Parties: Fla. Bar v. Went for It
Date: 1995-06-21
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Paragraph: 44 - That is why under the First Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence. N115* "[T]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented." Edenfield, 507 U.S., at ---- [113 S.Ct., at 1798]. By validating Florida's rule, today's majority is complicit in the Bar's censorship. For these reasons, I dissent from the opinion of the Court and from its judgment.
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Paragraph: 33 - But we do not allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener. On the contrary, we have said that these N85* "are classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment."
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Paragraph: 29 - Attorneys who communicate their willingness to assist potential clients are engaged in speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Paragraph: 33 - But we do not allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener. On the contrary, we have said that these N220* "are classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment." Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 701, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2024, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). And in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), where we struck down a ban on attorney advertising, we held that N221* "the mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising . . . offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity."
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Paragraph: 34 - We have applied this principle to direct mail cases as well as with respect to general advertising, noting that the right to use the mails is protected by the First Amendment. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2885-86, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring) (citing Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971). In Bolger, we held that a statute designed to N222* " shiel[d] recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to find offensive" furthered an interest of "little weight," noting that "we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression."
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