Parties: Garner v. Louisiana
Date: 1961-12-11
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Paragraph: 107 - But when a State seeks to subject to criminal sanctions conduct which, except for a demonstrated paramount state interest, would be within the range of freedom of expression as assured by the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot do so by means of a general and all-inclusive breach of the peace prohibition. It must bring the activity sought to be proscribed within the ambit of a statute or clause 'narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S., at 311, 60 S.Ct., at 906; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745. And of course that interest must be a legitimate one. A State may not 'suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.'
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Paragraph: 105 - Such a demonstration, in the circumstances of these two cases, is as much a part of theN121* 'free trade in ideas,' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (Holmes, J., dissenting), as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as 'speech.' It, like speech, appeals to good sense and to N122* 'the power of reason as applied through public discussion,' Whitney v. People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (Brandeis, J., concurring), just as much as, if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This Court has never limited the right to speak, a protected 'liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment, Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 629, 69 L.Ed. 1138, to mere verbal expression. Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633—634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Stromberg v. California, supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections.
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Paragraph: 105 - This Court has never limited the right to speak, a protected 'liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment, Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 629, 69 L.Ed. 1138, to mere verbal expression. Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633—634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Stromberg v. California, supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections. This is not to say, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches to demonstrations conducted on private property over the objection of the owner (as in Briscoe), just as it would surely not encompass verbal expression in a private home if the owner has not consented.
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Paragraph: 113 - In the absence of any Louisiana statute purporting to express the State's overriding interest in prohibiting petitioners' conduct as a clear and present danger to the welfare of the community, peaceful demonstration on public streets, and on private property with the consent of the owner, was constitutionally protected as a form of expression.
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Paragraph: 105 - If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Stromberg v. California, supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections. This is not to say, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches to demonstrations conducted on private property over the objection of the owner (as in Briscoe), just as it would surely not encompass verbal expression in a private home if the owner has not consented.
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Paragraph: 113 - In the absence of any Louisiana statute purporting to express the State's overriding interest in prohibiting petitioners' conduct as a clear and present danger to the welfare of the community, peaceful demonstration on public streets, and on private property with the consent of the owner, was constitutionally protected as a form of expression. Louisiana's breach of the peace statute drew no distinct line between presumably constitutionally protected activity and the conduct of the petitioners in Briscoe, as a criminal trespass statute might have done. The fact that in Briscoe, unlike Garner and Hoston, the management did not consent to the petitioners' remaining at the 'white' lunch counter does not serve to permit the application of this general breach of the peace statute to the conduct shown in that case. For the statute by its terms appears to be as applicable to 'incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech,' Winters v. People of State of New York, supra, 333 U.S., at 509, 68 S.Ct., at 667, as to that which is not within the range of such protection. Hence such a law gives no warning as to what may fairly be deemed to be within its compass.
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