Parties: NEIL RANDALL, et al., Petitioners v. WILLIAM H. SORRELL et al. VERMONT REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, et al., Petitioners v. WILLIAM H. SORRELL, et al. WILLIAM H. SORRELL, et al., Petitioners v. NEIL RANDALL, et al.
Date: 2006-06-26
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Paragraph: 44 - But, unlike expenditure limits (which "necessarily reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached," id., at 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659), contribution limits "involv[e] little direct restraint on" the contributor's speech, id., at 21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. They do restrict "one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association," namely, the contributor's ability to support a favored candidate, but they nonetheless "permi[t] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution," and they do "not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues."
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Phrase match: s freedom of political association," namely
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Paragraph: 148 - We said in Buckley that "expenditure limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association than do . . . contribution limitations," 424 U.S., at 44, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, but the Buckley Court did not categorically foreclose the possibility that some spending limit might comport with the First Amendment.
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Paragraph: 109 - But contributors, too, have a right to free speech. See Colorado I 518 U.S. 604, 637, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) ("If an individual is limited in the amount of resources he can contribute to the pool, he is most certainly limited in his ability to associate for purposes of effective advocacy"). Even Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), recognizes that contribution limits restrict the free speech of contributors, even if it understates the significance of this restriction. See id., at 20-21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (N253* "A limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate . . . entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication").
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Paragraph: 90 - As the plurality notes, our cases hold that expenditure limitations N117* "place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate."
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Paragraph: 25 - The Court explained that the basic reason for this difference between the two kinds of limitations is that expenditure limitations N118* "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than" do contribution limitations. Id., at 23, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. N119* Contribution limitations, though a "marginal restriction [***495] upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," nevertheless leave the contributor "fre[e] to discuss candidates and issues." Id., at 20-21, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. Expenditure limitations, by contrast, impose N120* "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign."
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