Parties: Broadrick v. Okla.
Date: 1973-06-25
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Segment Sets:
Paragraph: 39 - The mere existence of a statute that sweeps too broadly in areas protected by the First Amendment 'results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview. . . . Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression.'
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: all freedom of discussion that might
Search time: 2017-10-13 13:47:37 Searcher: ars9ef Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 14 - Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, § 818 is directed, by its terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, § 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that § 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers, supra. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that § 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-26 09:34:45 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 32 - Whatever one's view of the desirability or constitutionality of legislative efforts to restrict the political activities of government employees, one must regard today's decision upholding § 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration Act as a wholly unjus tified retreat from fundamental and previously well-established First and Fourteenth Amendment principles. For the purposes of this decision, the Court assumes—perhaps even concedes—that the statute at issue here sweeps too broadly, barring speech and conduct that are constitutionally protected even under the standards announced in United Public Workers v. Mitchell
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 40 - Although the Court declines to hold the Oklahoma Act unconstitutional on its face, it does expressly recognize that overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing a 'chilling effect' on protected expression. Nevertheless, the Court reasons that the function of the doctrine 'attenuates as the otherwiseunprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws the reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.' Ante, at 615. Where conduct is involved, a statute's overbreadth must henceforth be 'substantial' before the statute can properly be found invalid on its face.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 13 - But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk