Parties: Waters v. Churchill
Date: 1994-05-31
Identifiers:
Opinions:
Segment Sets:
Paragraph: 40 - "Our 'profound national commitment' to the freedom of speech," post, at 699 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), must of necessity operate differently when the government acts as employer rather than sovereign.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the freedom of speech," post, at
Search time: 2017-10-13 13:47:37 Searcher: ars9ef Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 53 - I do not doubt that the First Amendment contains within it some procedural prescriptions -- that in some circumstances, "the freedom of speech" recognized by the Constitution consisted of a right to speak unless and until certain procedures to prevent the speech had first been complied with.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: a right to speak unless and
Search time: 2018-01-12 14:48:12 Searcher: ars9ef Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 67 - N285* Every American has the right to express an opinion on issues of public significance. In the private sector, of course, the exercise of that right may entail unpleasant consequences. Absent some contractual or statutory provision limiting its prerogatives, a private-sector employer may discipline or fire employees for speaking their minds. The First Amendment, however, demands that the government respect its employees' freedom to express their opinions on issues of public importance.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: the right to express an opinion
Search time: 2018-01-12 14:48:12 Searcher: ars9ef Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 23 - Government employee speech must be treated differently with regard to procedural requirements as well. > For example, speech restrictions must generally precisely define the speech they target. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367-368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377, 84 S. Ct. 1316 (1964); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Yet surely a public employer may, consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being "rude to customers," a standard almost certainly too vague when [**1887] applied to the public at large.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match: Government employee speech must be treated
Search time: 2017-11-10 14:59:38 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 71 - A First Amendment claimant need not allege bad faith; the controlling question is not the regularity of the agency's investigative procedures, or the purity of its motives, [**1900] but whether the employee's freedom of speech has been "abridged."
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-02 15:38:12 Searcher: clm6u Editor: tcs9pk Segmenter: tcs9pk
Paragraph: 47 - I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's plurality opinion stating that, under the Free Speech Clause, a public employer who reasonably believes a third-party report that an employee engaged in constitutionally unprotected speech may punish the employee in reliance on that report, even if it turns out that the employee's actual remarks were constitutionally protected. I add these words to emphasize that, in order to avoid liability, the public employer must not only reasonably investigate the third-party report, but must also actually believe it.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 49 - A public employer who did not really believe that the employee engaged in disruptive or otherwise punishable speech can assert no legitimate interest strong enough to justify chilling protected expression, whether the employer affirmatively disbelieved the third-party report or merely doubted its accuracy. Imposing liability on such an employer respects the N211* "longstanding recognition that the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the administration of a government office."
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 14 - There is no dispute in this case about when speech by a government employee is protected by the First Amendment: To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the employee's interest in expressing herself on this [***695] matter must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to N212* "'the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'"
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 17 - These cases establish a basic First Amendment principle: Government action based on protected speech may under some circumstances violate the First Amendment even if the government actor honestly believes the speech is unprotected. And though JUSTICE SCALIA suggests that this principle be limited to licensing schemes and to "deprivation[s] of the freedom of speech specifically through the judicial process," post, at 687 (emphasis in original), we do not think the logic of the cases supports such a limitation. Speech can be chilled and punished by administrative action as much as by judicial processes; in no case have we asserted or even implied the contrary.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 42 - And under the Connick test, Churchill's speech as reported by Perkins-Graham and Ballew was unprotected. Even if Churchill's criticism of cross-training reported by Perkins-Graham and Ballew was speech on a matter of public concern -- something we need not decide -- the potential disruptiveness of the speech as reported was enough [***703] to outweigh whatever First Amendment value it might have had.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk
Paragraph: 68 - Given the posture in which this case comes to us, we must assume that Churchill's statements were fully protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the plurality concludes that a dismissal for speech is valid as a matter of law as long as the public employer reasonably believed that the employee's speech was protected. See ante, at 677-678. This conclusion is erroneous because it provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for less exalted rights, including contractual and statutory rights applicable in the private sector.
Notes:
Preferred Terms:
Phrase match:
Search time: 2018-04-12 08:37:53 Searcher: clm6u Editor: ars9ef tcs9pk Segmenter: ars9ef tcs9pk