to make a simple decision affecting their ability to receive communications from others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - N3* The inquiry in our public forum cases has instead asked whether N4* "the manner of expression is basically incompatiblewith the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S., at 116, 92 S.Ct., at 2303. Compare Grayned v. City of Rockford (restriction on speech permissible near school while in session) with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., supra (symbolic speech protected even during school hours); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (restriction on picketing permitted where limited to entrance of courthouse), with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966) (silent protest in library protected); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (protest near jailyard inconsistent with jail purposes), with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963) (protest permitted on state capitol grounds).
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - There is no doubt that the postal system is a massive, Government-operated communications facility open to all forms of written expression protected by the First Amendment. No one questions, however, that the Government, the operator of the system, may impose a fee on those who would use the system, even though the user fee measurably reduces the ability of various persons or organizations to communicate with others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - Having determined that a letterbox is not a public forum, the Court inexplicably terminates its analysis. Surely, however, the mere fact that property is not a public forum does not free government to impose unwarranted restrictions on First Amendment rights. The Court itself acknowledges that the postal power "may not . . . be exercised by Congress in a manner that abridges the freedom of speech or of the press protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution." Ante, at 126. Even where property does not constitute a public forum, government regulation that is content-neutral must still be reasonable as to time, place, and manner.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - However broad the postal power conferred by Art. I may be, it may not of course be exercised by Congress in a manner that abridges the freedom of speech or of the press protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - N126* The inquiry in our public forum cases has instead asked whether N127* "the manner of expression is basically incompatiblewith the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S., at 116, 92 S.Ct., at 2303. Compare Grayned v. City of Rockford (restriction on speech permissible near school while in session) with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., supra (symbolic speech protected even during school hours); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (restriction on picketing permitted where limited to entrance of courthouse), with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966) (silent protest in library protected); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (protest near jailyard inconsistent with jail purposes), with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963) (protest permitted on state capitol grounds). Assuming for the moment that the letterboxes, as "authorized depositories," are under governmental control and thus part of the governmental enterprise, their purpose is hardly incompatible with appellees' use. For the letterboxes are intended to receive written communication directed to the residents and to protect such materials from the weather or the intruding eyes of would-be burglars.
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Parties: Cal. Medical Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n
Date: 1981-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - >We held, inter alia, that the limitations placed by the Act on campaign expenditures violated the First Amendment in that they directly restrained the rights of citizens, candidates, and associations to engage in protected political speech. Id., 424 U.S., at 39-59, 96 S.Ct., at 644-654. Nonetheless, we upheld the various ceilings the Act placed on the contributions individuals and multicandidate political committees could make to candidates and their political committees, and the maximum aggregate amount any individual could contribute in any calendar year. We reasoned that such contribution restrictions did not directly infringe on the ability of contributors to express their own political views, and that such limitations served the important governmental interests in preventing the corruption or appearance of corruption of the political process that might result if such contributions were not restrained.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The type of expenditures that this Court in Buckley considered constitutionally protected were those made independently by a candidate, individual, or group in order to engage directly in political speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - We would naturally be hesitant to conclude that CMA's determination to fund CALPAC rather than to engage directly in political advocacy is entirelyunprotected by the First Amendment. Nonetheless, the "speech by proxy" that CMA seeks to achieve through its contributions to CALPAC is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection.
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Parties: Haig v. Agee
Date: 1981-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - N128* "[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), citing Z. Chafee, Freedom of Speech 10 (1920). Agee's disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution. The mere fact that Agee is also engaged in criticism of the Government does not render his conduct beyond the reach of the law.
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Parties: CBS v. Fcc
Date: 1981-07-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - The First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 625, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). Section 312(a)(7) thus makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - N172* "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experience which is crucial here."
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - N327* N328* A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a . . . frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others . . . ."
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Parties: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
Date: 1981-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - There can be no question that a prohibition on the erection of billboards infringes freedom of speech: The exceptions do not create the infringement, rather the general prohibition does.
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Segment in Paragraph: 151 - In the process of eradicating the perceived harms, the ordinance here in no sense suppresses freedom of expression, either by discriminating among ideas or topics or by suppressing discussion generally.
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Segment in Paragraph: 152 - It borders on the frivolous to suggest that the San Diego ordinance infringes on freedom of expression, given the wide range of alternative means available.
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Segment in Paragraph: 116 - Archaeologists use the term "graffiti" to describe informal inscriptions on tombs and ancient monuments. The graffito was familiar in the culture of Egypt and Greece, in the Italian decorative art of the 15th century, and it survives today in some subways and on the walls of public buildings. It is an inexpensive means of communicating political, commercial, and frivolous messages to large numbers of people; some creators of graffiti have no effective alternative means of publicly expressing themselves. Nevertheless, I believe a community has the right to decide that its interests in protecting property from damaging trespasses and in securing beautiful surroundings outweigh the countervailing interest in uninhibited expression by means of words and pictures in public places. If the First Amendment categorically protected the marketplace of ideas from any quantitative restraint, a municipality could not outlaw graffiti.
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Segment in Paragraph: 146 - San Diego adopted its ordinance to eradicate what it perceives—and what it has a right to perceive—as ugly and dangerous eyesores thrust upon its citizens. This was done with two objectives in mind: the disfigurement of the surroundings and the elimination of the danger posed by these large, eye-catching signs that divert the attention of motorists. The plurality acknowledges—as they must—that promoting traffic safety and preserving scenic beauty "are substantial governmental goals." Ante, at 507-508. See also ante, at 528 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) (traffic safety). But, having acknowledged the legitimacy of local governmental authority, the plurality largely ignores it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - I have no doubt that those who seek to convey commercial messages will engage in the most imaginative of exercises to place themselves within the safe haven of noncommercial speech, while at the same time conveying their commercial message. Encouraging such behavior can only make the job of city officials—who already are inclined to ban billboards that much more difficult and potentially intrusive upon legitimate noncommercial expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - N93* Justice Black said it well when he stated the First Amendment's presumption that "all present instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition."
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - N40* The characterization of the San Diego regulation as a total ban of a medium of communication has more than semantic implications, for it suggests a First Amendment analysis quite different from the plurality's. Instead of relying on the exceptions to the ban to invalidate the ordinance, I would apply the tests this Court has developed to analyze content-neutral prohibitions of particular media of communication. Most recently, in Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), this Court assessed N41* "the substantiality of the governmental interests asserted" and "whether those interests could be served by means that would be less intrusive on activity protected by the First Amendment," in striking down the borough's total ban on live commercial entertainment. Id., at 70, 101 S.Ct., at 2183. Schad merely articulated an analysis applied in previous cases concerning total bans of media of expression. For example, in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), the Court struck down total bans on handbill leafletting because there were less restrictive alternatives to achieve the goal of prevention of litter, in fact alternatives that did not infringe at all on that important First Amendment privilege. Id., at 162, 60 S.Ct., at 151. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance that forbade persons from engaging in the time-honored activity of door-to-door solicitation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 116 - It is an inexpensive means of communicating political, commercial, and frivolous messages to large numbers of people; some creators of graffiti have no effective alternative means of publicly expressing themselves. Nevertheless, I believe a community has the right to decide that its interests in protecting property from damaging trespasses and in securing beautiful surroundings outweigh the countervailing interest in uninhibited expression by means of words and pictures in public places. If the First Amendment categorically protected the marketplace of ideas from any quantitative restraint, a municipality could not outlaw graffiti.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Finally, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), we held: N129* "The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available for a particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation." Id., at 562-563, 100 S.Ct., at 2349-2350 (citation omitted). We then adopted a four-part test for determinating the validity of government restrictions on commercial speech as distinguished from more fully protected speech. (1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective.
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Segment in Paragraph: 121 - If one is persuaded, as I am, that a wholly impartial total ban on billboards would be permissible, it is difficult to understand why the exceptions in San Diego's ordinance present any additional threat to the interests protected by the First Amendment. The plurarity suggests that, because the exceptions are based in part on the subject matter of noncommercial speech, the city somehow is choosing the permissible subjects for public debate. See ante, at 515. While this suggestion is consistent with some of the broad dictum in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319, it does not withstand analysis in this case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - Government restrictions on protected speech are not permissible merely because the government does not favor one side over another on a subject of public controversy. Nor can a prohibition of all messages carried by a particular mode of communication be upheld merely because the prohibition is rationally related to a nonspeech interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - Although the protection extended to commercial speech has continued to develop, commercial and noncommercial communications, in the context of the First Amendment, have been treated differently. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), held that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression and that the specific advertisement at issue there was constitutionally protected. However, we continue to observe the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, indicating that the former could be forbidden and regulated in situations where the latter could not be.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - By "essentially neutral," THE CHIEF JUSTICE may mean either or both of two things. He may mean that government restrictions on protected speech are permissible so long as the government does not favor one side over another on a subject of public controversy. This concept of neutrality was specifically rejected by the Court last Term in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at 537, 100 S.Ct., at 2333. There, the Court dismissed the Commission's contention that a prohibition of all discussion, regardless of the viewpoint expressed, on controversial issues of public policy does not unconstitutionally suppress freedom of speech.N130* "The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Ibid. On the other hand, THE CHIEF JUSTICE may mean by neutrality that government restrictions on speech cannot favor certain communicative contents over others. As a general rule, this, of course, is correct, see, e. g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). The general rule, in fact, is applicable to the facts of this case: San Diego has chosen to favor certain kinds of messages—such as onsite commercial advertising, and temporary political campaign advertisements—over others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 155 - N131* The plurality concludes that a city may constitutionally exercise its police power by eliminating offsite commercial billboards; they reach this result by following our recent cases holding that commercial speech, while protected by the Constitution, receives less protection than "noncommercial"—i. e., political, religious, social—speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 166 - No case in this Court creates, as the plurality suggests, a hierarchy of types of speech in which, if one type is actually protected through legislative judgment, the Constitution compels that that judgment be exercised in favor of all types ranking higher on the list. When a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion—it neither undermines the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme nor renders its legislative choices ipso facto irrational. A city does not thereby "conced[e] that some communicative interests . . . are stronger than its competing interests in esthetics and traffic safety," ante, at 520; it has only declined, in one area, to exercise its powers to the full extent the Constitution permits.
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Parties: Rostker v. Goldberg
Date: 1981-06-25
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Parties: Widmar v. Vincent
Date: 1981-12-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Finally, we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S., at 188-189, 92 S.Ct., at 2349-2350, that recognize a University's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - A large part of respondents' argument, accepted by the court below and accepted by the majority, is founded on the proposition that because religious worship uses speech, it is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Not only is it protected, they argue, but religious worshipqua speech is not different from any other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle. I believe that this proposition is plainly wrong.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Here the UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley
Date: 1981-12-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - A limit on contributions in this setting need not be analyzed exclusively in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two rights overlap and blend; to limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint on the right of expression. The restraint imposed by the Berkeley ordinance on rights of association and in turn on individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - The Court today holds that a local ordinance restricting the amount of money that an individual can contribute to a committee organized to support or oppose a ballot measure violates the right to freedom of speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Placing limits on contributions which in turn limit expenditures plainly impairs freedom of expression. The integrity of the political system will be adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous contributions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Indeed what N132* today has become "a very significant form of political expression" was held just last Term to involve only N133* "some limited element of protected speech." California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) (MARSHALL, J., joined by BRENNAN, WHITE, and STEVENS, JJ.). N134* " 'Speech by proxy,' " we said, "is not the sort of advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection."
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - We would hold that Berkeley has neither demonstrated a genuine threat to its important governmental interests nor employed means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of protected activity. In Buckley, this Court upheld limitations on contributions to candidates as necessary to prevent contributors from corrupting the representatives to whom the people have delegated political decisions. But curtailment of speech and association in a ballot measure campaign, where the people themselves render the ultimate political decision, cannot be justified on this basis.
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Parties: Cabell v. Chavez-Salido
Date: 1982-01-12
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Parties: Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State
Date: 1982-01-12
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Parties: In re R. M. J., No 80-1431
Date: 1982-01-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), the Court considered whether the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech announced in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), applied to the regulation of advertising by lawyers. The Bates Court held that indeed lawyer advertising was a form of commercial speech, protected by the First Amendment, and that N135* "advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression."
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Parties: United States v. Lee
Date: 1982-02-23
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Parties: Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates
Date: 1982-03-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - We first examine whether the ordinance infringes Flipside's First Amendment rights or is overbroad because it inhibits the First Amendment rights of other parties. Flipside makes the exorbitant claim that the village has imposed a "prior restraint" on speech because the guidelines treat the proximity of drug-related literature as an indicium that paraphernalia are "marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Flipside also argues that because the presence of drug-related designs, logos, or slogans on paraphernalia may trigger enforcement, the ordinance infringes "protected symbolic speech." Brief for Appellee 25.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N136* We first examine whether the ordinance infringes Flipside's First Amendment rights or is overbroad because it inhibits the First Amendment rights of other parties. Flipside makes the exorbitant claim that the village has imposed a "prior restraint" on speech because the guidelines treat the proximity of drug-related literature as an indicium that paraphernalia are "marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Flipside also argues that because the presence of drug-related designs, logos, or slogans on paraphernalia may trigger enforcement, the ordinance infringes "protected symbolic speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - insofar as any commercial speech interest is implicated here, it is only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in the manner that the retailer desires. We doubt that the village's restriction on the manner of marketing appreciably limits Flipside's communication of information—with one obvious and telling exception. The ordinance is expressly directed at commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal drug use. If that activity is deemed "speech," then it is speech proposing an illegal transaction, which a government may regulate or ban entirely. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-564, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2560, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). Finally, it is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.
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Parties: Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l
Date: 1982-04-20
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Parties: Larson v. Valente
Date: 1982-04-21
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Parties: Finnegan v. Leu
Date: 1982-05-17
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Parties: Brown v. Hartlage
Date: 1982-04-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - [Potentially Corrosive] Solicitation Although agreements to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some element of association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without trenching on any right of association protected by the First Amendment. The fact that such an agreement necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech. Finally, while a solicitation to enter into an agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing conduct from pure speech, such a solicitation, even though it may have an impact in the political arena, remains in essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit, and may properly be prohibited.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N329* The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Amicus points out that § 121.055, as applied through Sparks v. Boggs, supra, bars promises to serve at a reduced salary only when the salary of the official has been "fixed by law," and where the promise cannot, therefore, be delivered. Of course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). But N42* "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive,' "
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Parties: United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski
Date: 1982-06-14
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Parties: Cal. v. Grace Brethren Church
Date: 1982-06-18
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Parties: Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
Date: 1982-06-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - See also id., at 575, 100 S.Ct., at 2826 (plurality opinion) (the "expressly guaranteed freedoms" of the First Amendment "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government"). Thus to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established for the first time that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Although there was no opinion of the Court in that case, seven Justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment, and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that N173* a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,"Mills v. Alabama,
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly afforded protection by the First Amendment. First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public. N174* "[A]t the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open."
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The State's argument based on this interest therefore proves too much, and runs contrary to the very foundation of the right of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers: namely,N175* "that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - N176* The Court does not assert that the First Amendment right it discerns from Richmond Newspapers is absolute; instead, it holds that when a N177* "State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - For the right of access is plainly not coextensive with the right of expression that was vindicated in Nebraska Press Assn., supra. Because statutes that bear on this right of access do not deter protected activity in the way that other laws sometimes interfere with the right of expression, we should follow the norm of reviewing these statutes as applied
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Parties: Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Date: 1982-06-24
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Parties: Rendell-Baker v. Kohn
Date: 1982-06-25
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Parties: Bd. of Educ. v. Pico
Date: 1982-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 190 - Despite Justice BRENNAN's suggestion to the contrary, this Court has never held that the First Amendment grants junior high school and high school students a right of access to certain information in school. It is true that the Court has recognized a limited version of that right in other settings, and Justice BRENNAN quotes language from five such decisions and one of his own concurring opinions in order to demonstrate the viability of the right-to-receive doctrine. Ante, at 866-867. But not one of these cases concerned or even purported to discuss elementary or secondary educational institutions. Justice BRENNAN brushes over this significant omission in First Amendment law by citing Tinker v. Des Moines School District for the proposition that N178* students too are beneficiaries of this [right-to-receive] principle." Ante, at 868. But Tinker held no such thing. One may readTinker in vain to find any recognition of a First Amendment right to receive information. Tinker, as already mentioned, was based entirely on the students' right to express their political views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 193 - The idea that such students have a right of access, in the school, to information other than that thought by their educators to be necessary is contrary to the very nature of an inculcative education.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - N179* First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to send them: "The right of freedom of speech and press . . . embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it." Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943) (citation omitted). "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - But we think that the First Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply implicated by the removal of books from the shelves of a school library. Our precedents have focused N190* "not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). And we have recognized that )N191* "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). In keeping with this principle, we have held that in a variety of contexts N192* "the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to send them: N193* "The right of freedom of speech and press . . . embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it."
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - N194* "a student can literally explore the unknown, and discover areas of interest and thought not covered by the prescribed curriculum. . . . Th[e] student learns that a library is a place to test or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom."
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - In my view, then, the principle involved here is both narrower and more basic than the "right to receive information" identified by the plurality. I do not suggest that the State has any affirmative obligation to provide students with information or ideas, something that may well be associated with a "right to receive." See post, at 887 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); post, at 915-918 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). And I do not believe, as the plurality suggests, that the right at issue here is somehow associated with the peculiar nature of the school library, see ante, at 868-869; if schools may be used to inculcate ideas, surely libraries may play a role in that process. Instead, I suggest that certain forms of state discrimination between ideas are improper. In particular, our precedents command the conclusion that the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - And I believe that tying the First Amendment right to the purposeful suppression of ideas makes the concept more manageable than Justice REHNQUIST acknowledges. Most people would recognize that refusing to allow discussion of current events in Latin class is a policy designed to "inculcate" Latin, not to suppress ideas. Similarly, removing a learned treatise criticizing American foreign policy from an elementary school library because the students would not understand it is an action unrelated to the purpose of suppressing ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - The apparent underlying basis of the plurality's view seems to be that students have an enforceable "right" to receive the information and ideas that are contained in junior and senior high school library books. Ante, at 866. This "right" purportedly follows "ineluctably" from the sender's First Amendment right to freedom of speech and as a "necessary predicate" to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom. Ante, at 866-867. No such right, however, has previously been recognized.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - First, the plurality argues that the right to receive ideas is derived in part from the sender's First Amendment rights to send them. Yet we have previously held that a sender's rights are not absolute. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970). Never before today has the Court indicated that the government has an obligation to aid a speaker or author in reaching an audience.
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - Second, the plurality concludes that " the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom." Ante, at 867 (emphasis in original). However, the "right to receive information and ideas," Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), cited ante, at 867, does not carry with it the concomitant right to have those ideas affirmatively provided at a particular place by the government. The plurality cites James Madison to emphasize the importance of having an informed citizenry. Ibid. We all agree with Madison, of course, that knowledge is necessary for effective government. Madison's view, however, does not establish a right to have particular books retained on the school library shelves if the school board decides that they are inappropriate or irrelevant to the school's mission.
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - The plurality also cites Tinker, supra, to establish that the recipient's right to free speech encompasses a right to have particular books retained on the school library shelf. Ante, at 868. But the cited passage of Tinker notes only that school officials may not prohibit a student from expressing his or her view on a subject unless that expression interferes with the legitimate operations of the school. The government does not "contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), cited ante, at 866, by choosing not to retain certain books on the school library shelf; it simply chooses not to be the conduit for that particular information. In short, even assuming the desirability of the policy expressed by the plurality, there is not a hint in the First Amendment, or in any holding of this Court, of a "right" to have the government provide continuing access to certain books.
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Segment in Paragraph: 188 - It is the very existence of a right to receive information, in the junior high school and high school setting, which I find wholly unsupported by our past decisions and inconsistent with the necessarily selective process of elementary and secondary education.
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Segment in Paragraph: 189 - The right described by Justice BRENNAN has never been recognized in the decisions of this Court and is not supported by their rationale. Justice BRENNAN correctly observes that students do not N195* "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). But, as this language from Tinker suggests, our past decisions in this area have concerned freedom of speech and expression, not the right of access to particular ideas. We have held that students may not be prevented from symbolically expressing their political views by the wearing of black arm bands, Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra, and that they may not be forced to participate in the symbolic expression of saluting the flag, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). But these decisions scarcely control the case before us. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found that petitioners' removal of books from the school libraries infringed respondents' right to speak or otherwise express themselves.
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Segment in Paragraph: 190 - Despite Justice BRENNAN's suggestion to the contrary, this Court has never held that the First Amendment grants junior high school and high school students a right of access to certain information in school. It is true that the Court has recognized a limited version of that right in other settings, and Justice BRENNAN quotes language from five such decisions and one of his own concurring opinions in order to demonstrate the viability of the right-to-receive doctrine. Ante, at 866-867. But not one of these cases concerned or even purported to discuss elementary or secondary educational institutions. Justice BRENNAN brushes over this significant omission in First Amendment law by citing Tinker v. Des Moines School District for the proposition that "students too are beneficiaries of this [right-to-receive] principle." Ante, at 868. But Tinker held no such thing. One may readTinker in vain to find any recognition of a First Amendment right to receive information. Tinker, as already mentioned, was based entirely on the students' right to express their political views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 191 - Justice BRENNAN correctly characterizes the right of access to ideas as "an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press" which "follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to send them." Ante, at 867 (emphasis in original). But he then fails to recognize the predicate right to speak from which the students' right to receive must follow. It would be ludicrous, of course, to contend that all authors have a constitutional right to have their books placed in junior high school and high school libraries. And yet without such a right our prior precedents would not recognize the reciprocal right to receive information. Justice BRENNAN disregards this inconsistency with our prior cases and fails to explain the constitutional or logical underpinnings of a right to hear ideas in a place where no speaker has the right to express them.
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Segment in Paragraph: 192 - Justice BRENNAN also correctly notes that the reciprocal nature of the right to receive information derives from the fact that it "is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom." Ibid. (emphasis in original). But the denial of access to ideas inhibits one's own acquisition of knowledge only when that denial is relatively complete. If the denied ideas are readily available from the same source in other accessible locations, the benefits to be gained from exposure to those ideas have not been foreclosed by the State. This fact is inherent in the right-to-receive cases relied on by Justice BRENNAN, every one of which concerned the complete denial of access to the ideas sought.
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Segment in Paragraph: 196 - Thus, Justice BRENNAN cannot rely upon the nature of school libraries to escape the fact that the First Amendment right to receive information simply has no application to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the selective conveyance of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 197 - After all else is said, however, the most obvious reason that petitioners' removal of the books did not violate respondents' right to receive information is the ready availability of the books elsewhere. Students are not denied books by their removal from a school library. The books may be borrowed from a public library, read at a university library, purchased at a bookstore, or loaned by a friend. The government as educator does not seek to reach beyond the confines of the school. Indeed, following the removal from the school library of the books at issue in this case, the local public library put all nine books on display for public inspection. Their contents were fully accessible to any inquisitive student.
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Segment in Paragraph: 200 - The justification for this limiting distinction is said by Justice BRENNAN to be his concern in this case with "the suppression of ideas." Ante, at 871. Whatever may be the analytical usefulness of this appealing sounding phrase, see Part II-D, infra, the suppression of ideas surely is not the identical twin of the denial of access to information. Not every official act which denies access to an idea can be characterized as a suppression of the idea. Thus unless the "right to receive information" and the prohibition against "suppression of ideas" are each a kind of Mother-Hubbard catch phrase for whatever First Amendment doctrines one wishes to cover, they would not appear to be interchangeable.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Similarly, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra, held that students' rights to freedom of expression of their political views could not be abridged by reliance upon anN2* "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" arising from such expression:
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Similarly, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra, held that students' rights to freedom of expression of their political views could not be abridged by reliance upon an N5* "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" arising from such expression:
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Similarly, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra, held that students' rights to freedom of expression of their political views could not be abridged by reliance upon an N6* "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" arising from such expression
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - In sum, just as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - The government does not N83* "contract the spectrum of available knowledge" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), cited ante, at 866, by choosing not to retain certain books on the school library shelf; it simply chooses not to be the conduit for that particular information. In short, even assuming the desirability of the policy expressed by the plurality, there is not a hint in the First Amendment, or in any holding of this Court, of a "right" to have the government provide continuing access to certain books.
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Parties: Clements v. Fashing
Date: 1982-06-25
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Parties: New York v. Ferber
Date: 1982-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - N70* "[I]t is the content of [an] utterance that determines whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected 'fighting comment.' " Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, 427 U.S., at 66, 96 S.Ct., at 2450. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Leaving aside the special considerations when public officials are the target, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 L.Ed. 1412 (1964), a libelous publication is not protected by the Constitution. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). Thus, it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required. When a definable class of material, such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials N71* as without the protection of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - the Court laid the foundation for the excision of obscenity from the realm of constitutionally protected expression:
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Like obscenity statutes, laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy. For the following reasons, however, we are persuaded that the States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - New York, as we have held, may constitutionally prohibit dissemination of material specified in § 263.15. While the reach of the statute is directed at the hard core of child pornography, the Court of Appeals was understandably concerned that some protected expression, ranging from medical textbooks to pictorials in the National Geographic would fall prey to the statute. How often, if ever, it may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct clearly within the reach of § 263.15 in order to produce educational, medical, or artistic works cannot be known with certainty. Yet we seriously doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach. Nor will we assume that the New York courts will widen the possibly invalid reach of the statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on "lewd exhibition[s] of the genitals."
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Embracing this judgment, the Court squarely held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), that N139* "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id., at 485, 77 S.Ct., at 1309. The Court recognized that N140* "rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance" was implicit in the history of the First Amendment:
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - protected by the Constitution. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). Thus, it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required. When a definable class of material, such as that covered by § 263.15, N141* bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.
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Parties: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
Date: 1982-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - It follows from these considerations that, consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - The presence of protected activity, however, does not end the relevant constitutional inquiry. Governmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672. A nonviolent and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834; NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2372, 65 L.Ed.2d 377. The right of business entities to "associate" to suppress competition may be curtailed. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 55 L.Ed.2d 637. Unfair trade practices may be restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part of "Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife."
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N146* "The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats against the peace to achieve a goal makes the present state of facts a conspiracy. We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to no decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment includes in its protection the right to commit crime."
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - The right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - While States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in the boycott in this case. This Court has recognized that expression on public issues N147* "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Speech itself also was used to further the aims of the boycott. Nonparticipants repeatedly were urged to join the common cause, both through public address and through personal solicitation. These elements of the boycott involve speech in its most direct form. In addition, names of boycott violators were read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist Church and published in a local black newspaper. Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott through social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. Speech does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Of course, the petitioners in this case did more than assemble peaceably and discuss among themselves their grievances against governmental and business policy. Other elements of the boycott, however, also involved activities ordinarily safeguarded by the First Amendment. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, the Court held that peaceful picketing was entitled to constitutional protection, even though, in that case, the purpose of the picketing N137* "was concededly to advise customers and prospective customers of the relationship existing between the employer and its employees and thereby to induce such customers not to patronize the employer." Id., at 99, 60 S.Ct., at 742. Cf. Chauffeurs v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341, 78 S.Ct. 779, 2 L.Ed.2d 809. In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697, we held that a peaceful march and demonstration was protected by the rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for a redress of grievances.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott through social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. Speech does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - the Court recognized that "offensive" and "coercive" speech was nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The established elements of speech, assembly, association, and petition, N138* "though not identical, are inseparable." Thomas v. Collins, supra, at 530, 65 S.Ct., at 322. Through exercise of these First Amendment rights, petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change. Through speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or revolution—petitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second-class citizens.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - It is clear that "fighting words"—those that provoke immediate violence—are not protected by the First Amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031. Similarly, words that create an immediate panic are not entitled to constitutional protection. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470. This Court has made clear, however, that mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 82 - The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers' speeches did not transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg. The lengthy addresses generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and economic power available to them. In the course of those pleas, strong language was used. If that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct.
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Parties: Larkin v. Grendel's Den
Date: 1982-12-13
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Parties: KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court
Date: 1982-12-23
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Parties: Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs
Date: 1983-02-11
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Parties: Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm.
Date: 1982-12-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a 'basic constitutional freedom,' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S., [51] at 57 [94 S.Ct., 303 at 307, 38 L.Ed.2d 260], that is 'closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N149* "The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a 'basic constitutional freedom,' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S., [51] at 57 [94 S.Ct., 303 at 307, 38 L.Ed.2d 260], that is 'closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.' Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 [, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231] (1960). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 [, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416-417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480] (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra, [357 U.S. 449] at 460-461 [78 S.Ct. 1163 at 1170-1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488]; NAACP v. Button, supra, [371 U.S.] at 452 [83 S.Ct. at 347] (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.' "
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Parties: Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm.
Date: 1982-12-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - On the other side of the balance, disclosure of recipients of expenditures will have a lesser impact on a minority party's First Amendment interests than will disclosure of contributors. As the majority states, ante, at 91, the First Amendment interest here is N148* "[t]he right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs." We have never drawn sharp distinctions between members and contributors, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 66, 96 S.Ct., at 657. As we recognized in Buckley, the privacy rights of contributors are especially sensitive, since many seek to express their political views privately through their pocketbook rather than publicly through other means. Disclosure of contributors directly implicates the contributors' associational rights.
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Parties: Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n
Date: 1983-02-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - There is no question that constitutional interests are implicated by denying PLEA use of the interschool mail system. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech applies to teacher's mailboxes as surely as it does elsewhere within the school, Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra, and on sidewalks outside, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). But this is not to say that the First Amendment requires equivalent access to all parts of a school building in which some form of communicative activity occurs. "Nowhere [have we] suggested that students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for . . . unlimited expressive purposes."
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - In order to secure the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and to prevent distortions of "the marketplace of ideas," see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), governments generally are prohibited from discriminating among viewpoints on issues within the realm of protected speech. In this case the board has infringed the respondents' First Amendment rights by granting exclusive access to an effective channel of communication to the petitioner and denying such access to the respondents. In view of the petitioner's failure to establish even a substantial state interest that is advanced by the exclusive access policy, the policy must be held to be constitutionally infirm.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - In a public forum, by definition, all parties have a constitutional right of access and the state must demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The primary question presented is whether the First Amendment, applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated when a union that has been elected by public school teachers as their exclusive bargaining representative is granted access to certain means of communication, while such access is denied to a rival union. There is no question that constitutional interests are implicated by denying PLEA use of the interschool mail system. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech applies to teacher's mailboxes as surely as it does elsewhere within the school, Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra, and on sidewalks outside, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). But this is not to say that the First Amendment requires equivalent access to all parts of a school building in which some form of communicative activity occurs. "Nowhere [have we] suggested that students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for . . . unlimited expressive purposes." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-118, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2303-04, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Because the school mail system is not a public forum, the School District had no "constitutional obligation per se to let any organization use the school mail boxes." Connecticut St. Federation of Teachers v. Bd. of Education Members, 538 F.2d 471, 481 (CA2 1976). In the Court of Appeals' view, however, the access policy adopted by the Perry schools favors a particular viewpoint, that of the PEA, on labor relations, and consequently must be strictly scrutinized regardless of whether a public forum is involved. There is, however, no indication that the school board intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another. We believe it is more accurate to characterize the access policy as based on the status of the respective unions rather than their views. Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued vitality of "free speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The content neutrality cases frequently refer to the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and both concepts have their roots in the First Amendment's bar against censorship. But unlike the viewpoint discrimination concept, which is used to strike down government restrictions on speech by particular speakers, the content neutrality principle is invoked when the government has imposed restrictions on speech related to an entire subject area. The content neutrality principle can be seen as an outgrowth of the core First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The Court properly acknowledges that teachers have protected First Amendment rights within the school context. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). In particular, we have held that teachers may not be N142* "compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work. . . ." Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). See also Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). We also have recognized in the school context the First Amendment right of N143* "individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs," Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2346, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972), and have acknowledged the First Amendment rights of dissident teachers in matters involving labor relations. City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167, 176, n. 10, 97 S.Ct. 421, 426, n. 10, 50 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). Against this background it is clear that the exclusive access policy in this case implicated the respondents' First Amendment rights by restricting their freedom of expression on issues important to the operation of the school system. As the Court of Appeals suggested, this speech is "if not at the very apex of any hierarchy of protected speech, at least not far below it."
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The First Amendment's prohibition against government discrimination among viewpoints on particular issues falling within the realm of protected speech has been noted extensively in the opinions of this Court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - In order to secure the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and to prevent distortions of "the marketplace of ideas," see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), governments generally are prohibited from discriminating among viewpoints on issues within the realm of protected speech. In this case the board has infringed the respondents' First Amendment rights by granting exclusive access to an effective channel of communication to the petitioner and denying such access to the respondents.
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Parties: Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue
Date: 1983-03-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - N100* Star Tribune instituted this action to seek a refund of the use taxes it paid from January 1, 1974 to May 31, 1975. It challenged the imposition of the use tax on ink and paper used in publications as a violation of the guarantees of freedom of the press and equal protection in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the tax against the federal constitutional challenge.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - " After noting that the tax was "single in kind" and that keying the tax to circulation curtailed the flow of information, id., at 250-251, 56 S.Ct., at 449, this Court held the tax invalid as an abridgment of the freedom of the press. Both
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - There is substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment. The role of the press in mobilizing sentiment in favor of independence was critical to the Revolution. When the Constitution was proposed without an explicit guarantee of freedom of the press, the Antifederalists objected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - Today we learn from the Court that a State runs afoul of the First Amendment proscription of laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" where the State structures its taxing system to the advantage of newspapers. This seems very much akin to protecting something so overzealously that in the end it is smothered. While the Court purports to rely on the intent of the "Framers of the First Amendment," I believe it safe to assume that in 1791 "abridge" meant the same thing it means today: to diminish or curtail. Not until the Court's decision in this case, nearly two centuries after adoption of the First Amendment has it been read to prohibit activities which in no way diminish or curtail the freedoms it protects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - To collect from newspapers their fair share of taxes under the sales and use tax scheme and at the same time avoid abridging the freedoms of speech and press, the Court holds today that Minnesota must subject newspapers to millions of additional dollars in sales tax liability. Certainly this is a hollow victory for the newspapers and I seriously doubt the Court's conclusion that this result would have been intended by the "Framers of the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Further, differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional. See, e.g., Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289-90, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982) (First Amendment has its "fullest and most urgent" application in the case of regulation of the content of political speech). Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment
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Parties: Anderson v. Celebrezze
Date: 1983-04-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - Writing for a unanimous Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), Justice Harlan stated that it "is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." In our first review of Ohio's electoral scheme, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), this Court explained the interwoven strands of "liberty" affected by ballot access restrictions:
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - N150* The right to vote is "heavily burdened" if that vote may be cast only for major-party candidates at a time when other parties or other candidates are "clamoring for a place on the ballot." Ibid.; Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S., at 31, 89 S.Ct., at 10. The exclusion of candidates also burdens voters' freedom of association, because an election campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a rallying-point for like-minded citizens.
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Parties: Connick v. Myers
Date: 1983-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - It is beyond dispute that how and where a public employee expresses his views are relevant in the second half of the Pickering inquiry—determining whether the employee's speech adversely affects the government's interests as an employer. The Court explicitly acknowledged this in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979), where we stated that when a public employee speaks privately to a supervisor, "the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the . . . message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered." Id., at 415, n. 4, 99 S.Ct., at 696, n. 4. But the fact that a public employee has chosen to express his views in private has nothing whatsoever to do with the first half of the Pickering calculus—whether those views relate to a matter of public concern. This conclusion is implicit in Givhan's holding that the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is not "lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public."
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - We have long recognized that one of the central purposes of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression is to protect the dissemination of information on the basis of which members of our society may make reasoned decisions about the government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - At issue was whether public high school students could constitutionally be prohibited from wearing black armbands in school to express their opposition to the Vietnam conflict. The District Court had ruled that such a ban "was reasonable because it was based on [school officials'] fear of a disturbance from the wearing of armbands." Id., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737. We found that justification inadequate, because "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - The explanation for the Constitution's special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. The First Amendment N180* "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215-216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the "highest rung of the heirarchy of First Amendment values," and is entitled to special protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - The constitutionally protected right to speak out on governmental affairs would be meaningless if it did not extend to statements expressing criticism of governmental officials.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - (describing N151* "[t]he importance of Government employees being assured of their right to freely comment on the conduct of Government, to inform the public of abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors . . .")
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - Such extreme deference to the employer's judgment is not appropriate when public employees voice critical views concerning the operations of the agency for which they work. Although an employer's determination that an employee's statements have undermined essential working relationships must be carefully weighed in the Pickering balance, we must bear in mind that N152* "the threat of dismissal from public employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech." Pickering, supra, at 574, 88 S.Ct., at 1737. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, 385 U.S., at 604, 87 S.Ct., at 684. If the employer's judgment is to be controlling, public employees will not speak out when what they have to say is critical of their supervisors. In order to protect public employees' First Amendment right to voice critical views on issues of public importance, the courts must make their own appraisal of the effects of the speech in question.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - N153* At issue was whether public high school students could constitutionally be prohibited from wearing black armbands in school to express their opposition to the Vietnam conflict. The District Court had ruled that such a ban "was reasonable because it was based on [school officials'] fear of a disturbance from the wearing of armbands." Id., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737. We found that justification inadequate, because N154* "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."
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Parties: United States v. Grace
Date: 1983-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving "speech" protected by the First Amendment.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - Visitors to this Court do not lose their First Amendment rights at the edge of the sidewalks any more than "students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). Since the continuing existence of the statute will inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, there is no virtue in deciding its constitutionality on a piecemeal basis.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - We have repeatedly recognized that a statute which sweeps within its ambit a broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment should be struck down on its face. "The existence of such a statute . . . results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (footnote omitted). As Justice BRENNAN stated in his opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), First Amendment freedoms "are delicate and vulnerable," and "[t]he threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." I would not leave visitors to this Court subject to the continuing threat of imprisonment if they dare to exercise their First Amendment rights once inside the sidewalks.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Publicly owned or operated property does not become a "public forum" simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1216, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976). Although whether the property has been "generally opened to the public" is a factor to consider in determining whether the government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes, it is not determinative of the question. We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish "to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please."
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - While the right to conduct expressive activities in such areas as streets, parks, and sidewalks is reinforced by their traditional use for purposes of assembly, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.), that right ultimately rests on the principle that N155* "one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion." Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 671, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943) (emphasis added). Every citizen lawfully present in a public place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in question,
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving "speech" protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Regan v. Taxation with Representation
Date: 1983-05-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - N156* Given this relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4), the Court finds that Congress' purpose in imposing the lobbying restriction was merely to ensure that "no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying." Ante, at 544, n. 6; see ante, at 545. Consistent with that purpose, "[t]he IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying." Ante, at 545, n. 6.As long as the IRS goes no further than this, we perhaps can safely say that "[t]he Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby." Ante, at 545. A § 501(c)(3) organization's right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax benefits for its nonlobbying activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - N157* Any significant restriction on this channel of communication, however, would negate the saving effect of § 501(c)(4). It must be remembered that § 501(c)(3) organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the Government. Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be insurmountable.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - It hardly answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him.
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Parties: Bob Jones Univ. v. United States
Date: 1983-05-24
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Parties: Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB
Date: 1983-05-31
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1646, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1646, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.
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Parties: Bush v. Lucas
Date: 1983-06-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial views. Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates' freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - " Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to support a political candidate opposing the party in office would routinely have provided an accepted basis for discharge. During the past century, however, the job security of federal employees has steadily increased.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - As the House Report explained, this legislation was intended "to protect employees against oppression and in the right of free speech and the right to consult their representatives." In enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient management of government operations did not preclude the extension of free speech rights to government employees.
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Parties: M.I.C., Ltd. v. Bedford Township
Date: 1983-09-13
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Parties: Edward J. De Bartolo Corp. v. NLRB
Date: 1983-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Stressing the fact that this case arises out of an entirely peaceful and orderly distribution of a written message, rather than picketing, the union argues that its handbilling is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The Board, without completely endorsing the union's constitutional argument, contends that it has sufficient force to invoke the Court's prudential policy of construing acts of Congress so as to avoid the unnecessary decision of serious constitutional questions. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500-501, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1318-1319, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979). That doctrine, however, serves only to authorize the construction of statute in a manner that is "fairly possible." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). We do not believe that the Board's expansive reading of the proviso meets that standard.
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Parties: Mueller v. Allen
Date: 1983-06-29
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Parties: Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.
Date: 1983-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Because the proscribed information N158* "may bear on one of the most important decisions" parents have a right to make, the restriction of "the free flow of truthful information" constitutes a "basic" constitutional defect regardless of the strength of the government's interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - N159* The right to use the mails is undoubtedly protected by the First Amendment, Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971). But because the home mailbox has features which distinguish it from a public hall or public park, where it may be assumed that all who are present wish to hear the views of the particular speaker then on the rostrum, it cannot be totally assimilated for purposes of analysis with these traditional public forums. Several people within a family or living group may have free access to a mailbox, including minor children; and obviously not every piece of mail received has been either expressly or impliedly solicited. It is the unsolicited mass mailings sent by respondents designed to promote the use of condoms that gives rise to this litigation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - N160* A prohibition on the use of the mails is a significant restriction of First Amendment rights. We have noted that N161* "[t]he United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. . . ." Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416, 91 S.Ct. 423, 428, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971), quoting Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437, 41 S.Ct. 352, 363, 65 L.Ed. 704 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). And First Amendment freedoms would be of little value if speakers had to obtain permission of their audiences before advancing particular viewpoints.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - I have not yet been persuaded that the commercial motivation of an author is sufficient to alter the state's power to regulate speech. Anthony Comstock surely had a constitutional right to speak out against the use of contraceptives in his day. Like Comstock, many persons today are morally opposed to contraception, and the First Amendment commands the government to allow them to express their views in appropriate ways and in appropriate places.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - It matters whether a law regulates communications for their ideas or for their style. Governmental suppression of a specific point of view strikes at the core of First Amendment values. In contrast, regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally appropriate balance between the advocate's right to convey a message and the recipient's interest in the quality of his environment:
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), this Court extended the protection of the First Amendment to commercial speech. Nonetheless, our decisions have recognized N72* "the 'commonsense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918-1919, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). Thus, we have held that the Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - For example, as a general matter, N73* "the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). With respect to noncommercial speech, this Court has sustained content-based restrictions only in the most extraordinary circumstances. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538-539, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2333-2334, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content, 46 U.Chi. L.Rev. 81, 82 (1978). By contrast, regulation of commercial speech based on content is less problematic. In light of the greater potential for deception or confusion in the context of certain advertising messages, see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200, 102 S.Ct. 929, 936, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982), content-based restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N74* >Youngs' informational pamphlets, however, cannot be characterized merely as proposals to engage in commercial transactions. Their proper classification as commercial or non-commercial speech thus presents a closer question. The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-266, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718-719, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Similarly, the reference to a specific product does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech. See Associated Students v. Attorney General, 368 F.Supp. 11, 24 (CD Cal.1973). Finally, the fact that Youngs has an economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself to turn the materials into commercial speech. See Bigelow v. Virginia,
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The combination of all these characteristics, however, provides strong support for the District Court's conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech. The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning. We have made clear that advertising which "links a product to a current public debate" is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N43* "The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at 563, 100 S.Ct., at 2350. In Central Hudson we adopted a four-part analysis for assessing the validity of restrictions on commercial speech. First, we determine whether the expression is constitutionally protected. For commercial speech to receive such protection, N44* "it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id., at 566, 100 S.Ct., at 2351. Second, we ask whether the governmental interest is substantial. If so, we must then determine whether the regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Ibid. Applying this analysis, we conclude that § 3001(e)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to appellee's mailings.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Our earlier cases have developed an analytic framework for commercial speech cases. N144* "At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - N145* Youngs' proposed commercial speech is therefore clearly protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, where—as in this case—a speaker desires to convey truthful information relevant to important social issues such as family planning and the prevention of venereal disease, we have previously found the First Amendment interest served by such speech paramount.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - In striking down a state prohibition of contraceptive advertisements in Carey v. Population Services International, supra, we stated that offensiveness was N146* "classically not [a] justificatio[n] validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment. At least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression." 431 U.S., at 701, 97 S.Ct., at 2024. We specifically declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech.
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Parties: Rice v. Rehner
Date: 1983-07-01
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Parties: Marsh v. Chambers
Date: 1983-07-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - In each case, there will be winners and losers in the political battle, and the losers' most common recourse is the right to dissent and the right to fight the battle again another day.
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Parties: United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott
Date: 1983-07-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The predominate purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters. The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards the Negro. Although we have examined with some care the legislative history that as been marshalled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly non-racial, but politically motivated conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by virtue of § 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume. If respondents' submission were accepted, the proscription of § 1985(3) would arguably reach the claim that a political party has interfered with the freedom of speech of another political party by encouraging the heckling of its rival's speakers and the disruption of the rival's meetings.
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Parties: Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California
Date: 1984-01-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - the First Amendment's concerns are much broader. The "common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government," Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2826, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (plurality opinion), that underlies the decision of cases of this kind provides protection to all members of the public "from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch."
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The First Amendment source of the right of access to the voir dire examination should not preclude frank recognition of the need to examine the content of the censored communication in determining whether, and to what extent, it may remain private.
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Parties: Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight
Date: 1984-02-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - This First Amendment freedom to explore novel or controversial ideas in the classroom is closely linked to the freedom of faculty members to express their views to the administration concerning matters of academic governance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - This First Amendment freedom to explore novel or controversial ideas in the classroom is closely linked to the freedom of faculty members to express their views to the administration concerning matters of academic governance. If the First Amendment is truly to protect the "free play of the spirit" within our institutions of higher learning, Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 487, 81 S.Ct., at 251, then the faculty at those institutions must be able to participate effectively in the discussion of such matters as, for example, curriculum reform, degree requirements, student affairs, new facilities, and budgetary planning. The freedom to teach without inhibition may be jeopardized just as gravely by a restriction on the faculty's ability to speak out on such matters as by the more direct restrictions struck down in Keyishian and in Epperson.
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - There can be no question but that the First Amendment secures the right of individuals to communicate with their government. And the First Amendment was intended to secure something more than an exercise in futility—it guarantees a meaningful opportunity to express one's views. For example, this Court has recognized that the right to forward views might become a practical nullity if Government prohibited persons from banding together to make their voices heard. Thus, the First Amendment protects freedom of association because it makes the right to express one's views meaningful.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - Moreover, the District Court found that prior to the passage of the challenged statute, appellees were able to participate in the "meet and confer" process. Their former ability to communicate with the administration has been impaired not by the administration's unwillingness to listen, but by the challenged statute. Any realistic appraisal of the effects of such a restriction must lead to the conclusion that this statute has restricted the traditional freedom of speech appellees had once enjoyed. "[T]he capacity of a group or individual 'to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate . . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members and [ ] students.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - There can be no question but that the First Amendment secures the right of individuals to communicate with their government. And the First Amendment was intended to secure something more than an exercise in futility—it guarantees a meaningful opportunity to express one's views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - There can be no question but that the First Amendment secures the right of individuals to communicate with their government. And the First Amendment was intended to secure something more than an exercise in futility—it guarantees a meaningful opportunity to express one's views. For example, this Court has recognized that the right to forward views might become a practical nullity if Government prohibited persons from banding together to make their voices heard. Thus, the First Amendment protects freedom of association because it makes the right to express one's views meaningful.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Indeed, the claim in this case is not even a claim of access to a nonpublic forum, such as the school mail system at issue in Perry Education Assn. A private organization there claimed a right of access to government property for use in speaking to potentially willing listeners among a group of private individuals and public officials not acting in an official capacity. The organization claimed no right to have anyone, public or private, attend to its message. See also United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981) (postal letter box); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (advertising space on municipal bus); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (county jail). Appellees here make a claim quite different from those made in the nonpublic forum cases. They do not contend that certain government property has been closed to them for use in communicating with private individuals or public officials not acting as such who might be willing to listen to them. Rather, they claim an entitlement to a government audience for their views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Appellees have no constitutional right to force the government to listen to their views. They have no such right as members of the public, as government employees, or as instructors in an institution of higher education.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The Constitution does not grant to members of the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Public officials at all levels of government daily make policy decisions based only on the advice they decide they need and choose to hear. To recognize a constitutional right to participate directly in government policymaking would work a revolution in existing government practices.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - Appellees' status as public employees, however, gives them no special constitutional right to a voice in the making of policy by their government employer.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Although there is no constitutional right to participate in academic governance, the First Amendment guarantees the right both to speak and to associate. Appellees' speech and associational rights, however, have not been infringed by Minnesota's restriction of participation in "meet and confer" sessions to the faculty's exclusive representative.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N162* It is doubtless true that the unique status of the exclusive representative in the "meet and confer" process amplifies its voice in the policymaking process. But that amplification no more impairs individual instructors' constitutional freedom to speak than the amplification of individual voices impaired the union's freedom to speak in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, supra. Moreover, the exclusive representative's unique role in "meet and negotiate" sessions amplifies its voice as much as its unique role in "meet and confer" sessions, yet the Court summarily affirmed the District Court's approval of that role in this case. Amplification of the sort claimed is inherent in government's freedom to choose its advisers. A person's right to speak is not infringed when government simply ignores that person while listening to others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - N163* It is crucial at the outset to recognize that two related First Amendment interests are at stake here. On the one hand, those faculty members who are barred from participation in "meet and confer" sessions by virtue of their refusal to join MCCFA have a First Amendment right to express their views on important matters of academic governance to college administrators. At the same time, they enjoy a First Amendment right to be free from compelled associations with positions or views that they do not espouse. In my view, the real vice of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) is that it impermissibly forces non-union faculty members to choose between these two rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - Especially in the academic setting where respect for these associational rights is considered fundamental to the protection of freedom of thought, such associational conformity is far too high a price to exact for the right to express one's views on questions of academic policy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Of course, if the "meet and confer" process did not play such a central and important role in formulating academic policy in Minnesota's community colleges or if other avenues of communication provided non-union faculty a nearly equivalent mechanism for expressing their views, the First Amendment would not be violated, since in those circumstances non-union faculty members would not be faced with a Hobson's choice between exercising their right to participate in academic policy discussions and preserving their associational rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - N164* In short, by prohibiting the administration from listening to appellees, the PELRA ensures that appellees' speech can have no meaningful impact upon the administration. Appellees do not rely on the government's "obligation" to hear them; they rely only on their right to have a meaningful opportunity to speak. If a public employer does not wish to listen to appellants, that is its privilege, but the First Amendment at least requires that that decision be made in an open marketplace of ideas, rather than under a statutory scheme that does not permit appellees' speech to be considered, no matter how much merit it may contain.
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - This statute gives the union the same "monopoly in expressing its views to the government" that we condemned in the Madison School District case. The Minnesota "meet and confer" sessions create, in reality, an exclusive method for communication with government, and permit only one point of view to be expressed. The resultant insulation of public policy from exposure to the full range of views is that to which the constitutional ban on viewpoint discrimination is addressed. The views of all have the right to be considered on their merits, rather than to be excluded by statutory prohibition. It is one thing to say, as the majority does, that the government may decline to listen to those whose views it finds unhelpful; it is quite another to say that those views need not be given even a fair chance to compete for the attention of government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - Thus the PELRA has substituted a union-controlled process for the formerly free exchange of views that took place between faculty and the administration. In practice, the union has a monopoly on the effective opportunity to present views to the administration on the wide range of subjects covered by the "meet and confer" process.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Nor is appellees' right to speak infringed by the ability of MCCFA to "retaliate" for protected speech, as the District Court put it, by refusing to appoint them to the "meet and confer" committees. The state of Minnesota seeks to obtain MCCFA's views on policy questions, and MCCFA has simply chosen representatives who share its views on the issues to be discussed with the state. MCCFA's ability to "retaliate" by not selecting those who dissent from its views no more unconstitutionally inhibits appellees' speech than voters' power to reject a candidate for office inhibits the candidate's speech.
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Parties: Grove City College v. Bell
Date: 1984-02-28
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Parties: Lynch v. Donnelly
Date: 1984-03-05
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Parties: Calder v. Jones
Date: 1984-03-20
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Parties: McDonald v. West Branch
Date: 1984-04-18
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Parties: Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry.
Date: 1984-04-25
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Parties: Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
Date: 1984-04-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952); others that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom of speech are fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, incitement to riot, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969), obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and child pornography,
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - N94* "Realistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-172, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1646-1647, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). N95* "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - And in its recent opinion identifying a new category of unprotected expression—child pornography—the Court expressly anticipated that an N45* "independent examination" of the allegedly unprotected material may be necessary "to assure ourselves that the judgment . . . 'does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - But the New York Times rule adequately addresses the need to shield protected speech from the risk of erroneous factfinding by placing the burden of proving "actual malice" on the party seeking to penalize expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952); others that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom of speech are fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, incitement to riot, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969), obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and child pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). In each of these areas, the limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of particular communications, have been determined by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional significance. In such cases, the Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - the Court held "as a matter of constitutional law" that the jury could not be allowed to determine the relevance of a defamatory statement to the plaintiff's status as a public figure. We explained that the jury's application of such a standard N147* "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,' New York Times, supra, at 270, 91 S.Ct., at 624, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail."
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Parties: Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent
Date: 1984-05-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the City. The application of the ordinance to appellees' expressive activities surely raises the question whether the ordinance abridges their "freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and appellees certainly have standing to challenge the application of the ordinance to their own expressive activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S., at 647, 101 S.Ct., at 2563-2564, a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S., at 654-655, 101 S.Ct., at 2567-2568; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at 535, 100 S.Ct., at 2332; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1618, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. To the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, see, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538-539, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960), there is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. Notwithstanding appellees' general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that appellees' ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - Finally, Taxpayers and COGS argue that Los Angeles could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity such as theirs, by permitting the posting of any kind of sign at any time on some types of public property, or by making a variety of other more specific exceptions to the ordinance: for signs carrying certain types of messages (such as political campaign signs), for signs posted during specific time periods (perhaps during political campaigns), for particular locations (perhaps for areas already cluttered by an excessive number of signs on adjacent private property), or for signs meeting design specifications (such as size or color). Plausible public policy arguments might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated, cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35, 85 S.Ct. 783, 789-790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that "Jesus Saves," that "Abortion is Murder," that every woman has the "Right to Choose," or that "Alcohol Kills," may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as "Roland Vincent—City Council."
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - the Court held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on the streets were invalid. The Court explained that cities could adequately protect the esthetic interest in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing those who actually litter.
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Parties: Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
Date: 1984-05-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280-1281, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) N181* ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information")
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that "[f]reedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-395, 70 S.Ct. 674, 681-682, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950). The critical question that this case presents is whether a litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that both granted him access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used. In addressing that question it is necessary to consider whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-355, 100 S.Ct. 594, 599-600, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 637-638, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280-1281, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) N166* ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information"). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280-1281, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965)N96* ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information"). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 194 U.S.App.D.C., at 287, 598 F.2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2910, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. See id., at 396, 99 S.Ct., at 2913-2914 (BURGER, C.J., concurring); Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - It is, of course, clear that information obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes ofunprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents. This interest may well include most—and possibly all—of what has been discovered as a result of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(1). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that N148* "[f]reedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time."
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Parties: Schall v. Martin
Date: 1984-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - Partly for similar reasons, we have consistently held violative of the First Amendment ordinances which make the ability to engage in constitutionally protected speechN149* "contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official."
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Parties: Hishon v. King & Spalding
Date: 1984-05-22
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Parties: Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp
Date: 1984-06-18
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Parties: Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB
Date: 1984-06-25
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Parties: Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
Date: 1984-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The Court in Schaumburg determined first that charitable solicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - Of course, a ceiling on the fees charged by professional fundraisers may have an incidental and indirect impact on protected expression—as would, for example, a ceiling placed on the fees charged by literary agents—in that marginal producers could be forced out of the market. In other words, price controls might tend to make these services less available, much as rent control is thought to make rental housing less available. But such an indirect and incidental impact on expression is not sufficient to subject such regulation to strict First Amendment scrutiny.
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Parties: Bacchus Imps. v. Dias
Date: 1984-06-29
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Parties: Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
Date: 1984-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. . . . Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - N167* "The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. . . . Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - What the Court may be suggesting is that if the tents and the 24-hour vigil are permitted, but not constitutionally required to be permitted, then respondents have no constitutional right to engage in expressive conduct that supplements these activities. Put in arithmetical terms, the Court appears to contend that if X is permitted by grace rather than by constitutional compulsion, X + 1 can be denied without regard to the requirements the Government must normally satisfy in order to restrain protected activity. This notion, however, represents a misguided conception of the First Amendment. The First Amendment requires the Government to justify every instance of abridgment. That requirement stems from our oft-stated recognition that the First Amendment was designed to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945), and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - A mere apprehension of difficulties should not be enough to overcome the right to free expression. See
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The proper starting point for analysis of this case is a recognition that the activity in which respondents seek to engage sleeping in a highly public place, outside, in the winter for the purpose of protesting homelessness—is symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - According to the majority, the significant Government interest advanced by denying respondents' request to engage in sleep-speech is the interest in "maintaining the parks in the heart of our capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence." Ante, at 296. That interest is indeed significant. However, neither the Government nor the majority adequately explains how prohibiting respondents' planned activity will substantially further that interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The majority cites no evidence indicating that sleeping engaged in as symbolic speech will cause substantial wear and tear on park property. Furthermore, the Government's application of the sleeping ban in the circumstances of this case is strikingly underinclusive. The majority acknowledges that a proper time, place, and manner restriction must be "narrowly tailored." Here, however, the tailoring requirement is virtually forsaken inasmuch as the Government offers no justification for applying its absolute ban on sleeping yet is willing to allow respondents to engage in activities—such as feigned sleeping—that is no less burdensome.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - The proper starting point for analysis of this case is a recognition that the activity in which respondents seek to engage sleeping in a highly public place, outside, in the winter for the purpose of protesting homelessness—is symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment. The majority assumes, without deciding, that the respondents' conduct is entitled to constitutional protection. Ante, at 293. The problem with this assumption is that the Court thereby avoids examining closely the reality of respondents' planned expression. The majority's approach denatures respondents' asserted right and thus makes all too easy identification of a Government interest sufficient to warrant its abridgment. A realistic appraisal of the competing interests at stake in this case requires a closer look at the nature of the expressive conduct at issue and the context in which that conduct would be displayed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - In a long line of cases, this Court has afforded First Amendment protection to expressive conduct that qualifies as symbolic speech. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (black armband worn by students in public school as protest against United States policy in Vietnam war); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966) (sit-in by Negro students in "whites only" library to protest segregation); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (flying red flag as gesture of support for communism). In light of the surrounding context, respondents' proposed activity N5* meets the qualifications. The Court has previously acknowledged the importance of context in determining whether an act can properly be denominated as "speech" for First Amendment purposes and has provided guidance concerning the way in which courts should "read" a context in making this determination.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - Although sleep in the context of this case is symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment, it is nonetheless subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. I agree with the standard enunciated by the majority: "[R] estrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Ante, at 293 (citations omitted). I conclude, however, that the regulations at issue in this case, as applied to respondents, fail to satisfy this standard.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - What the Court may be suggesting is that if the tents and the 24-hour vigil are permitted, but not constitutionally required to be permitted, then respondents have no constitutional right to engage in expressive conduct that supplements these activities. Put in arithmetical terms, the Court appears to contend that if X is permitted by grace rather than by constitutional compulsion, X + 1 can be denied without regard to the requirements the Government must normally satisfy in order to restrain protected activity. This notion, however, represents a misguided conception of the First Amendment. The First Amendment requires the Government to justify every instance of abridgment. That requirement stems from our oft-stated recognition that the First Amendment was designed to secure N46* "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945), and N47* "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49, 96 S.Ct. 612, 649, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-378, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648-649, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Moreover, the stringency of that requirement is not diminished simply because the activity the Government seeks to restrain is supplemental to other activity that the Government may have permitted out of grace but was not constitutionally compelled to allow. If the Government cannot adequately justify abridgment of protected expression, there is no reason why citizens should be prevented from exercising the first of the rights safeguarded by our Bill of Rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - N150* "The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. . . . Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - the activity in which respondents seek to engage sleeping in a highly public place, outside, in the winter for the purpose of protesting homelessness—is symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment.The majority assumes, without deciding, that the respondents' conduct is entitled to constitutional protection. Ante, at 293. The problem with this assumption is that the Court thereby avoids examining closely the reality of respondents' planned expression. The majority's approach denatures respondents' asserted right and thus makes all too easy identification of a Government interest sufficient to warrant its abridgment. A realistic appraisal of the competing interests at stake in this case requires a closer look at the nature of the expressive conduct at issue and the context in which that conduct would be displayed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - Although sleep in the context of this case is symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment, it is nonetheless subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
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Parties: Fcc v. League of Women Voters
Date: 1984-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - As a result of these restrictions, of course, the absolute freedom to advocate one's own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints—a freedom enjoyed, for example, by newspaper publishers and soapbox orators—is denied to broadcasters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - N101* In Red Lion, for example, we upheld the FCC's "fairness doctrine"—which requires broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of public issues and to ensure that this coverage fairly and accurately reflects the opposing views—because the doctrine advanced the substantial governmental interest in ensuring balanced presentations of views in this limited medium and yet posed no threat that a "broadcaster [would be denied permission] to carry a particular program or to publish his own views." 395 U.S., at 396, 89 S.Ct., at 1809. Similarly, in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, supra, the Court upheld the right of access for federal candidates imposed by § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act both because that provision "makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process," id., 453 U.S., at 396, 101 S.Ct., at 2830, and because it defined a sufficiently "limited right of 'reasonable' access" so that "the discretion of broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming" was not impaired. Id., at 396-397, 101 S.Ct., at 2830 (emphasis in original). Finally, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, the Court affirmed the FCC's refusal to require broadcast licensees to accept all paid political advertisements. Although it was argued that such a requirement would serve the public's First Amendment interest in receiving additional views on public issues, the Court rejected this approach, finding that such a requirement would tend to transform broadcasters into common carriers and would intrude unnecessarily upon the editorial discretion of broadcasters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - "A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of a 'law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on 'controversial issues of public policy' is plainly such a regulation." Id., at 546, 100 S.Ct., at 2338 (opinion concurring in judgment); accord, id., at 537-540, 100 S.Ct., at 2333-2334 (majority opinion). Section 399 is just such a regulation, for it singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to address their chosen audience on matters of public importance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - I find this case entirely different from the so-called "unconstitutional condition" cases, wherein the Court has stated that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In those cases the suppressed speech was not content-neutral in the same sense as here, and in those cases, there is at best only a strained argument that the legislative purpose of the condition imposed was to avoid subsidizing the prohibited speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Broadcasting As we observed in because "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, . . . the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences [through the medium of broadcasting] is crucial here [and it] may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC." 395 U.S., at 390, 89 S.Ct., at 1806.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N168* N169* "A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on 'controversial issues of public policy' is plainly such a regulation." Id., at 546, 100 S.Ct., at 2338 (opinion concurring in judgment); accord, id., at 537-540, 100 S.Ct., at 2333-2334 (majority opinion). Section 399 is just such a regulation, for it singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to address their chosen audience on matters of public importance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - N170* We therefore hold that even if some of the hazards at which § 399 was aimed are sufficiently substantial, the restriction is not crafted with sufficient precision to remedy those dangers that may exist to justify the significant abridgment of speech worked by the provision's broad ban on editorializing. The statute is not narrowly tailored to address any of the Government's suggested goals. Moreover, the public's "paramount right" to be fully and broadly informed on matters of public importance through the medium of noncommercial educational broadcasting is not well served by the restriction, for its effect is plainly to diminish rather than augment "the volume and quality of coverage" of controversial issues. Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 393, 89 S.Ct., at 1808. Nor do we see any reason to deny noncommercial broadcasters the right to address matters of public concern on the basis of merely speculative fears of adverse public or governmental reactions to such speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - Last Term, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983), we upheld a provision of the Internal Revenue Code which deprives an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt status and its right to receive tax-deductible contributions if it engages in lobbying. We squarely rejected the contention that Congress' decision not to subsidize lobbying violates the First Amendment, even though we recognized that the right to lobby is constitutionally protected. In so holding we reiterated that N171* "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right." Id., at 549, 103 S.Ct., at 2003/. We also rejected the notion that, because Congress chooses to subsidize some speech but not other speech, its exercise of its spending powers is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - The statute does not violate the fundamental principle that the citizen's right to speak may not be conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what the speaker intends to say. On the contrary, the statute was enacted in order to protect that very principle—to avoid the risk that some speakers will be rewarded or penalized for saying things that appeal to—or are offensive to—the sovereign. The interests the statute is designed to protect are interests that underlie the First Amendment itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of a N75* 'law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on 'controversial issues of public policy' is plainly such a regulation."
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - We squarely rejected the contention that Congress' decision not to subsidize lobbying violates the First Amendment, even though we recognized that the right to lobby is constitutionally protected. In so holding we reiterated that N151* "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right." Id., at 549, 103 S.Ct., at 2003. We also rejected the notion that, because Congress chooses to subsidize some speech but not other speech, its exercise of its spending powers is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - For the foregoing reasons I find this case entirely different from the so-called "unconstitutional condition" cases, wherein the Court has stated that the government N152* "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In those cases the suppressed speech was not content-neutral in the same sense as here, and in those cases, there is at best only a strained argument that the legislative purpose of the condition imposed was to avoid subsidizing the prohibited speech.
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Parties: Hudson v. Palmer
Date: 1984-07-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - This Court has held that the First Amendment entitles a prisoner to receive and send mail, subject only to the institution's right to censor letters or withhold delivery if necessary to protect institutional security, and if accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards.
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Parties: Roberts v. United States Jaycees
Date: 1984-07-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Still, the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive association.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N172* Subsequently, the Jaycees amended its complaint in the District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F.Supp. 766 (1982). On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because "the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees] does," the organization's right to select its members is protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id., at 1570. It further decided that application of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership policies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id., at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsible for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court concluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organization is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at 1573-1574.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - On the one hand, an association engaged exclusively in protected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of both the content of its message and the choice of its members. Protection of the message itself is judged by the same standards as protection of speech by an individual. Protection of the association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - On the other hand, there is only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association. There are, of course, some constitutional protections of commercial speech speech intended and used to promote a commercial transaction with the speaker. But the State is free to impose any rational regulation on the commercial transaction itself. The Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State. A shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The dichotomy between rights of commercial association and rights of expressive association is also found in the more limited constitutional protections accorded an association's recruitment and solicitation activities and other dealings with its members and the public. Reasonable, content-neutral state regulation of the time, place, and manner of an organization's relations with its members or with the State can pass constitutional muster, but only if the regulation is "narrowly drawn" to serve a "sufficiently strong, subordinating interest" "without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636-637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 835-836, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); see Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 960-961, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2849, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). Thus, after careful scrutiny, we have upheld regulations on matters such as the financial dealings between an association and its members, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 637, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), disclosure of membership lists to the State, see NAACP v. Alabama, supra, 356 U.S., at 463, 78 S.Ct., at 1172; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960), access to the ballot, time limits on registering before elections, and similar matters, see, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 39 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). See also Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). By contrast, an organization engaged in commercial activity enjoys only minimal constitutional protection of its recruitment, training, and solicitation activities. While the Court has acknowledged a First Amendment right to engage in nondeceptive commercial advertising, governmental regulation of the commercial recruitment of new members, stockholders, customers, or employees is valid if rationally related to the government's ends.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - The standard for deciding just how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association's First Amendment right to control its membership cannot, therefore, be articulated with simple precision. Clearly the standard must accept the reality that even the most expressive of associations is likely to touch, in some way or other, matters of commerce.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - In my view, an association should be characterized as commercial, and therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership and other associational activities, when, and only when, the association's activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment. It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in protected expression that state regulation of its membership will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective voice that would otherwise be heard. An association must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a "not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. 709 F.2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570; Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment, ibid., see, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 833, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members. Cf. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S., at 122, 101 S.Ct., at 1019 (recognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves 'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles' "). Moreover, the Jaycees already invites women to share the group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim that admission of women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - an association engaged exclusively in protected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of both the content of its message and the choice of its members. Protection of the message itself is judged by the same standards as protection of speech by an individual. Protection of the association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice. N153* "In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating . . . the speakers who may address a public issue." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-785, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1420, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). A ban on specific group voices on public affairs violates the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment—that citizens, not the government, control the content of public discussion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Many associations cannot readily be described as purely expressive or purely commercial. No association is likely ever to be exclusively engaged in expressive activities, if only because it will collect dues from its members or purchase printing materials or rent lecture halls or serve coffee and cakes at its meetings. And innumerable commercial associations also engage in some incidental protected speech or advocacy. The standard for deciding just how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association's First Amendment right to control its membership cannot, therefore, be articulated with simple precision.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - Determining whether an association's activity is predominantly protected expression will often be difficult, if only because a broad range of activities can be expressive. It is easy enough to identify expressive words or conduct that are strident, contentious, or divisive, but protected expression may also take the form of quiet persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, instruction of the young, and community service. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). The purposes of an association, and the purposes of its members in adhering to it, are doubtless relevant in determining whether the association is primarily engaged in protected expression. Lawyering to advance social goals may be speech, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 335-336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), but ordinary commercial law practice is not,
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent—wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no constitutional protection.
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Parties: Regan v. Time, Inc.
Date: 1984-07-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - The question for us, of course, is not whether Congress could have done a better job, but whether the job it did violates Time's right to free expression. It does not: Time is free to publish the symbol it wishes to publish and to express the messages it wishes to convey by use of that symbol; it merely must comply with restrictions on the manner of printing that symbol which are reasonably related to the strong governmental interests in preventing counterfeiting and deceptive uses of likenesses of the currency.
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - I do not interpret the provision to give the Government a license to determine the newsworthiness or the value of the substantive message being conveyed. Rather, giving it the liberal construction I think it deserves, the question is merely whether the image of the currency is used for such a purpose, or stated another way, whether the image is being used to convey information or express an idea. That requirement is easily met—whenever the image is used in connection with a news article, it necessarily will comply with this condition unless the editor's use of the image bears no rational relationship to the information or idea he is trying to convey. The key point is that he must be attempting to communicate: he must be using the symbol as expression protected by the First Amendment, and not merely reproducing images of the currency for some noncommunicative purpose, e.g., to facilitate counterfeiting.
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Parties: Catholic League, Southern California Chapter v. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc.
Date: 1984-10-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - Appellants contend, however, that as applied the California Constitution's provisions have the effect of denying them their rights to free speech, assembly, and exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. I think that appellants' federal claims are insubstantial. Nothing in the order of the California Court prevents appellants from assembling for purposes of expressing their views with respect to abortion, or from holding a religious or other memorial service. Appellants would find in the First Amendment's Speech or Religion Clauses a right to hold their service as an incident to the actual burial of the fetuses. But the First Amendment does not entitle appellants to have the State enhance the impact of their speech by providing the subjects of a funeral service. The proper disposition of these fetuses is peculiarly a question governed by the law of the State of California.
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Parties: Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.
Date: 1985-03-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - But the "contributors" are exactly that—contributors, rather than speakers. Every reason the majority gives for treating § 9012(f) as a restraint on speech relates to the effectiveness with which the donors can make their voices heard. In other words, what the majority purports to protect is the right of the contributors to make contributions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - In Buckley, I explained at some length why I am quite sure that regulations of campaign spending similar to that at issue here are constitutional. See 424 U.S., at 257-266, 96 S.Ct., at 744-748. I adhere to those views. The First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend, and limitations on the amount of money that can be spent are not the same as restrictions on speaking. I agree with the majority that the expenditures in this case "produce" core First Amendment speech. See ante, at 493. But that is precisely the point: they produce such speech; they are not speech itself.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - expenditures are direct political expression Buckley distinguished N173* "direct political expression," which could not be curtailed, from financial contributions, which could. 424 U.S., at 21-22, 96 S.Ct., at 635-636. Limitations on expenditures were considered direct restraints on the right to speak one's mind on public issues and to engage in advocacy protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 48, 96 S.Ct., at 648. The majority views the challenged provision as being in that category. I disagree.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - Even if spending money is to be considered speech, I fail to see how giving money to an independent organization to use as it wishes is also speech. I had thought the holding in Buckley was exactly the opposite. Certainly later cases would so indicate. See FEC v. National Right to Work Committee,
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - I agree with the majority that the expenditures in this case "produce" core First Amendment speech. See ante, at 493. But that is precisely the point: they produce such speech; they are not speech itself. At least in these circumstances, I cannot accept the identification of speech with its antecedents.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - N77* "the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor."
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Parties: Wayte v. United States
Date: 1985-03-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - Wayte has clearly established the first element of a prima facie case. The record demonstrates unequivocally that Wayte is a member of a class of vocal opponents to the Government's draft registration program. All members of that class exercised a First Amendment right to speak freely and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, and either reported themselves or were reported by others as having failed to register for the draft.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - In particular, he claims that "[e]ven though the [Government's passive] enforcement policy did not overtly punish protected speech as such, it inevitably created a content-based regulatory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-based impact on nonregistrants." Brief for Petitioner 23. This Court has held that when, as here, N154* "'speech and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."
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Parties: Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor
Date: 1985-04-23
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Parties: Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters.
Date: 1985-05-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - (Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas expressed)
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (BURGER, C.J.). We do not suggest this right not to speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - "The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Publication of an author's expression before he has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made public, a factor not present in fair use of published works.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's idea/expression dichotomy "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." 723 F.2d, at 203. No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726, n. , 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2147, n. , 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas expressed); 1 Nimmer § 1.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago observed: N174* "[T]he news element—the information respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day." International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234, 39 S.Ct. 68, 71, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918). But copyright assures those who write and publish factual narratives such as "A Time to Heal" that they may at least enjoy the right to market the original expression contained therein as just compensation for their investment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Moreover, freedom of thought and expression N175* "includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (BURGER, C.J.). We do not suggest this right not to speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - "The issue is not what constitutes 'news,' but whether a claim of newsreporting is a valid fair use defense to an infringement of copyrightable expression." Patry 119. The Nation has every right to seek to be the first to publish information. But The Nation went beyond simply reporting uncopyrightable information and actively sought to exploit the headline value of its infringement, making a "news event" out of its unauthorized first publication of a noted figure's copyrighted expression.
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Parties: Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court
Date: 1985-05-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - If Ohio seriously means to require Zauderer "fully to disclose the[se] terms," this requirement would obviously be so "unduly burdensome" as to violate the First Amendment. Ante, at 651. Such a requirement, compelling the publication of detailed fee information that would fill far more space than the advertisement itself, would chill the publication of protected commercial speech and would be entirely out of proportion to the State's legitimate interest in preventing potential deception.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, see Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, N155* "warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception."
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.
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Parties: Lowe v. SEC
Date: 1985-06-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The accepted rights of freedom of the press and due process of law might prevent any general regulation and perhaps also supervision over particular types of publications, even if the advertisements of these publications occasionally quite exaggerate the value of the factual information which is supplied. That the constitutional guarantee of liberty of the press is applicable to publications of all types, and not only to newspapers, has been clearly indicated by the United States Supreme Court
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - The power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech. The underlying principle was expressed by the Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 690-691, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949): "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - If the government enacts generally applicable licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the profession, it cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or the press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - The application of the Act's enforcement provisions to prevent unregistered persons from engaging in the business of publishing investment advice for the benefit of any who would purchase their publications, however, is a direct restraint on freedom of speech and of the press subject to the searching scrutiny called for by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by hisN97* 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish 'without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision. . . .
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - I do not believe it is necessary to the resolution of this case to determine whether petitioner's newsletters contain fully protected speech or commercial speech. The Act purports to make it unlawful for petitioner to publish newsletters containing investment advice and to authorize an injunction against such publication. The ban extends as well to legitimate, disinterested advice as to advice that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. Such a flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech is, as applied to fully protected speech, presumptively invalid and may be sustained only under the most extraordinary circumstances.
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Parties: Wallace v. Jaffree
Date: 1985-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - "We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182-1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628] (1943); id., at 645 [63 S.Ct., at 1188] (Murphy, J., concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the First Amendment. Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF JUSTICE recently wrote: N176* "We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182-1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628] (1943); id., at 645 [63 S.Ct., at 1188] (Murphy, J., concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority.
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Parties: Maryland v. Macon
Date: 1985-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - "The use by government of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new." Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1712, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961). "The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression." Id., at 729, 81 S.Ct., at 1714. See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 509-512, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). Thus in enforcing the Fourth Amendment's command, courts must exercise a "scrupulous exactitude" to ensure that official use of the power to search and seize poses no threat to the liberty of expression. Id., at 485, 85 S.Ct., at 511. In the words of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, "[t]he setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment . . . requirements because we examine what is 'unreasonable' in light of the values of freedom of expression."
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The Court's endorsement of the government's abuse of the arrest power as a means to enforce norms of taste in written and visual forms of expression is disquieting in its own right because the consequence inevitably will be suppression of protected nonobscene expression.
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Parties: McDonald v. Smith
Date: 1985-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The First Amendment guarantees "the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression. In
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 725-726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), held that a public official may recover damages for a false statement concerning his official conduct only where the statement was "made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." This standard, explicitly directed toward protection of "freedom of speech and of the press," id., at 264, 84 S.Ct., at 717, reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - "The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government; the people may therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will."
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N182* "Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity."
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - N183* "The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government; the people may therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will."
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - The First Amendment guarantees "the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - As with the freedoms of speech and press, exercise of the right to petition N177* "may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials," and the occasionally N178* "erroneous statement is inevitable."
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Second, McDonald argues that criticism of public officials under the Petition Clause is functionally different from, and therefore entitled to greater protection than, criticism of officials falling within the protection of the First Amendment's Speech and Press Clauses. Specifically, he contends that "[u]nlike the more general freedoms of speech and press, the right to petition was understood by the Framers of the Constitution and the First Amendment to be a necessary right of a self-governing people," and that "when the citizen is not speaking to the public at large, but is directly exercising his right to petition, [he] is thus performing a self-governmental function." Brief for Petitioner 7, 30 (emphasis added). Such a distinction is untenable. The Speech and Press Clauses, every bit as much as the Petition Clause, were included in the First Amendment to ensure the growth and preservation of democratic self-governance. A citizen who criticizes a public official is shielded by the Speech and Press Clauses because "[i]t is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 282, 84 S.Ct., at 727 (emphasis added). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - And although we have not previously addressed the precise issue before us today, we have recurrently treated the right to petition similarly to, and frequently as overlapping with, the First Amendment's other guarantees of free expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - N78* "The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government; the people may therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will."
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - There is no persuasive reason for according greater or lesser protection to expression on matters of public importance depending on whether the expression consists of speaking to neighbors across the backyard fence, publishing an editorial in the local newspaper, or sending a letter to the President of the United States. It necessarily follows that expression falling within the scope of the Petition Clause, while fully protected by the actual-malice standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, is not shielded by an absolute privilege.
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Parties: Brockett v. Spokane Arcades
Date: 1985-06-19
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Parties: United States v. Albertini
Date: 1985-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - As this Court later observed in Greer, the decision in Flower must be viewed as an application of established First Amendment doctrine concerning expressive activity that takes place in a municipality's open streets, sidewalks, and parks. 424 U.S., at 835-836, 96 S.Ct., at 1216-1217. Flower did not adopt any novel First Amendment principles relating to military bases, but instead concluded that the area in question was appropriately considered a public street. There is N179* "no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets," id., at 838, 96 S.Ct., at 1217, on military bases, even if they are generally open to the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The Court determined that New Braunfels Avenue was a public thoroughfare no different than other streets in the city, and that the military had abandoned not only the right to exclude civilian traffic from the avenue, but also any right to exclude leafleteers. Greer v. Spock, supra, 424 U.S., at 835, 96 S.Ct., at 1216. The defendant in Flower received a bar letter because he participated in an attempt to distribute unauthorized publications on the open military base. 407 U.S., at 197, 92 S.Ct., at 1843; United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80, 82, 87 (CA5 1971). This was the very activity that Flower held protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N180* Flower cannot plausibly be read to hold that regardless of the events leading to issuance of a bar letter, a person may not subsequently be excluded from a military facility that is temporarily open to the public. Instead, Flower establishes that where a portion of a military base constitutes a public forum because the military has abandoned any right to exclude civilian traffic and any claim of special interest in regulating expression, see Greer v. Spock, supra, 424 U.S., at 836-838, 96 S.Ct., at 1216-1218, a person may not be excluded from that area on the basis of activity that is itself protected by the First Amendment. Properly construed, Flower is simply inapplicable to this case. There is no suggestion that respondent's acts of vandalism in 1972, which resulted in the issuance of the bar letter, were activities protected by the First Amendment. The observation made by the Court of Appeals, 710 F.2d, at 1417, that enforcement of the bar letter was precipitated by respondent's "peaceful expressive activity" misses the point. Respondent was prosecuted not for demonstrating at the open house, but for reentering the base after he had been ordered not to do so.
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Parties: Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.
Date: 1985-06-26
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Parties: Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders
Date: 1985-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N102* That case concerned a public official's recovery of damages for the publication of an advertisement criticizing police conduct in a civil rights demonstration. As the Court noted, the advertisement concerned "one of the major public issues of our time." Id., 376 U.S., at 271, 84 S.Ct., at 721. Noting that "freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment," id., at 269, 84 S.Ct., at 720 (emphasis added), and that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," id., at 270, 84 S.Ct., at 721 (emphasis added), the Court held that a public official cannot recover damages for defamatory falsehood unless he proves that the false statement was made with " 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," id., at 280, 84 S.Ct., at 726.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - the First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech. None of our cases affords such a distinction; to the contrary, the Court has rejected it at every turn. It should be rejected again, particularly in this context, since it makes no sense to give the most protection to those publishers who reach the most readers and therefore pollute the channels of communication with the most misinformation and do the most damage to private reputation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - In evaluating the subject matter of expression, this Court has consistently rejected the argument that speech is entitled to diminished First Amendment protection simply because it concerns economic matters or is in the economic interest of the speaker or the audience. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 780, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-326, 61 S.Ct. 568, 569-570, 85 L.Ed. 855 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-103, 60 S.Ct. 736, 743-744, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); see also Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S., at 231-232, and n. 28, 97 S.Ct., at 1797-1798, and n. 28. "[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to full First Amendment protection." Id., at 231, 97 S.Ct., at 1797. The breadth of this protection evinces recognition that freedom of expression is not only essential to check tyranny and foster self-government but also intrinsic to individual liberty and dignity and instrumental in society's search for truth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - ("Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period").
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Also, by leaving the lie uncorrected, the New York Times rule plainly leaves the public official without a remedy for the damage to his reputation. Yet the Court has observed that the individual's right to the protection of his own good name is a basic consideration of our constitutional system, reflecting " 'our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' " Gertz, supra, at 341, 94 S.Ct., at 3008, quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92, 86 S.Ct. 669, 679, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). The upshot is that the public official must suffer the injury, often cannot get a judgment identifying the lie for what it is, and has very little, if any, chance of countering that lie in the public press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The free speech guarantee gives each citizen an equal right to self-expression and to participation in self-government. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459-463, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2289-2291, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1787, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648-649, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This guarantee also protects the rights of listeners to N181* "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - In evaluating the subject matter of expression, this Court has consistently rejected the argument that speech is entitled to diminished First Amendment protection simply because it concerns economic matters or is in the economic interest of the speaker or the audience.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - Credit reporting is not "commercial speech" as this Court has defined the term.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - If the press could be faced with possibly sizable damages for every mistaken publication injurious to reputation, the result would be an unacceptable degree of self-censorship, which might prevent the occasional mistaken libel, but would also often prevent the timely flow of information that is thought to be true but cannot be readily verified. The press must therefore be privileged to spread false information, even though that information has negative First Amendment value and is severely damaging to reputation, in order to encourage the full flow of the truth, which otherwise might be withheld.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern. Id., at 146-147, 103 S.Ct., at 1689-1690. As a number of state courts, including the court below, have recognized, the role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited when the concerns that activated New York Times and Gertz are absent. In such a case, N98* "[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press. The facts of the present case are wholly without the First Amendment concerns with which the Supreme Court of the United States has been struggling."
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan the Court held that the First Amendment shields all who speak in good faith from the threat of unrestrained libel judgments for unintentionally false criticism of a public official. Recognizing that libel law, like all other governmental regulation of the content of speech, N48* "can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations [and] must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment," 376 U.S., at 269, 84 S.Ct., at 720, the Court drew from salutary common law developments, id., at 280, and n. 20, 84 S.Ct., at 726 and n. 20. and unquestioned First Amendment principles, id., at 273-274, 84 S.Ct., at 722, to formulate the now-familiar actual malice test. Because the N49* "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate . . . [it] must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - The five Members of the Court voting to affirm the damages award in this case have provided almost no guidance as to what constitutes a protected "matter of public concern." Justice WHITE offers nothing at all, but his opinion does indicate that the distinction turns on solely the subject matter of the expression and not on the extent or conditions of dissemination of that expression. Ante, at 773. Justice POWELL adumbrates a rationale that would appear to focus primarily on subject matter. The opinion relies on the fact that the speech at issue was "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience," ante, at 762 (emphasis added). Analogizing explicitly to advertising, the opinion also states that credit reporting is "hardy" and "solely motivated by the desire for profit." Ibid. These two strains of analysis suggest that Justice POWELL is excluding the subject matter of credit reports from "matters of public concern" because the speech is predominantly in the realm of matters of economic concern.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - Our cases since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan have proceeded from the general premise that all libel law implicates First Amendment values to the extent it deters true speech that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment. 376 U.S., at 269, 84 S.Ct., at 720. In this sense defamation law does not differ from state efforts to control obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2614, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), ensure loyalty, see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), protect consumers, see Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), oversee professions, see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), or pursue other public welfare goals through content-based regulation of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - In libel law, no less than any other governmental effort to regulate speech, States must therefore use finer instruments to ensure adequate space for protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - We protect the press to ensure the vitality of First Amendment guarantees. This solicitude implies no endorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve lesser First Amendment protection.N156* "In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating . . . the speakers who may address a public issue."
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - N157* Arguing that at most Gertz should protect speech that "deals with a matter of public or general importance," ante, at 773, Justice WHITE, without analysis or explanation, decides that the credit report at issue here falls outside this protected category.
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - N158* Even if Justice POWELL's characterization of the credit reporting at issue here were accepted in its entirety, his opinion would have done no more than demonstrate that this speech is the equivalent of commercial speech. The opinion, after all, relies on analogy to advertising. Credit reporting is said to be hardy, motivated by desire for profit, and relatively verifiable. Ante, at 752. But this does not justify the elimination of restrictions on presumed and punitive damages. State efforts to regulate commercial speech in the form of advertising must abide by the requirement that the regulatory means chosen be narrowly tailored so as to avoid any unnecessary chilling of protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - Rather, the Court recognized and applied the principle that regulatory measures that chill protected speech be no broader than necessary to serve the legitimate state interest asserted. The plurality opinion today recognizes, as it must, that the state interest at issue here is identical to that at issue in Gertz. What was "irrelevant" in Gertz must still be irrelevant, and the requirement that the regulatory means be no broader than necessary is no less applicable even if the speech is simply the equivalent of commercial speech.
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Parties: Renaissance Arcade & Bookstore v. County of Cook
Date: 1985-09-05
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Parties: Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors
Date: 1985-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - But passing those problems, appellees' First Amendment arguments, at base, are really inseparable from their due process claims. The thrust is that they have been denied "meaningful access to the courts" to present their claims. This must be based in some notion that VA claimants, who presently are allowed to speak in court, and to have someone speak for them, also have a First Amendment right to pay their surrogate speaker; beyond that questionable proposition, however, even as framed appellees' argument recognizes that such a First Amendment interest would attach only in the absence of a "meaningful" alternative. The foregoing analysis of appellees' due process claim focused on substantially the same question—whether the process allows a claimant to make a meaningful presentation—and we concluded that appellees had such an opportunity under the present claims process, and that significant Government interests favored the limitation on "speech" that appellees attack. Under those circumstances appellees' First Amendment claim has no independent significance.
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Parties: School Dist. v. Ball
Date: 1985-07-01
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Parties: Aguilar v. Felton
Date: 1985-07-01
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Parties: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund
Date: 1985-07-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - "[S]oliciting funds involves interests protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - In addition to furthering the First Amendment rights of individuals, the use of government property for expressive activity helps further the interests that freedom of speech serves for society as a whole
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - The Court, of course, has recognized that the "First Amendment prohibits Congress from 'abridging freedom of speech, or of the press,' and its ramifications are not confined to the 'public forum.' " United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S., at 131, n. 7, 101 S.Ct., at 2686, n. 7. Nevertheless, it holds today that outside the "public forum," into which it collapses the limited-public-forum category, see infra, at ----, the constraint imposed upon the Government is nothing more than a rational-basis requirement. The Court offers no explanation why attaching the label "nonpublic forum" to particular property frees the Government of the more stringent constraints imposed by the First Amendment in other contexts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - N184* The Court recognizes that its decisions regarding the right of a citizen to engage in expressive activity on public property generally have divided public property into three categories public forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic forums. The Court also concedes, as it must, that "a public forum . . . created by government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects" is a limited public forum.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - The issue presented is whether respondents have a First Amendment right to solicit contributions that was violated by their exclusion from the CFC. To resolve this issue we must first decide whether solicitation in the context of the CFC is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further. Assuming that such solicitation is protected speech, we must identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic. Finally, we must assess whether the justifications for exclusion from the relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard. Applying this analysis, we find that respondents' solicitation is protected speech occurring in the context of a nonpublic forum and that the Government's reasons for excluding respondents from the CFC appear, at least facially, to satisfy the reasonableness standard.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The conclusion that the solicitation which occurs in the CFC is protected speech merely begins our inquiry. Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities. Cf. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2543, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977). Recognizing that the Government, "no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated," Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1217, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976), the Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes. Accordingly, the extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum. Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. See Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S., at 45, 103 S.Ct., at 954. Similarly, when the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest. Access to a nonpublic forum, however, can be restricted as long as the restrictions are "reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id., at 46, 103 S.Ct., at 955.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - At the same time, however, expressive activity on government property may interfere with other important activities for which the property is used. Accordingly, in answering the question whether a person has a right to engage in expressive activity on government property, the Court has recognized that the person's right to speak and the interests that such speech serves for society as a whole must be balanced against the "other interests inhering in the uses to which the public property is normally put."
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - In both public and limited public forums, because at least some types of expressive activity obviously are compatible with the normal uses of the property, the Court has recognized that people generally have a First Amendment right to engage in expressive activity upon the property.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Although the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech in a public forum, a nonpublic forum by definition is not dedicated to general debate or the free exchange of ideas. The First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Applying this analysis, we find that respondents' solicitation is protected speech occurring in the context of a nonpublic forum and that the Government's reasons for excluding respondents from the CFC appear, at least facially, to satisfy the reasonableness standard.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Charitable solicitation of funds has been recognized by this Court as a form of protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The conclusion that the solicitation which occurs in the CFC is protected speech merely begins our inquiry. Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities.
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Parties: Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind
Date: 1986-01-27
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Parties: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com.
Date: 1986-04-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Second, we noted that the newspaper's "treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Of course, the First Amendment does prohibit governmental action affecting the mix of information available to the public if the effect of the action approximates that of direct content-based suppression of speech. Thus, while the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, upheld limits on campaign contributions and allowed disparate governmental subsidies to various political parties, it struck down limitations on campaign expenditures because such limits "impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association."
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - This Court has recognized that natural persons enjoy negative free speech rights because of their interest in self-expression; an individual's right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others is a component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom of conscience. Thus, in Barnette, supra, this Court struck down a compulsory flag salute statute to protect "the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control." Id., at 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1187. Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the Court invalidated a statute requiring an official slogan to be displayed on all license plates to protect the individual interest in "freedom of mind." Id., at 714 97 S.Ct., at 1435. See also Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 234-235, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Most recently, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 524, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), this Court rejected a public figure exception to the copyright law, reasoning that the protection of an author's profit incentive furthers rather than inhibits expression, id., at 555-559, 105 S.Ct., at 2227-2230, and that an author has a countervailing First Amendment interest in "freedom of thought and expression [that] 'includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.' " Id., at 559, 105 S.Ct., at 2230 (emphasis added), quoting Wooley v. Maynard, supra, 430 U.S., at 714, 97 S.Ct., at 1435.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - To ascribe to such artificial entities an "intellect" or "mind" for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality. Corporations generally have not played the historic role of newspapers as conveyers of individual ideas and opinion. In extending positive free speech rights to corporations, this Court drew a distinction between the First Amendment rights of corporations and those of natural persons. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 776, 98 S.Ct., at 1415; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534-535, and n. 2, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2331-2332, and n. 2, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). It recognized that corporate free speech rights do not arise because corporations, like individuals, have any interest in self-expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - I would also rely on that part of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), holding that a forced right of reply violates a newspaper's right to be free from forced dissemination of views it would not voluntarily disseminate, just as we held that Maynard must be free from being forced by the State to disseminate views with which he disagreed. To compel Pacific to mail messages for others cannot be distinguished from compelling it to carry the messages of others on its trucks, its buildings, or other property used in the conduct of its business.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - We therefore concluded that a N185* "[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably N186* 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N187* The plurality concludes that a state-created, limited right of access to the extra space in a utility's billing envelopes unconstitutionally burdens the utility's right to speak if the utility has used the space itself to express political views to its customers. This is so even though the extra envelope space belongs to the customers as a matter of state property law. The plurality justifies its conclusion on grounds that the right of access may (1) deter the utility from saying things that might trigger an adverse response, or (2) induce it to respond to subjects about which it might prefer to remain silent, in violation of the principles established in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). I do not believe that the right of access here will have any noticeable deterrent effect. Nor do I believe that negative free speech rights, applicable to individuals and perhaps the print media, should be extended to corporations generally. I believe that the right of access here is constitutionally indistinguishable from the right of access approved in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), and therefore I dissent
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - N188* The right of access here constitutes an effort to facilitate and enlarge public discussion; it therefore furthers rather than abridges First Amendment values.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - N185* In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), we held that a State could, consistently with the Federal Constitution, prohibit the private owner of a shopping center from using state trespass law to exclude peaceful expressive activity in the open areas of the shopping center. Concurring in PruneYard, I viewed the State's abrogation of the property owner's traditional right to exclude as raising the question of how the Federal Constitution limits a State's ability to redefine its common-law property rights. See id., at 92-93, 100 S.Ct., at 2046 (MARSHALL, J., concurring). Today we face a similar question. In the present case, California has taken from appellant the right to deny access to its property—its billing envelope—to a group that wishes to use that envelope for expressive purposes. Two significant differences between the State's grant of access in this case and the grant of access in PruneYard lead me to find a constitutional barrier here that I did not find in the earlier case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - We found that the right-of-reply statute directly interfered with the newspaper's right to speak in two ways. Id., at 256, 94 S.Ct., at 2838. First, the newspaper's expression of a particular viewpoint triggered an obligation to permit other speakers, with whom the newspaper disagreed, to use the newspaper's facilities to spread their own message. The statute purported to advance free discussion, but its effect was to deter newspapers from speaking out in the first instance: by forcing the newspaper to disseminate opponents' views, the statute penalized the newspaper's own expression. We therefore concluded that a N182* "[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - This Court held that the shopping center did not have a constitutionally protected right to exclude the pamphleteers from the area open to the public at large. Id., 447 U.S., at 88, 100 S.Ct., at 2044. Notably absent from PruneYard was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the access right content based. PruneYard thus does not undercut the proposition that forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - N183* Appellant does not, of course, have the right to be free from vigorous debate. But it does have the right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own rights in order to N184* "enhance the relative voice" of its opponents.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - I would not go beyond the central question presented by this case, which is the infringement of Pacific's right to be free from forced association with views with which it disagrees. I would also rely on that part of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), holding that a forced right of reply violates a newspaper's right to be free from forced dissemination of views it would not voluntarily disseminate, just as we held that Maynard must be free from being forced by the State to disseminate views with which he disagreed. To compel Pacific to mail messages for others cannot be distinguished from compelling it to carry the messages of others on its trucks, its buildings, or other property used in the conduct of its business. For purposes of this case, those properties cannot be distinguished from property like the mailing envelopes acquired by Pacific from its income and resources.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - N186* The second difference between this case and PruneYard is that the State has chosen to give TURN a right to speak at the expense of appellant's ability to use the property in question as a forum for the exercise of its own First Amendment rights. While the shopping center owner in PruneYard wished to be free of unwanted expression, he nowhere alleged that his own expression was hindered in the slightest. In contrast, the present case involves a forum of inherently limited scope. By appropriating, four times a year, the space in appellant's envelope that appellant would otherwise use for its own speech, the State has necessarily curtailed appellant's use of its own forum. The regulation in this case, therefore, goes beyond a mere infringement of appellant's desire to remain silent, see post, at 32-35 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - /prefTerm>The plurality concludes that a state-created, limited right of access to the extra space in a utility's billing envelopes unconstitutionally burdens the utility's right to speak if the utility has used the space itself to express political views to its customers. This is so even though the extra envelope space belongs to the customers as a matter of state property law. The plurality justifies its conclusion on grounds that the right of access may (1) deter the utility from saying things that might trigger an adverse response, or (2) induce it to respond to subjects about which it might prefer to remain silent, in violation of the principles established in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). I do not believe that the right of access here will have any noticeable deterrent effect. Nor do I believe that negative free speech rights, applicable to individuals and perhaps the print media, should be extended to corporations generally. I believe that the right of access here is constitutionally indistinguishable from the right of access approved in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), and therefore I dissent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - This Court established in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), that the First Amendment prohibits the government from directly suppressing the affirmative speech of corporations. A newspaper publishing corporation's right to express itself freely is also implicated by governmental action that penalizes speech, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, because the deterrent effect of a penalty is very much like direct suppression. Our cases cannot be squared, however, with the view that the First Amendment prohibits governmental action that only indirectly and remotely affects a speaker's contribution to the overall mix of information available to society.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The Court in Tornillo struck down a statute granting political candidates a right to reply any time a private newspaper criticized them. See id., 418 U.S., at 244, 94 S.Ct., at 2832. The Court reasoned that the statute violated the First Amendment because it "exact[ed] a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper," id., at 256, 94 S.Ct., at 2839, that would likely have the effect of " 'dampe[ning] the vigor and limi[ting] the variety of public debate.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - N187* There is, however, a more fundamental flaw in the plurality's analysis. This Court has recognized that natural persons enjoy negative free speech rights because of their interest in self-expression; an individual's right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others is a component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom of conscience. Thus, in Barnette, supra, this Court struck down a compulsory flag salute statute to protect "the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control." Id., at 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1187. Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the Court invalidated a statute requiring an official slogan to be displayed on all license plates to protect the individual interest in "freedom of mind." Id., at 714 97 S.Ct., at 1435. See also Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 234-235, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Most recently, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 524, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), this Court rejected a public figure exception to the copyright law, reasoning that the protection of an author's profit incentive furthers rather than inhibits expression, id., at 555-559, 105 S.Ct., at 2227-2230, and that an author has a countervailing First Amendment interest in N188* "freedom of thought and expression [that] 'includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - This argument is bolstered by the fact that the two constitutional liberties most closely analogous to the right to refrain from speaking—the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and the constitutional right of privacy—have been denied to corporations based on their corporate status.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - Since the utility concedes that it has no right to use the extra space in the billing envelope for its own newsletter, the question is limited to whether the Commission's requirement that it be the courier for the message of a third party violates the First Amendment. In my view, this requirement differs little from regulations applied daily to a variety of commercial communications that have rarely been challenged—and to my knowledge never invalidated—on First Amendment grounds.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - Extension of the individual freedom of conscience decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an "intellect" or "mind" for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality. Corporations generally have not played the historic role of newspapers as conveyers of individual ideas and opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - The Court explained that the potential effect on affluent speech of limiting access to this one forum was constitutionally insignificant because of the availability of other forums, id., at 26, n. 26, 96 S.Ct., at 638, n. 26, and that the limitation protected the integrity of our representative democracy by limiting political quid pro quos and the appearance of corruption, id., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct., at 638. The Court also upheld a provision granting different levels of subsidies for Presidential campaigns depending upon whether the party receiving the subsidy is a major, minor, or new party.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - The right of access here constitutes an effort to facilitate and enlarge public discussion; it therefore furthers rather than abridges First Amendment values. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, supra, 471 U.S., at 558, 105 S.Ct., at 2229; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 92-93, 96 S.Ct., at 669-670. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), this Court held that N162* "[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, . . . [the] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in [a business'] advertising is minimal." Id., at 651, 105 S.Ct., at 2282 (citation omitted). Likewise, because the interest on which the constitutional protection of corporate speech rests is the societal interest in receiving information and ideas, the constitutional interest of a corporation in not permitting the presentation of other distinct views clearly identified as those of the speaker is de minimis.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government attack, the First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving information. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863-864, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 2821-2822, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting). The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the N163* "discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas" that the First Amendment seeks to foster.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Notably absent from PruneYard was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the access right content based. PruneYard thus does not undercut the proposition that forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next. It is therefore incorrect to say, as do appellees, that our decisions do not limit the government's authority to compel speech by corporations. The danger that appellant will be required to alter its own message as a consequence of the government's coercive action is a proper object of First Amendment solicitude, because the message itself is protected under our decisions in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison.
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Parties: Chicago Teachers Union, Local
Date: 1986-03-04
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Parties: Renton v. Playtime Theatres
Date: 1986-02-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - N50* "[T]he presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression protected under the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - the circumstances here N51* strongly suggest that the ordinance was designed to suppress expression, even that constitutionally protected, and thus was not to be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. The Court allows Renton to conceal its illicit motives, however, by reliance on the fact that other communities adopted similar restrictions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - in American Mini Theatres, a majority of this Court decided that, at least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to "content-neutral" time, place, and manner regulations. Justice STEVENS, writing for the plurality, concluded that the city of Detroit was entitled to draw a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of theaters N159* "without violating the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication," 427 U.S., at 70, 96 S.Ct., at 2452, noting that N160* "[i]t is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - However, respondents do not ask Renton to guarantee low-price sites for their businesses, but seek only a reasonable opportunity to operate adult theaters in the city. By denying them this opportunity, Renton can effectively ban a form of protected speech from its borders.
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Parties: Goldman v. Weinberger
Date: 1986-03-25
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Parties: Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.
Date: 1986-03-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - In Widmar, under essentially the same circumstances, we held that the University of Missouri at Kansas City had N161* "discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment." 454 U.S., at 269, 102 S.Ct., at 274. The only arguable distinction between Widmar and this case is that Widmar involved university students while the groups here are composed of high school students. We did note in Widmar that university students are "less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." Id., at 274, n. 14, 102 S.Ct., at 277, n. 14. Other decisions, however, have recognized that the First Amendment rights of speech and association extend also to high school students.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Yet the several commands of the First Amendment require vision capable of distinguishing between state establishment of religion, which is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, and individual participation and advocacy of religion which, far from being prohibited by the Establishment Clause, is affirmatively protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps
Date: 1986-04-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - N99* "A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount leads to . . . 'self-censorship.' . . . Under such a N100* rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so."
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - The Court's result is plausible however, only because it grossly undervalues the strong state interest in redressing injuries to private reputations. The error lies in its initial premise, with its mistaken belief that doubt regarding the veracity of a defamatory statement must invariably be resolved in favor of constitutional protection of the statement and against vindication of the reputation of the private individual. To support its premise, the Court relies exclusively on our precedents requiring the government to bear the burden of proving that a restriction of speech is justified. See ante, at 777-778. Whether such restrictions appear in the form of legislation burdening the speech of particular speakers or of particular points of view, or of common-law actions punishing seditious libel, the Court is doubtlessly correct that the government or its agents must at a minimum shoulder the burden of proving that the speech is false and must do so with sufficient reliability that we can be confident that true speech is not suppressed. It was to achieve this reliability that the Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), incorporated into the First Amendment the then-emergent common-law N52* "privilege for [good-faith] criticism of official conduct." Id., at 282, 84 S.Ct., at 727. See id., at 282, n. 21, 84 S.Ct., at 727, n. 21. Because N53* "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and [because] it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive, N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 [83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) ],' " id., 376 U.S., at 271-272, 84 S.Ct., at 721-722, this privilege is defeasible only if the defamatory statement N54* "was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," id., at 279-280, 84 S.Ct., at 725-726. N55* "Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant," was found wanting because it did not "mean that only false speech [would] be deterred"—doubts regarding whether truth "can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so" would force good-faith critics of official conduct to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone,' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N164* The Court, after acknowledging the need to N165* " 'accommodat[e] . . . the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment,' " ante, at 768 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S., at 325, 94 S.Ct., at 3000), decides to override "the common-law presumption" retained by several States that "defamatory speech is false" because of the need "[t]o ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred." Ante, at 776-777. I do not agree that our precedents require a private individual to bear the risk that a defamatory statement—uttered either with a mind toward assassinating his good name or with careless indifference to that possibility—cannot be proven false. By attaching no weight to the State's interest in protecting the private individual's good name, the Court has reached a pernicious result.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - In the context of governmental restriction of speech, it has long been established that the government cannot limit speech protected by the First Amendment without bearing the burden of showing that its restriction is justified. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 540, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (content-based restriction); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (speaker-based restriction); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 928-932, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (secondary-effects restriction). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (striking down the precondition that a taxpayer sign a loyalty oath before receiving certain tax benefits). It is not immediately apparent from the text of the First Amendment, which by its terms applies only to governmental action, that a similar result should obtain here: a suit by a private party is obviously quite different from the government's direct enforcement of its own laws. Nonetheless, the need to encourage debate on public issues that concerned the Court in the governmental-restriction cases is of concern in a similar manner in this case involving a private suit for damages: placement by state law of the burden of proving truth upon media defendants who publish speech of public concern deters such speech because of the fear that liability will unjustifiably result. See New York Times, 376 U.S., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725; Garrison, supra, 379 U.S., at 74, 85 S.Ct., at 215 N166* ("Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned"). Because such a "chilling" effect would be antithetical to the First Amendment's protection of true speech on matters of public concern, we believe that a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant. To do otherwise could N167* "only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free."
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Parties: New York v. P. J. Video, Inc.
Date: 1986-04-22
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Parties: Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.
Date: 1986-06-02
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Parties: Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.
Date: 1986-06-03
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Parties: Bowen v. Roy
Date: 1986-06-11
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Parties: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
Date: 1986-06-25
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Parties: Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura
Date: 1986-06-25
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Parties: Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc.
Date: 1986-06-27
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Parties: Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
Date: 1986-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - I have long believed that a proper construction of the First Amendment embraces a right of access to information about the conduct of public affairs.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - N189* If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - The First Amendment right asserted by petitioner in this case, in contrast, is not the right to publicize information in its possession, but the right to acquire access thereto.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - But it has always been apparent that the freedom to obtain information that the government has a legitimate interest in not disclosing, see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S., at 621, 102 S.Ct., at 2627 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), is far narrower than the freedom to disseminate information, which is "virtually absolute" in most contexts, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 582, 100 S.Ct., at 2830 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the risk of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial is perfectly obvious.
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Parties: Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.
Date: 1986-07-01
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - Appellant also makes the related argument that, having chosen to legalize casino gambling for residents of Puerto Rico, the legislature is prohibited by the First Amendment from using restrictions on advertising to accomplish its goal of reducing demand for such gambling. We disagree. In our view, appellant has the argument backwards. As we noted in the preceding paragraph, it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising. It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners such as appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the legislature into banning casino gambling by residents altogether.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - Our decisions have recognized, however, N79* the 'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - Because Puerto Rico actively promotes its casinos to tourists, these problems are likely to persist whether or not residents are also encouraged to gamble. Absent some showing that a ban on advertising aimed only at residents will directly advance Puerto Rico's interest in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with casino gambling, Puerto Rico may not constitutionally restrict protected expression in that way.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - In this case, nothing suggests that the Puerto Rico Legislature ever considered the efficacy of measures other than suppressing protected expression. More importantly, there has been no showing that alternative measures would inadequately safeguard the Commonwealth's interest in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with casino gambling. Under these circumstances, Puerto Rico's ban on advertising clearly violates the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - I see no reason why commercial speech should be afforded less protection than other types of speech where, as here, the government seeks to suppress commercial speech in order to deprive consumers of accurate information concerning lawful activity. Commercial speech is considered to be different from other kinds of protected expression because advertisers are particularly well suited to evaluate "the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - the Court does little more than defer to what it perceives to be the determination by Puerto Rico's Legislature that a ban on casino advertising aimed at residents is reasonable. The Court totally ignores the fact that commercial speech is entitled to substantial First Amendment protection, giving the government unprecedented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Such measures would directly address the problems appellee associates with casino gambling, while avoiding the First Amendment problems raised where the government seeks to ban constitutionally protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Accordingly, I would hold that Puerto Rico may not suppress the dissemination of truthful information about entirely lawful activity merely to keep its residents ignorant. The Court, however, would allow Puerto Rico to do just that, thus dramatically shrinking the scope of First Amendment protection available to commercial speech, and giving government officials unprecedented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected expression.
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Parties: Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser
Date: 1986-07-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The marked distinction between the political "message" of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals. In upholding the students' right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note that the case did "not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students." Id., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse. A sharply divided Court upheld the right to express an antidraft viewpoint in a public place, albeit in terms highly offensive to most citizens. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The plurality opinion went on to reject the radio station's assertion of a First Amendment right to broadcast vulgarity
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - The fact that the speech may not have been offensive to his audience—or that he honestly believed that it would be inoffensive does not mean that he had a constitutional right to deliver it. For the school—not the student—must prescribe the rules of conduct in an educational institution. But it does mean that he should not be disciplined for speaking frankly in a school assembly if he had no reason to anticipate punitive consequences.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the N80* "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the N81* "work of the schools."
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - Justice Sutherland taught us that a N82* nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). Vulgar language, like vulgar animals, may be acceptable in some contexts and intolerable in others. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3041, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). Indeed, even ordinary, inoffensive speech may be wholly unacceptable in some settings.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - I believe a school faculty must regulate the content as well as the style of student speech in carrying out its educational mission. It does seem to me, however, that if a student is to be punished for using offensive speech, he is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the consequences of its violation. The interest in free speech protected by the First Amendment and the interest in fair procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment combine to require this conclusion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - The Court today reaffirms the unimpeachable proposition that students do not " N168* 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' " Ante, at 680 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)). If respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); the Court's opinion does not suggest otherwise. Moreover, despite the Court's characterizations, the language respondent used is far removed from the very narrow class of "obscene" speech which the Court has held is not protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.
Date: 1986-07-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Respondent Cloud Books, Inc., has a bookstore that sells sexually explicit, but not allegedly obscene, publications. See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (1985); see also ante, at 1. The Court holds that the store can be shut down for one year as a nuisance if it is found to be a place "in or upon which any lewdness, assignation, or prostitution . . . exists," in violation of New York's Public Health Law §§ 2320 and 2329 (McKinney 1985). Despite the obvious role that commercial bookstores play in facilitating free expression, see, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959), the Court today concludes that a closure order would raise no First Amendment concerns, apparently because it would be triggered, not by respondents' sale of books, but by the nonexpressive conduct of patrons. See ante, at 698-699 and 706, n. 2. But the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against all laws "abridging the freedom of speech"—not just those specifically directed at expressive activity. Until today, this Court has never suggested that a State may suppress speech as much as it likes, without justification, so long as it does so through generally applicable regulations that have "nothing to do with any expressive conduct."
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - If the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment is to retain its "transcend[ent] value," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S., at 525, 78 S.Ct., at 1341, First Amendment interests must be given special protection. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S., at 509, 66 S.Ct., at 280. " 'Freedoms such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.' " Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2347, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972), quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960). Since I agree with the New York Court of Appeals that the mandatory closure requirement is unconstitutional as applied to respondents, I dissent from the reversal of that court's judgment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Nonetheless, respondents argue that the effect of the statutory closure remedy impermissibly burdens its First Amendment protected bookselling activities. The severity of this burden is dubious at best, and is mitigated by the fact that respondents remain free to sell the same materials at another location. In any event, this argument proves too much, since every civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities. One liable for a civil damages award has less money to spend on paid political announcements or to contribute to political causes, yet no one would suggest that such liability gives rise to a valid First Amendment claim. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Similarly, a thief who is sent to prison might complain that his First Amendment right to speak in public places has been infringed because of the confinement, but we have explicitly rejected a prisoner's claim to a prison environment least restrictive of his desire to speak to outsiders.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - That court ignored a crucial distinction between the circumstances presented in O'Brien and the circumstances of this case: unlike the symbolic draft card burning in O'Brien, the sexual activity carried on in this case manifests absolutely no element of protected expression.
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Parties: Munro v. Socialist Workers Party
Date: 1986-12-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - It can hardly be said that Washington's voters are denied freedom of association because they must channel their expressive activity into a campaign at the primary as opposed to the general election. It is true that voters must make choices as they vote at the primary, but there are no state-imposed obstacles impairing voters in the exercise of their choices. Washington simply has not substantially burdened the "availability of political opportunity."
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Parties: Tashjian v. Republican Party
Date: 1986-12-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416-417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960). The freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan political organization.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - The nature of appellees' First Amendment interest is evident. N189* "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416-417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960). The freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan political organization.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - It is, of course, fundamental to appellant's defense of the State's statute that this impingement upon the associational rights of the Party and its members occurs at the ballot box, for the Constitution grants to the States a broad power to prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, which power is matched by state control over the election process for state offices. But this authority does not extinguish the State's responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the State's citizens. The power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6-7, 84 S.Ct. 526, 529-530, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), or, as here, the freedom of political association.
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Parties: Fed. Election Com. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.
Date: 1986-12-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - However, the corporation is not free to use its general funds for campaign advocacy purposes. While that is not an absolute restriction on speech, it is a substantial one. Moreover, even to speak through a segregated fund, MCFL must make very significant efforts.
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Parties: 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy
Date: 1987-01-13
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Parties: Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook
Date: 1986-11-17
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Parties: Newport v. Iacobucci
Date: 1986-11-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - But if there is any integrity to the Court's reasoning on the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment, it must also embrace other forms of expressive conduct or attire that might be offensive to the majority, or perhaps likely to stimulate violent reactions, but would nevertheless ordinarily be entitled to First Amendment protection. For example, liquor cannot be sold in an athletic stadium, hotel, restaurant, or sidewalk cafe without a liquor license. According to the Court's rationale any restriction on speech—be it content based or neutral—in any of these places enjoys a presumption of validity. It is a strange doctrine indeed that implies that Paul Robert Cohen had a constitutional right to wear his vulgar jacket in a courtroom, but could be sent to jail for wearing it in Yankee Stadium.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N56* I submit, merely confirm my view that the Twenty-first Amendment really has no bearing whatsoever on the question whether the State's interest in maintaining order in licensed premises outweighs the interest in free expression that is protected by the First Amendment—whether that interest is asserted by a dancer, an actor, or merely an unpopular customer.
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Parties: Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Com.
Date: 1987-02-25
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Parties: Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland
Date: 1987-04-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Such official scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. See Regan v. Time, Inc., supra,
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N7* "We are aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means"
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Parties: Meese v. Keene
Date: 1987-04-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Likewise, despite the absence of any direct abridgment of speech, the District Court in this case assumed that the reactions of the public to the label "political propaganda" would be such that the label would interfere with freedom of speech. In Virginia Pharmacy Bd., we squarely held that a zeal to protect the public from "too much information" could not withstand First Amendment scrutiny
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Because the Court believes that the term "political propaganda" is neutral, it concludes that "the Act places no burden on protected expression." Ante, at 480. The Court's error on neutrality leads it to ignore the practical effects of the classification, which create an indirect burden on expression. As a result, the Court takes an unjustifiably narrow view of the sort of government action that can violate First Amendment protections. Because Congress did "not pose any obstacle to appellee's access to the materials he wishes to exhibit" in that it "did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials," ibid., the Court thinks that the propaganda classification does not burden speech. But there need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment violation. The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on speech, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, 70 S.Ct. 674, 685, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950), and that the First Amendment protections extend beyond the blatant censorship the Court finds lacking here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - N101* But there need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment violation. The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on speech, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, 70 S.Ct. 674, 685, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950), and that the First Amendment protections extend beyond the blatant censorship the Court finds lacking here. N102* "[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech . . . does not determine the free speech question."
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - N57* I do not agree that the designation "political propaganda," imposed by the Department of Justice on three films from Canada about acid rain and nuclear war, pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Act), 52 Stat. 631, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621, presents no obstacle to expression protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - N58* Because the Court believes that the term "political propaganda" is neutral, it concludes that "the Act places no burden on protected expression." Ante, at 480. The Court's error on neutrality leads it to ignore the practical effects of the classification, which create an indirect burden on expression. As a result, the Court takes an unjustifiably narrow view of the sort of government action that can violate First Amendment protections. Because Congress did "not pose any obstacle to appellee's access to the materials he wishes to exhibit" in that it "did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials," ibid., the Court thinks that the propaganda classification does not burden speech. But there need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment violation. The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on speech, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, 70 S.Ct. 674, 685, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950), and that the First Amendment protections extend beyond the blatant censorship the Court finds lacking here. N59* "[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech . . . does not determine the free speech question."
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - But the District Court's holding here—that a derogatory classification impermissibly inhibits protected expression—did not impose a ban; it merely lifted a disclosure requirement, as in the other cases cited above. Under the District Court's ruling, opponents of the viewpoint expressed by the National Film Board of Canada remained completely free to point out the foreign source of the films. The difference was that dialogue on the value of the films and the viewpoints they express could occur in an atmosphere free of the constraint imposed by Government condemnation. It is the Government's classification of those films as "political propaganda" that is paternalistic. For that Government action does more than simply provide additional information. It places the power of the Federal Government, with its authority, presumed neutrality, and assumed access to all the facts, behind an appellation designed to reduce the effectiveness of the speech in the eyes of the public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - First, the term "political propaganda" does nothing to place regulated expressive materials "beyond the pale of legitimate discourse." Ibid. Unlike the scheme in Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Act places no burden on protected expression. We invalidated the statute in Lamont as interfering with the addressee's First Amendment rights because it required N60* "an official act (viz., returning the reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights." 381 U.S., at 305, 85 S.Ct., at 1495. The physical detention of the materials, not their mere designation as "communist political propaganda," was the offending element of the statutory scheme. The Act N61* "se[t] administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail." Id., at 306, 85 S.Ct., at 1496. The Act in this case, on the other hand, does not pose any obstacle to appellee's access to the materials he wishes to exhibit. Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion, confusion, or deceit.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - Appellee does not argue that his speech is deterred by the statutory definition of "propaganda." He argues, instead, that his speech is deterred by the common perception that material so classified is unreliable and not to be trusted, bolstered by the added weight and authority accorded any classification made by the all-pervasive Federal Government. Even if the statutory definition is neutral, it is the common understanding of the Government's action that determines the effect on discourse protected by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Pope v. Illinois
Date: 1987-05-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - I do not believe Illinois may criminalize the sale of magazines to consenting adults who enjoy the constitutional right to read and possess them.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - The Court has adopted a restrictive reading of Stanley, opining that it has no implications to the criminalization of the sale or distribution of obscenity. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 28 L.Ed.2d 813 (1971); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). But such a crabbed approach offends the overarching First Amendment principles discussed in Stanley, almost as much as it insults the citizenry by declaring its right to read and possess material which it may not legally obtain. In Stanley, the Court recognized that there are legitimate reasons for the State to regulate obscenity: protecting children and protecting the sensibilities of unwilling viewers. 394 U.S., at 567, 89 S.Ct., at 1249. But surely a broad criminal prohibition on all sale of obscene material cannot survive simply because the State may constitutionally restrict public display or prohibit sale of the material to minors.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Justice STEVENS persuasively demonstrates the unconstitutionality of criminalizing the possession or sale of "obscene" materials to consenting adults. I write separately only to reiterate my view that any regulation of such material with respect to consenting adults suffers from the defect that N169* "the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms."
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Parties: Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte
Date: 1987-05-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - As we observed in Roberts, our cases have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that the Constitution protects against unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The Court also has recognized that admitting women in Rotary the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S., at 622, 104 S.Ct., at 3252. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909, 932-933, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3422-3424, 3435-3436, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). For this reason, "[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment. . . ." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80, n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2236, n. 4, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)). In this case, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Second, the Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities.
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Parties: United States v. Salerno
Date: 1987-05-26
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Parties: O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz
Date: 1987-06-09
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Parties: Houston v. Hill
Date: 1987-06-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The Houston ordinance is much more sweeping than the municipal ordinance struck down in Lewis. It is not limited to fighting words nor even to obscene or opprobrious language, but prohibits speech that "in any manner . . . interrupt[s]" an officer. The Constitution does not allow such speech to be made a crime. The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Second, contrary to the city's contention, the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. N84* Speech is often provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The Constitution does not allow such speech N85* to be made a crime. The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Second, contrary to the city's contention, the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. N103* "Speech is often provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
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Parties: Bd. of Airport Comm'Rs v. Jews for Jesus
Date: 1987-06-15
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Parties: Edwards v. Aguillard
Date: 1987-06-19
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Parties: Turner v. Safley
Date: 1987-06-01
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Parties: S.D. v. Dole
Date: 1987-06-23
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Parties: Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos
Date: 1987-06-24
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Parties: Rankin v. McPherson
Date: 1987-09-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern. "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); see also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136, 87 S.Ct. 339, 349, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966): "Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected."
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697-98, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Even though McPherson was merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - To appreciate fully why the majority errs in reaching its first conclusion, it is necessary to recall the origins and purposes of Connick § "public concern" requirement. The Court long ago rejected Justice Holmes' approach to the free speech rights of public employees, that N198* "[a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). We have, however, recognized that the government's power as an employer to make hiring and firing decisions on the basis of what its employees and prospective employees say has a much greater scope than its power to regulate expression by the general public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - N62* Just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected."
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - A statement lying so near the category of completelyunprotected speech cannot fairly be viewed as lying within the "heart" of the First Amendment's protection; it lies within that category of speech that can neither be characterized as speech on matters of public concern nor properly subject to criminal penalties, see Connick, supra, 461 U.S., at 147, 103 S.Ct., at 1690. Once McPherson stopped explicitly criticizing the President's policies and expressed a desire that he be assassinated, she crossed the line.
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Parties: San Francisco Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.
Date: 1987-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - I disagree. The statute is overbroad on its face because it is susceptible of application to a substantial amount of noncommercial speech, and vests the USOC with unguided discretion to approve and disapprove others' noncommercial use of "Olympic." Moreover, by eliminating even noncommercial uses of a particular word, it unconstitutionally infringes on the SFAA's right to freedom of expression. The Act also restricts speech in a way that is not content neutral. The Court's justifications of these infringements on First Amendment rights are flimsy. The statute cannot be characterized as a mere regulation of the "manner" of speech, and does not serve any Government purpose that would not effectively be protected by giving the USOC a standard commercial trademark.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - In this case, the SFAA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and other items, all emblazoned with the title "Gay Olympic Games." The possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the SFAA sought to exploit the "commercial magnetism," see Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205, 62 S.Ct. 1022, 1024, 86 L.Ed. 1381 (1942), of the word given value by the USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use could undercut the USOC's efforts to use, and sell the right to use, the word in the future, since much of the word's value comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the USOC's activities is directly contrary to Congress' interest. Even though this protection may exceed the traditional rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the application of the Act to this commercial speech is not broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional interest and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The USOC created the value of the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use. The SFAA's proposed use of the word is an excellent example. The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place over a 9-day period and were to be held in different locations around the world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an "Olympic anthem" and "Olympic Committee," and the award of gold, silver, and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that occurred in ancient Greece. The image the SFAA sought to invoke was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. The SFAA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it. The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those who have sown." International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S., at 239-240, 39 S.Ct., at 72. The USOC's right to prohibit use of the word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events is at the core of its legitimate property right.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - N196* The statute is overbroad on its face because it is susceptible of application to a substantial amount of noncommercial speech, and vests the USOC with unguided discretion to approve and disapprove others' noncommercial use of "Olympic." Moreover, by eliminating even noncommercial uses of a particular word, it unconstitutionally infringes on the SFAA's right to freedom of expression. The Act also restricts speech in a way that is not content neutral. The Court's justifications of these infringements on First Amendment rights are flimsy. The statute cannot be characterized as a mere regulation of the "manner" of speech, and does not serve any Government purpose that would not effectively be protected by giving the USOC a standard commercial trademark. Therefore, as construed by the Court, § 110(a)(4) cannot withstand the First Amendment challenge presented by petitioners.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - The Lanham Act allows "the use of the name, term, or device . . . which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or services of such party." Ibid. Again, a wide array of noncommercial speech may be characterized as merely descriptive of the goods or services of a party, and thus not intended to propose a commercial transaction. For example, the SFAA's description of its community services appears to be regulated by § 110, although the main purpose of such speech may be to educate the public about the social and political views of the SFAA. Congress' failure to incorporate this important defense in § 110(a)(4) confers an unprecedented right on the USOC. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 200-201, 105 S.Ct. 658, 664-665, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985) (noting that fair-use doctrine assists in preventing the "unprecedented" creation of "an exclusive right to use language that is descriptive of a product").
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - The Amateur Sports Act gives a single entity exclusive control over a wide range of uses of a word with a deep history in the English language and Western culture. Here, the SFAA intended, by use of the word "Olympic," to promote a realistic image of homosexual men and women that would help them move into the mainstream of their communities. As Judge Kozinski observed in dissent in the Court of Appeals, just as a jacket reading "I Strongly Resent the Draft" would not have conveyed Cohen's message, so a title such as "The Best and Most Accomplished Amateur Gay Athletes Competition" would not serve as an adequate translation of petitioners' message. 789 F.2d 1319, 1321 (CA9 1986). Indeed, because individual words carry N197* "a life and force of their own," translations never fully capture the sense of the original. The First Amendment protects more than the right to a mere translation. By prohibiting use of the word "Olympic," the USOC substantially infringes upon the SFAA's right to communicate ideas.
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - N86* Language, even in a commercial context, properly belongs to the public, unless the Government's asserted interest is substantial, and unless the limitation imposed is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. See ante, at 537, n. 16; see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S., at 215, n. 21, 105 S.Ct., at 672, n. 21 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), citing Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1320 (CCPA 1981) (recognizing importance of "free use of the language" in commercial speech context). The Lanham Act is carefully crafted to prevent commercial monopolization of language that otherwise belongs in the public domain. See Park 'N Fly, Inc., supra, 469 U.S. at 200-201, 105 S.Ct., at 664-665. The USOC demonstrates no need for additional protection. In my view, the SFAA therefore is entitled to use the word "Olympic" in a nonconfusing and nonmisleading manner in the noncommercial promotion of a theatrical or athletic event, absent proof of resultant harm to the USOC.
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - N104* [W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. We have been able . . . to discern little social benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to such grave results."
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - Given the large number of such users, this broad discretion creates the potential for significant suppression of protected speech. N170* "[A] law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."
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Parties: Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier
Date: 1988-01-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - If mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message were a constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech, school officials could censor each of the students or student organizations in the foregoing hypotheticals, converting our public schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism," id., at 511, 89 S.Ct., at 739, that "strangle the free mind at its source," West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185. The First Amendment permits no such blanket censorship authority. While the "constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings," Fraser, supra, 478 U.S., at 682, 106 S.Ct., at 3164, students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736. Just as the public on the street corner must, in the interest of fostering "enlightened opinion," Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), tolerate speech that "tempt[s] [the listener] to throw [the speaker] off the street," id., at 309, 60 S.Ct., at 906, public educators must accommodate some student expression even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the school wishes to inculcate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Since the censorship served no legitimate pedagogical purpose, it cannot by any stretch of the imagination have been designed to prevent "materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork," Tinker, 393 U.S., at 513, 89 S.Ct., at 740. Nor did the censorship fall within the category that Tinker described as necessary to prevent student expression from "inva[ding] the rights of others," ibid. If that term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights that are protected by law. "Any yardstick less exacting than [that] could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance," 795 F.2d, at 1376, a prospect that would be completely at odds with this Court's pronouncement that the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough [even in the public school context] to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., at 508, 89 S.Ct., at 737. And, as the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned, whatever journalistic impropriety these articles may have contained, they could not conceivably be tortious, much less criminal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - The Court opens its analysis in this case by purporting to reaffirm Tinker § time-tested proposition that public school students "do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' " Ante, at 266 (quoting Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736). That is an ironic introduction to an opinion that denudes high school students of much of the First Amendment protection that Tinker itself prescribed. Instead of "teach[ing] children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the American system," Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S., at 880, 102 S.Ct., at 2814 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and "that our Constitution is a living reality, not parchment preserved under glass," Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (CA5 1972), the Court today "teach[es] youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185. The young men and women of Hazelwood East expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - The mere fact of school sponsorship does not, as the Court suggests, license such thought control in the high school, whether through school suppression of disfavored viewpoints or through official assessment of topic sensitivity. The former would constitute unabashed and unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S., at 878-879, 102 S.Ct., at 2813-2814 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), as well as an impermissible infringement of the students'N199* " 'right to receive information and ideas,' " id., at 867, 102 S.Ct., at 2808 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); see First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). Just as a school board may not purge its state-funded library of all books that " 'offen[d] [its] social, political and moral tastes,' " 457 U.S., at 858-859, 102 S.Ct., at 2804 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted), school officials may not, out of like motivation, discriminatorily excise objectionable ideas from a student publication.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Nor did the censorship fall within the category that Tinker described as necessary to prevent student expression from "inva[ding] the rights of others," ibid. If that term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights that are protected by law. N200* "Any yardstick less exacting than [that] could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance," 795 F.2d, at 1376, a prospect that would be completely at odds with this Court's pronouncement that the N201* "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough [even in the public school context] to overcome the right to freedom of expression."
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - If mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message were a constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech, school officials could censor each of the students or student organizations in the foregoing hypotheticals, converting our public schools intoN105* "enclaves of totalitarianism," id., at 511, 89 S.Ct., at 739, that N106* "strangle the free mind at its source," West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185. The First Amendment permits no such blanket censorship authority. While the "constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings," Fraser, supra, 478 U.S., at 682, 106 S.Ct., at 3164, students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - N107* We held that official censorship of student expression—there the suspension of several students until they removed their armbands protesting the Vietnam war—is unconstitutional unless the speech N108* "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . ."
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The same cannot be said of official censorship designed to shield the audience or dissociate the sponsor from the expression. Censorship so motivated might well serve (although, as I demonstrate infra, at ---- - ----, cannot legitimately serve) some other school purpose. But it in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student newspaper, unless one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors. Unsurprisingly, Hazelwood East claims no such pedagogical purpose.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Official censorship of student speech on the ground that it addresses "potentially sensitive topics" is, for related reasons, equally impermissible. I would not begrudge an educator the authority to limit the substantive scope of a school-sponsored publication to a certain, objectively definable topic, such as literary criticism, school sports, or an overview of the school year. Unlike those determinate limitations, "potential topic sensitivity" is a vaporous nonstandard—like " N109* 'public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience,' " Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), or " 'general welfare of citizens,' " Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322, 78 S.Ct. 277, 282, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958)—that invites manipulation to achieve ends that cannot permissibly be achieved through blatant viewpoint discrimination and chills student speech to which school officials might not object.
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Parties: Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n
Date: 1988-01-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Even if an injury in fact is demonstrated, the usual rule is that a party may assert only a violation of its own rights. However, in the First Amendment context, N171* " '[l]itigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.' "
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Parties: Karcher v. May
Date: 1987-12-01
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Parties: St. Louis v. Praprotnik
Date: 1988-03-02
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Parties: Boos v. Barry
Date: 1988-03-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - Moreover, even if we could be confident about our ability to determine that a content-based law was intended to aim at the "secondary effects" of certain types of speech, such a law would still offend fundamental free speech interests by denying speakers the equal right to engage in speech and by denying listeners the right to an undistorted debate. These rights are all the more precious when the speech subject to unequal treatment is political speech and the debate being distorted is a political debate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - As we have noted, N63* "where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as expression under the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide N173* "adequate N174* 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."
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Parties: Lyng v. Int'l Union
Date: 1988-03-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - For the same reasons, we cannot agree that § 109 abridges appellees' right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government. Appellees rely on Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). But we do not read either Abood or the First Amendment as providing support for this claim. In Abood, the challenged state law required certain employees to pay a fee to their representative union. We ruled that this law violated the First Amendment insofar as it allowed those funds to be used to promote political and ideological purposes with which the employees disagreed and to which they objected, because by its terms the employees were "compelled to make . . . contributions for political purposes." Id., at 234, 97 S.Ct., at 1799. We based this conclusion on our observation that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State." Id., at 234-235, 97 S.Ct., at 1799. By contrast, the statute challenged in this case requires no exaction from any individual; it does not "coerce" belief; and it does not require appellees to participate in political activities or support political views with which they disagree. It merely declines to extend additional food stamp assistance to striking individuals simply because the decision to strike inevitably leads to a decline in their income. And this Court has explicitly stated that even where the Constitution prohibits coercive governmental interference with specific individual rights, it " 'does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.' "
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Parties: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n
Date: 1988-04-19
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Parties: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
Date: 1988-02-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 1245, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944), when he said that N202* "[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures." Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to N203* "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - N87* [T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - But in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), we held that even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or illwill his expression was protected by the First Amendment:
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - "Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) (N172* "Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action").
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Parties: Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
Date: 1988-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.
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Parties: Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith
Date: 1988-04-27
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Parties: United States v. Providence Journal Co.
Date: 1988-05-02
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Parties: Maynard v. Cartwright
Date: 1988-06-06
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Parties: Meyer v. Grant
Date: 1988-06-06
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Unquestionably, whether the trucking industry should be deregulated in Colorado is a matter of societal concern that appellees have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions. "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment." Id., at 101-102, 60 S.Ct., at 744. The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - One section of the state law regulating the initiative process makes it a felony to pay petition circulators. The question in this case is whether that provision is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the statute abridged appellees' right to engage in political speech and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. We agree.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Unquestionably, whether the trucking industry should be deregulated in Colorado is a matter of societal concern that appellees have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions. N204* "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment." Id., at 101-102, 60 S.Ct., at 744. The First Amendment N205* "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment.
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Parties: Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n
Date: 1988-06-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - But a truthful and nondeceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never "shou[t] at the recipient" or "gras[p] him by the lapels," id., at 19, as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation. The letter simply presents no comparable risk of overreaching. And so long as the First Amendment protects the right to solicit legal business, the State may claim no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to be read by the recipient. Moreover, the First Amendment limits the State's authority to dictate what information an attorney may convey in soliciting legal business. N206* "[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive," unless the State "assert[s] a substantial interest" that such a restriction would directly advance. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S., at 203, 102 S.Ct., at 937. Nor may a State impose a more particularized restriction without a similar showing. Aside from the interests that we have already rejected, respondent offers none.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Lawyer advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). The First Amendment principles governing state regulation of lawyer solicitations for pecuniary gain are by now familiar: N88* "Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest."
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - A standardized legal test has been devised for commercial speech cases. Under that test, such speech is entitled to constitutional protection only if it concerns lawful activities and is not misleading; if the speech is protected, government may still ban or regulate it by laws that directly advance a substantial governmental interest and are appropriately tailored to that purpose. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Applying that test to attorney advertising, it is clear to me that the States should have considerable latitude to ban advertising that is "potentially or demonstrably misleading," In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202, 102 S.Ct. 929, 937, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982) (emphasis added), as well as truthful advertising that undermines the substantial governmental interest in promoting the high ethical standards that are necessary in the legal profession.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Lawyer advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech.
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Parties: Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co.
Date: 1988-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - Just as there is no First Amendment right to operate a bookstore or locate a movie theater however or wherever one chooses notwithstanding local laws to the contrary, see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 92 L.Ed.2d 568 (1986); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), the First Amendment does not create a right of newspaper publishers to take city streets to erect structures to sell their papers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - The dissent's recharacterization of the issue is not merely semantic; substituting the time, place, or manner for the activity itself allows the dissent to define away a host of activities commonly considered to be protected. The right to demonstrate becomes the right to demonstrate at noise levels proscribed by law; the right to parade becomes the right to parade anywhere in the city 24 hours a day; and the right to circulate newspapers becomes the right to circulate newspapers by way of newsracks placed on public property. Under the dissent's analysis, ordinances giving the Mayor unbridled discretion over whether to permit loud demonstrations or evening parades would not be vulnerable to a facial challenge, since they would not "requir[e] a license to engage in activity protected by the First Amendment." Post, at 777. But see Grayned, 408 U.S., at 113, 92 S.Ct., at 2302 (implying that a law banning excessively loud demonstrations was not facially invalid because its terms could not invite "subjective or discriminatory enforcement").
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - As I read our precedents, the Lovell-Freedman line of cases is applicable here only if the Plain Dealer has a constitutional right to distribute its papers by means of dispensing devices or newsboxes, affixed to the public sidewalks. I am not convinced that this is the case.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Appellee has a right to distribute its newspapers on the city's streets, as others have a right to leaflet, solicit, speak, or proselytize in this same public forum area. But this N207* "does not mean that [appellee] can . . . distribute [its newspapers] where, when and how [it] chooses." See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642, 71 S.Ct. 920, 932, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951). More specifically, the Plain Dealer's right to distribute its papers does not encompass the right to take city property—a part of the public forum, as appellee so vigorously argues—and appropriate it for its own exclusive use, on a semi-permanent basis, by means of the erection of a newsbox. "The publisher of a newspaper. . . . has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others," Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133, 57 S.Ct. 650, 656, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937); these protected "rights of others" have always included the public-at-large's right to use the public forum for its chosen activities, including free passage of the streets.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - While there is a First Amendment right to publish newspapers, publishers have no right to force municipalities to turn over public property for the construction of a printing facility. There is a First Amendment right to sell books, but we would not accept an argument that a city must allow a bookseller to construct a bookshop—even a small one—on a city sidewalk. The right to leaflet does not create a right to build a booth on city streets from which leafletting can be conducted. Preventing the "taking" of public property for these purposes does not abridge First Amendment freedoms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - It may be that newspaper distributors can sell more papers by placing their newsracks on city sidewalks. But those seeking to distribute materials protected by the First Amendment do not have a right to appropriate public property merely because it best facilitates their efforts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - In sum, I believe that the First Amendment does not create a right of newspaper publishers to take a portion of city property to erect a structure to distribute their papers. There is no constitutional right to place newsracks on city sidewalks over the objections of the city.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The effectiveness of the newsrack as a means of distribution, especially for low-budget, controversial neighborhood newspapers, means that the twin threats of self-censorship and undetectable censorship are, if anything, greater for newsracks than for pamphleteers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - In contrast, a law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The actual "activity" at issue here is the circulation of newspapers, which is constitutionally protected. After all, N64* "[l]iberty of circulating is as essential to [freedom of expression] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value."
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Parties: N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York
Date: 1988-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The same may be said about the contention that the Law infringes upon every club member's right of expressive association. The ability and the opportunity to combine with others to advance one's views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N208* In a city as large and diverse as New York City, there surely will be organizations that fall within the potential reach of Local Law 63 and yet are deserving of constitutional protection. For example, in such a large city a club with over 400 members may still be relatively intimate in nature, so that a constitutional right to control membership takes precedence. Similarly, there may well be organizations whose expressive purposes would be substantially undermined if they were unable to confine their membership to those of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic background, or who share some other such common bond. The associational rights of such organizations must be respected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Predominately commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a First Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from the anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the law. Because Local Law 63 may be applied constitutionally to these organizations, I agree with the Court that it is not invalid on its face.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The ability and the opportunity to combine with others to advance one's views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government. N175* "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly."NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). This is not to say, however, that in every setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution.
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Parties: Frisby v. Schultz
Date: 1988-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - There simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - In this case, for example, appellees subjected the doctor and his family to the presence of a relatively large group of protesters on their doorstep in an attempt to force the doctor to cease performing abortions. But the actual size of the group is irrelevant; even a solitary picket can invade residential privacy. See Carey, 447 U.S., at 478-479, 100 S.Ct., at 2299 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("Whether . . . alone or accompanied by others . . . there are few of us that would feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside our home"). The offensive and disturbing nature of the form of the communication banned by the Brookfield ordinance thus can scarcely be questioned. Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 83-84, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (as opposed to regulation of communications due to the ideas expressed, which "strikes at the core of First Amendment values," "regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally appropriate balance between the advocate's right to convey a message and the recipient's interest in the quality of his environment").
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Assuming one construes the ordinance as the Court does, I agree that the regulation reserves ample alternative channels of communication. Ante, at 482-484. I also agree with the Court that the town has a substantial interest in protecting its residents' right to be left alone in their homes. Ante, at 484-485; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-471, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2295-2296, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). It is, however, critical to specify the precise scope of this interest. The mere fact that speech takes place in a residential neighborhood does not automatically implicate a residential privacy interest. It is the intrusion of speech into the home or the unduly coercive nature of a particular manner of speech around the home that is subject to more exacting regulation. Thus, the intrusion into the home of an unwelcome solicitor, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), or unwanted mail, Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970), may be forbidden. Similarly, the government may forbid the intrusion of excessive noise into the home, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), or, in appropriate circumstances, perhaps even radio waves, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). Similarly, the government may prohibit unduly coercive conduct around the home, even though it involves expressive elements. A crowd of protesters need not be permitted virtually to imprison a person in his or her own house merely because they shout slogans or carry signs. But so long as the speech remains outside the home and does not unduly coerce the occupant, the government's heightened interest in protecting residential privacy is not implicated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - The streets in a residential neighborhood that has no sidewalks are quite obviously a different type of forum than a stadium or a public park. Attaching the label "public forum" to the area in front of a single family dwelling does not help us decide whether the town's interest in the safe and efficient flow of traffic or its interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens justifies denying picketers the right to march up and down the streets at will.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Two characteristics of picketing—and of speech more generally make this a difficult case. First, it is important to recognize that, "[l]ike so many other kinds of expression, picketing is a mixture of conduct and communication." NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 618-619, 100 S.Ct. 2372, 2379, 65 L.Ed.2d 377 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). If we put the speech element to one side, I should think it perfectly clear that the town could prohibit pedestrians from loitering in front of a residence. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that a sign carrier has a right to march past a residence—and presumably pause long enough to give the occupants an opportunity to read his or her message—regardless of whether the reader agrees, disagrees, or is simply indifferent to the point of view being expressed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - As is often the function of picketing, during the periods of protest the doctor's home was held under a virtual siege. I do not believe that picketing for the sole purpose of imposing psychological harm on a family in the shelter of their home is constitutionally protected. I do believe, however, that the picketers have a right to communicate their strong opposition to abortion to the doctor, but after they have had a fair opportunity to communicate that message, I see little justification for allowing them to remain in front of his home and repeat it over and over again simply to harm the doctor and his family. Thus, I agree that the ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the kind of picketing that gave rise to its enactment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Of course, N176* "[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times."
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Parties: Bowen v. Kendrick
Date: 1988-06-29
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Parties: Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck
Date: 1988-06-29
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Parties: Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind
Date: 1988-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees "freedom of speech," a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The constitutional equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the context of fully protected expression was established in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra. There, the Court considered a Florida statute requiring newspapers to give equal reply space to those they editorially criticize. We unanimously held the law unconstitutional as content regulation of the press, expressly noting the identity between the Florida law and a direct prohibition of speech. "The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish a specified matter. Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers." Id., 418 U.S., at 256, 94 S.Ct., at 2839. That rule did not rely on the fact that Florida restrained the press, and has been applied to cases involving expression generally. For example, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), we held that a person could not be compelled to display the slogan "Live Free or Die." In reaching our conclusion, we relied on the principle that "[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind,' " as illustrated in Tornillo.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The constitutional equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the context of fully protected expression was established in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra. There, the Court considered a Florida statute requiring newspapers to give equal reply space to those they editorially criticize. We unanimously held the law unconstitutional as content regulation of the press, expressly noting the identity between the Florida law and a direct prohibition of speech. "The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish a specified matter. Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers." Id., 418 U.S., at 256, 94 S.Ct., at 2839. That rule did not rely on the fact that Florida restrained the press, and has been applied to cases involving expression generally. For example, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), we held that a person could not be compelled to display the slogan "Live Free or Die." In reaching our conclusion, we relied on the principle that N209* "[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind,' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - To the extent, then, that the licensing provisions have a burden on speech, it is one that truly can be said to be incidental. In addition, it is a burden that is countenanced in other circumstances without any suggestion that some type of heightened scrutiny should apply. For example, bar admission requirements may have some incidental effect on First Amendment protected activity by restricting a petitioner's right to hire whomever he pleases to serve as his attorney, but we have never suggested that state regulation of admission to the bar should generally be subject to strict scrutiny. In my view, then, requiring a professional fundraiser to wait until its license is approved before engaging in solicitation does not create a sufficiently significant burden on speech by charities that it should be reviewed under any more exacting standard than that which is typically applied to state occupational licensing requirements.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - Our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech, and that using percentages to decide the legality of the fundraiser's fee is not narrowly tailored to the State's interest in preventing fraud.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - But even assuming, without deciding, that such speech in the abstract is indeed merely "commercial," we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech. Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - It simply is not true that in this case the fundraisers are prevented from engaging in any protected speech on their own behalf by the State's licensing requirements; the requirements only restrict their ability to engage in the profession of "solicitation" without a license.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - But even assuming, without deciding, that such speech in the abstract is indeed merely "commercial," we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech. Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon. This is the teaching of Schaumburg and Munson, in which we refused to separate the component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole. Regulation of a solicitation N177* "must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . ., and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease."
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees "freedom of speech," a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Although the foregoing factual information might be relevant to the listener, and, in the latter case, could encourage or discourage the listener from making a political donation, a law compelling its disclosure would clearly and substantially burden the protected speech.
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Parties: California v. Freeman
Date: 1989-02-01
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Parties: Reed v. United Transp. Union
Date: 1989-01-11
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Parties: Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn
Date: 1989-01-18
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Parties: Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock
Date: 1989-02-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Although religious groups benefit from access to university facilities, a state university may not discriminate against them based on the content of their speech, and the university need not ban all student group meetings on campus in order to avoid providing any assistance to religion.
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Parties: Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.
Date: 1989-02-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Turning to the merits, the court characterized the prohibition on primary endorsements as an "outright ban" on political speech. Id., at 833. N190* "Prohibiting the governing body of a political party from supporting some candidates and opposing others patently infringes both the right of the party to express itself freely and the right of party members to an unrestricted flow of political information."
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Barring political parties from endorsing and opposing candidates not only burdens their freedom of speech but also infringes upon their freedom of association. It is well settled that partisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Tashjian, supra, 479 U.S. at 214, 107 S.Ct. at 548; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2681, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion). Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter has the right to associate with the political party of her choice, Tashjian, supra, 479 U.S., at 214, 107 S.Ct., at 548 (quoting Kusper, supra, 414 U.S., at 57, 94 S.Ct., at 307), but also that a political party has a right to " 'identify the people who constitute the association,' "
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Parties: Ft. Wayne Books v. Indiana
Date: 1989-02-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - It is nevertheless true that a host of citizens desires them N210* , that at best remote and indirect injury to third parties flows from them, and that purchasers have a constitutional right to possess them. The First Amendment thus requires the use of "sensitive tools" to regulate them. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). Indiana's RICO/CRRA statutes arm prosecutors not with scalpels to excise obscene portions of an adult bookstore's inventory but with sickles to mow down the entire undesired use. This the First Amendment will not tolerate. " '[I]t is better to leave a few . . . noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits,' " for the N211* "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society."
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The Constitution confers a right to possess even materials that are legally obscene.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - Because the line between protected pornographic speech and obscenity is N178* "dim and uncertain," Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66, 83 S.Ct. 631, 637, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963), N179* "a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity," Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961), but must employ careful procedural safeguards to assure that only those materials adjudged obscene are withdrawn from public commerce. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); see Miller v. California, 413 U.S., at 23-24, 93 S.Ct., at 2614-2615. The Constitution confers a right to possess even materials that are legally obscene. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). Moreover, public interest in access to sexually explicit materials remains strong despite continuing efforts to stifle distribution.
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Parties: United States DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press
Date: 1989-03-22
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Parties: Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist.
Date: 1989-03-28
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Parties: Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec.
Date: 1989-03-29
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Parties: American Foreign Service Ass'n v. Garfinkel
Date: 1989-04-18
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Parties: Dallas v. Stanglin
Date: 1989-04-03
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - The cases cited in Roberts recognize that "freedom of speech" means more than simply the right to talk and to write. It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons—coming together to engage in recreational dancing—is not protected by the First Amendment. Thus this activity qualifies neither as a form of "intimate association" nor as a form of "expressive association" as those terms were described in Roberts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N212* "In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N213* The cases cited in Roberts recognize that "freedom of speech" means more than simply the right to talk and to write. It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons—coming together to engage in recreational dancing—is not protected by the First Amendment. Thus this activity qualifies neither as a form of "intimate association" nor as a form of "expressive association" as those terms were described in Roberts.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not think the Constitution recognizes a generalized right of "social association" that includes chance encounters in dance halls. The Court of Appeals relied, mistakenly we think, on a statement from our opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), that N214* "[t]he right to freely associate is not limited to 'political' assemblies, but includes those that 'pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit' of our citizens." 744 S.W.2d, at 168, quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S., at 483, 85 S.Ct., at 1681. But the quoted language from Griswold recognizes nothing more than that the right of expressive association extends to groups organized to engage in speech that does not pertain directly to politics
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Parties: Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n
Date: 1989-04-25
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Parties: Thornburgh v. Abbott
Date: 1989-05-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - "Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. . . . The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him."
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - The reporters' assertion of a special right of access could not prevail, the Court explained, because the First Amendment does not give the media greater access to public events or institutions—including prisons—than it gives ordinary citizens.
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Parties: Hernandez v. Comm'r
Date: 1989-06-05
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Parties: Healy v. Beer Inst.
Date: 1989-06-19
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Parties: Tex. v. Johnson
Date: 1989-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-377, 88 S.Ct., at 1678-1679; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3068, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1594, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989). It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements. "[W]hat might be termed the more generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for proscription. A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 227 U.S.App.D.C. 19, 55-56, 703 F.2d 586, 622-623 (1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra. It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 132 - But the Court insists that the Texas statute prohibiting the public burning of the American flag infringes on respondent Johnson's freedom of expression. Such freedom, of course, is not absolute.
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Segment in Paragraph: 133 - N191* "Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - we concluded that N215* "the constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary,' and the 'right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous." Id., at 593, 89 S.Ct., at 1366, quoting Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1187. Nor may the government, we have held, compel conduct that would evince respect for the flag. N216* "To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - With all respect to those views, I do not believe the Constitution gives us the right to rule as the dissenting Members of the Court urge, however painful this judgment is to announce. Though symbols often are what we ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit. The case here today forces recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit us. It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.
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Segment in Paragraph: 137 - The result of the Texas statute is obviously to deny one in Johnson's frame of mind one of many means of "symbolic speech." Far from being a case of "one picture being worth a thousand words," flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others. Only five years ago we said in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2132, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places." The Texas statute deprived Johnson of only one rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest—a form of protest that was profoundly offensive to many—and left him with a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression to express his deep disapproval of national policy. Thus, in no way can it be said that Texas is punishing him because his hearers—or any other group of people—were profoundly opposed to the message that he sought to convey. xSuch opposition is no proper basis for restricting speech or expression under the First Amendment. It was Johnson's use of this particular symbol, and not the idea that he sought to convey by it or by his many other expressions, for which he was punished.
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Segment in Paragraph: 149 - The value of the flag as a symbol cannot be measured. Even so, I have no doubt that the interest in preserving that value for the future is both significant and legitimate. Conceivably that value will be enhanced by the Court's conclusion that our national commitment to free expression is so strong that even the United States as ultimate guarantor of that freedom is without power to prohibit the desecration of its unique symbol. But I am unpersuaded. The creation of a federal right to post bulletin boards and graffiti on the Washington Monument might enlarge the market for free expression, but at a cost I would not pay. Similarly, in my considered judgment, sanctioning the public desecration of the flag will tarnish its value—both for those who cherish the ideas for which it waves and for those who desire to don the robes of martyrdom by burning it. That tarnish is not justified by the trivial burden on free expression occasioned by requiring that an available, alternative mode of expression including uttering words critical of the flag, see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969)—be employed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of "speech," but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong. N89* "To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one' response to the flag burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's own, no better way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by—as one witness here did—according its remains a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - But whether or not he could appreciate the enormity of the offense he gave, the fact remains that his acts were speech, in both the technical and the fundamental meaning of the Constitution.
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Segment in Paragraph: 137 - The result of the Texas statute is obviously to deny one in Johnson's frame of mind one of many means of "symbolic speech." Far from being a case of "one picture being worth a thousand words," flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others. Only five years ago we said in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2132, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places." The Texas statute deprived Johnson of only one rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest—a form of protest that was profoundly offensive to many—and left him with a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression to express his deep disapproval of national policy. Thus, in no way can it be said that Texas is punishing him because his hearers—or any other group of people—were profoundly opposed to the message that he sought to convey. Such opposition is no proper basis for restricting speech or expression under the First Amendment. It was Johnson's use of this particular symbol, and not the idea that he sought to convey by it or by his many other expressions, for which he was punished.
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Segment in Paragraph: 137 - The result of the Texas statute is obviously to deny one in Johnson's frame of mind one of many means of "symbolic speech." Far from being a case of "one picture being worth a thousand words," flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others. Only five years ago we said in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2132, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), that N6* x"the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places." The Texas statute deprived Johnson of only one rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest—a form of protest that was profoundly offensive to many—and left him with a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression to express his deep disapproval of national policy. Thus, in no way can it be said that Texas is punishing him because his hearers—or any other group of people—were profoundly opposed to the message that he sought to convey. Such opposition is no proper basis for restricting speech or expression under the First Amendment. It was Johnson's use of this particular symbol, and not the idea that he sought to convey by it or by his many other expressions, for which he was punished.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The State of Texas conceded for purposes of its oral argument in this case that Johnson's conduct was expressive conduct, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, and this concession seems to us as prudent as was Washington's in Spence. Johnson burned an American flag as part—indeed, as the culmination—of a political demonstration that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for President. The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. At his trial, Johnson explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows: "The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn't have been made at that time. It's quite a just position [juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism and no patriotism." 5 Record 656. In these circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication," Spence, 418 U.S., at 409, 94 S.Ct., at 2730, to implicate the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 146 - As the Court analyzes this case, it presents the question whether the State of Texas, or indeed the Federal Government, has the power to prohibit the public desecration of the American flag. The question is unique. In my judgment rules that apply to a host of other symbols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately promoted emblems of political or commercial identity, are not necessarily controlling. Even if flag burning could be considered just another species of symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in other contexts, this case has an intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - To bring its argument outside our precedents, Texas attempts to convince us that even if its interest in preserving the flag's symbolic role does not allow it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical of the flag, it does permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the flag. The State's argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we have shown, is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it is here. See supra, at 402-403. In addition, both Barnette and Spence involved expressive conduct, not only verbal communication, and both found that conduct protected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N65* "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id., at 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1187. In Spence, we held that the same interest asserted by Texas here was insufficient to support a criminal conviction under a flag-misuse statute for the taping of a peace sign to an American flag.N66* "Given the protected character of [Spence's] expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts," we held, "the conviction must be invalidated."
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Parties: Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice
Date: 1989-06-21
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Parties: Fla. Star v. B. J. F.
Date: 1989-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Alternatively, it urges that our decisions in the above trilogy, and in other cases in which we have held that the right of the press to publish truth overcame asserted interests other than personal privacy, can be distilled to yield a broader First Amendment principle that the press may never be punished, civilly or criminally, for publishing the truth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - The tension between the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other, is a subject we have addressed several times in recent years. Our decisions in cases involving government attempts to sanction the accurate dissemination of information as invasive of privacy, have not, however, exhaustively considered this conflict. On the contrary, although our decisions have without exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - At issue in this case is whether there is any information about people, which—though true—may not be published in the press. By holding that only "a state interest of the highest order" permits the State to penalize the publication of truthful information, and by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not among those state interests of the highest order, the Court accepts appellant's invitation, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 10-11, to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of the publication of private facts. W. Prosser, J. Wade, & V. Schwartz, Torts 951-952 (8th ed. 1988). Even if the Court's opinion does not say as much today, such obliteration will follow inevitably from the Court's conclusion here. If the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons (such as B.J.F.) from recovering for the publication of the fact that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any "private facts" which persons may assume will not be published in the newspapers or broadcast on television.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - N217* "Does the spirit of the Bill of Rights require that individuals be free to pry into the unnewsworthy private affairs of their fellowmen? In our view it does not. In our view, fairly defined areas of privacy must have the protection of law if the quality of life is to continue to be reasonably acceptable. The public's right to know is, then, subject to reasonable limitations so far as concerns the private facts of its individual members."
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - A third and final consideration is theN110* "timidity and self-censorship" which may result from allowing the media to be punished for publishing certain truthful information.
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Parties: Massachusetts v. Oakes
Date: 1989-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Visual depictions of children engaged in live sexual performances or lewdly exhibiting their genitals cannot, of course, claim protected status, even though those depictions are not obscene. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). But other nonobscene representations of minors, including some that are pornographic, are shielded by the Constitution's guarantee of free speech. Id., at 764-765, 102 S.Ct., at 3358-3359. In particular,N67* "nudity, without more is protected expression."
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Visual depictions of children engaged in live sexual performances or lewdly exhibiting their genitals cannot, of course, claim protected status, even though those depictions are not obscene. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). But other nonobscene representations of minors, including some that are pornographic, are shielded by the Constitution's guarantee of free speech. Id., at 764-765, 102 S.Ct., at 3358-3359. In particular, N180* "nudity, without more is protected expression." Id., at 765, n. 18, 102 S.Ct., at 3359, n. 18, citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2274, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). Because § 29A's prohibition extends to posing or exhibiting children "in a state of nudity," rather than merely to their participation in live or simulated sexual conduct, the statute clearly restrains expression within the ambit of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton
Date: 1989-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area ofN181* " 'breathing space' " so that protected speech is not discouraged.
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Parties: Ward v. Rock Against Racism
Date: 1989-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - Here the bandshell was open, apparently, to all performers; and we decide the case as one in which the bandshell is a public forum for performances in which the government's right to regulate expression is subject to the protections of the First Amendment. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 17 7, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The grant of discretion that respondent seeks to challenge here is of an entirely different, and lesser, order of magnitude, because respondent does not suggest that city officials enjoy unfettered discretion to deny bandshell permits altogether. Rather, respondent contends only that the city, by exercising what is concededly its right to regulate amplified sound, could choose to provide inadequate sound for performers based on the content of their speech. Since respondent does not claim that city officials enjoy unguided discretion to deny the right to speak altogether, it is open to question whether respondent's claim falls within the narrow class of permissible facial challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of regulatory authority.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - /prefTerm>The majority's implication that government control of sound equipment is not a prior restraint because city officials do not "enjoy unguided discretion to deny the right to speak altogether," ante, at 794, is startling. In the majority's view, this case involves a question of "different and lesser" magnitude—the discretion to provide inadequate sound for performers. But whether the city denies a performer a bandshell permit or grants the permit and then silences or distorts the performer's music, the result is the same—the city censors speech. In the words of Chief Justice REHNQUIST, the First Amendment means little if it permits government to "allo[w] a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system."
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - But whether the city denies a performer a bandshell permit or grants the permit and then silences or distorts the performer's music, the result is the same—the city censors speech. In the words of Chief Justice REHNQUIST, the First Amendment means little if it permits government to N90* "allo[w] a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system."
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions N182* "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."
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Parties: Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC
Date: 1989-06-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - Section 223(b)(1)(A) unambiguously proscribes all obscene commercial messages, and thus admits of no construction that would render it constitutionally permissible. Because this criminal statute curtails freedom of speech far more radically than the Government's interest in preventing harm to minors could possibly license on the record before us, I would reverse the District Court's decision in No. 88-515 and strike down the statute on its face.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - N68* Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment; and the federal parties do not submit that the sale of such materials to adults could be criminalized solely because they are indecent. The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - I have long been convinced that the exaction of criminal penalties for the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults is constitutionally intolerable. In my judgment, N183* "the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms."
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment; and the federal parties do not submit that the sale of such materials to adults could be criminalized solely because they are indecent. The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.
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Parties: Bd. of Trs. v. Fox
Date: 1989-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - The dorm room is the student's residence for the academic term, and a student surely has a right to use this residence for expressive activities that are not inconsistent with the educational mission of the university or with the needs of other dorm residents (the distinction between tuba lessons and classical guitar lessons, or between drawing lessons and stone sculpture lessons, comes immediately to mind). See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). It cannot plausibly be asserted that music, art, speech, writing, or other kinds of lessons are inconsistent with the educational mission of the university, or that a categorical prohibition of these activities is the "least-restrictive means" (or is even "narrowly tailored") to protect the interests of other dorm residents. Nor is there any possible basis for believing that in-dorm psychological or vocational counseling is incompatible with the university's objectives or the needs of other residents. Thus, the broad reach of Resolution 66-156 cannot be squared with the dictates of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - Including these home economics elements no more converted AFS' presentations into educational speech, than opening sales presentations with a prayer or a Pledge of Allegiance would convert them into religious or political speech. As we said in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2880-2881, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983), communications can N91* constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues. . . . We have made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - While these examples consist of speech for a profit, they do not consist of speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which is what defines commercial speech, see Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S., at 761, 96 S.Ct., at 1825 (collecting cases).N92*
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Parties: County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Date: 1989-07-03
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Parties: Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC
Date: 1990-01-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N218* In our view, petitioner's reliance on the so-called academic-freedom cases is somewhat misplaced. In those cases government was attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the university or those affiliated with it. In Sweezy, for example, the Court invalidated the conviction of a person found in contempt for refusing to answer questions about the content of a lecture he had delivered at a state university. Similarly, in Keyishian, the Court invalidated a network of state laws that required public employees, including teachers at state universities, to make certifications with respect to their membership in the Communist Party. When, in those cases, the Court spoke of "academic freedom" and the right to determine on "academic grounds who may teach" the Court was speaking in reaction to content-based regulation.
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Parties: FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas
Date: 1990-01-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - Obscenity, in common understanding, is material that "treat[s] sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest," id., at 488, 77 S.Ct., at 1311. But for constitutional purposes we have added other conditions to that definition, out of an abundance of concern that "the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." Ibid. To begin with, we rejected the approach previously adopted by some courts, which would permit the banning of an entire literary work on the basis of one or several passages that in isolation could be considered obscene. Instead, we said, "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole " must appeal to prurient interest. Id., at 489, 77 S.Ct., at 1311 (emphasis added). We have gone on to add other conditions, which are reflected in the three-part test pronounced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
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Segment in Paragraph: 113 - The basis of decision I have described seems to me the proper means, in Chief Justice Warren's words, N192* "to reconcile the right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1684, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (dissenting opinion). It entails no risk of suppressing even a single work of science, literature, or art—or, for that matter, even a single work of pornography. Indeed, I fully believe that in the long run it will expand rather than constrict the scope of permitted expression, because it will eliminate the incentive to use, as a means of preventing commercial activity patently objectionable to large segments of our society, methods that constrict unobjectionable activity as well.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The businesses regulated by the city's licensing scheme include adult arcades (defined as places in which motion pictures are shown to five or fewer individuals at a time, see § 41A-2(1)), adult bookstores or adult video stores, adult cabarets, adult motels, adult motion picture theaters, adult theaters, escort agencies, nude model studios, and sexual encounter centers, §§ 41A-2(19) and 41A-3. Although the ordinance applies to some businesses that apparently are not protected by the First Amendment, e.g., escort agencies and sexual encounter centers, it largely targets businesses purveying sexually explicit speech which the city concedes for purposes of these cases are protected by the First Amendment. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959) (bookstores); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra (live theater performances); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (motion picture theaters); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) (nude dancing). As Justice SCALIA acknowledges, post, at 262, the city does not argue that the businesses targeted are engaged in purveying obscenity which is unprotected by the First Amendment. See Brief for Respondents 19, 20, and n. 8 ("[T]he city is not arguing that the ordinance does not raise First Amendment concerns. . . . [T]he right to sell this material is a constitutionally protected right . . ."). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). Nor does the city rely upon Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (1966), or contend that those businesses governed by the ordinance are engaged in pandering. It is this Court's practice to decline to review those issues neither pressed nor passed upon below. See Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234, 96 S.Ct. 1399, 1401-02, 47 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976) (per curiam). The city asserted at oral argument that it requires every business—without regard to whether it engages in First Amendment-protected speech—to obtain a certificate of occupancy when it moves into a new location or the use of the structure changes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; see also App. 42, Dallas City Code § 51-1.104 (1988) (certificate of occupancy required where there is new construction or before occupancy if there is a change in use). Under the challenged ordinance, however, inspections are required for sexually oriented businesses whether or not the business has moved into a new structure and whether or not the use of the structure has changed. Therefore, even assuming the correctness of the city's representation of its "general" inspection scheme, the scheme involved here is more onerous with respect to sexually oriented businesses than with respect to the vast majority of other businesses. For example, inspections are required whenever ownership of a sexually oriented business changes, and when the business applies for the annual renewal of its permit. We, therefore, hold, as a threshold matter, that petitioners may raise a facial challenge to the licensing scheme, and that as the suit comes to us, the businesses challenging the scheme have a valid First Amendment interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - It is not clear, however, whether they have prudential, jus tertii standing to challenge the ordinance on the ground that the ordinance infringes the associational rights of their motel patrons. Id., at 193, 97 S.Ct., at 454-55. But even if the motel owners have such standing, we do not believe that limiting motel room rentals to 10 hours will have any discernible effect on the sorts of traditional personal bonds to which we referred in Roberts. Any "personal bonds" that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those that have "played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs." 468 U.S., at 618-619, 104 S.Ct., at 3249-3250. We therefore reject the motel owners' challenge to the ordinance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - N93* but they perversely render less effective our efforts, through a restrictive definition of obscenity, to prevent the "chilling" of socially valuable speech. State RICO penalties for obscenity, for example, intimidate not just the porn-shop owner, but also the general bookseller who has been the traditional seller of new books such as Ulysses.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N111* 'It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which . . . makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - Moreover, a censorship system creates special concerns for the protection of speech, because N112* "the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable." Southeastern Promotions,
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - While many communities do not object to such businesses, others do, and have sought to eliminate them. Attempts to do so by focusing upon the individual books, motion pictures, or performances that these businesses market are doomed to failure by reason of the very stringency of our obscenity test, designed to avoid any risk of suppressing socially valuable expression. Communities cannot close down "porn-shops" by banning pornography (which, so long as it does not cross the distant line of obscenity, is protected), just as Congress cannot eliminate specialized "dial-a-porn" telephone services by prohibiting individual messages that are "indecent" but not quite obscene. Id., at 131, 109 S.Ct., at 2839.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - In Freedman, we addressed a motion picture censorship system that failed to provide for adequate procedural safeguards to ensure against unlimited suppression of constitutionally protected speech. 380 U.S., at 57, 85 S.Ct., at 738. Like a censorship system, a licensing scheme creates the possibility that constitutionally protected speech will be suppressed where there are inadequate procedural safeguards to ensure prompt issuance of the license.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The core policy underlying Freedman is that the license for a First Amendment-protected business must be issued within a reasonable period of time, because undue delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected speech.Thus, the first two safeguards are essential: the licensor must make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time period during which the status quo is maintained, and there must be the possibility of prompt judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously denied.
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - As I explained in my dissenting opinion in Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 602, 97 S.Ct. 1987, 1991-92, 52 L.Ed.2d 606 (1977), Ginzburg was decided before the Court extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech and cannot withstand our decision in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). If conduct or communication is protected by the First Amendment, it cannot lose its protected status by being advertised in a truthful and inoffensive manner. Any other result would be perverse,
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Parties: Spallone v. United States
Date: 1990-01-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - In perhaps the earliest American case to consider the import of the legislative privilege, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, interpreting a provision of the Massachusetts Constitution granting the rights of freedom of speech and debate to state legislators, recognized that "the privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the house as an organized body, as of each individual member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house; but derives it from the will of the people. . . ." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). This theme underlies our cases interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause and the federal common law of legislative immunity, where we have emphasized that any restriction on a legislator's freedom undermines the "public good" by interfering with the rights of the people to representation in the democratic process.
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Parties: Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization
Date: 1990-01-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N113* See also Follett, supra, 321 U.S., at 577, 64 S.Ct., at 719 ("The exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment is as obnoxious as the imposition of a censorship or a previous restraint")
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Parties: FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n
Date: 1990-01-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - We held that the governmental interest in regulating the "nonspeech element" of his conduct adequately justified the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms. Specifically, we concluded that the statute's incidental restriction on O'Brien's freedom of expression was no greater than necessary to further the Government's interest in requiring registrants to have valid certificates continually available.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - That case arose after black citizens boycotted white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. The white merchants sued under state law to recover losses from the boycott. We found that the N193* "right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself." Id., at 914, 102 S.Ct., at 3426. We accordingly held that "the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - ("The First Amendment does not bar application of a neutral regulation that incidentally burdens speech merely because a party contends that allowing an exception in the particular case will not threaten important government interests").
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Parties: Washington v. Harper
Date: 1990-02-27
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Parties: Butterworth v. Smith
Date: 1990-03-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 -
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Here, by contrast, we deal only with respondent's right to divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury, and not information which he may have obtained as a result of his participation in the proceedings of the grand jury. In such cases, where a person "lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance," we have held that "state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - We agree with the Court of Appeals that the interests advanced by the portion of the Florida statute struck down are not sufficient to overcome respondent's First Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information he acquired on his own.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - The Court holds that the Florida statute is unconstitutional "insofar as [it] prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended." Ante, at 626. I join the Court's opinion because I interpret that to refer to the information contained within the witness' testimony, but not necessarily to the fact that the witness conveyed that information to the grand jury. I take that to be the meaning of the Court's later clarification that we affirm "respondent's First Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information he acquired on his own."
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Parties: Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce
Date: 1990-03-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - This Court concluded in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (MCFL ), that a federal statute requiring corporations to make independent political expenditures only through special segregated funds, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, burdens corporate freedom of expression. MCFL, 479 U.S., at 252, 107 S.Ct., at 624 (plurality opinion); id., at 266, 107 S.Ct., at 632 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court reasoned that the small nonprofit corporation in that case would face certain organizational and financial hurdles in establishing and administering a segregated political fund. For example, the statute required the corporation to appoint a treasurer for its segregated fund, keep records of all contributions, file a statement of organization containing information about the fund, and update that statement periodically. Id., at 253, 107 S.Ct., at 625 (plurality opinion). In addition, the corporation was permitted to solicit contributions to its segregated fund only from "members," which did not include persons who merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization. Id., at 254, 107 S.Ct., at 626 (plurality opinion). These hurdles "impose[d] administrative costs that many small entities [might] be unable to bear" and "create[d] a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 115 - N103* The First Amendment would not tolerate a law prohibiting a newspaper or television network from spending on political comment because it operates through a corporation. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-220, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1436-1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). As Justice BRENNAN, supported by a majority of the Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), state: "[T]he rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities." Id., at 784, 105 S.Ct., at 2958 (dissenting opinion, joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 773, 105 S.Ct., at 2952 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he First Amendment gives no more protection to the press . . . than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech"). The argument relied on by the majority, that media corporations are in the business of communicating and other corporations are not, is unsatisfying. All corporations communicate with the public to some degree, whether it is their business or not; and communication is of particular importance for non-profit corporations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - The categorical suspension of the right of any person, or of any association of persons, to speak out on political matters must be justified by a compelling state need. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612, 646-647, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam ).
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Segment in Paragraph: 104 - But this distinction rests on the fallacy that the source of the speaker's funds is somehow relevant to the speaker's right of expression or society's interest in hearing what the speaker has to say. There is no reason that the free speech rights of an individual or of an association of individuals should turn on the circumstance that funds used to engage in the speech come from a corporation. Many persons can trace their funds to corporations, if not in the form of donations, then in the form of dividends, interest, or salary. That does not provide a basis to deprive such individuals or associations of their First Amendment freedoms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Because the right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our constitutional system, statutory classifications impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). We find that, even under such strict scrutiny, the statute's classifications pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause. As we explained in the context of our discussions of whether the statute was overinclusive, supra, at 660-661, or underinclusive, supra, at 665 and this page, the State's decision to regulate only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of political "war chests" amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The protection afforded core political speech is not diminished because the speaker is a nonprofit corporation. Even in the case of a for-profit corporation, we have upheld the right to speak on ballot issues.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (MCFL ), a First Amendment right to use corporate treasury funds was recognized for the nonprofit corporation then before us. Those who thought that the First Amendment exists to protect all points of view in candidate elections will be disillusioned by the Court's opinion today; for that protection is given only to a preferred class of nonprofit corporate speakers: small, single issue nonprofit corporations that pass the Court's own vague test for determining who are the favored participants in the electoral process.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - With regard to nonprofit corporations in particular, there is no reason to assume that the corporate form has an intrinsic flaw that makes it corrupt, or that all corporations possess great wealth, or that all corporations can buy more media coverage for their views than can individuals or other groups. There is no reason to conclude that independent speech by a corporation is any more likely to dominate the political arena than speech by the wealthy individual, protected in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, or by the well-funded PAC, protected in NCPAC, supra (protecting speech rights of PAC's against expenditure limitations). In NCPAC, we discredited the argument that because PAC's spend larger amounts than individuals, the potential for corruption is greater. Id., at 497-498, 105 S.Ct., at 1468-1469. We distinguished between the campaign contribution at issue in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, supra, and independent expenditures, by noting that while "the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form" with regard to candidate campaign contributions, a similar finding could not be supported for independent expenditures. NCPAC, supra, at 500-501, 105 S.Ct., at 1470.
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - That those who can afford to publicize their views may succeed in the political arena as a result does not detract from the fact that they are exercising a First Amendment right. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S., at 426, n. 7, 108 S.Ct., at 1894, n. 7 (upholding First Amendment right to use paid petition circulators). As we stated in Bellotti, paid advocacy N220* "may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it." 435 U.S., at 790, 98 S.Ct., at 1423. The suggestion that the government has an interest in shaping the political debate by insulating the electorate from too much exposure to certain views is incompatible with the First Amendment. N221* "[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments."
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Segment in Paragraph: 111 - To create second-class speakers that can be stifled on the subject of candidate qualifications is to silence some of the most significant participants in the American public dialogue, as evidenced by the amici briefs filed on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Public Interest Law, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Realtors, the American Insurance Association, the National Organization for Women, Greenpeace Action, the National Abortion Rights Action League, the National Right to Work Committee, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the Fund for the Feminist Majority, the Washington Legal Foundation, and the Allied Educational Foundation. I reject any argument based on the idea that these groups and their views are not of importance and value to the self-fulfillment and self-expression of their members, and to the rich public dialogue that must be the mark of any free society. To suggest otherwise is contrary to the American political experience and our own judicial knowledge.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - The protection afforded core political speech is not diminished because the speaker is a nonprofit corporation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - The Act operates to prohibit information essential to the ability of voters to evaluate candidates. In my view, this speech cannot be restricted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - With regard to nonprofit corporations in particular, there is no reason to assume that the corporate form has an intrinsic flaw that makes it corrupt, or that all corporations possess great wealth, or that all corporations can buy more media coverage for their views than can individuals or other groups. There is no reason to conclude that independent speech by a corporation is any more likely to dominate the political arena than speech by the wealthy individual, protected in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, or by the well-funded PAC, protected in NCPAC , supra
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Segment in Paragraph: 104 - The principled approach is to acknowledge that where political speech is concerned, freedom to speak extends to all nonprofit corporations
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Segment in Paragraph: 117 - The Court's hostility to the corporate form used by the speaker in this case and its assertion that corporate wealth is the evil to be regulated is far too imprecise to justify the most severe restriction on political speech ever sanctioned by this Court. In any event, this distinction is irrelevant to a non-profit corporation. N94* "Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation." MCFL, 479 U.S., at 265, 107 S.Ct., at 631. The wholesale ban on corporate political speech enacted by the Michigan Legislature is "too blunt an instrument for such a delicate task."Ibid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - By using distinctions based upon both the speech and the speaker, the Act engages in the rawest form of censorship: the State censors what a particular segment of the political community might say with regard to candidates who stand for election. The Court's holding cannot be reconciled with the principle that " 'legislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - Our cases acknowledge the danger that corruption poses for the electoral process, but draw a line in permissible regulation between payments to candidates ("contributions") and payments or expenditures to express one's own views ("independent expenditures"). Today's decision abandons this distinction and threatens once-protected political speech. The Michigan statute prohibits independent expenditures by a nonprofit corporate speaker to express its own views about candidate qualifications. Independent expenditures are entitled to greater protection than campaign contributions. MCFL, supra, 479 U.S., at 259-260, 107 S.Ct., at 628-629. See also Buckley, 424 U.S., at 20-21, 96 S.Ct., at 635.N69* "[E]xpenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do . . . limitations on financial contributions."
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - We confront here society's interest in free and informed discussion on political issues, a discourse vital to the capacity for self-government.N187* "In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-785, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1420, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). There is little doubt that by silencing advocacy groups that operate in the corporate form and forbidding them to speak on electoral politics, Michigan's law suffers from both of these constitutional defects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - Our cases acknowledge the danger that corruption poses for the electoral process, but draw a line in permissible regulation between payments to candidates ("contributions") and payments or expenditures to express one's own views ("independent expenditures"). Today's decision abandons this distinction and threatens once-protected political speech. The Michigan statute prohibits independent expenditures by a nonprofit corporate speaker to express its own views about candidate qualifications. Independent expenditures are entitled to greater protection than campaign contributions. MCFL, supra, 479 U.S., at 259-260, 107 S.Ct., at 628-629. See also Buckley, 424 U.S., at 20-21, 96 S.Ct., at 635.N188* "[E]xpenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do . . . limitations on financial contributions."
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - There is no reason to conclude that independent speech by a corporation is any more likely to dominate the political arena than speech by the wealthy individual, protected in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, or by the well-funded PAC, protected in NCPAC, supra (protecting speech rights of PAC's against expenditure limitations). In NCPAC, we discredited the argument that because PAC's spend larger amounts than individuals, the potential for corruption is greater.
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Parties: Employment Div. v. Smith
Date: 1990-04-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved freedom of religion, cf.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race, see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984), or before the government may regulate the content of speech, see, e.g., Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), is not remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other fields—equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech—are constitutional norms; what it would produce here—a private right to ignore generally applicable laws—is a constitutional anomaly.
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Parties: Osborne v. Ohio
Date: 1990-04-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - In these circumstances, the Court's focus on Ferber rather than Stanley is misplaced. Ferber held only that child pornography is "a category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection," 458 U.S., at 765, 102 S.Ct., at 3359 (emphasis added); our decision did not extend to private possession. The authority of a State to regulate the production and distribution of such materials is not dispositive of its power to penalize possession. Indeed, in Stanley we assumed that the films at issue were obscene and that their production, sale, and distribution thus could have been prohibited under our decisions. See 394 U.S., at 559, n. 2, 89 S.Ct., at 1244, n. 2. Nevertheless, we reasoned that although the States "retain broad power to regulate obscenity"—and child pornography as well—"that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home." Id., at 568, 89 S.Ct., at 1249. Ferber did nothing more than place child pornography on the same level of First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography, meaning that its production and distribution could be proscribed. The distinction established in Stanley between what materials may be regulated and how they may be regulated still stands. See United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 980, n. 4 (CA11 1985) (per curiam ); People v. Keyes, 135 Misc.2d 993, 995, 517 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1987). As Justice WHITE remarked in a different context: "[T]he personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read obscenity in their homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on whether the materials are obscene or whether obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights to have and view that material in private are independently saved by the Constitution."
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy to find restrictions on them invalid. But were the First Amendment limited to such discourse, our freedom would be sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne's pictures may be distasteful, but the Constitution guarantees both his right to possess them privately and his right to avoid punishment under an overbroad law. I respectfully dissent.
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Parties: United States v. Munoz-Flores
Date: 1990-05-21
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Parties: N.D. v. United States
Date: 1990-05-21
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Parties: Keller v. State Bar of Cal.
Date: 1990-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed.
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Parties: Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens
Date: 1990-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - This case involves the intersection of two First Amendment guarantees—the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause. We have long regarded free and open debate over matters of controversy as necessary to the functioning of our constitutional system. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (N222* "To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship"). That the Constitution requires toleration of speech over its suppression is no less true in our Nation's schools.
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - N114* "To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship"). That the Constitution requires toleration of speech over its suppression is no less true in our Nation's schools.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (no danger that high school students' symbolic speech implied school endorsement); West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (same). See generally Note, 92 Yale L.J. 499, 507-509 (1983) (summarizing research in adolescent psychology). The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.
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Parties: United States v. Eichman
Date: 1990-06-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The individual interest is unquestionably a matter of great importance. Indeed, it is one of the critical components of the idea of liberty that the flag itself is intended to symbolize. Moreover, it is buttressed by the societal interest in being alerted to the need for thoughtful response to voices that might otherwise go unheard. The freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment embraces not only the freedom to communicate particular ideas, but also the right to communicate them effectively. That right, however, is not absolute—the communicative value of a well-placed bomb in the Capitol does not entitle it to the protection of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N223* The individual interest is unquestionably a matter of great importance. Indeed, it is one of the critical components of the idea of liberty that the flag itself is intended to symbolize. Moreover, it is buttressed by the societal interest in being alerted to the need for thoughtful response to voices that might otherwise go unheard. The freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment embraces not only the freedom to communicate particular ideas, but also the right to communicate them effectively. That right, however, is not absolute—the communicative value of a well-placed bomb in the Capitol does not entitle it to the protection of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment embraces not only the freedom to communicate particular ideas, but also the right to communicate them effectively. That right, however, is not absolute—the communicative value of a well-placed bomb in the Capitol does not entitle it to the protection of the First Amendment.
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Parties: Peel v. Atty. Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n
Date: 1990-06-04
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N95* They may not, however, ban potentially misleading commercial speech if narrower limitations could be crafted to ensure that the information is presented in a nonmisleading manner.
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Parties: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
Date: 1990-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - N104* We are not persuaded that, in addition to these protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for "opinion" is required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - As Chief Justice Warren noted in concurrence, "[o]ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.' " Butts, supra, at 164, 87 S.Ct., at 1996. The Court has also determined that both for public officials and public figures, a showing of New York Times malice is subject to a clear and convincing standard of proof.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - Although I agree with the majority that statements must be scrutinized for implicit factual assertions, the majority's scrutiny in this case does not "hol[d] the balance true," ante, at 23, between protection of individual reputation and freedom of speech. The statements complained of neither state nor imply a false assertion of fact, and, under the rule the Court reconfirms today, they should be found not libel " 'as a matter of constitutional law.' " Ante, at 17, quoting Bresler, 398 U.S., at 13, 90 S.Ct., at 1541. Readers of Diadiun's column are signaled repeatedly that the author does not actually know what Milkovich said at the court hearing and that the author is surmising, from factual premises made explicit in the column, that Milkovich must have lied in court. Like the "imaginative expression" and the "rhetorical hyperbole" which the Court finds have "traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation," ante, at 18, conjecture is intrinsic to "the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" that is at "the heart of the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - Diadiun, therefore, is guilty. He is guilty of jumping to conclusions, of benightedly assuming that court decisions are always based on the merits, and of looking foolish to lawyers. He is not, however, liable for defamation. Ignorance, without more, has never served to defeat freedom of speech. "The constitutional protection does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - Punishing such conjecture protects reputation only at the cost of expunging a genuinely useful mechanism for public debate. "In a society which takes seriously the principle that government rests upon the consent of the governed, freedom of the press must be the most cherished tenet."
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - It is, therefore, imperative that we take the most particular care where freedom of speech is at risk, not only in articulating the rules mandated by the First Amendment, but also in applying them. " 'Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - Readers of Diadiun's column are signaled repeatedly that the author does not actually know what Milkovich said at the court hearing and that the author is surmising, from factual premises made explicit in the column, that Milkovich must have lied in court. Like the N224* "imaginative expression" and the "rhetorical hyperbole" which the Court finds have "traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation," ante, at 18, conjecture is intrinsic to N225* "the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" that is at "the heart of the First Amendment." Falwell, 485 U.S., at 50, 108 S.Ct., at 879. The public and press regularly examine the activities of those who affect our lives. N226* "One of the perogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize men and measures." Id., at 51, 108 S.Ct., at 879 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 1244-1245, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944)). But often only some of the facts are known, and solely through insistent prodding through conjecture as well as research—can important public questions be subjected to the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate to which this country is profoundly committed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - In 1964, we decided in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution placed limits on the application of the state law of defamation. There the Court recognized the need for N189* "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id., at 279-280, 84 S.Ct., at 726. This rule was prompted by a concern that, with respect to the criticism of public officials in their conduct of governmental affairs, a state-law " 'rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions' would deter protected speech." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S., at 334, 94 S.Ct., at 3004 (quoting New York Times, supra, 376 U.S., at 279, 84 S.Ct., at 725).
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Parties: Metro Broad. v. FCC
Date: 1990-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N194* [i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 390, 89 S.Ct., at 1806. "Congress may . . . seek to assure that the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting stations."
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N227* We have long recognized that "[b]ecause of the scarcity of [electromagnetic] frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). The Government's role in distributing the limited number of broadcast licenses is not merely that of a "traffic officer," National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1009, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943); rather, it is axiomatic that broadcasting may be regulated in light of the rights of the viewing and listening audience and that "the wildest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424-1425, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945). Safeguarding the public's right to receive a diversity of views and information over the airwaves is therefore an integral component of the FCC's mission. We have observed that " 'the "public interest" standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles,' " FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2112, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978), quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 122, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2096, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973), and that the Communications Act of 1934 has designated broadcasters as "fiduciaries for the public." FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3116, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984). "[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio [and other forms of broadcast] and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment," and "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 390, 89 S.Ct., at 1806. "Congress may . . . seek to assure that the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting stations." League of Women Voters, supra, 468 U.S., at 377, 104 S.Ct., at 3116.
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - In the context of broadcasting licenses, the burden on nonminorities is slight. The FCC's responsibility is to grant licenses in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity," 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1982 ed.), and the limited number of frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum means that "[n]o one has a First Amendment right to a license."
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - The FCC claims to advance its asserted interest in diverse viewpoints by singling out race and ethnicity as peculiarly linked to distinct views that require enhancement. The FCC's choice to employ a racial criterion embodies the related notions that a particular and distinct viewpoint inheres in certain racial groups, and that a particular applicant, by virtue of race or ethnicity alone, is more valued than other applicants because "likely to provide [that] distinct perspective." Brief for FCC in No. 89-453, p. 17; see 1978 Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d, at 981 (policies seek "representation of minority viewpoints in programming"); Brief for FCC in No. 89-700, p. 20 (current ownership structure creates programming deficient in "minorities['] . . . tastes and viewpoints"). The policies directly equate race with belief and behavior, for they establish race as a necessary and sufficient condition of securing the preference. The FCC's chosen means rest on the "premise that differences in race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect real differences that are relevant to a person's right to share in the blessings of a free society. [T]hat premise is utterly irrational and repugnant to the principles of a free and democratic society." Wygant, supra, at 316, 106 S.Ct., at 1869 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted). The policies impermissibly value individuals because they presume that persons think in a manner associated with their race. See Steele v. FCC, 248 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 285, 770 F.2d 1192, 1198 (1985) (minority preference contrary to "one of our most cherished constitutional and societal principles . . . that an individual's tastes, beliefs, and abilities should be assessed on their own merits rather than by categorizing that individual as a member of a racial group presumed to think and behave in a particular way"), vacated, No. 84-1176 (Oct. 31, 1985), remanded (CADC, Oct. 9, 1986).
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Parties: Rutan v. Republican Party
Date: 1990-08-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - "For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - "In 1968 the Court held that 'a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.' Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The Court noted that although criminal sanctions 'have a somewhat different impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech from dismissal from employment, it is apparent that the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting speech.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - N105* With regard to freedom of speech in particular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Once it is acknowledged that the Constitution's prohibition against laws "abridging the freedom of speech" does not apply to laws enacted in the government's capacity as employer in the same way that it does to laws enacted in the government's capacity as regulator of private conduct, it may sometimes be difficult to assess what employment practices are permissible and what are not. That seems to me not a difficult question, however, in the present context. The provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain transient majorities from impairing long-recognized personal liberties. They did not create by implication novel individual rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus, when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - Because the restriction on speech is more attenuated when the government conditions employment than when it imposes criminal penalties, and because "government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter," Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S., at 143, 103 S.Ct., at 1688, we have held that government employment decisions taken on the basis of an employee's speech do not "abridg[e] the freedom of speech," U.S. Const., Amdt. 1, merely because they fail the narrow-tailoring and compelling-interest tests applicable to direct regulation of speech. We have not subjected such decisions to strict scrutiny, but have accorded "a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment" that an employee's speech will interfere with close working relationships.
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - "In 1972 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that a nontenured public servant has no constitutional right to public employment, but nevertheless may not be dismissed for exercising his First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - It is undeniable, of course, that the patronage system entails some constraint upon the expression of views, particularly at the partisan-election stage, and considerable constraint upon the employee's right to associate with the other party. It greatly exaggerates these, however, to describe them as a general " 'coercion of belief,' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - N192* " 'For at least a quarter century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not act. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly."
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Parties: United States v. Kokinda
Date: 1990-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - For the most part, on streets and sidewalks, including the single-purpose sidewalk at issue here, communication between citizens can be permitted according to the principle that N228* "one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion."
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Solicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - It is only common sense that a public sidewalk adjacent to a public building to which citizens are freely admitted is a natural location for speech to occur, whether that speech is critical of government generally, aimed at the particular governmental agency housed in the building, or focused upon issues unrelated to the government. No doctrinal pigeonholing, complex formula, or multipart test can obscure this evident conclusion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 79 - ). Speech is not subject to regulation N96* " 'simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.' " Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N190* "[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions N191* 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - Although solicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment, the Government may regulate such activity on its property to an extent determined by the nature of the relevant forum. speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity or has been expressly dedicated by the Government to speech activity is subject to strict scrutiny.
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Parties: UNITED STATES v. R. ENTERPRISES, INC.
Date: 1991-01-22
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Parties: Leathers v. Medlock
Date: 1991-04-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - N106* This Court has long recognized that the freedom of the press prohibits government from using the tax power to discriminate against individual members of the media or against the media as a whole. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). The Framers of the First Amendment, we have explained, specifically intended to prevent government from using disparate tax burdens to impair the untrammeled dissemination of information. We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the obligation not to discriminate against individual members of the press prohibits the State from taxing one information medium—cable television—more heavily than others. The majority's answer to this question—that the State is free to discriminate between otherwise like-situated media so long as the more heavily taxed medium is not too "small" in number—is no answer at all, for it fails to explain which media actors are entitled to equal tax treatment. Indeed, the majority so adamantly proclaims the irrelevance of this problem that its analysis calls into question whether any general obligation to treat media actors even-handedly survives today's decision. Because I believe the majority has unwisely cut back on the principles that inform our selective-taxation precedents, and because I believe that the First Amendment prohibits the State from singling out a particular information medium for heavier tax burdens than are borne by like-situated media, I dissent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - our decisions have recognized that the Framers viewed selective taxation as a distinctively potent "means of abridging the freedom of the press,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - "[T]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution. Most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties or specific rights of individuals: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right to counsel, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to name a few. In contrast, the Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution."
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The danger from a tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers is the danger of censorship; a tax on a small number of speakers runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views. The risk is similar to that from content-based regulation: It will distort the market for ideas. N195* "The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - N97* cable television provides to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in "speech" under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the "press."
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - The Court discussed at length the pre-First Amendment English and American tradition of taxes imposed exclusively on the press. This invidious form of censorship was intended to curtail the circulation of newspapers and thereby prevent the people from acquiring knowledge of government activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - The danger from a tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers is the danger of censorship; a tax on a small number of speakers runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views. The risk is similar to that from content-based regulation: It will distort the market for ideas.
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Parties: Rust v. Sullivan
Date: 1991-05-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - This is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify government control over the content of expression. For example, this Court has recognized that the existence of a Government "subsidy," in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas that have "been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity," United States v. Kokinda, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 3119, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), or have been "expressly dedicated to speech activity." Kokinda, supra, 110 S.Ct., at 3119; Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). Similarly, we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 605-606, 87 S.Ct. 675, 683, 684-685, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). It could be argued by analogy that traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from government regulation, even when subsidized by the Government. We need not resolve that question here, however, because the Title X program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship. Nothing in them requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold. Nor is the doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program sufficiently all-encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice. The program does not provide post-conception medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her. The doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program. In these circumstances, the general rule that the Government may choose not to subsidize speech applies with full force.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppression of speech simply because that suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public funds. Whatever may be the Government's power to condition the receipt of its largess upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights, it surely does not extend to a condition that suppresses the recipient's cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or viewpoint of that speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - as the Court often has noted: " 'A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of a "law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." ' " League of Women Voters, 468 U.S., at 383-384, 104 S.Ct., at 3119, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 546, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2338, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - Finally, it is of no small significance that the speech the Secretary would suppress is truthful information regarding constitutionally protected conduct of vital importance to the listener. One can imagine no legitimate governmental interest that might be served by suppressing such information. Concededly, the abortion debate is among the most divisive and contentious issues that our Nation has faced in recent years. N229* "But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - N193* "For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' "
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Parties: Chapman v. United States
Date: 1991-05-30
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Parties: Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n
Date: 1991-05-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - First, it recognized that "[t]o compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests." 431 U.S., at 222, 97 S.Ct., at 1793. Unions traditionally have aligned themselves with a wide range of social, political, and ideological viewpoints, any number of which might bring vigorous disapproval from individual employees. To force employees to contribute, albeit indirectly, to the promotion of such positions implicates core First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all").
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Applying that standard to the challenged expenses, the Court found all three to be properly supportable through mandatory assessments. The dissenting employees in Ellis objected to charges relating to union social functions, not because those activities were inherently expressive or ideological in nature, but purely because they were sponsored by the union. Because employees may constitutionally be compelled to affiliate with a union, the Court found that forced contribution to union social events that were open to all imposed no additional burden on their First Amendment rights. Although the challenged expenses for union publications and conventions were clearly communicative in nature, the Court found them to entail little additional encroachment upon freedom of speech, "and none that is not justified by the governmental interests behind the union shop itself."
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - The burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great where, as here, the compelled speech is in a public context. By utilizing petitioners' funds for political lobbying and to garner the support of the public in its endeavors, the union would use each dissenter as "an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable."
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - We therefore disagree with Justice SCALIA that any charge that does not relate to an activity expressly authorized by statute is constitutionally invalid, irrespective of its impact, or lack thereof, on free expression. In our view, his analysis turns our constitutional doctrine on its head. Instead of interpreting statutes in light of First Amendment principles, he would interpret the First Amendment in light of state statutory law. It seems to us that this proposal bears little relation to the values that the First Amendment was designed to protect. A rule making violations of freedom of speech dependent upon the terms of state employment statutes would sacrifice sound constitutional analysis for the appearance of administrability.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - The First Amendment protects the individual's right of participation in these spheres from precisely this type of invasion. Where the subject of compelled speech is the discussion of governmental affairs, which is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1436, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 14, 96 S.Ct., at 632, the burden upon dissenters' rights extends far beyond the acceptance of the agency shop and is constitutionally impermissible.
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Segment in Paragraph: 99 - The opinion's attempted analogy between the coercion at issue in Wooley and the requirement that petitioners bear their fair share of the PPE costs is wholly unpersuasive. The requirement that a dissenting member contribute to the PPE message is not likely to violate a dissenter's "right to refrain from speaking." Wooley, supra, at 714, 97 S.Ct., at 1435. In Wooley, it was not sufficient that the complaining party disagreed with the government's message. What was dispositive was the fact that the government was forcing the citizens themselves to be "courier[s]" of the message with which they disagreed, see id., at 717, 97 S.Ct., at 1436, thereby conscripting their expressive capacities in service of the government's message.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - First, it recognized that N230* "[t]o compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests." 431 U.S., at 222, 97 S.Ct., at 1793. Unions traditionally have aligned themselves with a wide range of social, political, and ideological viewpoints, any number of which might bring vigorous disapproval from individual employees. To force employees to contribute, albeit indirectly, to the promotion of such positions implicates core First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all").
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Parties: Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.
Date: 1991-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 137 - It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to "free speech" an attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 151 - Gentile claims that Rule 177 is overbroad, and thus unconstitutional on its face, because it applies to more speech than is necessary to serve the State's goals.N194* The "overbreadth" doctrine applies if an enactment "prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be N195* "substantial."
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Parties: Renne v. Geary
Date: 1991-06-17
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Parties: Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
Date: 1991-06-20
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Parties: Barnes v. Glen Theatre
Date: 1991-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - Several of our cases contain language suggesting that nude dancing of the kind involved here is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), we said: N70* "[A]lthough the customary 'barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances." In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2181, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), we said that N71* "[f]urthermore, as the state courts in this case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation" (citations omitted).
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N72* N73* "It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons coming together to engage in recreational dancing—is not protected by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - [E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when 'speech and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
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Parties: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
Date: 1991-06-24
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Parties: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.
Date: 1991-12-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - N140* A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 1443-1444, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991). As we emphasized in invalidating a content-based magazine tax, "official scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - In the context of financial regulation, it bears repeating, as we did in Leathers, that the Government's ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. 499 U.S., at ----, 111 S.Ct., at 1444. The First Amendment presumptively places this sort of discrimination beyond the power of the Government. As we reiterated in Leathers, " 'The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Although the notion that protected speech may be restricted on the basis of content if the restriction survives what has sometimes been termed N196* N197* " 'the most exacting scrutiny,' " Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2543, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989), may seem familiar, the Court appears to have adopted this formulation in First Amendment cases by accident rather than as the result of a considered judgment. In Johnson, for example, we cited Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1163, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988), as support for the approach. Boos v. Barry in turn cited Perry Education Assn v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), for the proposition that to justify a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the State must show that the N198* 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " Boos v. Barry, supra, 485 U.S., at 320, 108 S.Ct., at 1163. Turning to the appropriate page in Perry, we discover that the statement was supported with a citation of Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2290-2291, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). Looking at last to Carey, it turns out the Court was making a statement about equal protection: N199* "When government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized." Id., at 461-462, 100 S.Ct., at 2290-2291. Thus was a principle of equal protection transformed into one about the government's power to regulate the content of speech in a public forum, and from this to a more general First Amendment statement about the government's power to regulate the content of speech.
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Parties: Norman v. Reed
Date: 1992-01-14
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Parties: Collins v. City of Harker Heights
Date: 1992-02-26
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Parties: Dawson v. Delaware
Date: 1992-03-09
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Parties: Burson v. Freeman
Date: 1992-05-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - As I noted in Simon & Schuster, there is a narrow area in which the First Amendment permits freedom of expression to yield to the extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional right.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - The speech and conduct prohibited in the campaign-free zone created by Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-7-111 (Supp.1991) is classic political expression. As this Court has long recognized, "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S.Ct. 612, 632, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (citation omitted). Therefore, I fully agree with the plurality that Tennessee must show that its " 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " Ante, at 198 (citations omitted). I do not agree, however, that Tennessee has made anything approaching such a showing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - The fact that campaign-free zones cover such a large area in some States unmistakably identifies censorship of election-day campaigning as an animating force behind these restrictions.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - To the contrary, we recognized that it is precisely on election day that advocacy and campaigning N74* "can be most effective." Mills, 384 U.S., at 219, 86 S.Ct., at 1437. Mills stands for the simple proposition that, tradition notwithstanding, the State does not have a legitimate interest in insulating voters from election-day campaigning.
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Parties: Burdick v. Takushi
Date: 1992-06-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Petitioner's right to freedom of expression is not implicated. His argument that the First Amendment confers upon citizens the right to cast a protest vote and to have government officials count and report this vote is not persuasive. As the majority points out, the purpose of casting, counting, and recording votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for political expression.
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Parties: Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement
Date: 1992-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Respondent mounts a facial challenge to the Forsyth County ordinance. It is well established that in the area of freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be subject to facial review and invalidation, even though its application in the case under consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - But a mistaken allusion in a later case to the facts of an earlier case does not by itself undermine the holding of the earlier case. The situations in Cox and Murdock were clearly different; the first involved a sliding fee to account for administrative and security costs incurred as a result of a parade on public property, while the second involved a flat tax on protected religious expression expression. I believe that the decision in Cox squarely controls the disposition of the question presented in this case, and I therefore would explicitly hold that the Constitution does not limit a parade license fee to a nominal amount.
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Parties: R. A. V. v. St. Paul
Date: 1992-06-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky, supra, 315 U.S., at 572, 62 S.Ct. at 762. We have recognized that "the freedom of speech" referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, ("fighting words")
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - N281* In broadest terms, our entire First Amendment jurisprudence creates a regime based on the content of speech. The scope of the First Amendment is determined by the content of expressive activity: Although the First Amendment broadly protects "speech," it does not protect the right to N282* fix prices, breach contracts, make false warranties, place bets with bookies, threaten, [or] extort."
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - What we have here, it must be emphasized, is not a prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause); but rather, a prohibition of fighting words that contain (as the Minnesota Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized) messages of "bias-motivated" hatred and in particular, as applied to this case, messages "based on virulent notions of racial supremacy." 464 N.W.2d, at 508, 511. One must wholeheartedly agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that "[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse communities to confront such notions in whatever form they appear," ibid., but the manner of that confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech. St. Paul's brief asserts that a general "fighting words" law would not meet the city's needs because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that the "group hatred" aspect of such speech "is not condoned by the majority." Brief for Respondent 25.The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - Obscene antigovernment" speech, then, is a contradiction in terms: If expression is antigovernment, it does not "lac[k] serious . . . political . . . value" and cannot be obscene.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all. Assuming that the Court is correct that this last class of speech is not wholly "unprotected," it certainly does not follow that fighting words and obscenity receive the same sort of protection afforded core political speech.Yet in ruling that proscribable speech cannot be regulated based on subject matter, the Court does just that.
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Segment in Paragraph: 117 - "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S., at 414, 109 S.Ct., at 2544. "Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form," Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 62, 103 S.Ct. 948, 964, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and requires particular scrutiny, in part because such regulation often indicates a legislative effort to skew public debate on an issue.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N2* we conclude that, even as narrowly construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance is facially unconstitutional. Although the phrase in the ordinance, "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others," has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction to reach only those symbols or displays that amount to "fighting words," the remaining, unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance applies only to "fighting words" that insult, or provoke violence, "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use "fighting words" in connection with other ideas—to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality—are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - A defendant being prosecuted for speech or expressive conduct may challenge the law on its face if it reaches protected expression, even when that person's activities are not protected by the First Amendment. This is because N75* "the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted."
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Segment in Paragraph: 74 - The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - N76* In answering these questions, my colleagues today wrestle with two broad principles: first, that certain "categories of expression [including 'fighting words'] are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,' " ante, at 400 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); and second, that "[c]ontent-based regulations [of expression] are presumptively invalid." Ante, at 382 (Opinion of the Court). Although in past opinions the Court has repeated both of these maxims, it has—quite rightly—adhered to neither with the absolutism suggested by my colleagues.
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - Whether a magazine is obscene, a gesture a fighting word, or a photograph child pornography is determined, in part, by its content. Even within categories of protected expression, the First Amendment status of speech is fixed by its content. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), establish that the level of protection given to speech depends upon its subject matter: speech about public officials or matters of public concern receives greater protection than speech about other topics. It can, therefore, scarcely be said that the regulation of expressive activity cannot be predicated on its content: much of our First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the assumption that content makes a difference.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - N77* constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all. Assuming that the Court is correct that this last class of speech is not wholly "unprotected," it certainly does not follow that fighting words and obscenity receive the same sort of protection afforded core political speech. Yet in ruling that proscribable speech cannot be regulated based on subject
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - N78* Admittedly, the categorical approach to the First Amendment has some appeal: either expression is protected or it is not—the categories create safe harbors for governments and speakers alike. But this approach sacrifices subtlety for clarity and is, I am convinced, ultimately unsound. As an initial matter, the concept of "categories" fits poorly with the complex reality of expression. Few dividing lines in First Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give rise only to fuzzy boundaries. Our definitions of "obscenity," see, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198, 97 S.Ct. 990, 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and "public forum," see, e.g., United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 126-131, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 2683-2686, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981); id., at 136-140, 101 S.Ct., at 2688-2691 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 147-151, 101 S.Ct., at 2694-2696 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 152-154, 101 S.Ct. at 2696-2698 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (all debating the definition of "public forum"), illustrate this all too well. The quest for doctrinal certainty through the definition of categories and subcategories is, in my opinion, destined to fail.
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Segment in Paragraph: 110 - the N79* "question whether a specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment always requires some consideration of both its content and its context." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 778, 102 S.Ct., at 3366 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 311-321, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1769-1774, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The categorical approach sweeps too broadly when it declares that all such expression is beyond the protection of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 127 - N80* The St. Paul ordinance does not ban all "hate speech," nor does it ban, say, all cross-burnings or all swastika displays. Rather it only bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words. Such a limited ordinance leaves open and protected a vast range of expression on the subjects of racial, religious, and gender equality.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - "Although the First Amendment does not apply to categories of unprotected speech, such as fighting words, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the regulation ofunprotected speech be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - A defendant being prosecuted for speech or expressive conduct may challenge the law on its face if it reaches protected expression, even when that person's activities are not protected by the First Amendment. This is because "the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted."
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Segment in Paragraph: 9 - In other words, the exclusion of "fighting words" from the scope of the First Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially a "nonspeech" element of communication. Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a N200* "mode of speech," Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282, 71 S.Ct. 325, 333, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - Even the prohibition against content discrimination that we assert the First Amendment requires is not absolute. It applies differently in the context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech. The rationale of the general prohibition, after all, is that content discrimination N201* "rais[es] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - Whether an agreement among competitors is a violation of the Sherman Act or protected activity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine hinges upon the content of the agreement. Similarly, N202* "the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say."
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - Likewise, whether speech falls within one of the categories of "unprotected" or "proscribable" expression is determined, in part, by its content. Whether a magazine is obscene, a gesture a fighting word, or a photograph child pornography is determined, in part, by its content. Even within categories of protected expression, the First Amendment status of speech is fixed by its content.
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Parties: Lee v. Weisman
Date: 1992-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - Speech is protected by insuring its full expression even when the government participates, for the very object of some of our most important speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own.
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Parties: Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
Date: 1992-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - Justice Roberts, concluding that individuals have a right to use N283* "streets and parks for communication of views," reasoned that such a right flowed from the fact that "streets and parks . . . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
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Parties: Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness
Date: 1992-06-26
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Parties: Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Date: 1992-06-29
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Parties: Rowland v. California Men's Colony
Date: 1993-01-12
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Parties: Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
Date: 1993-01-13
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Parties: Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC
Date: 1993-04-29
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Parties: Cincinnati v. Discovery Network
Date: 1993-03-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - The commercial publications at issue in this case illustrate the absurdity of treating all commercial speech as less valuable than all noncommercial speech. Respondent Harmon Publishing Company, Inc., publishes and distributes a free magazine containing listings and photographs of residential properties. Like the "For Sale" signs this Court, in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), held could not be banned, the information contained in Harmon's publication N284* "bears on one of the most important decisions [individuals] have a right to make: where to live and raise their families."
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - We then held that even speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The present case demonstrates that there is no reason to treat truthful commercial speech as a class that is less "valuable" than noncommercial speech. Respondents' publications, which respectively advertise the availability of residential properties and educational opportunities, are unquestionably "valuable" to those who choose to read them, and Cincinnati's ban on commercial newsracks should be subject to the same scrutiny we would apply to a regulation burdening noncommercial speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - The Court recognized, however, that government may regulate commercial speech in ways that it may not regulate protected noncommercial speech. See generally Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S., at 770-772, 96 S.Ct., at 1829-1831. Government may regulate commercial speech to ensure that it is not false, deceptive, or misleading, id., at 771-772, 96 S.Ct., at 1830-1831, and to ensure that it is not coercive. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 457, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1919, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). Government also may prohibit commercial speech proposing unlawful activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - In Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), this Court held that commercial N203* speech "which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' " is protected by the First Amendment, id., at 762, 96 S.Ct., at 1825, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). In so holding, the Court focused principally on the First Amendment interests of the listener. N204* The Court noted that "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate," 425 U.S., at 763, 96 S.Ct., at 1826, and that "the free flow of commercial information is indispensable . . . to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system . . . [and] to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered."
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - The majority in Central Hudson reviewed the Court's earlier commercial speech cases and concluded that the Constitution N205* "accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." 447 U.S., at 563, 100 S.Ct., at 2350. As a descriptive matter, this statement was correct, since our cases had recognized that commercial speech could be regulated on grounds that protected noncommercial speech could not. See n. 1, supra. This "lesser protection" did not rest, however, on the fact that commercial speech N206* "is of less constitutional moment than other forms of speech," as the Central Hudson majority asserted. Ibid., at n. 5. Rather, it reflected the fact that the listener's First Amendment interests, from which the protection of commercial speech largely derives, allow for certain specific kinds of government regulation that would not be permitted outside the context of commercial speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - N207* "We begin with several propositions that already are settled or beyond serious dispute. It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 [96 S.Ct. 612, 642-654, 46 L.Ed.2d 659] (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. [376], at 384 [93 S.Ct. 2553, 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973) ]; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. , at 266 [84 S.Ct. 710, 718, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ]. Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 [80 S.Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed.2d 205] (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 [72 S.Ct. 777, 780, 96 L.Ed. 1098] (1952) (motion pictures); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. , at 111 [63 S.Ct. 870, 874, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943) ] (religious literature), and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money.
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - We then held that even speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified N208* " 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' " Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).
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Parties: Edenfield v. Fane
Date: 1993-04-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - I again disengage myself from any part thereof, or inference therefrom, that commercial speech that is free from fraud or duress or the advocacy of unlawful activity is entitled to only an "intermediate level," see ante, at ____, of protection under the First Amendment's proscription of any law abridging the freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - N81* "Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (citations omitted). Even under the First Amendment's somewhat more forgiving standards for restrictions on commercial speech, a State may not curb protected expression without advancing a substantial governmental interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - "Solicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment"
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - It would also be inconsistent with this Court's general approach to the use of preventative rules in the First Amendment context. N210* "Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (citations omitted). Even under the First Amendment's somewhat more forgiving standards for restrictions on commercial speech, a State may not curb protected expression without advancing a substantial governmental interest.
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Parties: El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico
Date: 1993-05-17
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Parties: United States DOJ v. Landano
Date: 1993-05-24
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Parties: Fcc v. Beach Communications
Date: 1993-06-01
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Parties: Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.
Date: 1993-06-07
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Parties: Wisconsin v. Mitchell
Date: 1993-06-11
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Parties: Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
Date: 1993-06-11
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Parties: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.
Date: 1993-06-18
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Parties: United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.
Date: 1993-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - The Ward holding is applicable here, for we have observed that the validity of time, place, or manner restrictions is determined under standards very similar to those applicable in the commercial speech context and that it would be incompatible with the subordinate position of commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values to apply a more rigid standard to commercial speech than is applied to fully protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - While a State may indeed have an interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries, it does not necessarily follow that its interest is "substantial" enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected speech, especially one as draconian as the regulation at issue in this case. In my view, the sea change in public attitudes toward state-run lotteries that this country has witnessed in recent years undermines any claim that a State's interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries is so substantial as to outweigh respondent's First Amendment right to distribute, and the public's right to receive, truthful, nonmisleading information about a perfectly legal activity conducted in a neighboring State.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The Federal Government and the States simply do not have an overriding or "substantial" interest in seeking to discourage what virtually the entire country is embracing, and certainly not an interest that can justify a restriction on constitutionally protected speech as sweeping as the one the Court today sustains.
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Parties: CBS v. Davis
Date: 1994-02-09
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N118* "A prior restraint, by contrast . . ., has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication `chills' speech, prior restraint `freezes' it at least for the time."
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Parties: United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.
Date: 1994-02-23
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Parties: Waters v. Churchill
Date: 1994-05-31
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - "Our 'profound national commitment' to the freedom of speech," post, at 699 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), must of necessity operate differently when the government acts as employer rather than sovereign.
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - I do not doubt that the First Amendment contains within it some procedural prescriptions -- that in some circumstances, "the freedom of speech" recognized by the Constitution consisted of a right to speak unless and until certain procedures to prevent the speech had first been complied with.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - N285* Every American has the right to express an opinion on issues of public significance. In the private sector, of course, the exercise of that right may entail unpleasant consequences. Absent some contractual or statutory provision limiting its prerogatives, a private-sector employer may discipline or fire employees for speaking their minds. The First Amendment, however, demands that the government respect its employees' freedom to express their opinions on issues of public importance.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Government employee speech must be treated differently with regard to procedural requirements as well. > For example, speech restrictions must generally precisely define the speech they target. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367-368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377, 84 S. Ct. 1316 (1964); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Yet surely a public employer may, consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being "rude to customers," a standard almost certainly too vague when [**1887] applied to the public at large.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - A First Amendment claimant need not allege bad faith; the controlling question is not the regularity of the agency's investigative procedures, or the purity of its motives, [**1900] but whether the employee's freedom of speech has been "abridged."
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's plurality opinion stating that, under the Free Speech Clause, a public employer who reasonably believes a third-party report that an employee engaged in constitutionally unprotected speech may punish the employee in reliance on that report, even if it turns out that the employee's actual remarks were constitutionally protected. I add these words to emphasize that, in order to avoid liability, the public employer must not only reasonably investigate the third-party report, but must also actually believe it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - A public employer who did not really believe that the employee engaged in disruptive or otherwise punishable speech can assert no legitimate interest strong enough to justify chilling protected expression, whether the employer affirmatively disbelieved the third-party report or merely doubted its accuracy. Imposing liability on such an employer respects the N211* "longstanding recognition that the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the administration of a government office."
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - There is no dispute in this case about when speech by a government employee is protected by the First Amendment: To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the employee's interest in expressing herself on this [***695] matter must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to N212* "'the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'"
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - These cases establish a basic First Amendment principle: Government action based on protected speech may under some circumstances violate the First Amendment even if the government actor honestly believes the speech is unprotected. And though JUSTICE SCALIA suggests that this principle be limited to licensing schemes and to "deprivation[s] of the freedom of speech specifically through the judicial process," post, at 687 (emphasis in original), we do not think the logic of the cases supports such a limitation. Speech can be chilled and punished by administrative action as much as by judicial processes; in no case have we asserted or even implied the contrary.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - And under the Connick test, Churchill's speech as reported by Perkins-Graham and Ballew was unprotected. Even if Churchill's criticism of cross-training reported by Perkins-Graham and Ballew was speech on a matter of public concern -- something we need not decide -- the potential disruptiveness of the speech as reported was enough [***703] to outweigh whatever First Amendment value it might have had.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - Given the posture in which this case comes to us, we must assume that Churchill's statements were fully protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the plurality concludes that a dismissal for speech is valid as a matter of law as long as the public employer reasonably believed that the employee's speech was protected. See ante, at 677-678. This conclusion is erroneous because it provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for less exalted rights, including contractual and statutory rights applicable in the private sector.
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Parties: Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation
Date: 1994-06-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - States may prohibit inherently misleading speech entirely.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - States may not completely ban potentially misleading commercial speech if narrower limitations can ensure that the information is presented in a nonmisleading manner.
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Parties: Dolan v. City of Tigard
Date: 1994-06-24
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Parties: City of Ladue v. Gilleo
Date: 1994-06-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - While signs are a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause, they pose distinctive problems that are subject to municipalities' police powers. Unlike oral speech, signs take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation. It is common ground that governments may regulate the physical characteristics of signs just as they can, within reasonable bounds and absent censorial purpose, regulate audible expression in its capacity as noise.
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Parties: Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet
Date: 1994-06-27
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Parties: Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.
Date: 1994-06-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - N286* Petitioners' "counseling" of the clinic's patients is a form of expression analogous to labor picketing. It is a mixture of conduct and communication.N287* "In the labor context, it is the conduct element rather than the particular idea being expressed that often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment." NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 619, 100 S.Ct. 2372, 2379, 65 L.Ed.2d 377 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). As with picketing, the principal reason why handbills containing the same message are so much less effective than "counseling" is that N288* the former depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." Ibid. Just as it protects picketing, the First Amendment protects the speaker's right to offer "sidewalk counseling" to all passersby. That protection, however, does not encompass attempts to abuse an unreceptive or captive audience, at least under the circumstances of this case. One may register a public protest by placing a vulgar message on his jacket and, in so doing, expose unwilling viewers, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Nevertheless, that does not mean that he has an unqualified constitutional right to follow and harass an unwilling listener, especially one on her way to receive medical services. Cf.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The Florida Supreme Court correctly concluded:N289* "While the First Amendment confers on each citizen a powerful right to express oneself, it gives the picketer no boon to jeopardize the health, safety, and rights of others. No citizen has a right to insert a foot in the hospital or clinic door and insist on being heard—while purposefully blocking the door to those in genuine need of medical services. No picketer can force speech into the captive ear of the unwilling and disabled."
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Segment in Paragraph: 84 - Under this Court's jurisprudence, there is no question that this public sidewalk area is a "public forum," where citizens generally have a First Amendment right to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - But it is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches of persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic. Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is independently proscribable (i.e., "fighting words" or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, see Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S., at 292-293, 61 S.Ct., at 554-555, this provision cannot stand.N213* "As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide N214* adequate N215* breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."
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Parties: Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
Date: 1995-02-21
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Parties: United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emples. Union
Date: 1995-02-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - Thus, private speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employee's own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer. Id., at 148-149, 103 S.Ct., at 1690-1691. If, however, the speech does involve a matter of public concern, the Government bears the burden of justifying its adverse employment action. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2899, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1887, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994). Respondents' expressive activities in this case fall within the protected category of citizen comment on matters of public concern rather than employee comment on matters related to personal status in the workplace. The speeches and articles for which they received compensation in the past were addressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their government employment.
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Parties: United States v. X-Citement Video
Date: 1994-11-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - The Court derives its "serious constitutional doubts" from the fact that "sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of 18 are protected by the First Amendment," ante, at __. We have made it entirely clear, however, that the First Amendment protection accorded to such materials is not as extensive as that accorded to other speech. N216* "[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance. . . ."
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Parties: McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n
Date: 1995-04-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the literary realm.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry. Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Instead of asking whether "an honorable tradition" of anonymous speech has existed throughout American history, or what the "value" of anonymous speech might be, we should determine whether the phrase "freedom of speech, or of the press," as originally understood, protected anonymous political leafletting. I believe that it did.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - In this case, however, the historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated the "freedom of the press."
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - Several members of Congress then rose to oppose Gerry's motion on the ground that it invaded the freedom of the press. Merriweather Smith of Virginia rose, quoted from the offending article with approval, and then finished with a declaration that "[w]hen the liberty of the Press shall be restrained . . . the liberties of the People will be at an end." Henry Laurens, Notes of Debates, July 3, 1779, id., at 139. Supporting Smith, John Penn of North Carolina argued that the writer "no doubt had good designs," and that "[t]he liberty of the Press ought not to be restrained."
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Segment in Paragraph: 60 - To be sure, there was some controversy among newspaper editors over publishing anonymous articles and pamphlets. But this controversy was resolved in a manner that indicates that the freedom of the press protected an author's anonymity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - The understanding described above, however, when viewed in light of the Framers' universal practice of publishing anonymous articles and pamphlets, indicates that the Framers shared the belief that such activity was firmly part of the freedom of the press. It is only an innovation of modern times that has permitted the regulation of anonymous speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - The existence of a generalized right of anonymity in speech was rejected by this Court in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 33 S.Ct. 867, 57 L.Ed. 1190 (1913), which held that newspapers desiring the privilege of second class postage could be required to provide to the Postmaster General, and to publish, a statement of the names and addresses of their editors, publishers, business managers and owners.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - urgent, important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - When Federalist attempts to ban anonymity are followed by a sharp, widespread Anti-Federalist defense in the name of the freedom of the press, and then by an open Federalist retreat on the issue, I must conclude that both Anti-Federalists and Federalists believed that the freedom of the press included the right to publish without revealing the author's name.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - After reviewing the weight of the historical evidence, it seems that the Framers understood the First Amendment to protect an author's right to express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an anonymous fashion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - The Court's unprecedented protection for anonymous speech does not even have the virtue of establishing a clear (albeit erroneous) rule of law. For after having announced that this statute, because it "burdens core political speech," requires "exacting scrutiny" and must be "narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest," ante, at __ (ordinarily the kiss of death), the opinion goes on to proclaim soothingly (and unhelpfully) that "a State's enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement." Ante, at __. See also ante, at __ (GINSBURG, J., concurring) ("We do not . . . hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.") Perhaps, then, not all the State statutes I have alluded to are invalid, but just some of them; or indeed maybe all of them remain valid in "larger circumstances"! It may take decades to work out the shape of this newly expanded right-to-speak-incognito, even in the elections field. And in other areas, of course, a whole new boutique of wonderful First Amendment litigation opens its doors. Must a parade permit, for example, be issued to a group that refuses to provide its identity, or that agrees to do so only under assurance that the identity will not be made public? Must a municipally owned theater that is leased for private productions book anonymously sponsored presentations? Must a government periodical that has a "letters to the editor" column disavow the policy that most newspapers have against the publication of anonymous letters? Must a public university that makes its facilities available for a speech by Louis Farrakhan or David Duke refuse to disclose the on-campus or off-campus group that has sponsored or paid for the speech? Must a municipal "public-access" cable channel permit anonymous (and masked) performers? The silliness that follows upon a generalized right to anonymous speech has no end.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 54 - N119* When the Framers thought of the press, they did not envision the large, corporate newspaper and television establishments of our modern world. Instead, they employed the term "the press" to refer to the many independent printers who circulated small newspapers or published a writer's pamphlets for a fee. See generally B. Bailyn & J. Hench, The Press & the American Revolution (1980); L. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985); B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967).N120* "It was in this form as pamphlets—that much of the most important and characteristic writing of the American Revolution occurred." 1 B. Bailyn, Pamphlets of the American Revolution 3 (1965). This practice continued during the struggle for ratification. See, e.g., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States (P. Ford, ed. 1888). Regardless of whether one designates the right involved here as one of press or one of speech, however, it makes little difference in terms of our analysis, which seeks to determine only whether the First Amendment, as originally understood, protects anonymous writing.
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - After reviewing the weight of the historical evidence, it seems that the Framers understood the First Amendment to protect an author's right to express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an anonymous fashion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Indeed, the speech in which Mrs. McIntyre engaged—handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint is the essence of First Amendment expression. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). That this advocacy occurred in the heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the protection afforded to Ms. McIntyre's expression: urgent, important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre's.
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Segment in Paragraph: 52 - Instead of asking whether "an honorable tradition" of anonymous speech has existed throughout American history, or what the "value" of anonymous speech might be, we should determine whether the phrase "freedom of speech, or of the press," as originally understood, protected anonymous political leafletting. I believe that it did.
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Segment in Paragraph: 64 - The controversy over Federalist attempts to prohibit anonymous political speech is significant for several reasons. First, the Anti-Federalists clearly believed the right to author and publish anonymous political articles and pamphlets was protected by the liberty of the press. Second, although printers' editorial policies did not constitute state action, the Anti-Federalists believed that the Federalists were merely flexing the governmental powers they would fully exercise upon the Constitution's ratification. Third, and perhaps most significantly, it appears that the Federalists agreed with the Anti-Federalist critique. In Philadelphia, where opposition to the ban was strongest, there is no record that any newspaper adopted the non-anonymity policy, nor that of any city or State aside from Russell's Massachusetts Centinel and the Federalist Massachusetts Gazette.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind." Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960). Great works of literature have frequently been produced by authors writing under assumed names. Despite readers' curiosity and the public's interest in identifying the creator of a work of art, an author generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose her true identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry. Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - Indeed, the speech in which Mrs. McIntyre engaged—handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint is the essence of First Amendment expression. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). That this advocacy occurred in the heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the protection afforded to Ms. McIntyre's expression: urgent, important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed.
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Parties: Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.
Date: 1995-04-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - N290* I think respondent has a constitutional right to give the public accurate information about the alcoholic content of the malt beverages that it produces. I see no reason why the fact that such information is disseminated on the labels of respondent's products should diminish that constitutional protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - In my opinion the "commercial speech doctrine" is unsuited to this case, because the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) neither prevents misleading speech nor protects consumers from the dangers of incomplete information. A truthful statement about the alcohol content of malt beverages would receive full First Amendment protection in any other context; without some justification tailored to the special character of commercial speech, the Government should not be able to suppress the same truthful speech merely because it happens to appear on the label of a product for sale.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - N121* Not only does regulation of inaccurate commercial speech exclude little truthful speech from the market, but false or misleading speech in the commercial realm also lacks the value that sometimes inheres in false or misleading political speech. Transaction-driven speech usually does not touch on a subject of public debate, and thus misleading statements in that context are unlikely to engender the beneficial public discourse that flows from political controversy. Moreover, the consequences of false commercial speech can be particularly severe: investors may lose their savings, consumers may purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that do not work as advertised. Finally, because commercial speech often occurs in the place of sale, consumers may respond to the falsehood before there is time for more speech and considered reflection to minimize the risks of being misled.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of most other speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The First Amendment generally protects the right not to speak as well as the right to speak. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1511, ----, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1995) (slip op., at 7); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974); cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 51-52, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2486-2487, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985). In the commercial context, however, government is not only permitted to prohibit misleading speech that would be protected in other contexts, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-772, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830-1831, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), but it often requires affirmative disclosures that the speaker might not make voluntarily.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - In Central Hudson, the Court held that commercial speech is categorically distinct from other speech protected by the First Amendment. 447 U.S., at 561-566 and n. 5, 100 S.Ct., at 2348-2351 and n. 5. Defining N218* "commercial speech," alternatively, as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," id., at 561, 100 S.Ct., at 2348, and as N219* " 'speech proposing a commercial transaction,' " id., at 562, 100 S.Ct., at 2349, quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918-1919, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978), the Court adopted its much-quoted four-part test for determining when the government may abridge such expression. In my opinion the borders of the commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed, and its four-part test is not related to the reasons for allowing more regulation of commercial speech than other speech.
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Parties: McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co.
Date: 1995-09-21
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Parties: Hurley v. Irish-American Gay
Date: 1995-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - N291* "Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid," Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11, 106 S.Ct. 903, 909, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original), one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide "what not to say," id., at 16, 106 S.Ct., at 912. N292* Although the State may at times "prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial adver-tising" by requiring the dissemination of "purely factual and uncontroversial information," Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 2281, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386-387, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2559-2560, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973), outside that context it may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees, see Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1187. Indeed this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N293* The plurality made the further point that if "the government [were] freely able to compel . . . speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree, . . . protection [of a speaker's freedom] would be empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next." Id., at 16, 106 S.Ct., at 912. Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is compromised.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - N82* The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and songs, however, for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression. Noting that N83* "[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas," West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), our cases have recognized that the First Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so), id., at 632, 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1182, 1187, wearing an arm band to protest a war, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 735-736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931), and even N84* "[m]arching, walking or parading" in uniforms displaying the swastika, National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977). As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a "particularized message," cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (per curiam ), would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech. Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication. Cable operators, for example, are engaged in protected speech activities even when they only select programming originally produced by others. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2456, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (slip op., at 11) ("Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment"). For that matter, the presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons is a staple of most newspapers' opinion pages, which, of course, fall squarely within the core of First Amendment security, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2840, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), as does even the simple selection of a paid noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a daily paper, see New York Times, 376 U.S., at 265-266, 84 S.Ct., at 718-719. The selection of contingents to make a parade is entitled to similar protection.
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Parties: United States v. Aguilar
Date: 1995-06-21
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Parties: Fla. Bar v. Went for It
Date: 1995-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - That is why under the First Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence. N115* "[T]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented." Edenfield, 507 U.S., at ---- [113 S.Ct., at 1798]. By validating Florida's rule, today's majority is complicit in the Bar's censorship. For these reasons, I dissent from the opinion of the Court and from its judgment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - But we do not allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener. On the contrary, we have said that these N85* "are classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Attorneys who communicate their willingness to assist potential clients are engaged in speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - But we do not allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener. On the contrary, we have said that these N220* "are classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment." Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 701, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2024, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). And in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), where we struck down a ban on attorney advertising, we held that N221* "the mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising . . . offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity."
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - We have applied this principle to direct mail cases as well as with respect to general advertising, noting that the right to use the mails is protected by the First Amendment. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2885-86, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring) (citing Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971). In Bolger, we held that a statute designed to N222* " shiel[d] recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to find offensive" furthered an interest of "little weight," noting that "we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression."
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Parties: Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton
Date: 1995-06-26
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Parties: Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette
Date: 1995-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - Thus our cases protecting the individual's freedom to engage in communicative conduct on public property (whether by speaking, parading, handbilling, waving a flag, or carrying a banner), e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938), or to send messages from her own property by placing a sign in the window of her home, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2046-2047, do not establish the right to implant a physical structure (whether a campaign poster, a burning cross, or a statue of Elvis Presley) on public property.
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Segment in Paragraph: 94 - That the State may have granted a variety of groups permission to engage in uncensored expressive activities in front of the capitol building does not, in my opinion, qualify or contradict the normal inference of endorsement that the reasonable observer would draw from the unattended, freestanding sign or symbol. Indeed, parades and demonstrations at or near the seat of government are often exercises of the right of the people to petition their government for a redress of grievances—exercises in which the government is the recipient of the message rather than the messenger.
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - N294* The right to use government property for one's private expression depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-803, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3449, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). If the former, a State's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed: it may impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions (a ban on all unattended displays, which did not exist here, might be one such), but it may regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - N295* Thus our cases protecting the individual's freedom to engage in communi- cative conduct on public property (whether by speaking, parading, handbilling, waving a flag, or carrying a banner), e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938), or to send messages from her own property by placing a sign in the window of her home, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2046-2047, do not establish the right to implant a physical structure (whether a campaign poster, a burning cross, or a statue of Elvis Presley) on public property.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince. Accordingly, we have not excluded from free-speech protections religious proselytizing, Heffron, supra, at 647, 101 S.Ct., at 2563-2564, or even acts of worship, Widmar, supra, at 269, n. 6, 102 S.Ct., at 274, n. 6. Petitioners do not dispute that respondents, in displaying their cross, were engaging in constitutionally protected expression. They do contend that the constitutional protection does not extend to the length of permitting that expression to be made on Capitol Square.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - A government entity may ban posters on publicly owned utility poles to eliminate visual clutter, City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2130, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), and may bar camping as part of a demonstration in certain public parks, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). It may similarly adopt a content-neutral policy prohibiting private individuals and groups from erecting unattended displays in forums around public buildings. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) N223* ("[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided [that] the restrictions N224* 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information,' " quoting Clark, supra, at 293, 104 S.Ct., at 3069).
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - It is undeniable, of course, that speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the State. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 2685, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 44, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). The right to use government property for one's private expression depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses.
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Parties: Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.
Date: 1995-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 41 - The viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University's regulation required public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and belief. That course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N122* A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's own speech, which is controlled by different principles.
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Parties: Morse v. Republican Party
Date: 1996-03-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 172 - Among the constitutional questions raised by this decision are ones relating to freedom of political association. "The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 612, 632, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Political parties, and their supporters, enjoy this constitutional right of political affiliation. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487, 95 S.Ct. 541, 547, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975). "[A]t the very heart of the freedom of assembly and association," is "[t]he right of members of a political party to gather in a . . . political convention in order to formulate proposed programs and nominate candidates for political office." Id., at 491, 95 S.Ct., at 549 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). A convention to nominate a party candidate is perhaps the classic forum for individual expression of political views and for association with like-minded persons for the purpose of advancing those views.
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Parties: 44 Liquormart v. R.I.
Date: 1996-05-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - Justice Stevens delivered the principal opinion with respect to Parts III-VI, concluding that Rhode Island's ban on advertisements that provide the public with accurate information about retail liquor prices is an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of speech. Pp.
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - the Court explained that government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially his interest in freedom of speech." Id., at 597. That teaching clearly applies to state attempts to regulate commercial speech, as our cases striking down bans on truthful, nonmisleading speech by licensed professionals attest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - As one commentator has explained: N196* "The entire commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods and services." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Section(s) 12-15, p. 903 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, as we explained in Linmark, the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at "the substance of the information communicated" rather than the "commercial aspect of [it]-with offerors communicating offers to offerees."
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N296* As one commentator has explained: N297* The entire commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods and services." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Section(s) 12-15, p. 903 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, as we explained in Linmark, the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at N298* "the substance of the information communicated" rather than the "commercial aspect of [it]-with offerors communicating offers to offerees."
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - The Court opined that false or misleading advertising was not protected, on the grounds that the accuracy of advertising claims may be more readily verifiable than is the accuracy of political or other claims, and that "commercial" speech is made more durable by its profit motive. Id., at 771, and n. 24. The Court also made clear that it did not envision protection for advertising that proposes an illegal transaction.
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in colonial days, the public relied on "commercial speech" for vital information about the market. Early newspapers displayed advertisements for goods and services on their front pages, and town criers called out prices in public squares. See J. Wood, The Story of Advertising 21, 45-69, 85 (1958); J. Smith, Printers and Press Freedom 49 (1988). Indeed, commercial messages played such a central role in public life prior to the Founding that Benjamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support of his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - N86* Virginia Pharmacy Bd. attributed the State's authority to impose these regulations in part to certain "commonsense differences" that exist between commercial messages and other types of protected expression. 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24. Our opinion noted that the greater "objectivity" of commercial speech justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, ibid. and that the greater "hardiness" of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - In Virginia State Bd. ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), this Court held that speech that does N225* "`no more than propose a commercial transaction'" was protected by the First Amendment, and struck down a ban on price advertising regarding prescription drugs.
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - The Court opined that false or misleading advertising was not protected, on the grounds that the accuracy of advertising claims may be more readily verifiable than is the accuracy of political or other claims, and that "commercial" speech is made more durable by its profit motive.
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Parties: Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fec
Date: 1996-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor."
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Segment in Paragraph: 80 - In sum, unlike the Buckley Court, I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon freedom of political expression and association as do expenditure limits.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant difference between campaign contributions and expenditures: both forms of speech are central to the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - Moreover, we have recently recognized that where the "proxy" speech is endorsed by those who give, that speech is a fully-protected exercise of the donors' associational rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 81 - Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant difference between campaign contributions and expenditures: both forms of speech are central to the First Amendment. Curbs on protected speech, we have repeatedly said, must be strictly scrutinized. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NCPAC, supra, at 501; Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S., at 294; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978). I am convinced that under traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both spending and giving in the political process, like Section(s) 441a(d)(3), are unconstitutional.
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Parties: Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr
Date: 1996-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - Those precedents have long since rejected Justice Holmes' famous dictum, that a policeman N299* may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517 (1892). Recognizing that "constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or `chilling,' effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights," Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 11 (1972), our modern "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine holds that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech" even if he has no entitlement to that benefit, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972).
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Parties: O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake
Date: 1996-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 53 - The penultimate paragraph of that portion of the O'Hare opinion which sets forth the general principles of law governing the case, see ante, at 6-7, advises that henceforth N201* "the freedom of speech" alluded to in the Bill of Rights will be divided into two categories: (1) the "right of free speech," where "we apply the balancing test from Pickering," and (since this "right of free speech" presumably does not exhaust the Free Speech Clause), (2) "political affiliation," where we apply the rigid rule of Elrod and Branti.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - If one is so sanguine as to believe that facts involving the N202* "right of free speech" and facts involving "political affiliation" can actually be segregated into separate categories, there arises, of course, the problem of what to do when both are involved.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - The Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public employee has no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First Amendment rights, a doctrine once captured in Justice Holmes' aphorism that although a policeman N300* "may have a constitutional right to talk politics . . . he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517 (1892). A State may not condition public employment on an employee's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights.
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - N228* "[I]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. That would allow the government to N229* 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible." Perry v. Sindermann, supra, at 597, quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526 (1958). Absent some reasonably appropriate requirement, government may not make public employment subject to the express condition of political beliefs or prescribed expression.
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Parties: Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. Fcc
Date: 1996-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - N142* Because the cable access provisions are part of a scheme that restricts operators' free speech rights and expands the speaking opportunities of programmers who have no underlying constitutional right to speak through the cable medium, the programmers cannot challenge the scheme, or a particular part of it, as an abridgment of their "freedom of speech." Sections operator would have absent Government regulation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 199 - N143* Like a free-lance writer seeking a paper in which to publish newspaper editorials, a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 256-258. Likewise, the rights of would-be viewers are derivative of the speech rights of operators and programmers. Cf. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 756-757 (1976) ("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both"). Viewers have a general right to see what a willing operator transmits, but, under Tornillo and Pacific Gas, they certainly have no right to force an unwilling operator to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - Although indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment, the Government may have a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech on such a pervasive medium.
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Segment in Paragraph: 192 - N197* >We thus endowed the public with a right of access N198* "to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences." Id., at 390. That public right left broadcasters with substantial, but not complete, First Amendment protection of their editorial discretion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 198 - N199* In Red Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public interest and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the abstract. Under that view,N200* "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 395 U. S., at 390. After Turner, however, that view can no longer be given any credence in the cable context. It is the operator's right that is preeminent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 218 - Cable systems are not public property. Cable systems are privately owned and privately managed, and petitioners point to no case in which we have held that government may designate private property as a public forum. The public forum doctrine is a rule governing claims of "a right of access to public property," Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 44, and has never been thought to extend beyond property generally understood to belong to the government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 144 - N123* N124* In providing public access channels under their franchise agreements, cable operators therefore are not exercising their own First Amendment rights. They serve as conduits for the speech of others. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 87 (1980).
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Segment in Paragraph: 207 - N125* Under that view, content-neutral governmental impositions on an operator's editorial discretion may be sustained only if they further an important governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech and are no greater than is essential to further the asserted interest.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - In cable, the operators (e.g.,Comcast, Cox) are the speakers, not those who create the content on public access channels nor the viewers. The majority argues that because the cable regulations at issue in the case expand content creators expression and restrict that of the cable operators, creators cannot claim abrdigment of their speech, even if the rules limit what they can do and say in their programming. N301* Because the cable access provisions are part of a scheme that restricts operators' free speech rights and expands the speaking opportunities of programmers who have no underlying constitutional right to speak through the cable medium, the programmers cannot challenge the scheme, or a particular part of it, as an abridgment of their "freedom of speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 164 - N302* We have allowed content-based limitations of public forums, but only when necessary to serve specific institutional ends. See Perry, 460 U. S., at 48 (school mailboxes, if considered designated public forums, could be limited to mailings from "organizations that engage in activities of interest and educational relevance to students"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 267-268, n. 5 (1981) (recognizing a public university could limit the use of its facilities by reasonable regulations compatible with its mission of education); Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175, n. 8 (1976) (in assessing a teacher's right to speak at a school board meeting, considering it obvious that "public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter"). The power to limit or redefine forums for a specific legitimate purpose, see Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8), does not allow the government to exclude certain speech or speakers from them for any reason at all.
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Segment in Paragraph: 168 - N303* N304* Giving government free rein to exclude speech it dislikes by delimiting public forums (or common carriage provisions) would have pernicious effects in the modern age. Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media. Cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 737 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). The extent of public entitlement to participate in those means of communication may be changed as technologies change; and in expanding those entitlements the Government has no greater right to discriminate on suspect grounds than it does when it effects a ban on speech against the backdrop of the entitlements to which we have been more accustomed.
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Segment in Paragraph: 198 - N305* N306* when there is a conflict, a programmer's asserted right to transmit over an operator's cable system must give way to the operator's editorial discretion. Drawing an analogy to the print media, for example, the author of a book is protected in writing the book, but has no right to have the book sold in a particular book store without the store owner's consent. Nor can government force the editor of a collection of essays to print other essays on the same subject.
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Segment in Paragraph: 199 - N307* N308* We implicitly recognized in Turner that the programmer's right to compete for channel space is derivative of, and subordinate to, the operator's editorial discretion. Like a free-lance writer seeking a paper in which to publish newspaper editorials, a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted.
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Segment in Paragraph: 199 - N309* N310* Viewers have a general right to see what a willing operator transmits, but, under Tornillo and Pacific Gas, they certainly have no right to force an unwilling operator to speak.
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Segment in Paragraph: 211 - N311* Because the access provisions are part of a scheme that restricts the free speech rights of cable operators, and expands the speaking opportunities of access programmers, who have no underlying constitutional right to speak through the cable medium, I do not believe that access programmers can challenge the scheme, or a particular part of it, as an abridgment of their "freedom of speech." Outside the public forum doctrine, discussed infra, at 15-21, government intervention that grants access programmers an opportunity to speak that they would not otherwise enjoy-and which does not directly limit programmers' underlying speech rights-cannot be an abridgement of the same programmers' First Amendment rights, even if the new speaking opportunity is content-based.
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Segment in Paragraph: 233 - Also, petitioners' claim is in tension with the constitutional principle that Congress may not impose a remedy that is more restrictive than necessary to satisfy its asserted compelling interest and with their own arguments pressing that very principle. Cf. R. A. V., supra, at 402 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (though the N87* "overbreadth doctrine has the redeeming virtue of attempting to avoid the chilling of protected expression," an underbreadth challenge "serves no desirable function").
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Segment in Paragraph: 172 - N226* "[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." 403 U. S., at 26. The same is true of forbidding programs indecent in some respect. In artistic or political settings, indecency may have strong communicative content, protesting conventional norms or giving an edge to a work by conveying "otherwise inexpressible emotions," Ibid. In scientific programs, the more graphic the depiction (even if to the point of offensiveness), the more accurate and comprehensive the portrayal of the truth may be. Indecency often is inseparable from the ideas and viewpoints conveyed, or separable only with loss of truth or expressive power. Under our traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, factors perhaps justifying some restriction on indecent cable programming may all be taken into account without derogating this category of protected speech as marginal.
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Segment in Paragraph: 215 - N227* Whether viewed as the creation of a common carrier scheme or simply as a regulatory restriction on cable operators' editorial discretion, the net effect is the same: operators' speech rights are restricted to make room for access programmers. Consequently, the fact that the leased access provisions impose a form of common carrier obligation on cable operators does not alter my view that Congress' leased access scheme burdens the constitutionally protected speech rights of cable operators in order to expand the speaking opportunities of access programmers, but does not independently burden the First Amendment rights of programmers or viewers.
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Parties: Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network
Date: 1997-02-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - TThe most important holding in today's opinion is tucked away in the seeming detail of the "cease-and-desist'' discussion in the penultimate paragraph of analysis: There is no right to be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while seeking entrance to or exit from abortion clinics.
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - Thus, the Court's statements about what "the District Court was entitled to conclude'' are not only speculative (which is fatal enough) but positively contrary to the record of what the District Court did conclude-which was that permitting a few demonstrators within the buffer zone was perfectly acceptable, except when it would infringe the clinic employees' and patrons' right to be free of unwanted speech on public streets. In fact, the District Court expressly stated that if in the future it found that a complete ban on speech within the buffer zone were necessary, it would impose one.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - N231* "As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - There is no right to be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while seeking entrance to or exit from abortion clinics. Ante, at __-__. "As we said in Madsen [v.Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994)], quoting from Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 322, 108 S.Ct., at 1164, N230* [a]s a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'''
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public forum. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1164, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1708-1709, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). On the other hand, we have before us a record that shows physically abusive conduct, harassment of the police that hampered law enforcement, and the tendency of even peaceful conversations to devolve into aggressive and sometimes violent conduct. In some situations, a record of abusive conduct makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public sidewalk permissible.
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Parties: Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fcc
Date: 1997-03-31
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Parties: Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party
Date: 1997-04-28
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Parties: Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona
Date: 1997-03-03
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Parties: Agostini v. Felton
Date: 1997-06-23
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Parties: Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott
Date: 1997-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - N203* N204* Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision that had cited our decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), see Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429 (C.A.9 1993), the court began by stating that the "First Amendment right of freedom of speech includes a right not to be compelled to render financial support for others' speech.''
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - The Court today finds no First Amendment right to be free of coerced subsidization of commercial speech, for two principal reasons. First, the Court finds no discernible element of speech in the implementation of the Government's marketing orders, beyond what it sees as "germane'' to the undoubtedly valid, nonspeech elements of the orders. Second, the Court in any event takes the position that a person who is neither barred from saying what he wishes, nor subject to personal attribution of speech he dislikes, has no First Amendment objection to mandatory subsidization of speech unless it is ideological or political or contains a message with which the objecting person disagrees.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - N312* The general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid . . . ''
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The Court's second misemployment of Abood and its successors is its reliance on them for the proposition that when government neither forbids speech nor attributes it to an objector, it may compel subsidization for any objectionable message that is not political or ideological. But this, of course, is entirely at odds with the principle that speech significant enough to be protected at some level is outside the government's power to coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further justification.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - While it is perfectly true that cases like Abood and Keller did involve political or ideological speech, and the Court made reference to that character in explaining the gravity of the First Amendment interests at stake, nothing in those cases suggests that government has free rein to compel funding of nonpolitical speech (which might include art, for example, as well as commercial advertising).
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - While an individual's First Amendment interest in commercial speech, and thus the government's burden in justifying a regulation of it, may well be less weighty than the interest in ideological speech, Abood continues to stand for the proposition that being compelled to make expenditures for protected speech N126* "works no less an infringement of . . . constitutional rights'' than being prohibited from making such expenditures.
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - In numerous cases, this Court has recognized that paying money for the purposes of advertising involves speech. The Court also has recognized that compelling speech raises a First Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech. Given these two elemental principles of our First Amendment jurisprudence, it is incongruous to suggest that forcing fruit-growers to contribute to a collective advertising campaign does not even involve speech, while at the same time effectively conceding that forbidding a fruit-grower from making those same contributions voluntarily would violate the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Requiring a profession of disagreement is likewise at odds with our holding two Terms ago that no articulable message is necessary for expression to be protected, Hurley, 515 U.S., at 569, 115 S.Ct. at ----; protection of speech is not limited to clear-cut propositions subject to assent or contradiction, but covers a broader sphere of expressive preference.What counts here, then, is not whether respondents fail to disagree with the generalized message of the generic ads that California fruit is good, but that they do indeed deny that the general message is as valuable and worthy of their support as more particular claims about the merits of their own brands. One need not "disagree'' with an abstractionist when buying a canvas from a representational painter; one merely wishes to support a different act of expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The Court's second misemployment of Abood and its successors is its reliance on them for the proposition that when government neither forbids speech nor attributes it to an objector, it may compel subsidization for any objectionable message that is not political or ideological. But this, of course, is entirely at odds with the principle that speech significant enough to be protected at some level is outside the government's power to coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further justification. Supra, at __-__. Since a commercial speaker (who does not mislead) may generally promote commerce as he sees fit, the government requires some justification (such as its necessity for otherwise valid regulation) before it may force him to subsidize commercial speech to which he objects. While it is perfectly true that cases like Abood and Keller did involve political or ideological speech, and the Court made reference to that character in explaining the gravity of the First Amendment interests at stake, nothing in those cases suggests that government has free rein to compel funding of nonpolitical speech (which might include art, for example, as well as commercial advertising).
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - N233* While an individual's First Amendment interest in commercial speech, and thus the government's burden in justifying a regulation of it, may well be less weighty than the interest in ideological speech, Abood continues to stand for the proposition that being compelled to make expenditures for N234* protected speech "works no less an infringement of . . . constitutional rights'' than being prohibited from making such expenditures. Abood, 431 U.S., at 234, 97 S.Ct., at 1799. The fact that no prior case of this Court has applied this principle to commercial and nonideological speech simply reflects the fortuity that this is the first commercial-speech subsidy case to come before us.
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Parties: City of Boerne v. Flores
Date: 1997-06-25
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Parties: Reno v. Aclu
Date: 1997-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - N136* The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - Thus, the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under the CDA is to refrain completely from using indecent speech. But this forced silence impinges on the First Amendment right of adults to make and obtain this speech and, for all intents and purposes, N205* reduce[s] the adult population [on the Internet] to reading only what is fit for children.''
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - N88* ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment'').
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that N89* " [s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.'' Sable, 492 U.S., at 126, 109 S.Ct., at 2836. See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2024, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) (" [W]here obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression''). Indeed, Pacifica itself admonished that "the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.'' 438 U.S., at 745, 98 S.Ct., at 3038.
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - The first of these makes it a crime to knowingly send a patently offensive message or image to a specific person under the age of 18 ("specific person'' provision). §223(d)(1)(A). The second criminalizes the display of patently offensive messages or images "in a[ny] manner available'' to minors ("display'' provision). §223(d)(1)(B). None of these provisions purports to keep indecent (or patently offensive) material away from adults, who have a First Amendment right to obtain this speech. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (N235* "Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment").
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that N236* " [s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.'' Sable, 492 U.S., at 126, 109 S.Ct., at 2836. See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2024, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) N237* (" [W]here obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression''). Indeed, Pacifica itself admonished that N238* "the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.''
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Parties: Bogan v. Scott-Harris
Date: 1998-03-03
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Parties: Crawford-El v. Britton
Date: 1998-05-04
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Parties: Ark. Educ. Tv Comm'n v. Forbes
Date: 1998-05-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - Were it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the one hand, and First Amendment liability, on the other, a public television broadcaster might choose not to air candidates' views at all. A broadcaster might decide N206* "'the safe course is to avoid controversy,' . . . N207* and by so doing diminish the free flow of information and ideas.'' Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 512 U.S., at 656, 114 S.Ct., at 2466 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2839, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974)). In this circumstance, a N208* " [g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.'''
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - When a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity. Cf.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Although programming decisions often involve the compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communicative acts.
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Parties: Calderon v. Ashmus
Date: 1998-05-26
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Parties: Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller
Date: 1998-05-26
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Parties: Fec v. Akins
Date: 1998-06-01
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Parties: Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
Date: 1998-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - As the sponsors of §954(d)(1) noted in urging rejection of the Rohrabacher Amendment, "if we start down that road of prohibiting categories of expression, categories which are indeed constitutionally protected speech, where do we end? Where one Member's aversions end, others with different sensibilities and with different values begin.'' 136 Cong. Rec. 28624 (statement of Rep. Coleman); see also id., at 28663 (statement of Rep. Williams) (arguing that the Rohrabacher Amendment would prevent the funding of Jasper Johns' flag series, "The Merchant of Venice,'' "Chorus Line,'' "Birth of a Nation,'' and the "Grapes of Wrath''). In contrast, before the vote on §954(d)(1), one of its sponsors stated: "If we have done one important thing in this amendment, it is this. We have maintained the integrity of freedom of expression in the United States.''
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.'' U.S. Const., Amdt. 1 (emphasis added). To abridge is "to contract, to diminish; to deprive of.'' T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796). With the enactment of §954(d)(1), Congress did not abridge the speech of those who disdain the beliefs and values of the American public, nor did it abridge indecent speech. Those who wish to create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they were before the enactment of this statute. Avant-garde artistes such as respondents remain entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it. It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with measures ""aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'''
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - Nonetheless it is constitutional, as is the congressional determination to favor decency and respect for beliefs and values over the opposite. Because such favoritism does not "abridge'' anyone's freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - Given this congressional choice to sustain freedom of expression, Rosenberger teaches that the First Amendment forbids decisions based on viewpoint popularity. So long as Congress chooses to subsidize expressive endeavors at large, it has no business requiring the NEA to turn down funding applications of artists and exhibitors who devote their "freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry'' to defying our tastes, our beliefs, or our values.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - N116* In contrast, the "decency and respect'' criteria do not silence speakers by expressly "threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.'' See ibid. Thus, we do not perceive a realistic danger that §954(d)(1) will compromise First Amendment values.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First Amendment protection. See, e.g.,Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2345, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (remarking that examples of painting, music, and poetry are N90* "unquestionably shielded''); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) N91* ("Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment''); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2181, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) ("Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee''); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-120, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 2684, 37 L.Ed.2d 492 (1973) (" [P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection''). The constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political significance that may be attributable to such productions, though they may indeed comment on the political, but simply on their expressive character, which falls within a spectrum of protected "speech'' extending outward from the core of overtly political declarations. Put differently, art is entitled to full protection because our "cultural life,'' just like our native politics, "rests upon [the] ideal'' of governmental viewpoint neutrality.
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Segment in Paragraph: 61 - N92* "Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment,'' Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), and except when protecting children from exposure to indecent material, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978), the First Amendment has never been read to allow the government to rove around imposing general standards of decency, see, e.g.,Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (striking down on its face a statute that regulated "indecency'' on the Internet). Because N93* "the normal definition of "indecent' . . . refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality,'' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 740, 98 S.Ct., at 3035, restrictions turning on decency, especially those couched in terms of "general standards of decency,'' are quintessentially viewpoint based: they require discrimination on the basis of conformity with mainstream mores.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - N94* We recognize, of course, that reference to these permissible applications would not alone be sufficient to sustain the statute against respondents' First Amendment challenge. But neither are we persuaded that, in other applications, the language of §954(d)(1) itself will give rise to the suppression of protected expression. Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - N239* N240* N241* ("Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee''); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-120, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 2684, 37 L.Ed.2d 492 (1973) N242* (" [P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection'').
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - The constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political significance that may be attributable to such productions, though they may indeed comment on the political, but simply on their expressive character, which falls within a spectrum of protected "speech" extending outward from the core of overtly political declarations. Put differently, art is entitled to full protection because our "cultural life,'' just like our native politics, "rests upon [the] ideal'' of governmental viewpoint neutrality. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2458-2459, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - N243* "[O]bscenity is without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be funded''
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Parties: Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found.
Date: 1999-01-12
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - 'Total disclosure'" has been recognized as the "'essential cornerstone'" to effective campaign finance reform, id., at 39, and "fundamental to the political system," H. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform 164 (4th ed. 1992). In light of these many and substantial benefits of disclosure, we have upheld regulations requiring disclosure and reporting of amounts spent by candidates for election, amounts contributed to candidates, and the names of contributors, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 60-84, while holding that the First Amendment protects the right of the political speaker to spend his money to amplify his speech, see id., at 44-59.
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Parties: Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
Date: 1999-02-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - It is well settled that "freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country."
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Parties: Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States
Date: 1999-06-14
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - Given the special federal interest in protecting the welfare of Native Americans, see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-217, 94 L. Ed. 2d 244, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987), we recognize that there may be valid reasons for imposing commercial regulations on non-Indian businesses that differ from those imposed on tribal enterprises. It does not follow, however, that those differences also justify abridging non-Indians' freedom of speech more severely than the freedom of their tribal competitors. For HN12the power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct.
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Parties: Tex. v. Lesage
Date: 1999-11-29
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Parties: L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.
Date: 1999-12-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - For even though government may withhold a particular benefit entirely, it "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests -- especially his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Prototypical exceptions to this traditional rule are First Amendment challenges to statutes based on First Amendment overbreadth. N95* "At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech . . . the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing N96* 'attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.'"
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Parties: Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Pac
Date: 2000-01-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - N10* In the end, Buckley 's claim that contribution limits "d[o] not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante , at 6), ignores the distinct role of candidate organizations as a means of individual participation in the Nation's civic dialogue. The result is simply the suppression of political speech.By depriving donors of their right to speak through the candidate, contribution limits relegate donors' points of view to less effective modes of communication. Additionally, limiting contributions curtails individual participation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 73 - The Court did not even attempt to claim that contribution limits do not suppress the speech of political candidates. See 424 U. S., at 18 ("[C]ontribution ... limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by ... candidates"); id ., at 33 ("[T]he [contribution] limitations may have a significant effect on particular challengers or incumbents"). It could not have, given the reality that donations "mak[e] a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process."
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - I begin with a proposition that ought to be unassailable: Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection.
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - The limits directly suppress the political speech of both contributors and candidates, and only clumsily further the governmental interests that they allegedly serve. They are crudely tailored because they are massively overinclusive, prohibiting all donors who wish to contribute in excess of the cap from doing so and restricting donations without regard to whether the donors pose any real corruption risk.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - say what one pleasesThe right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, or to fund "speech by proxy," certainly merits significant constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection. See, e.g. , Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966); Whitney v. California , 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *422; Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 28 (1954); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 20 (1971); Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in The Bill of Rights in the Modern State 304-307 (G. Stone, R. Epstein, & C. Sunstein eds. 1992). The Founders sought to protect the rights of individuals to engage in political speech because a self-governing people depends upon the free exchange of political information. And that free exchange should receive the most protection when it matters the most--during campaigns for elective office.N266* "The value and efficacy of [the right to elect the members of government] depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively."
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - donations to political organizationsIn the end, Buckley 's claim that contribution limits "d[o] not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante , at 6), ignores the distinct role of candidate organizations as a means of individual participation in the Nation's civic dialogue. The result is simply the suppression of political speech. By depriving donors of their right to speak through the candidate, contribution limits relegate donors' points of view to less effective modes of communication. Additionally, limiting contributions curtails individual participation. "Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or standing in front of one's house with a hand-held sign may make the difference between participating and not participating in some public debate."
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - The right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, or to fund "speech by proxy," certainly merits significant constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern--not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech. Through contributions the contributor associates himself with the candidate's cause, helps the candidate communicate a political message with which the contributor agrees, and helps the candidate win by attracting the votes of similarly minded voters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - >Without the assistance of the speech-by-proxy argument, the remainder of Buckley 's rationales founder. Those rationales--that the N97* "quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution," Buckley v. Valeo, supra , at 21 (quoted ante , at 6), that N98* "the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante , at 6), and that N99* "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante , at 6)--still rest on the proposition that speech by proxy is not fully protected. These contentions simply ignore that a contribution, by amplifying the voice of the candidate, helps to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey. Absent the ability to rest on the denigration of contributions as mere "proxy speech," the arguments fall apart.
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - And, inasmuch as the speech-by-proxy argument was disconnected from the realities of political speech to begin with, it is not surprising that we have firmly rejected it since Buckley . In Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480 (1985), we cast aside the argument that a contribution does not represent the constitutionally protected speech of a contributor, recognizing N244* "that the contributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their money." Id. , at 495.
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - Those rationales--that the "quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution," Buckley v. Valeo, supra , at 21 (quoted ante , at 6), that N246* N247* "the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante , at 6), and thatN248* "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante , at 6)--still rest on the proposition that speech by proxy is not fully protected. These contentions simply ignore that a contribution, by amplifying the voice of the candidate, helps to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey. Absent the ability to rest on the denigration of contributions as mere "proxy speech," the arguments fall apart.
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - In the end, contribution limitations find support only in the proposition that other means will not be as effective at rooting out corruption. But when it comes to a significant infringement on our fundamental liberties, that some undesirable conduct may not be deterred is an insufficient justification to sweep in vast amounts of protected political speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - Under these circumstances, a presumption against constitutionality is out of place. I recognize that Buckley used language that could be interpreted to the contrary. It said, for example, that it rejected N249* N250* "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others." 424 U. S., at 48 -49. But those words cannot be taken literally. The Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the many--in Congress, for example, where constitutionally protected debate, Art. I, 6, is limited to provide every Member an equal opportunity to express his or her views.
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Parties: Bd. of Regents v. Southworth
Date: 2000-03-22
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Segment in Paragraph: 24 - The objecting teachers alleged that the union's use of their fees to engage in political speech violated their freedom of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 213. The Court agreed and held that any objecting teacher could "prevent the Union's spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative."
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - " In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), we rejected a shopping mall owner's blanket claim that N209* "a private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others." Id., at 85 (footnote omitted). We then upheld the right of individuals to exercise state-protected rights of expression on a shopping mall owner's property, noting among other things that there was no danger that such a requirement would N210* "'dampe[n] the vigor and limi[t] the variety of public debate.'"
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - The First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.
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Segment in Paragraph: 46 - We then upheld the right of individuals to exercise state-protected rights of expression on a shopping mall owner's property
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Parties: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.
Date: 2000-03-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review and reversed, concluding that the public nudity provisions of the ordinance violated respondent's rights to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 553 Pa. 348, 719 A. 2d 273 (1998). The Pennsylvania court first inquired whether nude dancing constitutes expressive conduct that is within the protection of the First Amendment. The court noted that the act of being nude, in and of itself, is not entitled to First Amendment protection because it conveys no message. Id., at 354, 719 A. 2d, at 276. Nude dancing, however, is expressive conduct that is entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment, a view that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted was endorsed by eight Members of this Court in Barnes.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The fact that this censorship may have a laudable ulterior purpose cannot mean that censorship is not censorship.
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - Correct analysis of the issue in this case should begin with the proposition that nude dancing is a species of expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. As Chief Judge Posner has observed, nude dancing fits well within a broad, cultural tradition recognized as expressive in nature and entitled to First Amendment protection. See 904 F.2d, at 1089 1104; see also Note, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1844 (1997). The nudity of the dancer is both a component of the protected expression and the specific target of the ordinance. It is pure sophistry to reason from the premise that the regulation of the nudity component of nude dancing is unrelated to the message conveyed by nude dancers.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - While the doctrinal theories behind "incidental burdens" and "secondary effects" are, of course, not identical, there is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to ban public nudity (even though such a ban may place incidental burdens on some protected speech) and at the same time recognizing that one specific occurrence of public nudity nude erotic dancing is particularly problematic because it produces harmful secondary effects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 50 - Far more important than the question whether nude dancing is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment are the dramatic changes in legal doctrine that the Court endorses today. Until now, the "secondary effects" of commercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location. For the first time, the Court has now held that such effects may justify the total suppression of protected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 63 - The Court is also mistaken in equating our secondary effects cases with the "incidental burdens" doctrine applied in cases such as O'Brien; and it aggravates the error by invoking the latter line of cases to support its assertion that Erie's ordinance is unrelated to speech. The incidental burdens doctrine applies when N251* " 'speech and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," and the government's interest in regulating the latter justifies incidental burdens on the former. O'Brien, 391 U.S., at 376. Secondary effects, on the other hand, are indirect consequences of protected speech and may justify regulation of the places where that speech may occur.
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Parties: Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe
Date: 2000-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - We have held, for example, that an individual's contribution to a government-created forum was not government speech. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Parties: Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones
Date: 2000-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The Court's contrary conclusion rests on the premise that a political party's freedom of expressive association includes a "right not to associate," which in turn includes a right to exclude voters unaffiliated with the party from participating in the selection of that party's nominee in a primary election. Ante, at 6-7. In drawing this conclusion, however, the Court blurs two distinctions that are critical: (1) the distinction between a private organization's right to define itself and its messages, on the one hand, and the State's right to define the obligations of citizens and organiza- tions performing public functions, on the other; and (2) the distinction between laws that abridge participation in the political process and those that encourage such participation.
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Parties: Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale
Date: 2000-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 11 - But the freedom of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute. We have held that the freedom could be overridden "by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Roberts, supra, at 623.
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the organization's right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association. That being the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a requirement through the application of its public accommodations law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 135 - At the same time, however, "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Ibid. Though participating in the Scouts could itself conceivably send a message on some level, it is not the kind of act that we have recognized as speech. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989). Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic speech; and such speech were attributable to the group being joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to exclude that person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 135 - N267* It is true, of course, that some acts are so imbued with symbolic meaning that they qualify as "speech" under the First Amendment. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). At the same time, however, N268* "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Ibid. Though participating in the Scouts could itself conceivably send a message on some level, it is not the kind of act that we have recognized as speech. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989). Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic speech; and such speech were attributable to the group being joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to exclude that person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 135 - Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic speech; and such speech were attributable to the group being joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to exclude that person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 135 - It is true, of course, that some acts are so imbued with symbolic meaning that they qualify as "speech" under the First Amendment. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). At the same time, however, N7* "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Ibid. Though participating in the Scouts could itself conceivably send a message on some level, it is not the kind of act that we have recognized as speech. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989). Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic speech; and such speech were attributable to the group being joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to exclude that person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the law.
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Segment in Paragraph: 103 - We have recognized N257* "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."
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Parties: Hill v. Colo.
Date: 2000-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 104 - In United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), we declined to uphold a ban on certain expressive activity on the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court. The purpose of the restriction was the perfectly valid interest in security, just as the purpose of the restriction here is the perfectly valid interest in unobstructed access; and there, as here, the restriction furthered that interest-but it furthered it with insufficient precision and hence at excessive cost to the freedom of speech. There was, we said, "an insufficient nexus" between security and all the expressive activity that was banned, id., at 181-just as here there is an insufficient nexus between the assurance of access and forbidding unconsented communications within eight feet.
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Segment in Paragraph: 149 - N137* So long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets. For example, a person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group of distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 150 - This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men.
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Segment in Paragraph: 20 - How far may men go in persuasion and communication, and still not violate the right of those whom they would influence? In going to and from work, men have a right to as free a passage without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy the same privilege.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - While the freedom to communicate is substantial, N211* "the right of every person `to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate."
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - We concluded our opinion by emphasizing that the First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to " `reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 168 - To restrict the right of the speaker to hand her a leaflet, to hold a sign, or to speak quietly is for the Court to deny the neutrality that must be the first principle of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - To support the legitimacy of its self-invented state interest, the Court relies upon a bon mot in a 1928 dissent (which we evidently overlooked in Schenck). It characterizes the "unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication" as an "aspect of the broader right to be let alone' " Justice Brandeis coined in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478. The amusing feature is that even this slim reed contradicts rather than supports the Court's position. The right to be let alone that Justice Brandeis identified was a right the Constitution "conferred, as against the government"; it was that right, not some generalized "common-law right" or "interest" to be free from hearing the unwanted opinions of one's fellow citizens, which he called the "most comprehensive" and "most valued by civilized men." Ibid. (emphasis added). To the extent that there can be gleaned from our cases a "right to be let alone" in the sense that Justice Brandeis intended, it is the right of the speaker in the public forum to be free from government interference of the sort Colorado has imposed here.
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Segment in Paragraph: 121 - In a further glaring departure from precedent we learn today that citizens have a right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum. Ante, at 11-12. For reasons Justice Scalia explains in convincing fashion, neither Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), nor the Court's opinion in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), establishes a right to be free from unwelcome expression aired by a fellow citizen in a traditional public forum: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views."
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Segment in Paragraph: 148 - one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may exercised in some other place.Schneider made clear that while citizens may not enjoy a right to force an unwilling person to accept a leaflet, they do have a protected right to tender it. The Court stressed a basic First Amendment precept: N269* [T]he streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may exercised in some other place."
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Segment in Paragraph: 145 - N100* They want to engage in peaceful face-to-face communication with individuals the petitioners believe are about to commit a profound moral wrong. Without the ability to interact in person, however momentarily, with a clinic patron near the very place where a woman might elect to receive an abortion, the statute strips petitioners of using speech in the time, place, and manner most vital to the protected expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 163 - N101* That this advocacy occurred in the heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the protection afforded to Mrs. McIntyre's expression:N102* Urgent, important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed. No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre's."
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - N252* ("Our cases make clear - that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions N253* `are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases. It is an aspect of the broader N254* "right to be let alone" that one of our wisest Justices characterized as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home, Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970), and its immediate surroundings, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S., at 485, but can also be protected in confrontational settings.
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Segment in Paragraph: 131 - Rather than adhere to this rule, the Court turns it on its head, stating the statute's overbreadth is "a virtue, not a vice." Ante, at 26. The Court goes even further, praising the statute's "prophylactic approach; it forbids all unwelcome demonstrators to come closer than eight feet." Ante, at 24. Indeed, in the Court's view, "bright-line prophylactic rule[s] may be the best way to provide protection" to those individuals unwilling to hear a fellow citizen's message in a public forum. Ante, at 25. The Court is quite wrong. Overbreadth is a constitutional flaw, not a saving feature. Sweeping within its ambit even more protected speech does not save a criminal statute invalid in its essential reach and design.
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Segment in Paragraph: 163 - N255* N256* "Urgent, important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed. No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre's."
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Parties: Mitchell v. Helms
Date: 2000-06-28
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Parties: City News & Novelty v. City of Waukesha
Date: 2001-01-17
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Parties: Bartnicki v. Vopper
Date: 2001-05-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' "
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Segment in Paragraph: 67 - "There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a " freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One who speaks into a phone "is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."
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Segment in Paragraph: 68 - These statutes undeniably protect this venerable right of privacy. Concomitantly, they further the First Amendment rights of the parties to the conversation.N212* "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - Accordingly, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), the Court upheld the right of the press to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - We think it clear that parallel reasoning requires the conclusion that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.
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Parties: Saucier v. Katz
Date: 2001-06-18
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Parties: United States v. United Foods
Date: 2001-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 10 - It imposes no restraint on the freedom of an objecting party to communicate its own message; the program does not compel an objecting party (here a corporate entity) itself to express views it disfavors; and the mandated scheme does not compel the expression of political or ideological views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - We did say in Glickman that Abood "recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.' " 521 U.S., at 471 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S., at 235). We take further instruction, however, from Abood's statement that speech need not be characterized as political before it receives First Amendment protection. Id., at 232.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - Money and speech are not identical. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-389 (2000); id., at 398. Stevens, J., concurring: N111* "Money is property; it is not speech"; id., at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring)
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Segment in Paragraph: 27 - N8* "First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience. Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views." Id., at 469-470. This case, although it involves mushrooms rather than fruit, is identical in each of these three critical respects. No one, including the Court, claims otherwise. And I believe these similar characteristics demand a similar conclusion.
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Segment in Paragraph: 40 - First, the program does not significantly interfere with protected speech interests. It does not compel speech itself; it compels the payment of money. Money and speech are not identical. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-389 (2000); id., at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring) N258* ("Money is property; it is not speech");
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - N259* ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising"); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) N260* ("A commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the N261* 'free flow of commercial information' ")
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - A quarter of a century ago, the Court held that commercial speech, usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction, is protected by the First Amendment. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). N262* "The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish."
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Parties: Fec v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
Date: 2001-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - In practice, Buckley scrutiny has meant that restrictions on contributions by individuals and political committees do not violate the First Amendment so long as they are N103* "closely drawn" to match a N104* "sufficiently important" government interest, Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387-389; see also Buckley, supra, at 58, but that restrictions on independent expenditures are constitutionally invalid, see Buckley, supra, at 58-59; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985). The rationale for this distinction between contributions and independent expenditures has been that, whereas ceilings on contributions by individuals and political committees N105* "entai[l] only a marginal restriction" on First Amendment interests, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 20, limitations on independent expenditures N106* "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association."
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Parties: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly
Date: 2001-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 119 - Even when speech falls into a category of reduced constitutional protection, the government may not engage in content discrimination for reasons unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that place it within the category. For example, a city may ban obscenity (because obscenity is an unprotected category, see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)), but it may not ban N263* "only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government."
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Parties: Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.
Date: 2001-06-11
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - What is at play here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas-and the private right to exert and receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, see, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-310 (1940), not banned by the Establishment Clause. A priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot.
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Parties: Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist.
Date: 2002-01-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - In response to these grave dangers of a censorship system, Freedman, supra, at 58, we held that a film licensing process must contain certain procedural safeguards in order to avoid constituting an invalid prior restraint: (1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period during which the status quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision must be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof once in court.
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - [T]he [permit] required is not the kind of prepublication license deemed a denial of liberty since the time of John Milton but a ministerial, police routine for adjusting the rights of citizens so that the opportunity for effective freedom of speech may be preserved. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1953). Regulations of the use of a public forum that ensure the safety and convenience of the people are not inconsistent with civil liberties but [are] one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which [civil liberties] ultimately depend. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). Such a traditional exercise of authority does not raise the censorship concerns that prompted us to impose the extraordinary procedural safeguards on the film licensing process in Freedman.
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Parties: Dep't of Hous. v. Rucker
Date: 2002-03-26
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Parties: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
Date: 2002-04-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 15 - The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 127 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). While these categories may be prohibited without violating the First Amendment, none of them includes the speech prohibited by the CPPA. In his dissent from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Judge Ferguson recognized this to be the law and proposed that virtual child pornography should be regarded as an additional category of unprotected speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - The Government cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it may fall into the hands of children.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - It is also well established that speech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our sensibilities. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) N107* ("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it"); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 874 (1997) N108* ("In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that N109* `[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment'")
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. protected speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - The prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959) ("Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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Parties: Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.
Date: 2002-04-29
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Parties: City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 00-799
Date: 2002-05-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - On the other hand, a city may not regulate the secondary effects of speech by suppressing the speech itself. A city may not, for example, impose a content-based fee or tax. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 230 (1987) ("[O]fficial scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press"). This is true even if the government purports to justify the fee by reference to secondary effects.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - Speech can produce tangible consequences. It can change minds. It can prompt actions. These primary effects signify the power and the necessity of free speech. Speech can also cause secondary effects, however, unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience. A newspaper factory may cause pollution, and a billboard may obstruct a view. These secondary consequences are not always immune from regulation by zoning laws even though they are produced by speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - The risk lies in the fact that when a law applies selectively only to speech of particular content, the more precisely the content is identified, the greater is the opportunity for government censorship. Adult speech refers not merely to sexually explicit content, but to speech reflecting a favorable view of being explicit about sex and a favorable view of the practices it depicts; a restriction on adult content is thus also a restriction turning on a particular viewpoint, of which the government may disapprove.
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Parties: Ashcroft v. ACLU
Date: 2002-05-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." This provision embodies "[o]ur profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U. S. 657, 686 (1989). "[A]s a general matter, `the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.'"
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Segment in Paragraph: 69 - N138* It is true, as JUSTICE THOMAS points out, ante, at 580-583, that requiring a speaker addressing a national audience to meet varying community standards does not always violate the First Amendment. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 106 (1974) (obscene mailings); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 125-126 (1989) (obscene phone messages). These cases, however, are of limited utility in analyzing the one before us, because each mode of expression has its own unique characteristics, and each "must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 557 (1975). Indeed, when Congress purports to abridge the freedom of a new medium, we must be particularly attentive to its distinct attributes, for "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386 (1969).
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - N139* And it is no answer to say that the speaker should "take the simple step of utilizing a [different] medium." Ante, at 583 (principal opinion of THOMAS, J.). "Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression .... [T]he danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent — by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - Like the restriction on indecent "dial-a-porn" numbers invalidated in Sable, the prohibition against mailing advertisements for contraceptives invalidated in Bolger, and the ban against selling adult books found impermissible in Butler, COPA seeks to limit protected speech that is not targeted at children, simply because it can be obtained by them while surfing the Web. In evaluating the overbreadth of such a statute, we should be mindful of Justice Frankfurter's admonition not to N264* "burn the house to roast the pig,"
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Parties: FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth.
Date: 2002-05-28
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Parties: Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton
Date: 2002-06-17
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - Second, requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the right to speak imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 14 - Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that N117* "pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees."
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - In Grosjean, while discussing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, the Court stated that N118* `[t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.'"
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Segment in Paragraph: 23 - The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises constitutional concerns. It is offensive — not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society — that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so.
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Parties: BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB
Date: 2002-06-24
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Parties: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Date: 2002-06-27
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Parties: Republican Party v. White
Date: 2002-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 45 - Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the right of the voters, not the State. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45, 60 (1982). The law in question here contradicts the principle that unabridged speech is the foundation of political freedom.
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Segment in Paragraph: 21 - electioneeringMoreover, the notion that the special context of electioneering justifies an abridgment of the right to speak out on disputed issues sets our First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.N270* "[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates" is "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms," not at the edges.
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Parties: Eldred v. Ashcroft
Date: 2003-01-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - create and disseminate ideasN271* This proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression. As Harper & Row observed:N272* "[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."
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Parties: Stewart v. McCoy
Date: 2002-10-21
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Parties: City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found.
Date: 2003-03-25
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Parties: Virginia v. Black
Date: 2003-04-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - We have never held that the mere threat that individuals who engage in protected conduct will be subject to arrest and prosecution suffices to render a statute overbroad. Rather, our overbreadth jurisprudence has consistently focused on whether the prohibitory terms of a particular statute extend to protected conduct; that is, we have inquired whether individuals who engage in protected conduct can be convicted under a statute, not whether they might be subject to arrest and prosecution. E. g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 459 (1987) N110* (a statute "that make[s] unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid" (emphasis added)); N111* Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 114 (1972) (a statute may be overbroad "if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct" (emphasis added)); N112* R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S., at 397 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (deeming the ordinance at issue "fatally overbroad because it criminalizes ... expression protected by the First Amendment" (emphasis added)).
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - As the history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is not always intended to intimidate. Rather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity. It is a ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the Klan itself. Thus, N113* "[b]urning a cross at a political rally would almost certainly be protected expression." R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S., at 402, n. 4 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S., at 445). Cf. National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43 (1977) (per curiam).
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Parties: Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs.
Date: 2003-05-05
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected speech.
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Parties: Virginia v. Hicks
Date: 2003-06-16
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 796 (1984). The showing that a law punishes a "substantial" amount of protected free speech, "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973), suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, "until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression,"
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 796 (1984). The showing that a law punishes a N265* "substantial" amount of protected free speech, "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973), suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, "until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression,"
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Parties: Overton v. Bazzetta
Date: 2003-06-16
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Parties: FEC v. Beaumont
Date: 2003-06-16
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Parties: United States v. Am. Library Ass'n
Date: 2003-06-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - That some people may be too embarassed to ask for access to blocked Internet sites is not an infringement of their speech rights.N273* But the Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library without any risk of embarrassment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - N119* "The policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion, and N120* the guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential."
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - The upshot was a growing understanding that a librarian's job was to guarantee that "all people had access to all ideas," Geller, supra, at 156, and by the end of the 1930s, librarians' "basic position in opposition to censorship [had] emerged," Krug & Harvey, ALA and Intellectual Freedom: A Historical Overview, in Intellectual Freedom Manual, pp. xi, xv (American Library Association 1974) (hereinafter Intellectual Freedom Manual)
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Segment in Paragraph: 95 - Thus, there is no preacquisition scarcity rationale to save library Internet blocking from treatment as censorship, and no support for it in the historical development of library practice. To these two reasons to treat blocking differently from a decision declining to buy a book, a third must be added. Quite simply, we can smell a rat when a library blocks material already in its control, just as we do when a library removes books from its shelves for reasons having nothing to do with wear and tear, obsolescence, or lack of demand. Content-based blocking and removal tell us something that mere absence from the shelves does not.
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Segment in Paragraph: 1 - N266* Internet access in public libraries is neither a "traditional" nor a "designated" public forum. See, e. g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 802-803. Unlike the "Student Activity Fund" at issue in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 834, Internet terminals are not acquired by a library in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves. Rather, a library provides such access for the same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and appropriate quality. The fact that a library reviews and affirmatively chooses to acquire every book in its collection, but does not review every Web site that it makes available, is not a constitutionally relevant distinction. The decisions by most libraries to exclude pornography from their print collections are not subjected to heightened scrutiny; it would make little sense to treat libraries' judgments to block online pornography any differently. Moreover, because of the vast quantity of material on the Internet and the rapid pace at which it changes, libraries cannot possibly segregate, item by item, all the Internet material that is appropriate for inclusion from all that is not. While a library could limit its Internet collection to just those sites it found worthwhile, it could do so only at the cost of excluding an enormous amount of valuable information that it lacks the capacity to review. Given that tradeoff, it is entirely reasonable for public libraries to reject that approach and instead exclude certain categories of content, without making individualized judgments that everything made available has requisite and appropriate quality. Concerns over filtering software's tendency to erroneously "overblock" access to constitutionally protected speech that falls outside the categories software users intend to block are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software disabled.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - Like the District Court, the dissents fault the tendency of filtering software to "overblock" —that is, to erroneously block access to constitutionally protected speech that falls outside the categories that software users intend to block. See post, at 221-222 (opinion of Stevens, J.); post, at 233-234 (opinion of Souter, J.). Due to the software's limitations, "[m]any erroneously blocked [Web] pages contain content that is completely innocuous for both adults and minors, and that no rational person could conclude matches the filtering companies' category definitions, such as `pornography' or `sex.'" 201 F. Supp. 2d, at 449. Assuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional difficulties, any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software disabled. When a patron encounters a blocked site, he need only ask a librarian to unblock it or (at least in the case of adults) disable the filter.
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - Appellees argue that CIPA imposes an unconstitutional condition on libraries that receive E-rate and LSTA subsidies by requiring them, as a condition on their receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amendment right to provide the public with access to constitutionally protected speech. The Government counters that this claim fails because Government entities do not have First Amendment rights. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)N267* ("The First Amendment protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the government");
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - In my judgment, a statutory blunderbuss that mandates this vast amount of "overblocking" abridges the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The effect of the overblocking is the functional equivalent of a host of individual decisions excluding hundreds of thousands of individual constitutionally protected messages from Internet terminals located in public libraries throughout the Nation. Neither the interest in suppressing unlawful speech nor the interest in protecting children from access to harmful materials justifies this overly broad restriction on adult access to protected speech. N268* "The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech."
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Segment in Paragraph: 72 - As described above, all filtering software erroneously blocks access to a substantial number of Web sites that contain constitutionally protected speech on a wide variety of topics. See id., at 446-447 (describing erroneous blocking of speech on churches and religious groups, on politics and government, on health issues, on education and careers, on sports, and on travel). Moreover, there are "frequent instances of underblocking," id., at 448, that is, instances in which filtering software did not prevent access to Web sites with depictions that fall within what CIPA seeks to block access to. In short, the message conveyed by the use of filtering software is not that all speech except that which is prohibited by CIPA is supported by the Government, but rather that all speech that gets through the software is supported by the Government.
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Parties: Grutter v. Bollinger
Date: 2003-06-23
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Parties: Locke v. Davey
Date: 2004-02-25
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Parties: McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL.
Date: 2003-12-10
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Segment in Paragraph: 365 - Another proposition which could explain at least some of the results of today's opinion is that the First Amendment right to spend money for speech does not include the right to combine with others in spending money for speech. Such a proposition fits uncomfortably with the concluding words of our Declaration of Independence: N11* And for the support of this Declaration, . . . we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." (Emphasis added.) The freedom to associate with others for the dissemination of ideas — not just by singing or speaking in unison, but by pooling financial resources for expressive purposes — is part of the freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 256 - We repeatedly have struck down limitations on expenditures "made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 47, on the ground that such limitations "impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association" than do limits on contributions and coordinated expenditures, id., at 44, while "fail[ing] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," id., at 47-48.
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Segment in Paragraph: 349 - This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could have imagined that the same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), dissemination of illegally intercepted communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), and sexually explicit cable programming, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000), would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government.
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Segment in Paragraph: 367 - The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that N213* `[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 590 - The First Amendment protects the right of all organizations, not just a subset of them, to engage in political speech. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 700-701 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (N215* "The First Amendment does not permit courts to exercise speech suppression authority denied to legislatures").
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Segment in Paragraph: 354 - N274* money enables speech by proxyThat proposition has been endorsed by one of the two authors of today's principal opinion: N275* The right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, [and] to fund `speech by proxy,' . . . [are] property rights . . . not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (STEVENS, J., concurring). Until today, however, that view has been categorically rejected by our jurisprudence. As we said in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 16, N276* "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 356 - financial transactionsmoney enables speech by proxyDivision of labor requires a means of mediating exchange, and in a commercial society, that means is supplied by money. The publisher pays the author for the right to sell his book; it pays its staff who print and assemble the book; it demands payments from booksellers who bring the book to market. This, too, presents opportunities for repression: Instead of regulating the various parties to the enterprise individually, the government can suppress their ability to coordinate by regulating their use of money. What good is the right to print books without a right to buy works from authors? Or the right to publish newspapers without the right to pay deliverymen?The right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise.
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Segment in Paragraph: 580 - N277* We are supposed to find comfort in the knowledge that the ad is banned under § 203 only if it "is targeted to the relevant electorate," defined as communications that can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the candidate's district. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(C) (Supp. 2003). This Orwellian criterion, however, is analogous to a law, unconstitutional under any known First Amendment theory, that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long as his intended audience could not hear him. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-765 (1972) (discussing the "First Amendment right to receive information and ideas" (internal quotation marks omitted)). A central purpose of issue ads is to urge the public to pay close attention to the candidate's platform on the featured issues. By banning broadcast in the very district where the candidate is standing for election, § 203 shields information at the heart of the First Amendment from precisely those citizens who most value the right to make a responsible judgment at the voting booth.
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Segment in Paragraph: 357 - This is not to say that any regulation of money is a regulation of speech. The government may apply general commercial regulations to those who use money for speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for other purposes. But where the government singles out money used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore.
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Segment in Paragraph: 373 - N112* The First Amendment does not in my view permit the restriction of that political speech. And the same holds true for corporate electoral speech: A candidate should not be insulated from the most effective speech that the major participants in the economy and major incorporated interest groups can generate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 407 - Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that N113* "the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry," and thus that "an author's decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 372 - In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428-429, 431, we held that the NAACP could assert First Amendment rights "on its own behalf, . . . though a corporation," and that the activities of the corporation were "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to compel corporate speech. "The identity of the speaker," we said, "is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the `discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster."
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Segment in Paragraph: 284 - Limitations on the amount that an individual may contribute to a candidate or political committee impinge on the protected freedoms of expression and association. See Buckley, supra, at 20-22. When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. See ante, at 136 (joint opinion of STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ.) ("[A] contribution limit involving even "`significant interference"' with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the `lesser demand' of being `"closely drawn"' to match a `"sufficiently important interest"'" (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003)).
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Segment in Paragraph: 372 - In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428-429, 431, we held that the NAACP could assert First Amendment rights N269* "on its own behalf, . . . though a corporation," and that the activities of the corporation were N270* "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to compel corporate speech. N271* "The identity of the speaker," we said, "is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the N272* `discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster."
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Segment in Paragraph: 407 - The N273* "historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated the `freedom of the press.'" McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 361 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that N274* "the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry," and thus that "an author's decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." Id., at 342. The Court now backs away from this principle, allowing the established right to anonymous speech to be stripped away based on the flimsiest of justifications.
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Segment in Paragraph: 420 - Second, it is far from bizarre to suggest that (potentially regulable) speech that is in practice impossible to differentiate from fully protected speech must be fully protected. It is, rather, part and parcel of First Amendment first principles. See, e. g., Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S., at 255 N275* ("The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse"). In fact, First Amendment protection was extended to that fundamental category of artistic and entertaining speech not for its own sake, but only because it was indistinguishable, practically, from speech intended to inform. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948) (rejecting suggestion that "the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas" as the "line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right," noting that "[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine"). This principle clearly played a significant role in Buckley itself, see 424 U. S., at 42 (after noting that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application," holding that the "express advocacy" standard must be adopted as the interpretation of the relevant language in FECA). The express-advocacy line was drawn to ensure the protection of the "discussion of issues and candidates," not out of some strange obsession of the Court to create meaningless lines. And the joint opinion misses the point when it notes that "Buckley's express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption." Ante, at 193-194. Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in combating real or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech unrelated to election campaigns.
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Segment in Paragraph: 547 - The Government and the majority are right about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of magic words, is easy to circumvent. The Government seizes on this observation to defend BCRA § 203, arguing it will prevent what it calls "sham issue ads" that are really to the same effect as their more express counterparts. Ante, at 185, 193-194. What the Court and the Government call sham, however, are the ads speakers find most effective. Unlike express ads that leave nothing to the imagination, the record shows that issue ads are preferred by almost all candidates, even though politicians, unlike corporations, can lawfully broadcast express ads if they so choose. It is a measure of the Government's disdain for protected speech that it would label as a sham the mode of communication sophisticated speakers choose because it is the most powerful.
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Parties: Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish
Date: 2004-03-30
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Parties: Vieth v. Jubelirer
Date: 2004-04-28
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Parties: Tennessee v. Lane
Date: 2004-05-17
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Parties: Sabri v. United States
Date: 2004-05-17
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Parties: City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C
Date: 2004-06-07
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - Such activity, when subjected to a general permit requirement unrelated to censorship of content, has no special claim to priority in the judicial process. The notion that media corporations have constitutional entitlement to accelerated judicial review of the denial of zoning variances is absurd.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - the pandering of sex is not protected by the First Amendment. N114* "The Constitution does not require a State or municipality to permit a business that intentionally specializes in, and holds itself forth to the public as specializing in, performance or portrayal of sex acts, sexual organs in a state of arousal, or live human nudity." Id., at 258. This represents the Nation's long understanding of the First Amendment, recognized and adopted by this Court's opinion in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 470-471 (1966). Littleton's ordinance targets sex-pandering businesses, see Littleton City Code § 3-14-2 (2003); to the extent it could apply to constitutionally protected expression its excess is not so great as to render it substantially overbroad and thus subject to facial invalidation, see FW/PBS, 493 U. S., at 261-262.
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Parties: Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow
Date: 2004-06-14
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Parties: Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC
Date: 2004-09-14
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Parties: Ashcroft v. ACLU
Date: 2004-06-29
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - I agree with JUSTICE BREYER's conclusion that the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U. S. C. § 231, is constitutional. See post, at 689 (dissenting opinion). Both the Court and JUSTICE BREYER err, however, in subjecting COPA to strict scrutiny. Nothing in the First Amendment entitles the type of material covered by COPA to that exacting standard of review. N3* "We have recognized that commercial entities which engage in `the sordid business of pandering' by `deliberately emphasiz[ing] the sexually provocative aspects of [their nonobscene products], in order to catch the salaciously disposed,' engage in constitutionally unprotected behavior."
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - N115* It may be, as JUSTICE BREYER contends, that the statute's coverage extends "only slightly" beyond the legally obscene, and therefore intrudes little into the realm of protected expression. Post, at 679 (dissenting opinion). But even with JUSTICE BREYER's guidance, I find it impossible to identify just how far past the already ill-defined territory of "obscenity" he thinks the statute extends. Attaching criminal sanctions to a mistaken judgment about the contours of the novel and nebulous category of "harmful to minors" speech clearly imposes a heavy burden on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
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Segment in Paragraph: 77 - The software "is simply incapable of discerning between constitutionally protected and unprotected speech." Id., at 65. It "inappropriately blocks valuable, protected speech, and does not effectively block the sites [it is] intended to block." Id., at 66 (citing reports documenting overblocking).
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Parties: Hibbs v. Winn
Date: 2004-06-14
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Parties: Kowalski v. Tesmer
Date: 2004-12-13
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Parties: City of San Diego v. Roe
Date: 2004-12-06
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Segment in Paragraph: 8 - The Court has recognized the right of employees to speak on matters of public concern, typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to comment.
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Parties: Multimedia Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court
Date: 2005-04-15
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - A threat of prosecution or criminal contempt against a specific publication raises special First Amendment concerns, for it may chill protected speech much like an injunction against speech by putting that party at an added risk of liability.
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Parties: Granholm v. Heald, (03-1116), (03-1120), (03-1274)
Date: 2005-05-16
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Parties: Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n
Date: 2005-05-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the "marketplace of ideas" would be out of the question. See Keller, supra, at 12-13 (N278* If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed"
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech. And that is no less true when the funding is achieved through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to which the assessed citizens object.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - In sum, the First Amendment cannot be implemented by sanctioning government deception by omission (or by misleading statement) of the sort the Court today condones, and expression that is not ostensibly governmental, which government is not required to embrace as publicly as it speaks, cannot constitute government speech sufficient to justify enforcement of a targeted subsidy to broadcast it.
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Parties: Clingman v. Beaver
Date: 2005-05-23
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Parties: Cutter v. Wilkinson
Date: 2005-05-31
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Parties: Tory v. Cochran
Date: 2005-05-31
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Parties: ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., Petitioners v. ANGEL McCLARY RAICH et al.
Date: 2005-06-06
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Parties: THOMAS VAN ORDEN, Petitioner v. RICK PERRY, in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXAS and CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATION BOARD, et al.
Date: 2005-06-27
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Parties: McCREARY COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Petitioners v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY et al.
Date: 2005-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 98 - At other times, limits on governmental action that might make sense as a way to avoid establishment could arguably limit freedom of speech when the speaking is done under government auspices. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). The dissent, then, is wrong to read cases like Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697, 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970), as a rejection of neutrality on its own terms, post, at ____ - ____, 162 L. Ed. 2d, at ____ - ____, for tradeoffs are inevitable, and an elegant interpretative rule to draw the line in all the multifarious situations is not to be had.
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Parties: JOHN DOE, Petitioner v. ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
Date: 2005-10-07
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Parties: WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., Appellant v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Date: 2006-01-23
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Parties: ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE UNIAO DO VEGETAL ET AL.
Date: 2006-02-21
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Parties: MICHAEL HARTMAN, FRANK KORMANN, PIERCE McINTOSH, NORMAN ROBBINS, AND ROBERT EDWARDS, Petitioners v. WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR.
Date: 2006-04-26
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Parties: GIL GARCETTI, et al., Petitioners v. RICHARD CEBALLOS
Date: 2006-05-30
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - "It is well settled that "a State cannot condition public employment [***696] on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." Connick v. Myers,
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Segment in Paragraph: 47 - As Justice Souter explains, public employees are still citizens while they are in the office. The notion that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one's employment is quite wrong. Over a quarter of a century has passed since then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected "the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly."
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Segment in Paragraph: 16 - As the Court's decisions have noted, for many years N134* "the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment--including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." Connick, 461 U.S., at 143, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708. That dogma has been qualified in important respects. See id., at 144-145, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708. The Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - N135* ("Were [public employees] not able to speak on [the operation of their employers], the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it" (citation omitted)); cf. Treasury Emples., 513 U.S., at 470, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964 N136* ("The large-scale disincentive to Government employees' expression also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said").
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - The employees N137* retain the prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic discourse. This prospect of protection, however, does not invest them with a right to perform their jobs however they see fit.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - As for the importance of such speech to the individual, it stands to reason that a citizen may well place a very high value on a right to speak on the public issues he decides to make the subject of his work day after day. Would anyone doubt that a school principal evaluating the performance of teachers for promotion or pay adjustment retains a citizen's interest in addressing the quality of teaching in the schools? (Still, the majority indicates he could be fired without First Amendment recourse for fair but unfavorable comment when the teacher under review is the superintendent's daughter.) Would anyone deny that a prosecutor like Richard Ceballos may claim the interest of any citizen in [**1966] speaking out against a rogue law enforcement officer, simply because his job requires him to express a judgment about the officer's performance? (But the majority says the First Amendment gives Ceballos no protection, even if his judgment in this case was sound and appropriately expressed.)
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - Indeed, the very idea of categorically separating the citizen's interest from the employee's interest ignores [***708] the fact that the ranks of public service include those who share the poet's "object . . . to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation"; 33 these citizen servants are the ones whose civic interest rises highest when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones government employers most want to attract. 44 There is no question that public employees speaking on matters they are obliged to address would generally place a high value on a right to speak, as any responsible citizen would.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - "Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it." San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82, 125 S. Ct. 521, 160 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2004) (per curiam) (citation omitted). This is not a whit less true when an employee's job duties require him to speak about such things: when, for example, a public auditor speaks on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an obligatory [**1967] report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer expressly balks at a superior's order to violate constitutional rights he is sworn to protect. (The majority, however, places all these speakers [***709] beyond the reach of First Amendment protection against retaliation.)
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - Where the speech of government employees is at issue, the First Amendment offers protection only where the offer of protection itself will not unduly interfere with legitimate governmental interests, such as the interest in efficient administration. That is because the government, like any employer, must have adequate authority to direct the activities of its employees. That is also because efficient administration of legislatively authorized programs reflects the constitutional need effectively to implement the public's democratically determined will.
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Segment in Paragraph: 87 - Consequently, where a government employee speaks N51* "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest," the First Amendment does not offer protection. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983). Where the employee speaks N52* "as a citizen . . . upon matters of public concern," the First Amendment offers protection but only where the speech survives a screening test. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). That test, called, in legal shorthand, "Pickering balancing," requires a judge to "balance . . . the interests" of the employee N53* "in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - N116* It is well settled that "a State cannot condition public employment [***696] on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression."
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Parties: DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., Petitioners v. FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INC., et al.
Date: 2006-03-06
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Segment in Paragraph: 18 - We recently [**1307] held that
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - ] freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say. In West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943), we held unconstitutional a state law requiring schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and to salute the flag. And in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977), we held unconstitutional another that required New Hampshire motorists to display the state motto--"Live Free or Die"--on their license plates.
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The compelled speech to which the law schools point is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment's regulation of conduct, and "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949). Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the employer's speech rather than conduct. See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) ("[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct"). Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah's Witness to display the motto "Live Free or Die," and it trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.
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Segment in Paragraph: 28 - The compelled-speech violations in Tornillo and Pacific Gas also resulted from interference with a speaker's desired message. In Tornillo, we recognized that "the compelled printing of a reply . . . tak[es] up space that could be devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print," 418 U.S., at 256, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 41 L. Ed. 2d 730, and therefore concluded that this right-of-reply statute infringed the newspaper editors' freedom of speech by altering the message the paper wished to express,
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The Solomon Amendment does not violate law schools' freedom of speech, but the First Amendment's protection extends beyond the right to speak. We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate [**1312] for the purpose of speaking, which we have termed a "right of expressive association." See, e.g., BSA v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000). The reason we have extended First Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one's voice with the voices of others. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1984). If the government were free to restrict individuals' ability to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First Amendment is intended to protect.
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Segment in Paragraph: 39 - In Dale, we held that the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association was violated by New Jersey's public accommodations law, which required the organization to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster. After determining that the Boy Scouts was an expressive association, that "the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its expression," and that the State's interests did not justify this intrusion, we concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights were violated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate [**1312] for the purpose of speaking, which we have termed a N216* "right of expressive association." See, e.g., BSA v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000). The reason we have extended First Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one's voice with the voices of others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 42 - Students and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's message; nothing about the statute affects the composition of the group by making group membership less desirable. The Solomon Amendment therefore does not violate a law school's First Amendment rights. A military recruiter's mere presence on campus does not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message.
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - Our compelled-speech cases are not limited to the situation in which an individual must personally speak the government's message. We have also in a number of instances limited the government's ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker's message. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995) (state law cannot require a parade to include a group whose message the parade's organizer does not wish to send); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21, 106 S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) [***174] (plurality opinion); accord, id., at 25, 106 S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (state agency cannot require a utility company to include a third-party newsletter in its billing envelope); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 41 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1974) (right-of-reply statute violates editors' right to determine the content of their newspapers).
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Segment in Paragraph: 37 - The Solomon Amendment does not violate law schools' freedom of speech, but the First Amendment's protection extends beyond the right to speak. [HN13] We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate [**1312] for the purpose of speaking, which we have termed a N133* "right of expressive association." See, e.g., BSA v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000). The reason we have extended First Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one's voice with the voices of others.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - In O'Brien, we recognized that some forms of "'symbolic speech'" were deserving of First Amendment protection. 391 U.S., at 376, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672. But we rejected the view that N50* "conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Ibid. Instead, we have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive.
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Segment in Paragraph: 22 - Some of this Court's leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.
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Segment in Paragraph: 29 - In this case, accommodating the military's message does not affect the law schools' speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions. Unlike a parade [**1310] organizer's choice of parade contingents, a law school's decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive. Law schools facilitate recruiting to assist their students in obtaining jobs. A law school's recruiting [***175] services lack the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper; its accommodation of a military recruiter's message is not compelled speech because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of the school.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - The expressive component of a law school's actions is not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it. The fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection under O'Brien. If combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into "speech" simply by talking about it. For instance, if an individual announces that he intends to express his disapproval of the Internal Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income taxes, we would have to apply O'Brien to determine whether the Tax Code violates the First Amendment. Neither O'Brien nor its progeny supports such a result.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Having rejected the view that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly regulates speech, we must still consider whether the expressive nature of the conduct regulated by the statute brings that conduct within the First Amendment's protection. In O'Brien, we recognized that some forms of N9* "'symbolic speech'" were deserving of First Amendment protection. 391 U.S., at 376, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672. But we rejected the view that N10* "conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Ibid. Instead, we have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive.
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Parties: NEIL RANDALL, et al., Petitioners v. WILLIAM H. SORRELL et al. VERMONT REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, et al., Petitioners v. WILLIAM H. SORRELL, et al. WILLIAM H. SORRELL, et al., Petitioners v. NEIL RANDALL, et al.
Date: 2006-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 44 - But, unlike expenditure limits (which "necessarily reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached," id., at 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659), contribution limits "involv[e] little direct restraint on" the contributor's speech, id., at 21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. They do restrict "one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association," namely, the contributor's ability to support a favored candidate, but they nonetheless "permi[t] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution," and they do "not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues."
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Segment in Paragraph: 148 - We said in Buckley that "expenditure limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association than do . . . contribution limitations," 424 U.S., at 44, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, but the Buckley Court did not categorically foreclose the possibility that some spending limit might comport with the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - But contributors, too, have a right to free speech. See Colorado I 518 U.S. 604, 637, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) ("If an individual is limited in the amount of resources he can contribute to the pool, he is most certainly limited in his ability to associate for purposes of effective advocacy"). Even Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), recognizes that contribution limits restrict the free speech of contributors, even if it understates the significance of this restriction. See id., at 20-21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (N253* "A limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate . . . entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication").
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - As the plurality notes, our cases hold that expenditure limitations N117* "place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate."
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Segment in Paragraph: 25 - The Court explained that the basic reason for this difference between the two kinds of limitations is that expenditure limitations N118* "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than" do contribution limitations. Id., at 23, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. N119* Contribution limitations, though a "marginal restriction [***495] upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," nevertheless leave the contributor "fre[e] to discuss candidates and issues." Id., at 20-21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. Expenditure limitations, by contrast, impose N120* "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign."
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Parties: LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., Appellants v. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Appellants v. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al. EDDIE JACKSON, et al., Appellants v. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al. GI FORUM OF TEXAS, et al., Appellants v. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al.
Date: 2006-06-28
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Parties: JEFFREY A. BEARD, SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Petitioner v. RONALD BANKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
Date: 2006-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - It is indisputable that this prohibition on the possession of newspapers and photographs infringes upon respondent's First Amendment rights. "[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only [***714] the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought . . . ." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965) (citation omitted). See also Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-120, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 37 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1973) (explaining that photographs, like printed materials, are protected by the First Amendment).
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Segment in Paragraph: 70 - It is indisputable that this prohibition on the possession of newspapers and photographs infringes upon respondent's First Amendment rights. N217* [T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only [***714] the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought . . . ."
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Segment in Paragraph: 56 - Even as the advent of prison libraries increased prisoners' access to reading materials, that access was universally N121* "subject to some form of censorship," such that "inmates of correctional institutions are denied access to books which are freely available to the rest of the community."
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Parties: ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Petitioner v. LEROY CARHART, et al. ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Petitioner v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., et al.
Date: 2007-04-18
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Parties: GARY DAVENPORT, et al., Petitioners v. WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION WASHINGTON, Petitioner v. WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
Date: 2007-06-14
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Parties: TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Petitioner v. BRENTWOOD ACADEMY
Date: 2007-06-21
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Parties: DEBORAH MORSE, et al., Petitioners v. JOSEPH FREDERICK
Date: 2007-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - Our cases make clear that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). At the same time, we have held that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings," Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986), and that the rights of students "must be 'applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,'" Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1988) (quoting Tinker, supra, at 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731). Consistent with these principles, we hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - In light of the history of American public education, it cannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendment "freedom of speech" encompasses a student's right to speak in public schools. Early public schools [***310] gave total control to teachers, who expected obedience and respect [**2635] from students. And courts routinely deferred to schools' authority to make rules and to discipline students for violating those rules. Several points are clear: (1) Under in loco parentis, speech rules and other school rules were treated identically; (2) the in loco parentis doctrine imposed almost no limits on the types of rules that a school could set while students were in school; and (3) schools and teachers had tremendous discretion in imposing punishments for violations of those rules.
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - N132* The Tinker Court claimed that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years." 393 U.S., at 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731. But the cases the Court cited in favor of that bold proposition do not support it. Tinker chiefly relies upon Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923) (striking down a law prohibiting the teaching of German). However, Meyer involved a challenge by a private school, id., at 396, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, and the Meyer Court was quick to note that no "challenge [has] been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports," id., at 402, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042. Meyer provides absolutely no support for the proposition that free-speech rights apply within schools operated by the State. And notably, Meyer relied as its chief support on the Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905), line of cases, 262 U.S., at 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, a line of cases that has long been criticized, United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 167 L. Ed. 2d 655 (2007). Tinker also relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925). Pierce has nothing to say on this issue either. Pierce simply upheld the right of parents to send their children to private school.
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - N254* N255* Accordingly, unless a student's speech would disrupt the educational process, students had a fundamental right to speak their minds (or wear their armbands)--even on matters the school disagreed with or found objectionable. Ibid.
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Segment in Paragraph: 83 - N256* In my view, petitioners could prevail for a much simpler reason: As originally understood, the Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools.
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - N257* N258* In the name of the First Amendment, Tinker has undermined the traditional authority of teachers to maintain order in public schools. "Once a society that generally respected the authority of teachers, deferred to their judgment, and trusted them to act in the best interest of school children, we now accept defiance, disrespect, and disorder as daily occurrences in many of our public schools." Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49, 50 (1996). We need look no further than this case for an example: Frederick asserts a constitutional right to utter at a school event what is either "gibberish," ante, at 402, 168 L. Ed. 2d, at 299, or an open call to use illegal drugs. To elevate such impertinence to the status of constitutional protection would be farcical and would indeed be to N259* "surrender control of the American public school system to public school students."
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Segment in Paragraph: 26 - The question thus becomes whether [***LEdHR2] [2] a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.
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Segment in Paragraph: 168 - There is abundant precedent, including another opinion The Chief Justice announces today, for the proposition that when the N122* "First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker," Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., post, at 474, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329 (2007)(principal opinion), and that N123* "when it comes to defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy . . . we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship," post, at 482, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329.
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Segment in Paragraph: 31 - First, Fraser's holding demonstrates that N277* "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings." Id., at 682, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549. Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971); Fraser, supra, at 682-683, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549. In school, however, Fraser's First Amendment rights were circumscribed "in light of the special characteristics of the school [**2627] environment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 151 - The Court rejects outright these twin foundations of Tinker because, in its view, the unusual importance of protecting children from the scourge of drugs supports a ban on all speech in the school environment that promotes drug use. Whether or not such a rule is sensible as a matter of policy, carving out pro-drug speech for uniquely harsh treatment finds no support in our case law and is inimical to the values protected by the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 157 - If the school's rule is, by hypothesis, a valid one, it is valid only insofar as it scrupulously preserves adequate space for constitutionally protected speech. When First Amendment rights are at stake, a rule that "sweep[s] in a great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization" may not leave "too wide a discretion in its application." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
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Parties: FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Appellant v. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC. SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, et al., Appellants v. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC.
Date: 2007-06-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - The freedom of speech . . . guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."
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Segment in Paragraph: 48 - N133* Under the test set forth above, that is not enough to establish that the ads can only reasonably be viewed as advocating or opposing a candidate in a federal election. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940). Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election. Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - This evidence goes to WRTL's subjective intent in running the ads, and we have already explained that WRTL's intent is irrelevant in an as-applied challenge. Evidence of this sort is therefore beside the point, as it should be--WRTL does not forfeit its right to speak on issues simply because in other aspects of its work it also opposes candidates who are involved with those issues.
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - N124* But when it comes to defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a ban--the issue we do have to decide--we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment's command that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech" demands at least that.
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Segment in Paragraph: 85 - In this critical area of political discourse, the speaker cannot be compelled to risk felony prosecution with no more assurance of impunity than his prediction that what he says will be found susceptible of some "reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." Under these circumstances, N278* "[m]any persons, rather than undertake [***362] the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech--harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."
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Segment in Paragraph: 86 - It will not do to say that this burden must be accepted--that WRTL's anti-filibustering, constitutionally protected speech can be constrained--in the necessary pursuit of electoral "corruption." We have rejected the "can't-make-an-omelet-without-breaking-eggs" approach to the First Amendment, even for the infinitely less important (and less protected) speech category of virtual child pornography.
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - The Court rejected the principle that protected speech may be banned because it is difficult to distinguish from unprotected speech. Ibid. N279* "[T]hat protected speech may be banned as a means to banunprotected speech," it said, "turns the First Amendment upside down."Id., at 255, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403. The same principle must be applied here. Indeed, it must be applied a fortiori, since laws targeting political speech are the principal object of the First-Amendment guarantee. The fact that the line between electoral advocacy and issue advocacy dissolves in practice is an indictment of the statute, not a justification of it.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - The test to distinguish constitutionally protected political speech from speech that BCRA may proscribe should provide a safe harbor for those who wish to exercise First Amendment rights. The test should also "reflec[t] our N280* 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964)). A test turning on the intent of the speaker does not remotely fit the bill.
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Segment in Paragraph: 36 - A test focused on the speaker's intent could lead to the bizarre result that identical ads aired at the same time could be protected speech for one speaker, while leading to criminal penalties for another. See M. Redish, Money Talks: Speech, Economic Power, and the Values of Democracy 91 (2001)N281* ("[U]nder well-accepted First Amendment doctrine, a speaker's motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional protection").
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Segment in Paragraph: 66 - Our jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an absolutist interpretation of those words, but when it comes to drawing difficult lines in the area of pure political speech--between what is protected and what the Government may ban--it is worth recalling the language we are applying. McConnell held that express advocacy of a candidate or his opponent by a corporation shortly before an election may be prohibited, along with the functional equivalent of such express advocacy. We have no occasion to revisit that determination today. But when it comes to defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a ban--the issue we do have to decide--we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.
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Parties: MICHAEL W. SOLE, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al., Petitioners v. T. A. WYNER, et al.
Date: 2007-06-04
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Parties: NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Petitioners v. MARGARITA LOPEZ TORRES et al.
Date: 2008-01-16
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Parties: WASHINGTON STATE GRANGE, Petitioner v. WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY, et al.; WASHINGTON, et al., Petitioners v. WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY, et al.
Date: 2008-03-18
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Segment in Paragraph: 49 - When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose views the group does not accept, the organization's message is undermined; the organization is understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with them. We therefore held, for example, that a State severely burdened the right of expressive association when it required the Boy Scouts to accept an openly gay scoutmaster. The scoutmaster's presence N218* "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
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Parties: United States v. Williams
Date: 2008-05-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 113 - (individual) freedomThis should weigh heavily in the overbreadth balance, because "First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought."
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - N123* A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means "a protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed," post, at 321, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 680. Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever, so long as it is offered and sought as such, and not as real child pornography. The dissent would require an exception from the statute's prohibition when, unbeknownst to one or both of the parties to the proposal, the completed [**1845] transaction would not have been unlawful because it is (we have said) protected by the First Amendment. We fail to see what First Amendment interest would be served by drawing a distinction between two defendants who attempt to acquire contraband, one of whom happens to be mistaken about the contraband nature of what he would acquire.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - Free Speech Coalition reaffirmed that nonobscene virtual pornographic images are protected, because they fail to trigger the concern for child safety that disentitles child pornography to First Amendment protection. See id., at 249-251, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403. The case thus held that pictures without real minors (but only simulations, or young-looking adults) may not be the subject of a nonobscenity pornography crime, id., at 246, 251, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, and it has reasonably been taken to mean that transactions in pornographic pictures featuring children may not be punished without proof of real children
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Segment in Paragraph: 5 - We have long held that [***LEdHR2] [2] obscene speech--sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions of decency--is not protected by the First Amendment. [**1836] See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-485, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957). But to protect explicit material that has social value, we have limited the scope of the obscenity exception, and have overturned convictions for the distribution of sexually graphic but nonobscene material.
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Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Petitioners v. DICK ANTHONY HELLER
Date: 2008-06-26
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Parties: CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Petitioners v. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
Date: 2008-06-19
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - the Federal Government's refusal to provide food stamp benefits to striking workers was justified because "[s]trikers and their union would be much better off if food stamps were available," but the "strikers' right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that right").
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Parties: JACK DAVIS, Appellant v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Date: 2008-06-26
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - In Buckley, we soundly rejected a cap on a candidate's expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech. We held that a N108* "candidate . . . has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election" and that a cap on personal expenditures imposes "a substantial," "clea[r]," and "direc[t]" restraint on that right.
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Segment in Paragraph: 121 - Enhancing the speech of the millionaire's opponent, far from contravening the First Amendment, actually advances its core principles. If only one candidate can make himself heard, the voter's ability to make an informed choice is impaired.
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Parties: DANIEL B. LOCKE, et al., Petitioners v. EDWARD A. KARASS, STATE CONTROLLER, et al.
Date: 2009-01-21
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Parties: BEN YSURSA, IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE, et al., Petitioners v. POCATELLO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al.
Date: 2009-02-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - The First Amendment prohibits government from "abridging the freedom of speech"; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - The First Amendment prohibits government from "abridging the freedom of speech"; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression. Idaho's law does not restrict political speech, but rather declines to promote that speech by allowing public employee checkoffs for political activities.
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Segment in Paragraph: 59 - The majority's facile assertion that the First Amendment does not confer a right to government subsidization of private speech cannot validate an evidently discriminatory restriction on fundraising for political speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - N109* "It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys."
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Parties: PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al., Petitioners v. SUMMUM
Date: 2009-02-25
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Segment in Paragraph: 75 - I agree with the Court that the Ten Commandments monument is government speech, that is, an expression of a government's position on the moral and religious issues raised by the subject of the monument. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2000) (noting government speech may "promote [government's] own policies or . . . advance a particular idea"). And although the government should lose when the character of the speech is at issue and its governmental nature has not been made clear, see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 577, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 161 L. Ed. 2d 896 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), I also agree with the Court that the city need not satisfy the particular formality urged by Summum as a condition of recognizing that the expression here falls within the public category. I have qualms, however, about accepting the position that public monuments are government speech categorically. See ante, at 470-471, 172 L. Ed. 2d, at 863 ("Just as government-commissioned and government-financed monuments speak for the government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the government accepts and displays to the public on government land").
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Parties: JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., Petitioners v. JAVAID IQBAL et al.
Date: 2009-05-18
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Parties: ERIC PRESLEY, Petitioner v. GEORGIA
Date: 2010-01-19
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Parties: CITIZENS UNITED, Appellant v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Date: 2010-01-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 55 - N96* The First Amendment provides that [***LEdHR15] "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process. The following are just a few examples of restrictions that have been attempted at different stages of the speech process--all laws found to be invalid: restrictions requiring a permit at the outset, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 153 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2002); imposing a burden by impounding proceeds on receipts or royalties, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108, 123, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1991); seeking to exact a cost after the speech occurs, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 267, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686; and subjecting the speaker to [**897] criminal penalties, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969) (per curiam).
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Segment in Paragraph: 213 - The dissent attempts this demonstration, however, in splendid isolation from the text of the First Amendment. It never shows why "the freedom of speech" that was the right of Englishmen did not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the corporate form. To be sure, in 1791 (as now) corporations could pursue only the objectives set forth in their charters; but the dissent provides no evidence that their speech in the pursuit of those objectives could be censored.
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Segment in Paragraph: 223 - Historical evidence relating to the textually similar clause "the freedom of . . . the press" also provides no support for the proposition that the First Amendment excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from the scope of its protection. The freedom of "the press" was widely understood to protect the publishing activities of individual editors and printers. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); see also McConnell, 540 U.S., at 252-253, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). But these individuals often acted through newspapers, which (much like corporations) had their own names, outlived the individuals who had founded them, could be bought and sold, were sometimes owned by more than one person, and were operated for profit. See generally F. [**928] Mott, American Journalism: A History of Newspapers in the United States Through 250 Years 3-164 (1941); J. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (1956). Their activities were not stripped of First Amendment protection simply because they were carried out under the banner of an artificial legal entity. And the notion which [***815] follows from the dissent's view, that modern newspapers, since they are incorporated, have free-speech rights only at the sufferance of Congress, boggles the mind.
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Segment in Paragraph: 224 - It is passing strange to interpret the phrase "the freedom of speech, or of the press" to mean, not everyone's right to speak or publish, but rather everyone's right to speak or the institutional press's right to publish. No one thought that is what it meant.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech, or of
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Segment in Paragraph: 230 - The dissent says that "'speech'" refers to oral communications of human beings, and since corporations are not human beings they cannot speak. Post, at 428, n. 55, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 838. This is sophistry. The authorized spokesman of a corporation is a human being, who speaks on behalf of the human beings who have formed that association -- just as the spokesman of an unincorporated association speaks on behalf of its members. The power to publish thoughts, no less than the power to speak thoughts, belongs only to human beings, but the dissent sees no problem with a corporation's enjoying the freedom of the press.
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Segment in Paragraph: 329 - "Our jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an absolutist interpretation" of the First Amendment. WRTL, 551 U.S., at 482, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Apart perhaps from measures designed to protect the press, that text might seem to permit no distinctions of any kind. Yet in a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker's identity, when identity is understood in categorical or institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of students,41 prisoners,42 members of the Armed Forces,43 foreigners,44 and its own employees.45 When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, [**946] they do not necessarily raise constitutional [***834] problems.
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Segment in Paragraph: 355 -
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Segment in Paragraph: 356 - In normal usage then, as now, the term "speech" referred to oral communications by individuals. See, e.g., 2 S. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language 1853-1854 (4th ed. 1773) (reprinted 1978) (listing as primary definition of "speech": "The power of articulate utterance; the power of expressing thoughts by vocal words"); 2 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1970) (listing as primary definition of "speech": "The faculty of uttering articulate sounds or words, as in human beings; the faculty of expressing thoughts by words or articulate sounds. Speech was given to man by his Creator for the noblest purposes"). Indeed, it has been "claimed that the notion of institutional speech . . . did not exist in post-revolutionary America." Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637, 1654 (2006); see also Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 775 (1995) ("In the intellectual heritage of the eighteenth century, the idea that free speech was individual and personal was deeply rooted and clearly manifest in the writings of Locke, Milton, and others on whom the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights drew"). Given that corporations were conceived of as artificial entities and do not have the technical capacity to "speak," the burden of establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood "the freedom of speech" to encompass corporate speech is, I believe, far heavier than the majority acknowledges.
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Segment in Paragraph: 357 - The Court observes that the Framers drew on diverse intellectual sources, communicated through newspapers, and aimed to provide greater freedom of speech than had existed in England. Ante, at 353, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 790-791. From these (accurate) observations, the Court concludes that "[t]he First Amendment was certainly not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society's most salient media." Ibid. This conclusion is far from certain, given that many historians believe the Framers were focused on prior restraints on publication and did not understand the First Amendment to "prevent the subsequent punishment of such [publications] as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare." [**951] Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 714, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931). Yet, even if the majority's conclusion were correct, it would tell us only that the First Amendment was understood to protect political speech in certain media. It would tell us little about whether the Amendment was understood to protect general treasury electioneering expenditures by corporations, and to what extent.
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Segment in Paragraph: 361 - Justice Scalia also emphasizes the unqualified nature of the First Amendment text. Ante, at 386, 392-393, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 812, 815-816. Yet he would seemingly read out the Free Press Clause: How else could he claim that my purported views on newspapers must track my views on corporations generally? Ante, at 390, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 814.57 Like virtually all modern lawyers, Justice [**952] Scalia presumably believes that the First Amendment restricts the Executive, even though its language refers to Congress alone. In any event, the text only leads us back to the questions who or what is guaranteed "the freedom of speech," and, just as critically, what that freedom consists of and under what circumstances it may be limited. Justice Scalia appears to believe that because corporations are created and utilized by individuals, it follows (as night the day) that their electioneering must be equally protected by the First Amendment and equally immunized from expenditure limits. See ante, at 391-392, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 815. That conclusion certainly does not follow as a logical matter, and Justice Scalia fails to explain why the original public meaning leads it to follow as a matter of interpretation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 445 - One fundamental concern of the First Amendment is to "protec[t] the individual's interest in self-expression." Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534, n. 2, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 65 L. Ed. 2d [***863] 319 (1980); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 777, n. 12, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707. Freedom of speech helps "make men free to develop their faculties," Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), it respects their "dignity and choice," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971), and it facilitates the value of "individual self-realization," Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 594 (1982). Corporate speech, however, is derivative speech, speech by proxy. A regulation such as BCRA § 203 may affect the way in which individuals disseminate certain messages through the corporate form, but it does not prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice. "Within the realm of [campaign spending] generally," corporate spending is "furthest from the core of political expression."
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Segment in Paragraph: 365 - We have long since held that corporations are covered by the First Amendment, and many legal scholars have long since rejected the concession theory of the corporation.
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Segment in Paragraph: 213 - It never shows why "the freedom of speech" that was the right of Englishmen did not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the corporate form. To be sure, in 1791 (as now) corporations could pursue only the objectives set forth in their charters; but the dissent provides no evidence that their speech in the pursuit of those objectives could be censored.
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Segment in Paragraph: 225 - N219* "Liberty of the press, in civil policy, is the free right of publishing books, pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state."
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Segment in Paragraph: 62 - The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. [***LEdHR16] The First Amendment "'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office."
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Segment in Paragraph: 110 - N220* The purpose and effect of this law is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public. This makes Austin's antidistortion rationale all the more an aberration. [***LEdHR33] [33] N221* "[T]he First Amendment protects the right of corporations to petition legislative and administrative bodies."
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - As the Government stated, this case "would require a remand" to apply a de minimis standard. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 (Sept. 9, 2009). Applying this standard would thus require case-by-case determinations. But archetypical political speech would be chilled in the meantime. [***LEdHR7] [7] "'First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.'" WRTL, supra, at 468-469, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963)). We decline to adopt an interpretation that requires intricate case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech is banned, especially if we are convinced that, in the end, this corporation has a constitutional right to speak on this subject.
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Segment in Paragraph: 477 - Congress may not abridge the "right to anonymous speech" based on the N139* "'simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information,'" i
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Segment in Paragraph: 65 - Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
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Segment in Paragraph: 106 - So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news organization has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business to influence or control the media in order to advance its overall business interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an identical business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure, would be forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This differential treatment cannot be squared with the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 224 - N138* The dissent seeks to avoid this conclusion (and to turn a liability into an asset) by interpreting the Freedom of the Press Clause to refer to the institutional press (thus demonstrating, according to the dissent, that the Founders "did draw distinctions -- explicit distinctions -- between types of 'speakers,' or speech outlets or forms"). Post, at 431, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 840, and n. 57. It is passing strange to interpret the phrase "the freedom of speech, or of the press" to mean, not everyone's right to speak or publish, but rather everyone's right to speak or the institutional press's right to publish. No one thought that is what it meant.
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Segment in Paragraph: 229 - But the individual person's right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of "an individual American." It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different -- or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not "an individual American."
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Segment in Paragraph: 237 - All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided.
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Segment in Paragraph: 355 - The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively [**950] regulated in the service of the public welfare. Unlike our colleagues, they had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.55 While individuals might join together to exercise their speech rights, business corporations, at least, were plainly not seen as facilitating such associational or expressive ends.
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Segment in Paragraph: 359 - Although Justice Scalia makes a perfectly sensible argument that an individual's right to speak entails a right to speak with others for a common cause, cf. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 107 S. Ct. 616, 93 L. Ed 2d 539, he does not explain why those two rights must be precisely identical, or why that principle applies to electioneering by corporations that serve no "common cause." Ante, at 392, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 815. Nothing in his account dislodges my basic point that members of the founding generation held a cautious view of corporate power and a narrow view of corporate rights (not that they "despised" corporations, [***840] ante, at 386, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 812), and that they conceptualized speech in individualistic terms. If no prominent Framer bothered to articulate that corporate speech would have lesser status than individual speech, that may well be because the contrary proposition--if not also the very notion of "corporate speech"--was inconceivable.56
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Segment in Paragraph: 450 - In short, regulations such as § 203 and the statute upheld in Austin impose only a limited burden on First Amendment freedoms not only because they target a narrow subset of expenditures and leave untouched the broader "public dialogue," ante, at 341, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 783, but also because they leave untouched the speech of natural persons. Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of Austin, the Court places primary emphasis not on the corporation's right to electioneer, but rather on the listener's interest in hearing what every possible speaker may have to say. The Court's central argument is that laws such as § 203 have "'deprived [the electorate] of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,'" ante, at 354, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 792 (quoting CIO, 335 U.S., at 144, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849 (Rutledge, J., concurring in judgment)), and this, in turn, "interferes with the 'open marketplace' of ideas protected by the First Amendment," ante, at 354, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 791 (quoting New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208, 128 S. Ct. 791, 169 L. Ed. 2d 665 (2008)
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S., at 428-429, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936). Under the rationale of these precedents, [***LEdHR23] [23] political speech does not lose First Amendment protection N54* "simply because its source is a corporation." Bellotti, supra, at 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) N55* ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster"
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker's wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker's identity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 134 - Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement. Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at 176-177, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 ("Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives . . . to exploit [26 U.S.C. § 527] organizations will only increase"). Our Nation's speech dynamic is changing, and informative voices should not have to circumvent onerous restrictions to exercise their First Amendment rights. Speakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour news cycle. Corporations, like individuals, do not have monolithic views. On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials.
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Segment in Paragraph: 182 - The text and purpose of the First Amendment point in the same direction: Congress may not prohibit political speech, even if the speaker is a corporation or union.
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Segment in Paragraph: 233 - The Amendment is written in terms of "speech," not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals -- and the dissent offers no evidence about the original meaning of the text to support any such exclusion. We are therefore simply left with the question whether the speech at issue in this case is "speech" covered by the First Amendment. No one says otherwise. A documentary film critical of a potential Presidential candidate is core political speech, and its nature as such does not change simply because it was funded by a corporation. Nor does the character of that funding produce any reduction whatever in the N56* "inherent worth of the speech" and "its capacity for informing the public," First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). Indeed, to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public debate.
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Segment in Paragraph: 355 - In light of these background practices and understandings, it seems to me implausible that the Framers believed "the freedom of speech" would extend equally to all corporate speakers, much less that it would preclude legislatures from taking limited measures to guard against corporate capture of elections.
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Segment in Paragraph: 356 - In normal usage then, as now, the term "speech" referred to oral communications by individuals. See, e.g., 2 S. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language 1853-1854 (4th ed. 1773) (reprinted 1978) (listing as primary definition of "speech": "The power of articulate utterance; the power of expressing thoughts by vocal words"); 2 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1970) (listing as primary definition of "speech": "The faculty of uttering articulate sounds or words, as in human beings; the faculty of expressing thoughts by words or articulate sounds. Speech was given to man by his Creator for the noblest purposes"). Indeed, it has been "claimed that the notion of institutional speech . . . did not exist in post-revolutionary America." Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637, 1654 (2006); see also Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 775 (1995) ("In the intellectual heritage of the eighteenth century, the idea that free speech was individual and personal was deeply rooted and clearly manifest in the writings of Locke, Milton, and others on whom the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights drew"). Given that corporations were conceived of as artificial entities and do not have the technical capacity to "speak," the burden of establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood "the freedom of speech" to encompass corporate speech is, I believe, far heavier than the majority acknowledges.
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Segment in Paragraph: 445 - Freedom of speech helps N57* "make men free to develop their faculties," Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), it respects their "dignity and choice," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971), and it facilitates the value of "individual self-realization," Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 594 (1982). Corporate speech, however, is derivative speech, speech by proxy. A regulation such as BCRA § 203 may affect the way in which individuals disseminate certain messages through the corporate form, but it does not prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice. N58* "Within the realm of [campaign spending] generally," corporate spending is "furthest from the core of political expression."
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Segment in Paragraph: 109 - The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has N125* "muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy." McConnell, supra, at 257-258, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d [***792] 491 (opinion of Scalia, J.). And N126* "the electorate [has been] deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function." CIO, 335 U.S., at 144, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849 (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.
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Segment in Paragraph: 112 - When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control [***793] thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.
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Segment in Paragraph: 233 - The Amendment is written in terms of "speech," not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals -- and the dissent offers no evidence about the original meaning of the text to support any such exclusion. We are therefore simply left with the question whether the speech at issue in this case is "speech" covered by the First Amendment. No one says otherwise. A documentary film critical of a potential Presidential candidate is core political speech, and its nature as such does not change simply because it was funded by a corporation. Nor does the character of that funding produce any reduction whatever in the N4* "inherent worth of the speech" and "its capacity for informing the public,"First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). Indeed, to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free economy.
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Segment in Paragraph: 51 - Because the FEC's N124* "business is to censor, there inheres the danger that [it] may well be less responsive than a court--part of an independent branch of government--to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58, 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965). When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, N125* "[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech--harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."
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Segment in Paragraph: 71 - political speech does not lose First Amendment protection N282* "simply because its source is a corporation." Bellotti, supra, at 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) N283* ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster"
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Parties: MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P. A., et al., Petitioners v. UNITED STATES (No. 08-1119) UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P. A., et al. (No. 08-1225)
Date: 2010-03-08
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - Covered professionals remain free to "tal[k] fully and candidly about the incurrence of debt in contemplation of filing a bankruptcy case." Brief for Milavetz 73. Section 526(a)(4) requires professionals only to avoid instructing or encouraging assisted persons to take on more debt in that circumstance. Cf. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a [**1338] client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law"). Even if the statute were not clear in this regard, we would reach the same conclusion about its scope because the inhibition of frank discussion serves no conceivable purpose within the statutory scheme.
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Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. ROBERT J. STEVENS
Date: 2010-04-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - N130* But we are unaware of any similar tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty from "the freedom of speech" codified in the First Amendment, and the Government points us to none.
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - N131* The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it most certainly does not protect violent criminal conduct, even if [**1599] engaged in for expressive purposes. Crush videos present a highly unusual free speech issue because they are so closely linked with violent criminal conduct.
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Segment in Paragraph: 93 - The most relevant of our prior decisions is Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, which concerned child pornography. The Court there held that child pornography is not protected speech, and I believe that Ferber's reasoning dictates a similar conclusion here.
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Parties: KEN L. SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al., Petitioners v. FRANK BUONO
Date: 2010-04-28
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Parties: ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., Petitioners v. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT et al. (No. 08-1498) HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT, et al., Petitioners v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. (No. 09-89)
Date: 2010-06-21
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - (The First Amendment's protections of speech, assembly, association, and petition, N222* 'though not identical, are inseparable' " (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945))); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937) (describing the N223* "right of peaceable assembly" as "a right cognate to those of free speech and free presses and . . . equally fundamental")
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Segment in Paragraph: 89 - N284* ("Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech" in which "[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most protected position")
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Segment in Paragraph: 91 - "Coordination" with a group that engages in unlawful activity also does not deprive the plaintiffs of the First Amendment's protection under any traditional "categorical" exception to its protection. The plaintiffs do not propose to solicit a crime. They will not engage in fraud or defamation or circulate obscenity. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-469, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010) (describing "categories" ofunprotected speech). And the First Amendment protects advocacy even of unlawful action so long as that advocacy is not N285* "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action."
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Parties: JOHN DOE #1, et al., Petitioners v. SAM REED, WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, et al.
Date: 2010-06-24
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Segment in Paragraph: 88 - I doubt whether signing a petition that has the effect of suspending a law fits within "the freedom of speech" at all. But even if, as the Court concludes, ante, at ___, 177 L. Ed. 2d, at 501, it does, a long history of practice shows that the First Amendment does not prohibit public disclosure.
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - N98* Plaintiffs point to no precedent from this Court holding that legislating is protected by the First Amendment.33 Nor do they identify historical evidence demonstrating that "the freedom of speech" the First Amendment codified encompassed a right to legislate without public disclosure. This should come as no surprise; the exercise of lawmaking power in the United States has traditionally been public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 107 - Of course the practice of viva voce voting was gradually replaced with the paper ballot, which was thought to reduce fraud and undue influence. See Evans 1-6; Dinkin 101-106. There is no indication that the shift resulted from a sudden realization that public voting infringed voters' freedom of speech, and the manner in which it occurred suggests the contrary.
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Segment in Paragraph: 108 - I am aware of no assertion of ballot secrecy that relied on federal or state constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech.
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Segment in Paragraph: 111 - The long history of public legislating and voting contradicts plaintiffs' claim that disclosure of petition signatures having legislative effect violates the First Amendment. As I said in McIntyre, "[w]here the meaning of a constitutional text (such as 'the freedom of speech') is unclear, the widespread and long-accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of what fundamental beliefs it was intended to enshrine."
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Segment in Paragraph: 96 - Nor do they identify historical evidence demonstrating that "the freedom of speech" the First Amendment codified encompassed a right to legislate without public disclosure. This should come as no surprise; the exercise of lawmaking power in the United States has traditionally been public.
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Segment in Paragraph: 101 - We have acknowledged the existence of a First Amendment interest in voting, see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 119 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1992), but we have never said that it includes the right to vote anonymously. The history of voting in the United States completely undermines that claim.
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Segment in Paragraph: 76 - N59* On the other side of the ledger, I view the burden of public disclosure on speech and associational rights as minimal in this context. As this Court has observed with respect to campaign-finance regulations, N60* "disclosure [***514] requirements . . . 'do not prevent anyone from speaking.' Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 366, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 799 When it comes to initiatives and referenda, the impact of public disclosure on expressive interests is even more attenuated. While campaign-finance disclosure injects the government into what would otherwise have been private political activity, the process of legislating by referendum is inherently public. To qualify a referendum for the ballot, citizens are required to sign a petition and supply identifying information to the State. The act of signing typically occurs in public, and the circulators who collect and submit signatures ordinarily owe signers no guarantee of confidentiality. For persons with the "civic courage" to participate in this process, [**2829] post, at ___, 177 L. Ed. 2d, at 522 (opinion of Scalia, J.), the State's decision to make accessible what they voluntarily place in the public sphere should not deter them from engaging in the expressive act of petition signing. Disclosure of the identity of petition signers, moreover, in no way directly impairs the ability of anyone to speak and associate for political ends either publicly or privately.
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Parties: CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, aka HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, Petitioner v. LEO P. MARTINEZ et al.
Date: 2010-06-28
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Segment in Paragraph: 173 - It is now well established that the First Amendment shields the right of a group to engage in expressive association by limiting membership to persons whose admission does not significantly interfere with the group's ability to convey its views.
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Segment in Paragraph: 176 - As our cases have recognized, the right of expressive association permits It bears emphasis that permitting religious groups to limit membership to those who share the groups' beliefs would not have the effect of allowing other groups to discriminate on the basis of religion. It would not mean, for example, that fraternities or sororities could exclude students on that basis. a group to exclude an applicant for membership only if the admission of that person would "affec[t] in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - In accord with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we reject CLS's First Amendment challenge. Compliance with Hastings' all-comers policy, we conclude, is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum. In requiring CLS--in common with all other student organizations--to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations. CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings' policy. The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.
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Segment in Paragraph: 38 - As just noted, speech and expressive-association rights are closely linked. See Roberts, 468 U.S., at 622, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (Associational freedom is N140* "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment."). When these intertwined rights arise in exactly the same context, it would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review under our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive association.
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Segment in Paragraph: 150 - In fact, funding plays a very small role in this case. Most of what CLS sought and was denied--such as permission to set up a table on the law school patio--would have been virtually cost free. If every such activity is regarded as a matter of funding, the First Amendment rights of students at public universities will be at the mercy of the administration. As CLS notes: "[T]o university students, the campus is their world. The right to meet on campus and use campus channels of communication is at least as important to university students as the right to gather on the town square and use local communication forums is to the citizen."
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Segment in Paragraph: 170 - The First Amendment [***883] protects the right of N141* "'expressive association' "--that is, the "right to associate for the purpose of speaking." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 164 L. Ed. 2d 156 (2006) (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2000)). And the Court has recognized that N142* "[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."
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Segment in Paragraph: 173 - N61* ("[T]he First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities")
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Parties: OTIS McDONALD, et al., Petitioners v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, et al.
Date: 2010-06-28
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Parties: ALBERT SNYDER, Petitioner v. FRED W. PHELPS, SR., et al.
Date: 2011-03-02
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Segment in Paragraph: 92 - If the First Amendment permits the States to protect their residents from the harm inflicted by such attacks--and the Court does not hold otherwise--then the location of the tort should not be dispositive. A physical assault may occur without trespassing; it is no defense that the perpetrator had "the right to be where [he was]." See ante, at ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 184. And the same should be true with respect to unprotected speech. Neither classic "fighting words" nor defamatory statements are immunized when they occur in a public place, and there is no good reason to treat a verbal assault based on the conduct or character of a private figure like Matthew Snyder any differently.
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - Given that Westboro's [HN9] speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to "special protection" under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989). Indeed, "the point of all speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful." Hurley v. Irish-American [***185] Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995).
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Segment in Paragraph: 19 - That is because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest: N127* "[T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas"; and the "threat of liability" does not pose the risk of "a reaction of self-censorship" on matters of public [**1216] import.
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Segment in Paragraph: 90 - But in any event, I fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected. The First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public concern, and there is no good reason why respondents' attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be treated differently.
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Segment in Paragraph: 34 - N286* "in public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate N287* 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1988) (some internal quotation marks omitted). What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to "special protection" under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.
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Parties: NEVADA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, Petitioner v. MICHAEL A. CARRIGAN
Date: 2011-06-13
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Segment in Paragraph: 43 - And the Court has made it clear that N224* "the right of citizens N225* to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views" is among the First Amendment's most pressing concerns.
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Segment in Paragraph: 35 - For the reasons the Court explains, the act of casting an official vote is not itself protected by the Speech Clause of the First Amendment
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Parties: BOROUGH OF DURYEA, PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Petitioners v. CHARLES J. GUARNIERI
Date: 2011-06-20
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Segment in Paragraph: 58 - There is abundant historical evidence that "Petitions" were directed to the executive and legislative branches of government, not to the courts. In 1765, the Stamp Act Congress stated N226* [t]hat it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies to petition the King or either House of Parliament." Declaration of Rights and Grievances, Art. 13, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 195, 198 (1971); it made no mention of petitions directed to the courts. As of 1781, seven state constitutions protected citizens' right to apply or petition for redress of grievances; all seven referred only to legislative petitions. See Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 Ohio St. L. J. 557, 604-605, n. 159 (1999).
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Segment in Paragraph: 30 - In analogous cases under the Speech Clause, this Court has noted the N227* Constitution's special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs," Connick, supra, at 145, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708, even though it is likely that, in this and any other age, most speech concerns purely private matters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 32 - The right to petition traces its origins to Magna Carta, which confirmed the right of barons to petition the King. W. McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John 467 (rev. 2d ed. 1958). The Magna Carta itself was King John's answer to a petition from the barons.
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Segment in Paragraph: 17 - Both speech and petition are integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance.
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Parties: WILLIAM H. SORRELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VERMONT, et al., Petitioners v. IMS HEALTH INC. et al.
Date: 2011-06-23
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Segment in Paragraph: 33 - report is "speech"). Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendmentpurposes.
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Phrase match: report is "speech"). Facts, after all
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing, however, is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
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Segment in Paragraph: 57 - When it enacted § 4631(d), the Vermont Legislature found that the N126* "marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in expensive pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors." 2007 Vt. Laws No. 80, § 1(4). N127* "The goals of marketing programs," the legislature said, "are often in conflict with the goals of the state." § 1(3). The text of § 4631(d), associated legislative findings, and the record developed in the District Court establish that Vermont enacted its law for this end. The State has burdened a form of protected expression that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State has left unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views. This the State cannot do.
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Parties: ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB'S FREEDOM CLUB PAC, et al., Petitioners (No. 10-238) v. KEN BENNETT, in his official capacity as ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, et al., JOHN McCOMISH, et al., Petitioners (No. 10-239) v. KEN BENNETT, in his official capacity as ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, et al.
Date: 2011-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 102 - In case after case, year upon year, we have distinguished between speech restrictions and speech subsidies. N128* " 'There is a basic difference,' " we have held, " 'between direct state interference with [First Amendment] protected activity and state encouragement' " of other expression.
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Segment in Paragraph: 78 - But the whole point of the First Amendment is to protect speakers against unjustified government restrictions on speech, even when those restrictions reflect the will of the majority. When it comes to protected speech, the speaker is sovereign.
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Parties: EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Petitioners v. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION et al.
Date: 2011-06-27
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Segment in Paragraph: 7 - And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, "the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary" when a new and different medium for communication appears.
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Segment in Paragraph: 12 - That is of course the same expansive view of governmental power to abridge the freedom of speech based on interest balancing that we rejected in Stevens. [***LEdHR6] [6] Our opinion in Winters, which concluded that the New York statute failed a heightened vagueness standard applicable to restrictions upon speech entitled to First Amendment protection, 333 U.S., at 517-519, 68 S. Ct. 665, 92 L. Ed. 840, made clear that violence is not part of the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - The practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that "the freedom of speech," as originally understood, does not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through the minors' parents or guardians. I would hold that the law at issue is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Phrase match: the freedom of speech," as originally
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Segment in Paragraph: 104 - The historical evidence shows that the founding generation believed parents had absolute authority over their minor children and expected parents to use that authority to direct the proper development of their children. It would be absurd to suggest that such a society understood "the freedom of speech" to include a right [***735] to speak to minors (or a corresponding right of minors to access speech) without going through the minors' parents.
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Segment in Paragraph: 142 - In light of this history, the Framers could not possibly have understood "the freedom of speech" to include an unqualified right to speak to minors.
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - But I do not think the First Amendment stretches that far. The practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that "the freedom of speech," as originally understood, does not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through the minors' parents or guardians.
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Segment in Paragraph: 148 - But this Court has never held, until today, that "the freedom of speech" includes a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through the minors' parents. To the contrary, "[i]t is well settled that a State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to adults."
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Segment in Paragraph: 100 - The practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that "the freedom of speech," as originally understood, does not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through the minors' parents or guardians.
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - Because speech about violence is [***717] not obscene, it is of no consequence that California's statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity for minors that we upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88
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Segment in Paragraph: 13 - N129* We held that the legislature could N130* "adjus[t] the definition of obscenity N131* 'to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests . . .' of . . . minors." Id., at 638, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509, 86 S. Ct. 958, 16 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966)). And because "obscenity is not protected expression," the New York statute could be sustained so long as the legislature's judgment that the proscribed materials were harmful to children "was not irrational."
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Parties: Locks v. Commanding General, [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Date: 1968-10-12
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Parties: United States v. Cruikshank
Date: 1875-10-00
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Parties: Ex parte Jackson
Date: 1877-10-00
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Segment in Paragraph: 2 - Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation of printed matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of the press. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value. If, therefore, printed matter be excluded from the mails, its transportation in any other way cannot be forbidden by Congress.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press. Liberty
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - In 1836, the question as to the power of Congress to exclude publications from the mail was discussed in the Senate; and the prevailing opinion of its members, as expressed in debate, was against the existence of the power. President Jackson, in his annual message of the previous year, had referred to the attempted circulation through the mail of inflammatory appeals, addressed to the passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various publications, tending to stimulate them to insurrection; and suggested to Congress the propriety of passing a law prohibiting, under severe penalties, such circulation of 'incendiary publications' in the Southern States. In the Senate, that portion of the message was referred to a select committee, of which Mr. Calhoun was chairman; and he made an elaborate report on the subject, in which he contended that it belonged to the States, and not to Congress, to determine what is and what is not calculated to disturb their security, and that to hold otherwise would be fatal to the States; for if Congress might determine what papers were incendiary, and as such prohibit their circulation through the mail, it might also determine what were not incendiary, and enforce their circulation. Whilst, therefore, condemning in the strongest terms the circulation of the publications, he insisted that Congress had not the power to pass a law prohibiting their transmission through the mail, on the ground that it would abridge the liberty of the press. 'To understand,' he said, 'more fully the extent of the control which the right of prohibiting circulation through the mail would give to the government over the press, it must be borne in mind that the power of Congress over the post-office and the mail is an exclusive power. It must also be remembered that Congress, in the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable water to be a post-road; and that, by the act of 1825, it is provided 'that no stage, or other vehicle which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a road parallel to it, shall carry letters.' The same provision extends to packets, boats, or other vessels on navigable waters.
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - N57* Like provision may be extended to newspapers and pamphlets, which, if it be admitted that Congress has the right to discriminate in reference to their character, what papers shall or what shall not be transmitted by the mail, would subject the freedom of the press, on all subjects, political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and pleasure. It wou d in fact, in some respects, more effectually control the freedom of the press than any sedition law, however severe its penalties.' Mr. Calhoun, at the same time, contended that when a State had pronounced certain publications to be dangerous to its peace, and prohibited their circulation, it was the duty of Congress to respect its laws and co-operate in their enforcement; and whilst, therefore, Congress could not prohibit the transmission of the incendiary documents through the mails, it could prevent their delivery by the postmasters in the States where their circulation was forbidden. In the discussion upon the bill reported by him, similar views against the power of Congress were expressed by other senators, who did not concur in the opinion that the delivery of papers could be prevented when their transmission was permitted.
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Phrase match: the freedom of the press, on
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Segment in Paragraph: 4 - But it is evident that they were founded upon the assumption that it was competent for Congress to prohibit the transportation of newspapers and pamphlets over postal-routes in any other way than by mail; and of course it would follow, that if, with such a prohibition, the transportation in the mail could also be forbidden, the circulation of the documents would be destroyed, and a fatal blow given to the freedom of the press. But we do not think that Congress possesses the power to prevent the transportation in other ways, as merchandise, of matter which it excludes from the mails. To give efficiency to its regulations and prevent rival postal systems, it may perhaps prohibit the carriage by others for hire, over postal routes, of articles which legitimately constitute mail matter, in the sense in which those terms were used when the Constitution was adopted, consisting of letters, and of newspapers and pamphlets, when not sent as merchandise; but further than this its power of prohibition cannot extend.
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Segment in Paragraph: 6 - In excluding various articles from the mail, the object of Congress has not been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the people; but to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals. Thus, by the act of March 3, 1873, Congress declared 'that no obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print, or other publication of an indecent character, or any article or thing designed or intended for the prevention of conception or procuring of abortion, nor any article or thing intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use or nature, nor any written or printed card, circular, book, pamphle , advertisement, or notice of any kind, giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or of whom, or by what means, either of the things before mentioned may be obtained or made, nor any letter upon the envelope of which, or postal-card upon which indecent or scurrilous epithets may be written or printed, shall be carried in the mail; and any person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mailing or delivery, any of the hereinbefore mentioned articles or things, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall, for every offence, be fined not less than $100, nor more than $5,000, or imprisonment at hard labor not less than one year nor more than ten years, or both, in the discretion of the judge.'
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Segment in Paragraph: 3 - N61* In 1836, the question as to the power of Congress to exclude publications from the mail was discussed in the Senate; and the prevailing opinion of its members, as expressed in debate, was against the existence of the power. President Jackson, in his annual message of the previous year, had referred to the attempted circulation through the mail of inflammatory appeals, addressed to the passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various publications, tending to stimulate them to insurrection; and suggested to Congress the propriety of passing a law prohibiting, under severe penalties, such circulation of 'incendiary publications' in the Southern States. In the Senate, that portion of the message was referred to a select committee, of which Mr. Calhoun was chairman; and he made an elaborate report on the subject, in which he contended that it belonged to the States, and not to Congress, to determine what is and what is not calculated to disturb their security, and that to hold otherwise would be fatal to the States; for if Congress might determine what papers were incendiary, and as such prohibit their circulation through the mail, it might also determine what were not incendiary, and enforce their circulation. Whilst, therefore, condemning in the strongest terms the circulation of the publications, he insisted that Congress had not the power to pass a law prohibiting their transmission through the mail, on the ground that it would abridge the liberty of the press. 'To understand,' he said, 'more fully the extent of the control which the right of prohibiting circulation through the mail would give to the government over the press, it must be borne in mind that the power of Congress over the post-office and the mail is an exclusive power. It must also be remembered that Congress, in the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable water to be a post-road; and that, by the act of 1825, it is provided 'that no stage, or other vehicle which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a road parallel to it, shall carry letters.' The same provision extends to packets, boats, or other vessels on navigable waters. Like provision may be extended to newspapers and pamphlets, which, if it be admitted that Congress has the right to discriminate in reference to their character, what papers shall or what shall not be transmitted by the mail, would subject the freedom of the press, on all subjects, political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and pleasure. It wou d in fact, in some respects, more effectually control the freedom of the press than any sedition law, however severe its penalties.' Mr. Calhoun, at the same time, contended that when a State had pronounced certain publications to be dangerous to its peace, and prohibited their circulation, it was the duty of Congress to respect its laws and co-operate in their enforcement; and whilst, therefore, Congress could not prohibit the transmission of the incendiary documents through the mails, it could prevent their delivery by the postmasters in the States where their circulation was forbidden. In the discussion upon the bill reported by him, similar views against the power of Congress were expressed by other senators, who did not concur in the opinion that the delivery of papers could be prevented when their transmission was permitted.
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