Free Speech

Case - 466 U.S. 789

Parties: Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent

Date: 1984-05-15

Identifiers:

Opinions:

Segment Sets:

Paragraph: 21 - The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the City. The application of the ordinance to appellees' expressive activities surely raises the question whether the ordinance abridges their "freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and appellees certainly have standing to challenge the application of the ordinance to their own expressive activities.

Notes:

Preferred Terms:

  • (reg) restrictions for significant and legitimate state interests

Phrase match: their "freedom of speech" within the

Source: http://freespeech.iath.virginia.edu/exist-speech/cocoon/freespeech/FOS_newSTerms_One?doc=/db/fos_all/federal/SC/1980s/19840515.466.US.789.xml&keyword1=freedom of&wordsBefore=1&wordsAfter=3#m1

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Paragraph: 36 - While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S., at 647, 101 S.Ct., at 2563-2564, a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S., at 654-655, 101 S.Ct., at 2567-2568; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at 535, 100 S.Ct., at 2332; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1618, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. To the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, see, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538-539, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960), there is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. Notwithstanding appellees' general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that appellees' ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.

Notes:

Preferred Terms:

  • (is not) entitelement to all methods of communication
  • (is not) posting signs on public property

Phrase match: the right to employ every conceivable

Source: http://freespeech.iath.virginia.edu/exist-speech/cocoon/freespeech/FOS_newSTerms_One?doc=/db/fos_all/federal/SC/1980s/19840515.466.US.789.xml&keyword1=right to&wordsBefore=1&wordsAfter=3#m1

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Paragraph: 43 - Finally, Taxpayers and COGS argue that Los Angeles could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity such as theirs, by permitting the posting of any kind of sign at any time on some types of public property, or by making a variety of other more specific exceptions to the ordinance: for signs carrying certain types of messages (such as political campaign signs), for signs posted during specific time periods (perhaps during political campaigns), for particular locations (perhaps for areas already cluttered by an excessive number of signs on adjacent private property), or for signs meeting design specifications (such as size or color). Plausible public policy arguments might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated, cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35, 85 S.Ct. 783, 789-790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that "Jesus Saves," that "Abortion is Murder," that every woman has the "Right to Choose," or that "Alcohol Kills," may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as "Roland Vincent—City Council."

Notes:

Preferred Terms:

  • (reg) the line between political and other forms of communication is too thin to police

Phrase match: the "Right to Choose," or that

Source: http://freespeech.iath.virginia.edu/exist-speech/cocoon/freespeech/FOS_newSTerms_One?doc=/db/fos_all/federal/SC/1980s/19840515.466.US.789.xml&keyword1=right to&wordsBefore=1&wordsAfter=3#m1

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Paragraph: 31 - the Court held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on the streets were invalid. The Court explained that cities could adequately protect the esthetic interest in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing those who actually litter.

Notes:

Preferred Terms:

  • (is) handbilling

Phrase match:

Source: http://freespeech.iath.virginia.edu/exist-speech/cocoon/freespeech/FOS_newSTerms_One?doc=/db/fos_all/federal/SC/1980s/19840515.466.US.789.xml&keyword1= expression protected expression&wordsBefore=&wordsAfter=#m1

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