Parties: United States v. Albertini
Date: 1985-06-24
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Paragraph: 21 - As this Court later observed in Greer, the decision in Flower must be viewed as an application of established First Amendment doctrine concerning expressive activity that takes place in a municipality's open streets, sidewalks, and parks. 424 U.S., at 835-836, 96 S.Ct., at 1216-1217. Flower did not adopt any novel First Amendment principles relating to military bases, but instead concluded that the area in question was appropriately considered a public street. There is N179* "no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets," id., at 838, 96 S.Ct., at 1217, on military bases, even if they are generally open to the public.
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Phrase match: constitutional right to make political speeches
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Paragraph: 22 - The Court determined that New Braunfels Avenue was a public thoroughfare no different than other streets in the city, and that the military had abandoned not only the right to exclude civilian traffic from the avenue, but also any right to exclude leafleteers. Greer v. Spock, supra, 424 U.S., at 835, 96 S.Ct., at 1216. The defendant in Flower received a bar letter because he participated in an attempt to distribute unauthorized publications on the open military base. 407 U.S., at 197, 92 S.Ct., at 1843; United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80, 82, 87 (CA5 1971). This was the very activity that Flower held protected by the First Amendment.
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Phrase match: the right to exclude civilian traffic
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Paragraph: 23 - N180* Flower cannot plausibly be read to hold that regardless of the events leading to issuance of a bar letter, a person may not subsequently be excluded from a military facility that is temporarily open to the public. Instead, Flower establishes that where a portion of a military base constitutes a public forum because the military has abandoned any right to exclude civilian traffic and any claim of special interest in regulating expression, see Greer v. Spock, supra, 424 U.S., at 836-838, 96 S.Ct., at 1216-1218, a person may not be excluded from that area on the basis of activity that is itself protected by the First Amendment. Properly construed, Flower is simply inapplicable to this case. There is no suggestion that respondent's acts of vandalism in 1972, which resulted in the issuance of the bar letter, were activities protected by the First Amendment. The observation made by the Court of Appeals, 710 F.2d, at 1417, that enforcement of the bar letter was precipitated by respondent's "peaceful expressive activity" misses the point. Respondent was prosecuted not for demonstrating at the open house, but for reentering the base after he had been ordered not to do so.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: any right to exclude civilian traffic
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