Parties: Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart
Date: 1976-06-30
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Paragraph: 99 - N82* (I)t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the (First Amendment's) guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S., at 713, 51 S.Ct., at 630. See also, e. g., id., at 716-717, 51 S.Ct., at 631; Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249, 56 S.Ct. 444, 448, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). Prior restraints are N83* "the essence of censorship," Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, 283 U.S., at 713, 51 S.Ct., at 630, and N84* "(o)ur distaste for censorship reflecting the natural distaste of a free people is deep-written in our law." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1244, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975).
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Phrase match: the essence of censorship," Near v. Minnesota
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Paragraph: 100 - N85* A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a criminal process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship shows." T. Emerson,
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Phrase match: history of all censorship shows." T. Emerson
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Paragraph: 101 - Respondents correctly contend that "the (First Amendment) protection even as to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited." Near v. Minnesota, supra, 283 U.S., at 716, 51 S.Ct., at 631. However, the exceptions to the rule have been confined to "exceptional cases." Ibid. The Court in Near, the first case in which we were faced with a prior restraint against the press, delimited three such possible exceptional circumstances. The first two exceptions were that N96* "the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications," and that "(t)he security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government (for) (t)he constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that have all the effect of force. . . .' " Ibid. These exceptions have since come to be interpreted as situations in which the "speech" involved is not encompassed within the meaning of the First Amendment. See, E. g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1306, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n. *, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2147, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id., at 731 n. 1, 91 S.Ct., at 2153 (White, J., concurring). And even in these situations, adequate and timely procedures are mandated to protect against any restraint of speech that does come within the ambit of the First Amendment. See, E. g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957). Thus, only the third category in Near contemplated the possibility that speech meriting and entitled to constitutional protection might nevertheless be suppressed before publication in the interest of some overriding countervailing interest
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