Free Speech

Paragraph: 29 - The Court's second theory is that, in any event, the Illinois statute is sufficiently specific to satisfy Miller. Although the statute does not contain an "exhaustive list" of specific examples, ante, at 776, it passes muster because it contains a generic reference to "the kinds of sexual conduct which may not be represented or depicted under the obscenity laws . . .," ibid. (emphasis in original). To hold that the list need not be exhaustive is to hold that a person can be prosecuted although the materials he sells are not specifically described in the list. Only five years ago, the Court promised that "no one" could be so prosecuted, Miller, 413 U.S., at 27, 93 S.Ct., at 2616. And if the statute need only describe the "kinds" of proscribed sexual conduct, it adds no protection to what the Constitution itself creates. For in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642, this Court held that the Constitution protected all expression which is not N32* "within either of the two examples given in Miller" or "sufficiently similar to such material to justify similar treatment."

Notes:

• N32* / quote / endorsement / Q0455 /

Preferred Terms:

• (reg) obscenity

Phrase match:

Source: http://freespeech.iath.virginia.edu/exist-speech/cocoon/freespeech/FOS_newSTerms_One?doc=/db/fos_all/federal/SC/1970s/19770609.431.US.767.xml&keyword1= expression protected expression&wordsBefore=&wordsAfter=#m1

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