Parties: Wooley v. Maynard
Date: 1977-04-20
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Paragraph: 18 - The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of "individual freedom of mind." Id., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185.
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Paragraph: 19 - Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably N143* 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate,'
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Paragraph: 21 - The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.
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Paragraph: 18 - We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182-1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); id., at 645, 63 S.Ct., at 1188 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of N242* "individual freedom of mind."
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Paragraph: 33 - The District Court found for appellees on the ground that the obscuring of the motto N1* was protected "symbolic speech." This Court, in relying upon a ground expressly avoided by the District Court, appears to disagree with the ground adopted by the District Court; indeed it points out that appellees' claim of symbolic expression has been "substantially undermined" by their very complaint in this action.
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Phrase match: motto meaning the state motto on a license plate was protected "symbolic speech." This Court, in relying upon
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Paragraph: 34 - N2* I not only agree with the Court's implicit recognition that there is no protected "symbolic speech" in this case, but I think that that conclusion goes far to undermine the Court's ultimate holding that there is an element of protected expression here. The State has not forced appellees to "say" anything; and it has not forced them to communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to "speech," such as wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a symbolic gesture. The State has simply required that all noncommercial automobiles bear license tags with the state motto, "Live Free or Die." Appellees have not been forced to affirm or reject that motto; they are simply required by the State, under its police power, to carry a state auto license tag for identification and registration purposes.
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Phrase match: is no protected "symbolic speech" in this case, but I
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Paragraph: 33 - The Court holds that a State is barred by the Federal Constitution from requiring that the state motto be displayed on a state license plate. The path that the Court travels to reach this result demonstrates the difficulty in supporting it. The Court holds that the required display of the motto is an unconstitutional "required affirmation of belief." The District Court, however, expressly refused to consider this contention, and noted that, in an analogous case, a decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had reached precisely the opposite result. See State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972). The District Court found for appellees on the ground that the obscuring of the motto was protected "symbolic speech."
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Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 15 - N98* The District Court held that by covering up the state motto "Live Free or Die" on his automobile license plate, Mr. Maynard was engaging in symbolic speech and that "New Hampshire's interest in the enforcement of its defacement statute is not sufficient to justify the restriction on (appellee's) constitutionally protected expression." 406 F.Supp., at 1389. We find it unnecessary to pass on the "symbolic speech" issue, since we find more appropriate First Amendment grounds to affirm the judgment of the District Court. We turn instead to what in our view is the essence of appellees' objection to the requirement that they display the motto "Live Free or Die" on their automobile license plates.
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