Parties: United States v. Reidel
Date: 1971-05-03
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Paragraph: 8 - The focus of this language was on freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy of one's home. It does not require that we fashion or recognize a constitutional right in people like Reidel to distribute or sell obscene materials. The personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read obscenity in their homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on whether the materials are obscene or whether obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights to have and view that material in private are independently saved by the Constitution.
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Paragraph: 22 - Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such. In other words, the N81* 'right to receive' recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of infringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.
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Paragraph: 22 - The analogous constitutionally protected interest in the Stanley situation which restricts governmental efforts to proscribe obscenity is the First Amendment right of the individual to be free from governmental programs of thought control, however such programs might be justified in terms of permissible state objectives. For me, at least, Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such. In other words, the N85* 'right to receive' N86* recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of infringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.
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Paragraph: 7 - Whatever the scope of the N96* 'right to receive' referred to in Stanley, it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here—dealings that Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment.
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Paragraph: 8 - The right Stanley asserted was 'the right to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.' 394 U.S., at 565, 89 S.Ct., at 1248. The Court's response was that N97* 'a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the though of giving government the power to control men's minds.' Ibid. The focus of this language was on freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy of one's home. It does not require that we fashion or recognize a constitutional right in people like Reidel to distribute or sell obscene materials.
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Paragraph: 9 - Reidel is in a wholly different position. He has no complaints about governmental violations of his private thoughts or fantasies, but stands squarely on a claimed First Amendment right to do business in obscenity and use the mails in the process. But Roth has squarely placed obscenity and its distribution outside the reach of the First Amendment and they remain there today. Stanley did not overrule Roth and we decline to do so now.
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Paragraph: 16 - I join the opinion of the Court which, as I understand it, holds that the Federal Government may prohibit the use of the mails for commercial distribution of materials properly classifiable as obscene. The Court today correctly rejects the contention that the recognition in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), that private possession of obscene materials is constitutionally privileged under the First Amendment carries with it a N98* 'right to receive' such materials through any modes of distribution as long as adequate precautions are taken to prevent the dissemination to unconsenting adults and children. Appellee here contends, in effect, that the Stanley 'right to receive' language, 394 U.S., at 564—565, 89 S.Ct., at 1247—1248, constituted recognition that obscenity was constitutionally protected for its content. Governmental efforts to proscribe obscenity as such would, on this interpretation, not be constitutional; rather, the power of both the State and Federal Governments would now be restricted to the regulation of the constitutionally protected right to engage in this category of 'speech' in light of otherwise permissible state interests, such as the protection of privacy or the protection of children.
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Paragraph: 22 - > For me, at least, Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such. In other words, the N99* 'right to receive' recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of infringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.
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Paragraph: 16 - I join the opinion of the Court which, as I understand it, holds that the Federal Government may prohibit the use of the mails for commercial distribution of materials properly classifiable as obscene. The Court today correctly rejects the contention that the recognition in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), that private possession of obscene materials is constitutionally privileged under the First Amendment carries with it a 'right to receive' such materials through any modes of distribution as long as adequate precautions are taken to prevent the dissemination to unconsenting adults and children. Appellee here contends, in effect, that the Stanley 'right to receive' language, 394 U.S., at 564—565, 89 S.Ct., at 1247—1248, constituted recognition that obscenity was constitutionally protected for its content. Governmental efforts to proscribe obscenity as such would, on this interpretation, not be constitutional; rather, the power of both the State and Federal Governments would now be restricted to the regulation of the constitutionally protected right to engage in this category of 'speech in light of otherwise permissible state interests, such as the protection of privacy or the protection of children.
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Paragraph: 17 - That interpretation of Stanley, however, is flatly inconsistent with the square holding of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957): N70* 'We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.'
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Paragraph: 21 - In view of Stanley's explicit reaffirmance of Roth, I do not read the former case as limiting governmental power to deal with obscenity to modes of regulation geared to public interests to be judicially assessed as legitimate or illegitimate in light of the nature of obscenity as a special category of constitutionally protected speech. Rather, I understand Stanley to rest in relevant part on the proposition that the power which Roth recognized in both State and Federal Governments to proscribe obscenity as constitutionally unprotected cannot be exercised to the exclusion of other constitutionally protected interests of the individual. That treatment of Stanley is consistent with the Court's approach to the problem of prior restraints in the obscenity area; if government chooses a system of prior restraints as an aid to its goal of proscribing obscenity, the system must be designed to minimize impact on speech which is constitutionally protected.
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Paragraph: 4 - In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), Roth was convicted under § 1461 for mailing obscene circulars and advertising. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that N71* 'obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,' id., at 485, 77 S.Ct., at 1309, and that § 1461, N72* 'applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, do(es) not offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited.' Id., at 492, 77 S.Ct., at 1313. Roth has not been overruled. It remains the law in this Court and governs this case. Reidel, like Roth, was charged with using the mails for the distribution of obscene material. His conviction, if it occurs and the materials are found in fact to be obscene, would be no more vulnerable than was Roth's.
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